IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA16-1217
Filed: 18 July 2017
Buncombe County, No. 16 SPC 898
IN THE MATTER OF:
STEPHEN WOLFE
Appeal by respondent from order entered 9 June 2016 by Judge Andrea Dray
in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 3 May 2017.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Andrew L.
Hayes, for petitioner-appellee.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Amanda S.
Zimmer, for respondent-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Respondent Stephen Wolfe, an adult incompetent, appeals from an order
concurring in his voluntary admission to a twenty-four hour (inpatient) psychiatric
facility and ordering he remain admitted for further inpatient treatment. Wolfe
contends the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter its order because
it never received his written and signed application for voluntary admission to the
facility as statutorily required to initiate the postadmission review hearing from
which its order arose. Because we hold the lack of a written and signed application
for voluntary admission fails to vest a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
IN RE S.W.
Opinion of the Court
concur in a patient’s voluntary admission and order continued admission for further
treatment, we vacate the court’s order.
I. Background
On 25 May 2016, Wolfe presented to the emergency department at Mission
Hospital in Buncombe County “suffering from self-reported dehydration, and
apparent psychiatric decompensation due to treatment noncompliance.” Three days
later Wolfe was admitted to Mission Hospital’s inpatient psychiatric unit (Copestone)
and evaluated that same day by a staff psychiatrist, Dr. Suzanne Collier.
On 31 May, Dr. Collier filed with the Buncombe County District Court an
evaluation for admission, in which she noted that Wolfe had a history of bipolar
disorder and psychiatric hospitalizations; that he had recently stopped taking his
psychiatric medication and was exhibiting signs of paranoia, delusions, and
sleeplessness; and opined that Wolfe was mentally ill, needed further evaluation, and
should be admitted to Copestone for inpatient psychiatric treatment. Upon receipt of
Dr. Collier’s evaluation, the district court scheduled an “Involuntary Commitment or
Voluntary Admission hearing” to review Wolfe’s admission and determine if further
inpatient psychiatric treatment was necessary. The district court never received a
written and signed application for Wolfe’s voluntary admission to Mission Hospital
or to its psychiatric unit at Copestone.
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On 3 June, Wolfe was appointed counsel. After interviewing Wolfe, his
appointed counsel filed a notice with the district court requesting a hearing because
Wolfe “does not agree with [Dr. Collier’s] recommendations.”
At the 9 June hearing on Wolfe’s admission, Dr. Collier testified that Wolfe
“did not present [to the emergency room] for psychiatric reasons per his report” and
stated when she first evaluated Wolfe on 28 May, “he told me he came in for some
other medical problem, and that he didn’t need to be at Copestone.” Dr. Collier stated
that Wolfe was admitted to the hospital’s psychiatric unit because he had stopped
taking his bipolar disorder medications; was currently in a manic episode; and was
decompensating, experiencing symptoms of agitation, paranoia, delusions, and
sleeplessness. After about a week of observation, Dr. Collier explained that Wolfe
“generally remained calm, but argumentative about the fact that he [did not] believe
he need[ed] to be on medication.” Wolfe initially refused to take the oral psychiatric
medication prescribed at Copestone because he believed it was unnecessary and was
“poisoning him.” After a few forced antipsychotic injections to which Wolfe’s guardian
apparently consented, Wolfe started voluntarily taking his oral medication a few days
before the hearing. Dr. Collier opined that Wolfe needed further inpatient treatment
to stabilize him on his current medication and expressed concern that if he were
released, Wolfe might stop taking his medication, decompensate, and become manic.
She opined further that it would currently be medically inappropriate to discharge
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Opinion of the Court
Wolfe to an independent living situation and requested that the court authorize his
continued inpatient psychiatric treatment at Copestone for thirty more days.
Wolfe testified that he presented to Mission Hospital’s emergency department
complaining of severe dehydration and malnourishment because he was unable to
pay for groceries, since his payee, who receives government benefits on his behalf,
failed to provide him funds timely for basic living expenses. Wolfe conceded that he
did not believe he has bipolar disorder and stated he initially refused medication at
Copestone because each of the seven or eight psychiatric medications he has been
prescribed over the past several years have “poison[ed the] emotional state of being
in [his] state of mind” and have “made [him] angry, irritable, and stupid.” Wolfe
testified that he was currently receiving outpatient treatment at Family Preservation
Services and taking psychiatric medication as needed, as prescribed by a general
psychiatrist there. Wolfe indicated he would continue taking the medicine prescribed
at Copestone if discharged and was currently able to return to living independently.
Wolfe requested that if the court found it necessary he receive further inpatient
treatment, it send him to another facility for an independent assessment, since
Copestone “seem[ed] to be intent on making [him] take [bipolar] medicine and stay
there.” Wolfe’s guardian was not present at the hearing.
After the hearing, the court entered an order on 9 June 2016 concurring in
Wolfe’s voluntary admission and authorizing his continued inpatient admission at
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Opinion of the Court
Copestone for no more than thirty days. In its order, the court found by clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence that Wolfe was mentally ill, in need of further treatment at
Copestone, and that lesser measures would be insufficient. Wolfe was discharged
from Copestone on 22 June 2016. Wolfe appeals.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Wolfe contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to concur in his
voluntary admission and order he remain admitted for further inpatient psychiatric
treatment because it never received a written and signed application for his voluntary
admission to Copestone as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-232 to initiate the
hearing. Wolfe also challenges the sufficiency of evidence underlying the district
court’s finding that his admission was voluntary, arguing no evidence presented
showed that his admission to Mission Hospital’s inpatient psychiatric unit at
Copestone was, in fact, voluntary. Because we hold that the lack of Wolfe’s
application for voluntary admission failed to vest the trial court with subject-matter
jurisdiction to concur in his admission and authorize he remain admitted for
additional inpatient treatment, we vacate the order and thus decline to address
Wolfe’s second argument.
We review de novo whether a trial court has jurisdiction over particular subject
matter. See, e.g., McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592
(2010). Subject-matter jurisdiction “involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the
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type of controversy presented by the action before it.” Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 143
N.C. App. 688, 693, 547 S.E.2d 127, 130, disc. rev. denied, 354 N.C. 217, 554 S.E.2d
338 (2001). “A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court
without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity,” Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C.
462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964) (citing High v. Pearce, 220 N.C. App. 266, 271,
17 S.E.2d 108, 112 (1941)), and “in its absence a court has no power to act[ and any
resulting] ‘judgment is void,’ ” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 590, 636 S.E.2d 787, 790
(2006) (quoting Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678
(1956)). “When the record shows a lack of jurisdiction in the lower court, the
appropriate action on the part of the appellate court is to . . . vacate any order entered
without authority.” State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 176, 273 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1981)
(citations omitted).
“ ‘Where jurisdiction is statutory and the [l]egislature requires the [c]ourt to
exercise its jurisdiction in a certain manner, to follow a certain procedure, or
otherwise subjects the [c]ourt to certain limitations, an act of the [c]ourt beyond these
limits is in excess of its jurisdiction.’ ” In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590, 636 S.E.2d at
790 (quoting Eudy v. Eudy, 288 N.C. 71, 75, 215 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1975), overruled on
other grounds by Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 290 S.E.2d 653 (1982)). Thus, for
certain statutorily created causes of action, a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
over the action does not fully vest unless the action is properly initiated. In re T.R.P.,
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360 N.C. at 591–93, 636 S.E.2d at 790–92 (holding court lacked jurisdiction to enter
a custody review order in an abuse, neglect, and dependency action because
statutorily required initiating petition was defective); see also Hodges v. Hodges, 226
N.C. 570–71, 571, 39 S.E.2d 596, 597 (1946) (holding court lacked jurisdiction to enter
order in alimony action because statutorily required initiating complaint was
defective). This principle also applies to statutorily created involuntary commitment
proceedings and a court’s authority to enter an involuntary commitment order. See
In re Ingram, 74 N.C. App. 579, 580–81, 328 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1985) (vacating
commitment order for want of jurisdiction where initiating petition lacked statutorily
required affidavit).
Article 5 of Chapter 122C of the North Carolina General Statutes governs the
procedures for admitting or committing persons into inpatient psychiatric facilities.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-211(a) (2015) provides that for a competent adult to seek
voluntary admission to a facility, “a written application for evaluation or admission,
signed by the individual seeking admission, is required.” For incompetent adults
seeking voluntary admission, the written application must be completed and signed
by his or her guardian. Id. § 122C-231 (“The provisions of G.S. 122C-211 shall apply
to admissions of an incompetent adult . . . except that the legally responsible person
shall act for the individual, in applying for admission to a facility . . . .”); id. § 122C-
3(20) (“ ‘Legally responsible person’ means . . . when applied to an adult, who has
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been adjudicated incompetent, a guardian . . . .”). Accordingly, for Wolfe to have been
voluntarily admitted to Copestone, his guardian was required to complete and sign a
written application for Wolfe’s admission.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 112C-232 (2015) empowers a district court to review an
incompetent adult’s voluntary admission into an inpatient psychiatric facility and
order he or she remain admitted for further inpatient treatment. The statute
mandates that the district court must hold a hearing within ten days after an
incompetent adult’s voluntary admission to “determine whether the incompetent
adult is mentally ill . . . and is in need of further treatment at the facility.” Id. §§
122C-232(a), (b). If the court determines by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that the patient is mentally ill, in need of further treatment, and that lesser measures
would be insufficient, the court may concur with the voluntary admission and
authorize further treatment. Id. § 122C-232(b). If further inpatient treatment is
authorized, “only the facility or the court may release the incompetent adult” upon a
determination that such treatment is no longer needed. Id. § 122C-233(b).1
Significantly here, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 112C-232(b) provides that “[i]n any case
requiring [this] hearing . . . , no petition is necessary; the written application for
voluntary admission shall serve as the initiating document for the hearing.”
(Emphasis added.) This limitation conditions subject-matter jurisdiction: a district
1Additionally, if the facility refuses a legal guardian’s request to discharge an incompetent adult, the
guardian may apply to the court for a discharge hearing. Id.
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court’s N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-232 jurisdiction to concur in an incompetent adult’s
voluntary admission and order that he or she remain admitted for further inpatient
treatment does not vest absent the statutorily required written application for
voluntary admission signed by the incompetent adult’s legal guardian.
Here, the district court entered an order purporting to concur in Wolfe’s
voluntary admission to Copestone and ordering he remain admitted for an additional
thirty days of inpatient psychiatric treatment. Yet the appellate record contains no
written application for Wolfe’s voluntary admission signed by his guardian. Rather,
as an amendment to appellate record reflects, Wolfe’s “application was not filed in
the court file for this case,” and the Buncombe County District Court calendared the
hearing upon receipt of Dr. Collier’s evaluation for admission. Because a written and
signed application for voluntary admission never initiated the hearing, the district
court failed to comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-232(b).
Because the district court never received this required application for voluntary
admission, its subject-matter jurisdiction to concur in Wolfe’s voluntary admission to
Copestone and order he remain admitted for further inpatient psychiatric treatment
never vested. The district court thus lacked authority to enter its voluntary
admission order and it must be vacated. See In re Ingram, 74 N.C. App. at 580–81,
328 S.E.2d at 589 (vacating commitment order for want of jurisdiction where petition
to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings lacked statutorily required
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affidavit); cf. In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 591–93, 636 S.E.2d at 790–92 (affirming this
Court’s decision to vacate a custody review order because lower court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction never vested where initiating petition lacked statutorily required
verification).
III. Conclusion
The lack of a required written application for Wolfe’s voluntary admission
signed by his guardian failed to vest the district court with subject-matter jurisdiction
to concur in his voluntary admission to Copestone and order he remain admitted for
further inpatient treatment. We therefore vacate its voluntary admission order.
VACATED.
Judges INMAN and BERGER concur.
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