NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0503-15T3
WELLS FARGO, N.A.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHERRI Y. SCAFE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________
Submitted February 7, 2017 – Decided August 10, 2017
Before Judges Suter and Guadagno.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Camden County,
Docket No. F-023370-12.
Sherri Y. Scafe, appellant pro se.
Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones, PC,
attorneys for respondent (Brian Yoder, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Pro se defendant, Sherri Y. Scafe, also known as Nin el
Ameen Bey1, appeals from the August 14, 2015 Chancery Division
order denying her motion to vacate a June 9, 2014 final judgment
of foreclosure. We affirm.
On January 7, 2008, defendant executed a promissory note to
AmTrust Bank (AmTrust) for repayment of a loan in the amount of
$288,900. The note was secured by a non-purchase money mortgage
on real property located at 60 Orlando Drive, Sicklerville, in
favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)
as nominee for AmTrust. The mortgage was recorded in the Camden
County Clerk's Office on January 14, 2008. MERS, as nominee for
AmTrust, subsequently assigned the mortgage to plaintiff, Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A.
In September 2011, defendant defaulted on the required
monthly payments and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage sent defendant a
notice of intention to foreclose dated October 9, 2011, by
regular and certified mail at the mortgaged premises.
After defendant failed to cure the default, plaintiff filed
a complaint for foreclosure on October 17, 2012. Defendant was
served by regular and certified mail at the mortgaged premises
1
When the Chancery judge addressed defendant as Sherri Scafe,
she promptly corrected the judge, stating her name was Nin El
Ameen Bey.
2 A-0503-15T3
on April 29, 2013. Defendant failed to file responsive
pleadings and a default was entered against her on September 5,
2013. On February 20, 2014, plaintiff mailed notice of entry of
default to defendant.
On March 4, 2014, defendant filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition, but the matter was dismissed by the bankruptcy court
twenty days later. In May 2014, plaintiff moved for a final
judgment of foreclosure. While that motion was pending,
defendant attempted to remove the matter to federal district
court. On June 18, 2014, District Judge Robert B. Kugler
remanded the matter to the Chancery Division.
Final judgment of foreclosure was entered on June 9, 2014
and a copy of the judgement was mailed to defendant at the
mortgaged premises. A sheriff's sale was scheduled for August
20, 2014, but defendant filed a second petition for bankruptcy
on August 1, 2014. After the bankruptcy court entered a
discharge on June 19, 2015, defendant moved to vacate the June
9, 2014 judgment of foreclosure and dismiss the foreclosure
complaint. The Chancery judge denied defendant's motion on
August 14, 2015.
On appeal, defendant claims the Chancery judge erred in not
vacating the judgment of foreclosure; the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to enter the foreclosure judgment; plaintiff
3 A-0503-15T3
failed to join an indispensable party; and defendant pled a
meritorious defense.
None of defendant's arguments have sufficient merit to
warrant further discussion in our opinion beyond these brief
observations. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
During oral argument on her motion to vacate the judgment
of foreclosure, defendant objected to Wells Fargo being a party
to the matter and argued that the Federal National Mortgage
Association ("Fannie Mae"), should have been joined as a party.
When counsel for plaintiff noted that defendant had not
challenged plaintiff's standing in her moving papers, defendant
claimed that plaintiff failed to serve her with "notice of
acceleration." The Chancery judge then read the acceleration
provision in the mortgage to defendant and explained that the
October 9, 2011, notice of intent to foreclose was served one
year before the foreclosure complaint was filed. Because
defendant failed to contest the foreclosure and default was
entered, the judge explained that defendant waived any challenge
to standing or to the sufficiency of the notice.
Almost six years after defendant defaulted on this
mortgage, the matter is still pending, with defendant continuing
4 A-0503-15T3
to reside in the mortgaged premises without paying the mortgage
or property taxes.2
We affirm the denial of defendant's motion to vacate the
June 9, 2014 final judgment of foreclosure and direct that,
absent a stay by the Supreme Court, a sheriff's sale be
scheduled within sixty days of the filing of this opinion.
2
We note the observation of District Judge Kugler in his opinion
dismissing a related complaint submitted by defendant against
several Wells Fargo employees, which he described as "gibberish-
filled":
this Court cannot rule out the possibility
that Plaintiffs did not commence this matter
with bona fide litigation in mind. Indeed,
the content of the Pleading suggests that
Plaintiffs might be attempting to capitalize
on the docketing system of federal courts in
general, and this District in particular, in
order to: (a) assert that their Pleading is
"on file" with this District; and then (b)
build on this fact by self-declaring their
right to a certain real estate property
(seemingly, 60 Orlando Drive, Sicklerville,
New Jersey), and by claiming that this
property is free from mortgage encumbrances
held, seemingly, by the Wells Fargo Bank.
[Bey v. Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 556
(D.N.J. 2011).]
5 A-0503-15T3