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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
DAVID DRY
Appellant : No. 1393 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 25, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0001698-2011,
CP-22-CR-0004993-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 01, 2017
David Dry appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed July 25,
2016, in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, following the
revocation of his probation and parole in two separate cases. At Docket No.
1698-2011, Dry pled guilty to two counts of possession with intent to deliver
controlled substances ("PWID")1 (fentanyl). The court found Dry violated
the terms of his parole and sentenced him to serve the balance of his
sentence - 12 months, three days' imprisonment. At Docket No. 4993-2015,
Dry pled guilty to one count of terroristic threats.2 The court found Dry
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.
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violated the terms of his intermediate punishment ("IP") and electronic
monitoring sentence, and sentenced him to two years' probation, concurrent
with the sentence at Docket No. 1698-2011. Contemporaneous with this
appeal, Dry's counsel has filed a petition to withdraw from representation
and an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967);
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981). The sole issue
addressed in the Anders brief challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the court's revocation of Dry's probation and parole. Based on
the following, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel's
petition to withdraw.
The relevant facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are as
follows. On December 5, 2012, Dry entered a guilty plea at Docket No.
1698-2011 to two counts of PWID for selling fentanyl to an undercover
officer in October and December of 2010. On June 27, 2015, the court
imposed concurrent sentences of three to 23 months' imprisonment, and
$200 in fines and costs. Dry was immediately paroled. In February of 2015,
the trial court determined Dry had violated the terms of his parole by failing
to make payments toward his costs and fines. Thereafter, on March 12,
2015, the court resentenced him to serve the balance of his original
sentence - 20 months', six days' imprisonment - and again granted him
immediate parole.
On June 26, 2015, Dry was arrested and charged with terroristic
threats at Docket No. 4993-2015, based upon comments he made to his
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caseworker and a nurse at Harrisburg Hospital. He subsequently entered a
guilty plea to the charge on January 4, 2016, and was sentenced to a term
of two years' IP, with six months of electronic monitoring. The same day,
his parole was revoked for a second time at Docket No. 1698-2011, and he
was again sentenced to serve the balance of his term - 14 months' and one
day imprisonment. Dry was immediately released to the YMCA. A detainer
was issued for both cases in May of 2016. On July 25, 2016, the trial court
conducted a probation/parole revocation hearing. Dry's probation officer
testified that Dry violated several terms of his probation/parole and was
discharged from a rehabilitation facility for threatening the staff. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Dry violated the terms of
his parole at Docket No. 1689-2011, and his probation at Docket No. 4993-
2015, and imposed the aforementioned sentences. This timely appeal
followed.3 Thereafter, on September 12, 2016, the trial court modified Dry's
3 On August 29, 2016, the trial court ordered Dry to file a concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After
requesting, and being granted, an extension of time, on October 20, 2016,
Dry's counsel filed a statement of her intention to file an
Anders/McClendon brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).
On October 28, 2016, this Court issued a per curiam order dismissing
the appeal for failure to file a docketing statement. However, the court
granted Dry's motion for reconsideration, and promptly reinstated the appeal
on November 7, 2016. Following this Court's reinstatement of the appeal,
the trial court entered a second order on November 29, 2016, directing Dry
to file a concise statement. Thereafter, on December 12, 2016, counsel
again filed notice of her intention to file an Anders/McClendon brief in lieu
of a concise statement.
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sentence at both dockets "to release [Dry] on an approved home plan
developed by Dauphin County Management Unit." Order, 9/12/2016.4
When counsel files a petition to withdraw and accompanying Anders
brief, we must first examine the request to withdraw before addressing any
of the substantive issues raised on appeal. Commonwealth v. Bennett,
124 A.3d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 2015). Our review of the record reveals
counsel has complied with the requirements for withdrawal outlined in
Anders, supra, and its progeny. Notably, counsel completed the following:
(1) she filed a petition for leave to withdraw, in which she states her belief
that the appeal is frivolous; (2) she filed an Anders brief pursuant to the
dictates of Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009);
(3) she furnished a copy of the Anders brief to Dry; and (4) she advised
Dry of his right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se. See
Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en
banc). Moreover, we have received no correspondence from Dry
supplementing the Anders brief.
Therefore, we proceed "to make a full examination of the proceedings
and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact
wholly frivolous." Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1248 (Pa.
4 At the conclusion of the July 25, 2016, revocation hearing, the trial court
had indicated its willingness to transfer Dry to an inpatient treatment facility.
See N.T., 7/25/2016, at 6.
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Super. 2015) (quotations and citation omitted). In so doing, we review not
only the issues identified by appointed counsel in the Anders brief, but
examine all of the proceedings to "make certain that appointed counsel has
not overlooked the existence of potentially non -frivolous issues." Id. at 1249
(footnote omitted).
The sole claim identified in counsel's Anders brief asserts the evidence
of Dry's technical violations presented at the revocation hearing was
insufficient to support the court's revocation of his probation at Docket No.
4993-2015, and parole at Docket No. 1698-2011. See Anders Brief at 9.
The decision whether to revoke a defendant's probation and parole is within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d
1033, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 109 A.3d
678 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 291 (Pa.
Super. 2008). The Commonwealth has the burden to prove a violation by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33
A.3d 31, 37 (Pa. Super. 2011) (probation), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 441 (Pa.
2010); Kalichak, supra (parole).
Furthermore,
"When assessing whether to revoke probation, the trial court
must balance the interests of society in preventing future
criminal conduct by the defendant against the possibility of
rehabilitating the defendant outside of prison.["] ... "[T]he
reason for revocation of probation need not necessarily be the
commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal conduct.
Rather, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged the very broad
standard that sentencing courts must use in determining
whether probation has been violated[.]" "A probation violation is
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established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the
probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an
ineffective vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient
to deter against future antisocial conduct."
Colon, supra, 102 A.3d at 1041 (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, when considering the evidence supporting a violation of
parole, this Court has explained: "This lighter burden of proof reflects the
policy of a parole revocation hearing whereby the emphasis is whether
parole is an effective tool to promote rehabilitation and deter 'future
antisocial conduct.' Commonwealth v. Gochenaur, 480 A.2d 307, 309
(Pa. Super. 1984) (qutotation omitted).
Here, Dry argues the revocation of both his probation and parole was
based solely on insufficient evidence of technical violations. Although
neither he nor his counsel explicitly contested the Commonwealth's
evidence, counsel offered "an explanation for some of [Dry's] conduct,"
which, Dry asserts "would not rise to the level of a violation." Anders Brief
at 10. Further, Dry stated at the revocation hearing: "[A] lot of those
things that were said didn't happen." N.T., 7/25/2016, at 6. Moreover, with
regard to his "unaccountability on electronic monitoring," Dry asserts the
probation officer testified that Dry was hospitalized during some of those
periods. Anders Brief at 11. Accordingly, he maintains: "It could be
reasonably inferred that [Dry's] hospitalization made it impossible for him to
comply with the condition to remain at his home address." Id.
Our review of the testimony from the July 25, 2016, revocation
hearing reveals ample support for the court's ruling. Indeed, Dry's probation
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officer testified that Dry violated the following conditions of his probation and
parole: (1) refrain from "overt behavior;" (2) make payments toward
fine/costs; (3) may not move or change address, (4) comply with treatment,
and (5) abstain from use of drugs. N.T., 7/25/2016, at 3. The probation
officer explained Dry was discharged from a drug and alcohol rehabilitation
facility for "threatening staff and becoming uncooperative with staff." Id.
He further stated Dry had "no payment history" with regard to his fines and
costs, and, "did not have a valid address." Id. The probation officer
testified that "[o]n his transport to Dauphin County Prison on May 26th,
2016, [Dry] did admit to abusing his medications, opiates." Id. Lastly, the
probation officer noted Dry had periods of "unaccountability" on electronic
monitoring, although he acknowledged that during some of those times Dry
was hospitalized or detained. Id. at 4.
Neither counsel nor Dry contested any of the technical violations
presented by the probation officer. Counsel did note the dispute at the
rehabilitation facility "started out" over a "kind of silly thing ... that [Dry] did
not handle well." Id. at 5. Further, he requested Dry be placed in an
inpatient facility for mental health and medical issues. Id. Dry agreed with
this request, but stated "[A] lot of those things that were said didn't
happen." Id. at 6. He did not elaborate.
We conclude the testimony of Dry's probation officer, concerning the
numerous technical violations of Dry's probation and parole, was sufficient to
support the court's ruling. It is well -settled that "technical violations are
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sufficient to trigger the revocation" of probation and parole.
Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). Here,
Dry's actions established that both probation and parole have proven to be
ineffective tools in promoting his rehabilitation and deterring his future
antisocial conduct. See Colon, supra; Gochenaur, supra.
We agree with counsel's assessment that this claim is frivolous.
Moreover, we have conducted "a full examination of the proceedings" and
conclude that "the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous." Commonwealth v.
Flowers, supra, 113 A.3d 1246, 1248.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel
granted.
Judgment Entered.
J seph D. Seletyn, Es .
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/2017
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