J-S22026-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
A.R.Z. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
C.M.B.
Appellee No. 1887 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered October 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Civil Division at No(s): 2016-4937 CIVIL
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED JULY 17, 2017
A.R.Z. (“Mother”) appeals from the October 12, 2016 order entered in
the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas denying Mother’s petition
for a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order. We affirm.
On September 1, 2016, Mother filed a petition for a PFA order on
behalf of R.R., a minor, against C.M.B. (“Father”). That same day, the trial
court entered a temporary PFA order and scheduled a hearing for September
7, 2016. Following a series of continuances, the trial court held a hearing on
October 11, 2016. On October 12, 2016, the trial court denied Mother’s
petition. On November 14, 2016, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal. 1
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Although the order is dated October 12, 2016, notations on the order
show that the Prothonotary entered the order on the docket and mailed
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S22026-17
The well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Jessica E. Brewbaker set
forth the factual history underlying this appeal, which we adopt and
incorporate herein. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/30/16, at 1-6 (“1925(a) Op.”).
Mother raises two issues on appeal:
1. Did the [trial c]ourt err in determining there was
insufficient evidence to grant a PFA order?
2. Did the [trial c]ourt err in not granting the PFA order
considering C.[M.]B.’s inconsistent or false
statements provided to the Guardian ad Litem and in
testimony to the [trial c]ourt?
Mother’s Br. at 6 (suggested answers omitted).
Mother argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence
was insufficient to grant a PFA order. The PFA Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-22,
is intended “to protect victims of domestic violence from those who
perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance prevention of
physical and sexual abuse.” Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260,
1262 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quotation omitted). PFA petitioners have the
burden of proving the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of the
evidence. Ferko-Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917, 926-27 (Pa.Super. 2013). “The
preponderance of the evidence is defined as the greater weight of the
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
copies of the order to the parties on October 14, 2016. Because the “day of
entry [is] the day the clerk of the court or the office of government unit
mails or delivers copies of the order to the parties,” Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), the
30-day appeal period began to run on October 14, 2016. Therefore,
Mother’s appeal is timely.
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evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is the criteria or requirement for
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 927 (quotation omitted). “Our
standard of review for PFA orders is well settled. In the context of a PFA
order, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions for an error of law or
abuse of discretion.” Boykai v. Young, 83 A.3d 1043, 1045 (Pa.Super.
2014) (quotation omitted).
In both of her issues, Mother challenges the trial court’s credibility
determinations and asserts that the evidence she presented proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that R.R. was entitled to a PFA order against
Father. We disagree.
In its opinion, the trial court applied the relevant law and properly
determined that Mother failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Father abused R.R. See 1925(a) Op. at 6-11. The trial court found
that R.R.’s testimony lacked credibility, and the court carefully explained its
reasons for so finding. See id. at 7-9. In contrast, the trial court found that
Father’s testimony, as well as the testimony of Father’s witnesses, was
consistent, credible, and, in some cases, supported by photographic
evidence that contradicted R.R.’s testimony. “This Court defers to the
credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who appeared
before it[,]” Ferko-Fox, 68 A.3d at 927 (quotation omitted), which are
supported by the record. Further, the trial court considered and weighed the
evidence, including testimony, photographs, the guardian ad litem’s report,
prior PFA orders, and psychiatric reports. After reviewing the parties’ briefs,
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the record, and the relevant law, we conclude that the trial court neither
erred nor abused its discretion. We affirm based on the trial court’s
reasoning. See 1925(a) Op. at 6-11.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/17/2017
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Circulated 06/20/2017 08:51 AM