J-S38008-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
DARNELL WOODSON :
:
Appellant : No. 1576 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 5, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013190-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 25, 2017
Appellant, Darnell Woodson, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury
trial convictions for robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, simple assault,
and intimidation of a witness or victim.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On August 10, 2014, co-defendants, Shaheed Carroll and Edward Martin,
and a group of individuals assaulted and robbed Victim. Victim reported the
incident to police. On the night of September 19-20, 2014, Appellant and
co-defendants assaulted and robbed Victim. During the September 2014
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iv), 903(c), 2701(a), and 4952(a)(1),
respectively.
_____________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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incident, Appellant accused Victim of “snitching” to police.
The Commonwealth charged Appellant and co-defendants with
robbery, conspiracy, simple assault, and intimidation of a witness or victim
stemming from the September 2014 incident. Appellant and co-defendants
proceeded to a joint jury trial on October 25, 2016. At trial, the jury heard
the testimony of, inter alia, Victim and Officer Brian Williams, who
investigated the September 2014 offense.
Victim testified that on the night of September 19-20, 2014, Appellant
and co-defendants approached him and accused him of “snitching” to police.
Victim stated that Appellant attempted to punch Victim, and one of the co-
defendants pointed a knife at Victim and threatened to stab him. Victim
explained that Appellant and co-defendants knocked him to the ground and
punched and kicked him repeatedly. Appellant and co-defendants also took
from Victim multiple items, including his cell phone. Victim testified that he
reported the September 2014 incident to police that same night.
Officer Brian Williams testified that he responded to the scene in the
early morning of September 20, 2014. Upon arriving, Officer Williams
noticed Victim was holding his stomach. Officer Williams explained that
Victim specified which personal items had been stolen. Officer Williams
stated he was able to track Victim’s stolen cell phone to Appellant and co-
defendants’ location. Officer Williams said when he arrived at the identified
location with Victim, Appellant and co-defendants were already in police
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custody. Officer Williams said he saw other officers confiscate from co-
defendants several items, which matched the items stolen from Victim.
Officer Williams testified that Victim identified all three assailants by name
and stated they had also robbed him in August.
On November 2, 2015, the jury convicted Appellant of robbery,
conspiracy to commit robbery, simple assault, and intimidation of a witness.
On January 5, 2016, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of four (4) to
eight (8) years’ incarceration on the intimidation of a witness charge, and a
concurrent term of four (4) to eight (8) years’ incarceration for the robbery
and conspiracy to commit robbery charges, which merged for purposes of
sentencing. The court imposed an aggregate sentence of four (4) to eight
(8) years’ incarceration.
Appellant filed post-sentence motions on January 13, 2016. On May
16, 2016, Appellant filed a premature notice of appeal. 2 On May 17, 2016,
Appellant’s post sentence motions were denied by operation of law. The
court ordered Appellant, on May 19, 2016, to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant timely
complied on May 21, 2016.
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2
Appellant’s notice of appeal relates forward to May 17, 2016, the date
Appellant’s post sentence motions were denied by operation of law. See
Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating notice of appeal filed after court’s determination
but before entry of appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry
and on date of entry). Hence, no appellate jurisdictional defects impede our
review.
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Appellant raises two issues for our review:
WHETHER THE JURY’S VERDICT FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY OF INTIMIDATION OF A WITNESS…, ROBBERY…,
SIMPLE ASSAULT…, AND CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY…, WAS
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE?
WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE JURY’S VERDICT FINDING APPELLANT
GUILTY OF INTIMIDATION OF A WITNESS – REFRAIN
FROM REPORTING, 18 PA.C.S.A § 4952, WHERE [VICTIM]
TESTIFIED THAT APPELLANT AND THE CO-DEFENDANTS
TOLD HIM THAT THEY WERE CONFRONTING HIM ABOUT
PAST “SNITCHING,” WHICH IS CONDUCT THAT IS ONLY
ACTIONABLE UNDER THE CHARGE OF RETALIATION
AGAINST A WITNESS, 18 PA.C.S.A. § 4953, AND DOES
NOT FALL UNDER THE AMBIT OF INTIMIDATION OF A
WITNESS, WHICH APPLIES TO FUTURE CONDUCT?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5).
In his first issue, Appellant argues his convictions were against the
weight of the evidence because Victim’s trial testimony was incredible.
Appellant concludes this Court should vacate his convictions and judgment of
sentence. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, we must determine if Appellant properly
preserved his challenge to the weight of the evidence. Issues not raised in a
Rule 1925 concise statement of errors will be deemed waived.
Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 403, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (2005)
(citing Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306 (1998));
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). “Rule 1925(b) waivers may be raised by the
appellate court sua sponte.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 609 Pa. 410, 428, 16
A.3d 484, 494 (2011). See also Wirth v. Commonwealth, 626 Pa. 124,
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149-150, 95 A.3d 822, 836-37 (2014) (providing appellate court may
address waiver sua sponte).
Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is
as follows:
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of
fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An
appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the lower
court’s verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where the trial
court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate
court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial
court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight
claim.
Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408
(2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004)
(internal citations omitted).
Section 3701 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines robbery, in
pertinent part, as follows:
§ 3701. Robbery
(a) Offense defined.—
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of
committing a theft, he:
* * *
(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens
another with or intentionally puts him in fear of
immediate bodily injury;
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* * *
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(iv). Criminal conspiracy is defined in relevant part
as follows:
§ 903. Criminal conspiracy
* * *
(c) Conspiracy with multiple criminal objectives.—
If a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is
guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple
crimes are the object of the same agreement or
continuous conspiratorial relationship.
* * *
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(c). The pertinent subsection of the simple assault
statute provides in pertinent part as follows:
§ 2701. Simple Assault
(a) Offense defined.—Except as provided under section
2702 (relating to aggravated assault), a person is guilty of
assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon;
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in
fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
* * *
18 Pa.C.S.A § 2701(a)(1)-(3). Additionally, intimidation of witnesses or
victims is defined in relevant part as follows:
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§ 4952. Intimidation of witnesses or victims
(a) Offense defined.─A person commits an offense if,
with the intent to or with the knowledge that his conduct
will obstruct, impede, impair, prevent or interfere with the
administration of criminal justice, he intimidates or
attempts to intimidate any witness or victim to:
(1) Refrain from informing or reporting to any law
enforcement officer, prosecuting official or judge
concerning any information, document or thing relating
to the commission of a crime.
* * *
18 Pa.C.S.A § 4952(a)(1).
Instantly, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion that included a
challenge to the weight of the evidence and requested the trial court to
vacate his convictions and judgment of sentence. The issue Appellant
presented in this regard was:
C. The jury’s verdict was against the force of the
evidence, where police recovered no contraband or
weapons from [Appellant], [Victim] had zero credibility,
because he admitted at trial that he falsely accused
[Appellant] of being a participant in the August 10, 2014
Robbery and that he lied about being hospitalized as a
result of the incident.
(See Post-Sentence Motion, filed 1/13/16, at 5 unpaginated). In his Rule
1925(b) statement, Appellant presented the following weight challenge:
1. The jury’s verdict finding [Appellant] guilty of
Intimidation of a Witness (F1), Robbery (F2), Simple
Assault (M2), and Criminal Conspiracy (F1), was against
the weight of the evidence.
(See Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 5/21/16, at 1 unpaginated). In his post-
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sentence motion, Appellant based his weight claim partly on the credibility of
Victim’s trial testimony. By comparison, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement
included a generic challenge to the weight of the evidence. In his brief on
appeal, however, the sole basis for Appellant’s weight claim is Victim’s
purported incredible trial testimony. Thus, Appellant did not properly
preserve, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, his specific weight issue to the
extent it relates to the credibility of Victim’s testimony. Although Appellant
preserved in his post-sentence motion a more specific weight claim
regarding Victim’s credibility, Appellant arguably waived that issue for
purposes of appellate review. See Castillo, supra; Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii).
Moreover, the trial court did not specifically address Victim’s credibility
in its Rule 1925(a) analysis. Nevertheless, the record reveals Appellant fully
pursued Victim’s credibility at trial through cross-examination, and the trial
court properly instructed the jury as to credibility determinations. Thus,
even if Appellant had properly preserved this aspect of his weight claim for
appellate review, we would see no error in the court’s decision to deny relief.
See Champney, supra (explaining weight of evidence is exclusively for
finder of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of evidence and to
determine credibility of witnesses; this Court cannot substitute its judgment
for that of fact-finder and may reverse verdict only if it is so contrary to
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice). In response to Appellant’s
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weight claim, the trial court reasoned:
The facts presented at trial regarding the September 19
robbery are clear and the defense presented no evidence
at trial, either in their case in chief or through cross
examination that would outweigh the finding made by the
jury. [Appellant] was identified by [Victim] as having
participated in the robbery. Through words and physical
assault, he, along with the two co-defendants, intimated to
[Victim] that they did not want him to go forward in the
investigation of the previous robbery a month before. And
most importantly all three defendants were arrested
shortly after with the proceeds of the robbery in their
possession. Therefore the denial of [Appellant]’s post-
sentence motion alleging that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence was proper and was not an abuse
of discretion.
(See Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/10/17, at 4.) The record supports the
court’s analysis. The totality of the Commonwealth’s evidence produced a
sufficient nexus between Appellant and: his co-defendants, relating the
August 10, 2014 and September 19, 2014 incidents; the accusations the
September 19th assailants directed at Victim for “snitching” about the August
10th incident; the stolen property from Victim on September 19, 2014; and
the injuries Victim sustained on September 19, 2014. Based on the
foregoing, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assessment of
Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim. See Champney, supra.
Accordingly, we affirm.
In his second issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth presented
insufficient evidence to support his witness intimidation conviction.
Appellant avers that at the time of the September 2014 incident, there were
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no criminal cases pending or ongoing investigations stemming from the
August 2014 incident. Appellant contends Victim testified that Appellant and
co-defendants accosted him because he “snitched” to police. Appellant
asserts Victim did not testify that Appellant and co-defendants warned him
to refrain from cooperating with law enforcements in the future. Appellant
concludes this Court should vacate his conviction for intimidation of a
witness. We disagree.
With respect to a sufficiency claim:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super.
2003)).
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Instantly, concerning Appellant’s sufficiency claim, the trial court
reasoned as follows:
Given the circumstances of the two robberies happening
only a month apart, the conduct shown by the defendants
satisfies the Intimidation of a Witness charge. The
complaining witness, [Victim] reported to police what
happened, but no court process or charges were brought
against those who committed [the August 10th] robbery at
the time of the [September 19th] robbery. Since the
defendants knew about the [August 10th] robbery, their
comments regarding “snitching” could reasonably be
inferred to include refraining from reporting or cooperating
further with authorities regarding [the August 10th]
robbery and not necessarily about his conduct of filing a
police report regarding the first robbery. Therefore the
evidence presented was sufficient to find the defendant
guilty on Intimidation of a Witness.
(See Trial Court Opinion at 5.) The record supports the trial court’s
rationale. Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency claim merits no relief.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/25/2017
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