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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-12124
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-00770-AT
LEONARD ROWE,
ROWE ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,
LEE KING,
LEE KING PRODUCTIONS INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
WILLIE E. GARY,
WILLIAM C. CAMPBELL,
SEKOU M. GARY,
TRICIA P. HOFFLER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
MARIA SPERANDO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(July 20, 2017)
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Before MARCUS, MARTIN, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maria Sperando, a lawyer proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
refusal to allow her to file a motion for sanctions against Leonard Rowe, Rowe
Entertainment, Inc., Lee King, and Lee King Productions Inc. (collectively, the
“plaintiffs”). After careful review, we reverse and remand to the district court.
I.
The law firm Gary, Williams, Parenti, Watson & Gary, P.L.L.C. (the “Gary
Firm”), represented the plaintiffs in a civil rights suit before the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York. In 2005, the New York court granted
summary judgment to the defendants. Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris
Agency, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 8272 (RPP), 2005 WL 22833 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005),
aff’d, 167 F. App’x 227 (2d Cir. 2005).
In 2015, the plaintiffs sued the Gary firm in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia. In addition to the Gary firm, the Georgia complaint
also asserted claims against a number of lawyers who worked at the Gary Firm at
the time the civil rights suit was pending. Sperando was one of those lawyers. The
plaintiffs alleged the Gary Firm and the individually named lawyers sabotaged the
civil rights suit in exchange for bribes from the defendants in that suit. The
plaintiffs brought two claims under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
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Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68, as well as a number of state-law claims.
Sperando, representing herself, filed a motion to dismiss. The rest of the
defendants filed a separate motion to dismiss.
In addition to her motion to dismiss, Sperando served a motion for sanctions
on the plaintiffs, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(2) (requiring a motion for sanctions be served 21 days before it is
filed). The motion sought sanctions against Rowe, King, and their counsel under
Rule 11, the court’s inherent power, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The plaintiffs filed a
motion for extension of time to respond to the motions to dismiss, as well as
Sperando’s motion for sanctions. The district court granted plaintiffs’ extension
request, but added that it would not consider any sanctions motions until after it
ruled on the motions to dismiss.1
At oral argument on the motions to dismiss, the court told Sperando that, if it
granted the motions to dismiss, it would consider retaining jurisdiction so that
Sperando could file her motion for sanctions. However, the district court’s order
granting the motions to dismiss did not do so. The court said:
[T]he Court does not find that Plaintiffs’ allegations are inherently
frivolous, and the Court will not entertain a motion for sanctions by
any of the Defendants. There is no doubt that Plaintiffs, though
belated and arguably misguided in their efforts here, were deeply
impacted by their professional experiences and by the loss of their
1
Although Sperando never filed the sanctions motion with the court, the plaintiffs
attached it to their extension request.
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landmark case in which they believed they would prevail, in reliance
on the representations of their counsel at the Gary Firm.
Sperando appeals the district court’s refusal to entertain a motion for sanctions.
II.
We review a district court’s decision to deny sanctions for an abuse of
discretion. Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010). A district court
abuses its discretion if it applies the wrong legal standard. Id.
Among other things, Sperando’s proposed sanctions motion requested
sanctions under Rule 11. Rule 11 imposes an objective standard on attorneys and
unrepresented parties who sign a complaint to conduct a reasonable inquiry into
the complaint’s claims and factual pleadings before filing it with a federal court.2
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); see Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47, 111 S. Ct.
2123, 2134 (1991) (“Rule 11 . . . imposes an objective standard of reasonable
inquiry . . . .”); Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enterprises, Inc., 498
U.S. 533, 548, 111 S. Ct. 922, 932 (1991) (“[A]ny signer must conduct a
reasonable inquiry or face sanctions.” (quotation omitted)). Thus, this Court
applies a two-step inquiry to decide whether Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate:
First we ask whether the claims were “objectively frivolous, in view of the law or
facts.” In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1573 (11th Cir. 1995). Second, we ask whether
2
Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, even parties who do not sign the complaint, like
Rowe and King here, may be sanctioned under Rule 11. See Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075,
1106 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co.,
553 U.S. 639, 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008).
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the person who signed the complaint “should have been aware that it was
frivolous.” Id.
The district court failed to apply this objective standard in its order refusing
to entertain Sperando’s sanctions motion. The court found the plaintiffs’
allegations were not inherently frivolous, but its reasoning relied on the plaintiffs’
subjective circumstances. It explained that the plaintiffs “were deeply impacted by
their professional experiences and by the loss of their landmark case in which they
believed they would prevail, in reliance on the representations of their counsel at
the Gary Firm.” The court failed to explain why the legal theories or factual
allegations in the complaint were not objectively frivolous. See id. We therefore
conclude that the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal
standard in evaluating whether Rule 11 sanctions were appropriate. Peer, 606 F.3d
at 1311.
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We reverse and remand to the district court for consideration of Sperando’s
sanctions motion.3
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
3
Sperando’s proposed motion also requested sanctions under the court’s inherent power,
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The standard for sanctions under the court’s inherent power is a
subjective standard and requires a finding of bad faith. See Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem
Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017). Also sanctions under § 1927 are meant for
litigants that intentionally and unnecessarily cause delays during litigation. See Peer, 606 F.3d at
1314. The district court suggested the plaintiffs did not act with bad faith, and the record does
not support a finding of delay. Because Sperando has yet to file her sanctions motion, we leave
it to the district court to decide in the first instance whether sanctions under the court’s inherent
power or § 1927 are appropriate if requested.
In addition, Sperando requested attorney’s fees in her proposed motion. But under Rule
11, a district court cannot impose a sanction of attorney’s fees to be paid to a pro se litigant, even
if that litigant is an attorney. See Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (11th Cir. 2001)
(per curiam).
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