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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-15890
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:16-cv-80681-BB
ANTHONY E. RAMOS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN R. TOMASINO,
Clerk of Court Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Supreme Court of Florida,
RICHARD LISS,
JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR.,
BARBARA PARIENTE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
THOMAS D. HALL,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 7, 2017)
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Before MARCUS, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
Anthony Eladio Ramos, a disbarred Florida attorney proceeding pro se,
appeals the dismissal of his antitrust case alleging violations of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. Ramos brought suit against: (1) the Florida Supreme Court,
the Office of the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court (the “Office of the Clerk”), a
Florida Supreme Court justice, and the current and former Clerks of the Florida
Supreme Court (collectively the “Florida Supreme Court”); (2) the Florida Bar and
three individual employees (collectively the “Florida Bar”); and (3) the Florida
Board of Bar Examiners (the “Board of Bar Examiners”). In the complaint, Ramos
alleged that the defendants conspired to violate the Sherman Act in connection
with his Florida Bar disciplinary proceedings, which ended before he filed this case
and before he decided to become licensed to practice law in the State of New York
and the District of Columbia (“D.C.”). In order to apply to those jurisdictions in
2014, Ramos requested a certified copy of records from his Florida Bar
disciplinary proceedings from the Office of the Clerk, who responded that the
records had been destroyed “in accordance with approved destruction schedules.”
Ramos alleged that because he was “unable to certify either his identity or status”
with the Florida Bar, he had to withdraw his applications from New York and D.C.
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Ramos’s complaint included four counts, all of which were dismissed by the
district court. Counts 1 and 2 alleged Sherman Act violations by the individual
defendants and the “Institutional Defendants,” respectively, claiming they
conspired to monopolize the attorney admissions process and to deny him the
ability to practice law by destroying his records. Count 3 sought to enjoin the
Florida Supreme Court to enter an order stating that Ramos had been a member in
good standing before the court since 1981 and to remove all internet and other
references to his ineligibility to practice. Count 4 sought to enjoin the court from
disseminating any information other than the judgment requested in Count 3.
On appeal, Ramos argues, inter alia, that the district court erred in
dismissing his case based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 and on immunity
grounds. After careful review, we affirm in part and remand in part.
Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a threshold jurisdictional
matter that we review de novo. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.
2009); Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir. 1994). We also review a
district court’s application of immunity de novo. Danner Const. Co. v.
Hillsborough Cty., 608 F.3d 809, 812-13 (11th Cir. 2010). We may affirm the
judgment of the district court on any ground supported by the record, even if the
1
The doctrine is derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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district court did not rely on it. Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294,
1309 (11th Cir. 2012).
First, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing on Rooker-
Feldman grounds the counts of Ramos’s complaint that challenge the results of his
Florida Bar proceedings. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal
courts “from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.”
Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
The Supreme Court has indicated that the doctrine should be confined only to
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. (quotation omitted);
see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005). In
other words, the doctrine bars the losing party “from seeking what in substance
would be appellate review of” the state court’s judgment. Brown v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2010).
We have specifically applied Rooker-Feldman to claims against the Florida
Supreme Court for refusing to grant admission to the bar. Uberoi v. Supreme
Court of Fla., 819 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016). There, the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the Florida Supreme Court from refusing to grant her bar application, a
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request we said was clearly a challenge to a state court judicial proceeding
resulting in the denial of her application. Id.
Here, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to hear the portion of Ramos’s claims concerning his
Florida state disbarment proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court conclusively
resolved Ramos’s disbarment prior to the filing of this action, and since then, has
sanctioned Ramos for submitting numerous additional filings long after his case
was finalized. See Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners ex rel. Ramos, 17 So. 3d 268, 269,
271 (Fla. 2009) (prohibiting Ramos from making further filings without the
assistance of a licensed Florida attorney due to the volume and frivolity of
Ramos’s post-disbarment and post-petition-for-reinstatement filings); Fla. Bar v.
Ramos, 717 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 1998) (case nos. 91,562 and 91,564) (table); Fla. Bar
v. Ramos, 703 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1997) (table). In part, Counts 3 and 4 of Ramos’s
complaint sought injunctive relief requiring the appellees to certify that he has
been a bar member in good standing since 1981. This relief would nullify his state
court proceedings concluding otherwise, which ended well before Ramos filed this
lawsuit. As a result, the district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
over these counts.
However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to state judicial
decisions, not state administrative decisions. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486
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(“United States District Courts . . . have subject matter jurisdiction over general
challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in non-judicial
proceedings, which do not require review of a final state court judgment in a
particular case. They do not have jurisdiction, however, over challenges to state
court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those
challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.”); Narey, 32
F.3d at 1525-26 (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain
challenges to unreviewed state administrative agency decisions); Staley v.
Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1017-18 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a district court
lacked jurisdiction to review a county agency’s decision that had been upheld by
the state court of appeals). In Uberoi, we held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not deprive the district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over “general
challenges to state bar rules” like Uberoi’s due process claim. Uberoi, 819 F.3d at
1313 (quotation omitted).
Ramos seeks, in Counts 1 and 2, damages for the destruction of records
related to his bar proceedings, and in part of Counts 3 and 4, injunctive relief
barring the appellees from making any references or disseminating any information
suggesting that Ramos has not been a member in good standing since 1981.
Because these challenges involve state administrative rules or practices concerning
the destruction of records and the dissemination of bar status information, we
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cannot say that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman to hear
these claims. See id. Thus, these claims should not have been dismissed on
Rooker-Feldman grounds.
But even if the district court had jurisdiction over these claims, his pursuit of
those remaining claims is nonetheless barred by state action immunity. The
Sherman Act is a federal antitrust law enacted in 1890 to prohibit combinations
and conspiracies in restraint of trade (Section 1), and to regulate monopolies
(Section 2). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the
Supreme Court established a general immunity from antitrust liability for state
entities and officials acting pursuant to state law, a concept known as “Parker
immunity” or “state action immunity.” Danner, 608 F.3d at 812-13. The Supreme
Court has applied Parker immunity to state supreme courts acting in a lawmaking
capacity. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984). Hoover addressed
Parker’s application to the challenged conduct of four members of Arizona’s bar
admissions committee. Id. at 560, 571-72. Under the Arizona Constitution, the
Arizona Supreme Court had plenary authority to regulate bar admissions, and in an
exercise of that authority, it created the admissions committee to carry out certain
responsibilities. Id. at 561-62. It reserved, however, the ultimate authority to grant
or deny admission. Id.
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Hoover squarely held that Parker immunity barred the Sherman Act claims
at issue in that case. Id. at 581-82. In so holding, the Supreme Court focused on
“the incontrovertible fact that under the law of Arizona only the State Supreme
Court had authority to admit or deny admission to practice law.” Id. at 581. While
the Sherman Act claims involved the committee and its actions, they were really
claims against the state. Id. at 572-73. Notably, the Supreme Court declined to
apply the test for antitrust immunity articulated in Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), which requires the challenged
restraint to be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and
the policy to be actively supervised by the state itself, id. at 106. Hoover said
Midcal only applied when private actors sought Parker immunity for their conduct.
466 U.S. at 568-69. Where the conduct at issue is in fact that of the state, the
inquiry stops, and Midcal need not be addressed. Id.
In Hoover, the Supreme Court also rejected the argument that Parker
immunity only applies if “the sovereign acted wisely after full disclosure from its
subordinate officers.” Id. at 574. The sole requirement, instead, “is that the action
be that of ‘the State acting as a sovereign.’” Id. (quoting Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (applying Parker immunity to the disciplinary
actions of the State Bar of Arizona, under rules expressly adopted by the Arizona
Supreme Court, concerning the advertisement of legal services)).
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We’ve applied Parker immunity to the actions of the Alabama State Bar in
disciplining attorneys for violations of advertising rules. Foley v. Ala. State Bar,
648 F.2d 355, 358-59 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981). 2 There, we noted that the case
was “not appreciably distinguishable from Bates,” because the disciplinary rules of
the Alabama State Bar were effectively the rules of the Supreme Court of
Alabama. Id. at 359. Moreover, the Alabama State Bar was a component of the
judiciary and subject to the supervision of the Alabama Supreme Court. Id. Since
the challenged actions were those of the State of Alabama, Parker prohibited the
claims under the Sherman Act. Id. We also applied Parker to the claims against
the president and general counsel of the Alabama State Bar, noting that the Parker
“shield of immunity, of course, is not limited to governmental agencies alone but
extends as well to officers or agents of the State.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The Florida Supreme Court has “exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
admission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted.”
Fla. Const. art. V, § 15. The Florida Rules of Bar Admissions, which are reviewed
and promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court, provide that the “Florida Board of
Bar Examiners is an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Florida created
by the court to implement the rules relating to bar admission.” Fla. Bar Admiss. R.
2
See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982) (adopting as binding all
decisions issued by a Unit B panel of the former Fifth Circuit).
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1-12, 1-13. Thus, under Florida law, the Board is an arm of and solely answerable
to that court. In re Fla. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1977).
Similarly, the Florida Bar is “an official arm of [the Florida Supreme]
Court,” acting at all times under the supervision and control of the Court. Dade-
Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. N. Dade Bar Ass’n, 152 So. 2d 723, 726 (Fla.
1963). The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar provide that the Florida Bar is
subject to the authority, continued direction, and supervision of the Florida
Supreme Court. R. Reg. Fla. Bar. 2-3.2(a). Further, the Florida Supreme Court
has the authority “to prescribe standards of conduct for lawyers, to determine what
constitutes grounds for discipline of lawyers, to discipline for cause attorneys
admitted to practice law in Florida, and to revoke the license of every lawyer
whose unfitness to practice law has been duly established.” R. Reg. Fla. Bar. 3-
1.2. Florida rules of judicial administration specifically permit court records
related to cases “disposed of by order involving individuals licensed or regulated
by the court” to be destroyed after 10 years. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.430(c)(3)(B).
Here, the remaining counts of Ramos’s complaint are barred by Parker
immunity, which gives state entities and officials acting pursuant to state law
immunity from antitrust liability. Counts 1 and 2 expressly style themselves as
alleging violations of the Sherman Act, and claim that the defendants conspired to
monopolize the attorney admissions process and deny him the ability to practice
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law by destroying his records. Counts 3 and 4 were not expressly labeled as
Sherman Act violations, but they both repeated allegations regarding the
destruction of records, they both alleged that the defendants held a monopoly over
the records and his ability to gain admission to practice law, and they both cite the
Parker immunity doctrine, which arises only in the antitrust context. Because these
counts seek relief based on the same allegations of antitrust violations, they are all
barred by Parker.
Indeed, just as in Hoover, where the challenged actions were those of the
state supreme court, Ramos’s counts are, in effect, against the Supreme Court of
Florida. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 573. Like the Arizona constitution in Hoover, the
Florida constitution expressly grants the Florida Supreme Court the authority to
regulate bar admissions. See id. at 562; Fla. Const. art. V, § 15. Similarly, like the
bar admissions committee in Hoover, both the Florida Bar and the Board of Bar
Examiners were created by the Florida Supreme Court, and both are subject to the
direct control and supervision of that court. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 562-64; Fla. Bd.
of Bar Examiners, 353 So. 2d at 100; Dade-Commonwealth, 152 So. 2d at 726.
Because the Florida Supreme Court retains plenary authority over the actions of
the Florida Bar and the Board of Bar Examiners, it retains the ultimate power to
make admissions and disciplinary decisions. Compare with Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 776, 791-92 (1975) (declining to apply Parker immunity to
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claims against a private Virginia county bar association that was “prompted,” but
not compelled, by the Virginia Supreme Court to adopt certain fee schedules for
legal services). Parker immunity applies not only to the entity defendants, but also
to the individual defendants who were acting as officers of those agencies. Foley,
648 F.2d at 359. And because the conduct at issue was in fact that of the State of
Florida, the Midcal test does not apply in this case. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 568-69. 3
Finally, the records in Ramos’s disbarment cases were properly destroyed
pursuant to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, which specifically allow
for the destruction of records related to cases disposed without opinion after 10
years. Fla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.430(c)(3)(B). But even if the destruction of records
somehow violated that rule, Parker immunity has never required a sovereign to act
“wisely after full disclosure from its subordinate officers.” Id. Hoover specifically
indicates that the “only requirement is that the action be that of the State acting as a
sovereign,” 466 U.S. at 574 (quotation omitted), which this clearly is.
In short, the Parker immunity doctrine serves as a bar to Counts 1 and 2 and
the portions of Counts 3 and 4 seeking to enjoin the appellees from making any
references or disseminating any information suggesting that Ramos has not been a
member in good standing since 1981. The district court did not err in dismissing
3
Similarly, Ramos misapprehends Midcal in arguing that it prevents the application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Midcal was confined to Parker immunity from Sherman Act claims
and did not involve federal district court review of a state court decision. See generally Midcal,
445 U.S. 97.
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these claims for failure to state a claim. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 565-67 (holding
that state-action immunity can be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).
Moreover, the portions of Counts 3 and 4 of Ramos’s complaint seeking to enjoin
the appellees to certify that he has been a bar member in good standing since 1981
were properly dismissed on Rooker-Feldman grounds. However, a Rooker-
Feldman dismissal is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and “[a]
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits and
is entered without prejudice.” Stalley v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524
F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Boda v. United States, 698 F.2d 1174,
1177 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983) (dismissal on subject matter jurisdiction grounds “is
without prejudice”). We therefore affirm the dismissal of these portions of Counts
3 and 4, but remand with instructions that the district court reenter its dismissal as
to these portions as one without prejudice. We affirm in all other respects.4
AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.
4
Because all of Ramos’s claims were barred on Rooker-Feldman and Parker immunity
grounds, we decline to address Ramos’s additional arguments concerning Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and those arguments that do not involve the application of immunity. See Kernel
Records Oy, 694 F.3d at 1309; see also McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d
1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[A]voiding Eleventh Amendment questions where there are other
dispositive issues . . . permits courts to avoid squandering judicial resources.” (quotation
omitted)).
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