In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265
DETLEF SOMMERFIELD,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 06 C 3132 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED MAY 19, 2017 — DECIDED JULY 12, 2017
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and KANNE, Circuit
Judges.
WOOD, Chief Judge. After years of protracted litigation, a
jury awarded Chicago Police Officer Detlef Sommerfield
$30,000 in his workplace discrimination suit. For his efforts,
Sommerfield’s lawyer requested $1.5 million in attorney’s
fees, a sum the district court reduced to $430,000.
Sommerfield now appeals, challenging the district court’s
2 Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265
handling of his case and, in particular, its refusal to grant his
attorney the full $1.5 million. We affirm.
I
Sommerfield has been an officer with the Chicago Police
Department (CPD) since 1994. From 2000 to 2007 he was as‐
signed to the Eighth District, where he worked with Sergeant
Lawrence Knasiak. Sommerfield is Jewish and German,
which evidently bothered Knasiak. Throughout that time
Knasiak publicly made offensive remarks about Sommer‐
field’s ethnicity. Examples include “Jews are bloodsucking
parasites” and “Germans are like niggers, couldn’t get rid of
them then, can’t get rid of them now.” We will not belabor the
point—Knasiak’s other comments were similarly outrageous.
Sommerfield complained, and in March 2004 CPD’s
Internal Affairs Division launched an investigation of Knasiak
that culminated in his suspension in April 2007. (Knasiak
retired that June and so he never served this suspension.)
Sommerfield also filed a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found “reasonable
cause to believe that [CPD] violated Title VII by harassing
[Sommerfield] based on his national origin, German, and
religion, Jewish.” These complaints, Sommerfield believes,
led to retaliation from an amorphous group of “supervisors”
that included, but was not limited to, Knasiak. The alleged
retaliatory acts included frequent postings to undesirable
hospital duty, requirements to use his own car for police
work, refusals to give him a beat‐car assignment, and
assignments in which he had to work alone. Sommerfield was
disciplined, too: Knasiak filed an insubordination complaint
against him on March 15, 2004; other officers lodged
complaints in January 2003, December 2004, and April 2005.
Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265 3
The cumulative disciplinary actions rendered Sommerfield
ineligible for a promotion to the coveted post of dog handler.
We refer to these incidents collectively as “staffing decisions.”
Sommerfield did not take this lying down. He filed an‐
other EEOC charge alleging retaliation, and the agency once
again found reasonable cause. In June 2006, Sommerfield’s
lawyer, Joseph A. Longo, filed this lawsuit. The amended
complaint alleged (1) discrimination based on religion, (2) dis‐
crimination based on national origin, (3) retaliation, (4) viola‐
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and (5) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Sommerfield later asked the district court to sanction the City
for not informing him that the City Council passed two reso‐
lutions congratulating Knasiak on his retirement.
In September 2010 the district court pared down the
complaint considerably by granting partial summary
judgment for the City. It confined the discrimination counts (1
and 2) to the question whether Knasiak’s statements had
created a hostile work environment, and it eliminated Counts
4 and 5 altogether for lack of any evidence that would permit
a finding that Sommerfield’s injury resulted from an express
policy, a widespread practice, or a policymaker’s final action.
It restricted the retaliation claim (Count 3) to the period after
2004. It excluded the staffing decisions from Count 3 because
Sommerfield failed to point to facts establishing a jury
question. Finally, the court refused to sanction the City,
because the congratulatory resolutions were publicly
available and there was no hint of bad faith in the City’s failure
to send them to Sommerfield.
The slimmed‐down case proceeded to trial, and in January
2012 the jury found for Sommerfield on the discrimination
counts, but for the City on the retaliation count. It awarded
4 Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265
him $30,000, which prompted Longo to seek a princely
$1,496,930 in attorney’s fees for having prevailed. Longo
claimed to have worked 3,742 hours at an hourly rate of $395.
Magistrate Judge Cole reduced the hours to 2,878 and the rate
to $300, which yielded a lodestar of $863,000. At that point, he
took into account the modest degree of success Sommerfield
had achieved and halved the lodestar, for a final fee of
$430,000. The district court approved that recommendation,
and this appeal followed.
II
Sommerfield’s complaints on appeal are wide‐ranging, in‐
cluding the adverse rulings on summary judgment, the rejec‐
tion of sanctions against the City, and the substantial reduc‐
tion in the requested attorney’s fees. We address the merits
first, and then turn to the fees.
A
A plaintiff suing under Title VII “may pursue a claim not
explicitly included in an EEOC complaint only if her allega‐
tions fall within the scope of the earlier charges contained in
the EEOC complaint.” Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041, 1046
(7th Cir. 2005). To decide if additional claims meet that stand‐
ard, we ask if they are “like or reasonably related to those con‐
tained in the EEOC complaint. If they are, then we ask
whether the current claim reasonably could have developed
from the EEOC’s investigation of the charges before it.” Id.
Claims are “reasonably related” when “there is a factual rela‐
tionship between them.” Id. The EEOC charge and the com‐
plaint “must describe the same conduct and implicate the
same individuals.” Id.
Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265 5
Sommerfield’s first EEOC charge accused Knasiak of cre‐
ating a “hostile work environment” by using “offense [sic] ra‐
cial remarks about Jewish people, Germans, African‐Ameri‐
cans and Mexicans.” Sommerfield argues that his allegations
about undesirable work assignments, suspensions, and denial
of the “K‐9” job all fit under this broad language and hence
that the district court erred in excluding them. But the original
charge does no more than describe verbal abuse by Lawrence
Knasiak; it does not refer to any other people or conduct.
Moreover, many of the staffing decisions to which Sommer‐
field alludes do not appear to be Knasiak’s doing at all, but
rather are the work of an ill‐defined group of “supervisors.”
This is not enough to show that the staffing decisions “impli‐
cate the same individuals.” Ezell, 400 F.3d at 1046. In fact, it is
hard to see how the staffing decisions reflect discrimination
at all. Knasiak is the only CPD officer Sommerfield accuses of
bigotry. His core theory is that after Knasiak made offensive
remarks and Sommerfield complained, “supervisors” retali‐
ated against Sommerfield for those grievances. That describes
a case about retaliation, not discrimination. And indeed, that
is just how the district court saw it: if they were anything,
these incidents supported claims about retaliation under
Count 3, not discrimination under Counts 1 and 2.
Sommerfield’s fallback evidentiary argument is no better.
He maintains that even if the staffing decisions were not ac‐
tionable as discrimination claims, they still could be used as
evidence that Knasiak’s statements were discriminatory. We
do not see how. Sometimes pre‐charge evidence can help to
demonstrate a pattern of hostile action, but typically the same
people and the same type of harassment will be involved.
Sommerfield did not provide enough information about these
earlier slights to permit that kind of linkage. And to the extent
6 Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265
that he was trying to smuggle the staffing decisions back into
the case as an independent ground of relief, the court was en‐
titled to block such a move.
B
On to retaliation. The district court’s summary judgment
decision excluded as untimely all of the allegedly retaliatory
staffing decisions and limited Sommerfield to arguing that
Knasiak’s remarks after his 2004 complaint were retaliatory.
This ruling effectively gutted Sommerfield’s retaliation claim.
We take a fresh look at summary judgment decisions, con‐
struing facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
non‐movant. Bordelon v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago,
811 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2016). The parties are required to
put their evidentiary cards on the table, and if that evidence
shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court
is entitled to resolve the case without a trial. Summary judg‐
ment is not a time to be coy: “[c]onclusory statements not
grounded in specific facts” are not enough. Id. The non‐mo‐
vant must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the rec‐
ord.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
Sommerfield failed to meet this burden. We cannot im‐
prove on the district court’s summary of the record:
The argument is not organized in any logical
fashion. The court has attempted to review all of the
record evidence of retaliation cited by Sommerfield in
this portion of his brief. Several of the citations point to
portions of documents that were not provided to the
court; others point to evidence which does not support
Sommerfield’s contentions. In many places,
Somerfield’s only citation is “Supra.” or “Infra.” The
Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265 7
court cannot determine whether these generic
references are meant to incorporate other citations. In
any event, the court will not sift through the lengthy
record for Sommerfield’s evidence.
While Sommerfield is correct that the district court was duty‐
bound to construe the facts in his favor, he forgets that Rule 56
still requires him to identify the relevant facts. The judge
rightly declined to wade through the voluminous record to
find evidence on a counseled plaintiff’s behalf. Sommerfield
tried to salvage matters with a motion to reconsider, but that
came too late.
C
That leaves the sanctions request. In November 2007 and
February 2008 the Chicago City Council passed generic reso‐
lutions that congratulated Knasiak on his retirement. These
were publicly available. Highlights include thanking Knasiak
for his “dedication, professionalism and personal sacrifice,”
references to the American Dream, and a quote from Winston
Churchill.
Sommerfield maintains that the district court should have
sanctioned the City for not bringing these documents to his
attention. But the City had no reason to do so. Discovery is
limited to matters “relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). It is hard to see how fill‐in‐the‐name
City Council resolutions have anything to do with the case. In
any event, Sommerfield’s position rests on a glaring mischar‐
acterization of the district court’s reasoning. He paints the
City’s non‐disclosure as sanctionable and part of a long pat‐
tern of discovery misconduct. If that were true, the court’s rul‐
ing would be harder to defend. But it is not. In fact, the district
8 Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265
court found no bad faith, no prejudice, and it expressly de‐
clined to pass on discovery spats that had occurred years ear‐
lier. We see no error in that ruling, much less a reversible one.
III
In federal civil rights actions, district courts may grant the
prevailing party “a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. The award’s size is a function of three numbers: the
hours worked, the hourly rate, and any overall adjustments
up or down. The district court first calculates the “lodestar,”
which is “the hours reasonably expended multiplied by the rea‐
sonable hourly rate—and nothing else.” Johnson v. GDF, Inc.,
668 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphases added). The total
time should exclude work that was “excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The lodestar may also take into ac‐
count factors such as “the amount involved and the results
obtained,” as well as “the experience, reputation, and ability
of the attorneys.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3 (listing factors).
Once the lodestar is calculated, it may be appropriate to adjust
it further. While “a plaintiff who achieves excellent results
should receive the entire lodestar,” that sum may be “exces‐
sive” for one who “has achieved only partial or limited suc‐
cess.” Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2014) (in‐
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted). Extraordinarily
good results, by the same token, may warrant extra compen‐
sation. We give the district court the benefit of the doubt when
we review its decision on fees. Baker v. Lindgren, 856 F.3d 498,
503 (7th Cir. 2017).
Magistrate Judge Cole scrupulously followed the proper
procedure for determining attorney’s fees. Longo reported
that he had put 3,742 hours into the case. The magistrate judge
Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265 9
went through Longo’s billing records item by item, ultimately
subtracting 864 hours of time that, in the judge’s view, was
spent on unnecessary or frivolous work. That left 2,878 com‐
pensable hours. The magistrate judge also reduced Longo’s
requested hourly rate of $395 to $300. He noted that the affi‐
davits Longo submitted to prove that the $395 rate was rea‐
sonable were of dubious worth, that defense counsel billed
$275 per hour, and that Longo’s associate received just $265
an hour. Perhaps most importantly, the reduction reflected
Longo’s poor performance over the years consumed by the lit‐
igation. Multiplying Longo’s hourly rate by his compensable
hours yielded a lodestar of $863,000. The magistrate judge
then reduced that figure by 50% to reflect Longo’s limited suc‐
cess and problematic litigation conduct. That left a fee award
of $430,000. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation after a thorough review that con‐
sidered and rejected Sommerfield’s objections.
Sommerfield has carried those objections forward to this
court. He first contends that the magistrate judge wrongly
double‐counted by excluding the hours spent on unnecessary
filings when calculating the lodestar, and then halving the
lodestar number. But these represent two distinct phases of
the process. As we emphasized earlier, the lodestar is not just
a number reached by mechanically multiplying requested
hours times requested hourly rate; it requires an assessment
of reasonable hours expended and a reasonable fee. Sometimes
the court may conclude that counsel’s requests in both re‐
spects are reasonable, but other times—as occurred here—the
court may feel compelled to exclude unnecessary hours or to
reduce an unsupported rate before calculating the lodestar.
10 Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265
After finding the lodestar, the court may make further
adjustments that are appropriate for the case before it.
Sometimes, again as here, it may decide that the final fee
award should be lower than the lodestar because of a relative
lack of success. We approved a nearly identical procedure in
Montanez, 755 F.3d 547. There the district court began by
excluding “unnecessary, duplicative, or insufficiently
documented” hours from the compensable total, and then it
cut the lodestar in half to reflect the plaintiff’s limited success.
Id. at 552, 555. We saw no problem with this, and remarked
that “[a] plaintiff who achieves excellent results should
receive the entire lodestar, but where a plaintiff has achieved
only partial or limited success, the lodestar may be an
excessive amount.” Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Montanez is not an isolated example.
Recently we affirmed a fee award in which a district court
made “discretionary adjustments to the hours claimed and
also halved the lodestar to reflect [the plaintiff’s] limited
success.” Baker, 856 F.3d at 504. It was not a stretch for the
district court in our case to come to the same conclusion:
Longo spent over a decade on a case in which he lost on most
claims and netted his client $30,000. A reduction for limited
success strikes us as entirely appropriate.
Nor are we moved by Sommerfield’s argument that the
district court overemphasized the gap between the jury’s
award and his fee request. It is true that “we have rejected the
notion that the fees must be calculated proportionally to dam‐
ages.” Anderson v. AB Painting & Sandblasting Inc., 578 F.3d
542, 545 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But this is not a categorical ban on considering proportional‐
ity. The point instead is that “there is no rule requiring propor‐
tionality between damages and attorney’s fees,” but “a district
Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265 11
court may consider proportionality as one factor in determin‐
ing a reasonable fee.” Schlacher v. Law Offices of Phillip J. Rotche
& Assocs., P.C., 574 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2009) (second em‐
phasis added).
Sommerfield fares no better in arguing that Longo’s work
on the unsuccessful claims should be compensated because
they were inextricably linked to his successful claims. The as‐
sumption of such a tight link is questionable, at best. For the
most part, the discrimination claims on which Sommerfield
prevailed rest on facts that are quite distinct from the retalia‐
tion theory (i.e. verbal abuse instead of shift assignments and
suspensions). Nevertheless, even if the claims really are inter‐
woven, we have held that when it is impossible to separate
time spent on winning and losing claims, “there is nothing to
do but make an across‐the‐board reduction that seems appro‐
priate in light of the ratio between winning and losing
claims.” Richardson v. City of Chicago, Ill., 740 F.3d 1099, 1103
(7th Cir. 2014). That outcome seems especially appropriate
here, given the court’s finding that Longo’s conduct was re‐
sponsible for the mess the case became.
Sommerfield’s challenge to the court’s choice of a $300
hourly rate for Longo is equally unpersuasive. Sommerfield
complains that the court ignored six affidavits he submitted
from other lawyers, all of whom said that Longo’s $395 rate
was reasonable. But the court did not ignore them; it simply
put less weight on the affidavits than Longo would have
liked. Some of the affiants did not practice in the same area
(two affidavits do not even specify a practice area); others
were not familiar with Longo’s performance in this specific
case; and the court had an unfavorable opinion about the
12 Nos. 12‐1506 & 13‐1265
quality of his performance. Sommerfield insists that the affi‐
davits must be taken at face value because they are “undis‐
puted,” but that is a mischaracterization. The City vigorously
disputes the affidavits and supports its position with an affi‐
davit claiming that $275 is the appropriate hourly rate.
Finally, Longo attacks the district court’s decision to take
note of criticisms in past decisions of his performance. The
theory seems to be that the court’s reference to his previous
misconduct shows that the judges assigned to his case deter‐
mined his fee based on personal animus rather than the lode‐
star. Nothing supports this accusation. To the contrary, the
magistrate judge explicitly said that the ultimate fee award
would have been the same even if Longo’s previous mischief
was ignored. The district court endorsed this point in its de‐
tailed decision reviewing and approving the magistrate
judge’s recommendation. It would not have been improper in
any event for the judges to consider Longo’s “experience, rep‐
utation, and ability.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3.
IV
We find no error in the district court’s fee calculations nor
in its handling of the case as a whole, and so we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.