NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERRELL D. JOHNSON, No. 16-55654
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-07296-BRO-JPR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT,
official capacity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 11, 2017**
Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.
Terrell D. Johnson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal
and state law claims in connection with his arrest and conviction. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s action because success on
Johnson’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, and
Johnson failed to show that his conviction had been invalidated. See Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . the
complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”). Because the district court
did not specify whether the dismissal of Johnson’s action was with or without
prejudice, we treat the dismissal as being without prejudice. See Trimble v. City of
Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissals under Heck are without
prejudice).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Johnson’s
amended complaint without leave to amend because Johnson was provided with
one opportunity to amend and further amendment would be futile. See Cervantes
v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting
forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is
proper when amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co.,
2 16-55654
Inc., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already
granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to
amend is particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for reconsideration because Johnson failed to
demonstrate any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.
ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of
review and grounds for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).
AFFIRMED.
3 16-55654