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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DEBORAH H. BRENGLE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JAMES K. BRENGLE
Appellant No. 2753 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered August 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 06-25964
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 14, 2017
Appellant, James Brengle (“Husband”), appeals from the order that
increased his alimony payments to his ex-wife, Appellee Deborah H. Brengle
(“Wife”). Husband raises several challenges to the trial court’s order, but we
address only one: whether the trial court erred in using a rebuttable
presumption to set Husband’s liability for alimony. We conclude that it did,
and therefore vacate and remand for the trial court to apply the appropriate
analysis.
For the purposes of this memorandum, the relevant facts of this case
are largely undisputed and may be summarized as follows. Wife and
Husband were married in 1970, and separated approximately thirty-five
years later in 2005. During the marriage, Husband was briefly in the Navy
and later pursued a career as an attorney in private practice. Wife worked
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full time until the parties’ first child was born in 1983. From 1983 to 1990,
Wife maintained a consulting business that she operated out of the home. In
1990, she became a full-time homemaker.
Wife filed a complaint in divorce in 2006. She was just shy of her 57th
birthday at the time. Husband was nearly 60, and a partner in a large law
firm. The parties’ two children were no longer minors.
The court split the parties’ marital estate equally, with each party
receiving slightly over one million dollars. Due to the vast discrepancy in
income and earning capacity between the parties, Husband was ordered to
pay indefinite alimony to Wife in the sum of $6,000 per month. This sum
was a continuation of the amount of alimony pendente lite Husband had
been paying during the five-year litigation of the divorce decree.
Since the initial determination of alimony, Husband has sought to have
the award reduced three times. His first attempt, based upon a reduction of
his income, successfully reduced the monthly amount to $3,400. His second
request, premised upon his impending forced retirement and an expected
reduction of income to approximately $75,000, was also successful, as he
reduced the monthly amount to $1,241.66 per month. His final request to
eliminate his liability for alimony, based upon his discovery that his income
after retirement would be only approximately $50,000 and that Wife had
maintained gainful employment, failed.
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Shortly after Husband’s retirement, Wife notified him that she was
once again employed and her income would be approximately $70,000 per
year. The parties subsequently stipulated that the monthly amount of
alimony would be set to $0.
Shortly thereafter, Wife’s employment was downgraded from full-time,
and she suffered a significant loss of income. As a result, she filed the
instant petition to increase the amount of monthly alimony. After a half-day
hearing, the trial court set the monthly alimony amount at $1,669.71 for 24
months. Wife filed a motion for clarification and Husband filed a motion for
reconsideration. The trial court granted the motion for clarification and
denied reconsideration. While the motions were pending, Husband filed this
timely appeal, which became ripe upon the resolution of the parties’
motions.
On appeal, Husband seeks to raise six issues for our review. However,
the first five issues are all permutations of Husband’s contention that the
trial court applied the improper standard in evaluating Wife’s petition for
modification of alimony. In his final issue, Husband seeks to have the trial
court’s order reversed due to alleged ambiguities in the order. As we
conclude that the trial court explicitly applied an incorrect standard in its
analysis, all other issues are rendered moot.
Our standard of review pertaining to an award of alimony is as follows.
The role of an appellate court in reviewing alimony orders
is limited; we review only to determine whether there has
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been an error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial
court. Absent an abuse of discretion or insufficient
evidence to sustain the support order, this Court will not
interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court.
Smith v. Smith, 904 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
An award of alimony aims to “ensure that the reasonable needs of the
person who is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate
employment, are met.” Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Alimony is a secondary remedy, to be used
when the ends of economic justice cannot be met through equitable
distribution. See id.
“Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the
lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during the
marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Pursuant to the Divorce Code, when determining the
nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of alimony, the court must
consider all relevant factors, including the seventeen factors statutorily
prescribed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b). See Smith, 904 A.2d at 20
(emphasis supplied).
Here, the trial court found that it was “reasonable that [Wife] be
provided with spousal support pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 et seq. for
the next two years.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/6/17, at 4 (emphasis supplied).
While the trial court’s analysis improperly described the award as “spousal
support,” it correctly cited to the statute for alimony. Furthermore, the
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court’s discussion of the relative earning capacities of the parties is clearly
reasonable. While Husband is “retired,” he nonetheless has income from the
law firm. Wife, on the other hand, spent two decades out of the work force
during the marriage and is now of retirement age herself.
As the record currently stands, the court’s determination that Wife is
entitled to some level of alimony is reasonable. Thus, the trial court’s
mistaken use of “support” did not impact the nature of this part of its
analysis. We can find no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that
Wife was entitled to an increase in alimony for two years. We therefore turn
to the trial court’s calculation of the increase.
In addressing the appropriate amount of alimony, the trial court begins
by properly noting several relevant circumstances, such as the lifestyle of
the parties during marriage and Wife’s earning capacity. However, the court
concludes its analysis with the following paragraph:
Pursuant to [Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1(d)] there is a rebuttable
presumption that the amount of the award determined from the
Guidelines is the correct amount of support to be awarded. The
Pennsylvania Support Guidelines Worksheet prepared by the
Montgomery County Domestic Relations Office calculated that
[Wife] was entitled to monthly support of $1,669.97. This [c]ourt
reviewed the calculations, along with the testimony of the
witnesses and the exhibits introduced and found that this was
the proper amount of support which [Wife] was entitled to
receive. No deviations from this amount were made.
Id., at 5.
Unlike the determination of whether Wife was entitled to any alimony,
this discussion reveals that the trial court applied an incorrect standard in
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calculating the amount of alimony. First, the court cited to the Rules of Civil
Procedure governing support actions, Rules 1910.1 – 1910.50. These Rules
apply, with exceptions not applicable here, to “all civil actions … brought …
to enforce a duty of support, or an obligation to pay alimony pendente lite.” 1
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1. It does not reference alimony. Similarly, Rule 1910.16-
1(b) notes that “[t]he amount of support (child support, spousal support or
alimony pendente lite) to be awarded … shall be determined in accordance
with the support guidelines[.]”
These rules explicitly target “support actions.” As such, they clearly
encompass actions for child and spousal support. In addition, they explicitly
address actions for alimony pendente lite. They do not explicitly purport to
cover traditional alimony.
In addition, the Divorce Code treats traditional alimony separately
from child support, spousal support, and alimony pendente lite. Section
3701 of the Divorce Code provides the statutory basis for the award of
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1
Alimony pendente lite is “an order for temporary support granted to a
spouse during the pendency of a divorce or annulment proceeding.”
Childress v. Bogosian, 12 A.3d 448, 463 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). In contrast, as noted, alimony is
awarded to “ensure that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable
to support himself or herself through appropriate employment, are met[,] …
and is available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of
the parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution award[.]”
Nemoto v. Nemoto, 620 A.2d 1216, 1219 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation
omitted).
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traditional alimony, while § 3702 provides the statutory basis for the award
of alimony pendente lite and spousal support.
Looking to § 3701(a), it provides that a court “may allow alimony, as it
deems reasonable, only if it finds that alimony is necessary.” Thus, § 3701
explicitly negates the application of a rebuttable presumption that the
support guidelines apply to alimony. Furthermore, § 3701(b) provides that
“in determining the … amount … of alimony, the court shall consider all
relevant factors[.]” The statute then provides a non-exclusive list of
seventeen factors, none of which explicitly reference the support guidelines.
Lastly, our courts have consistently held that the amount of alimony
awarded is to be “based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the
lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties during the
marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay.” Teodorski, 857 A.2d at 200
(internal quotation marks omitted). Neither party cites to any support in the
case law for the application of a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
applicability of the support guidelines to the determination of the amount of
alimony.
Our analysis leads us to conclude that while a court may reference the
guidelines when considering the payor’s ability to pay an amount of alimony,
there is no rebuttable presumption that the guideline amount is per se
appropriate. Rather, the court must consider all relevant factors, including
those listed in § 3701(b).
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Here, the trial court explicitly referenced the guidelines, and noted that
the amount in the guidelines was presumptively correct. See Trial Court
Opinion, 2/6/17, at 5. This was an error, and we must vacate and remand
for the trial court to apply the proper analysis.
To be clear, we are not holding that the amount the trial court
awarded was inappropriate. We have not reached that issue. Rather, we
merely hold that the trial court must consider all relevant factors, including
those listed in § 3701(b), in determining the proper amount.
The trial court is entitled to find that the support guidelines are a
relevant consideration. However, the amount set forth by the guidelines is
not presumptively correct; the court must also, for example, consider
whether the equitable distribution award to Wife was sufficient to provide for
her reasonable needs.
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/14/2017
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