NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 14 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSHUA LAINE, No. 16-17142
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:15-cv-03656-VC
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF LIVERMORE; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Vince G. Chhabria, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2017**
Before: SCHROEDER, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Joshua Laine appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his action alleging federal and state law claims in connection with the
impoundment of his truck. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo, Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007),
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Laine’s request for oral
argument, set forth in his opening brief, is denied.
and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laine’s Fourth
Amendment claims because Laine failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether Officer Thompson lacked probable cause to believe a traffic
violation had occurred, and whether the impounding of his vehicle was
unreasonable. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (“As a
general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred”.); see also Cal.
Veh. Code § 4000(a)(1) (a person shall not drive a vehicle unless it is
registered); Cal. Veh. Code § 22651(o) (1)(A) (an officer may remove a vehicle
whose registration expired more than six months before); Miranda v. City of
Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2005) (“An impoundment may be proper
under the community caretaking doctrine if the driver’s violation of a vehicle
regulation prevents the driver from lawfully operating the vehicle.”). Contrary to
Laine’s contentions, vehicle registration requirements are not unconstitutional. See
Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915); see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d
1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1999) (there is no constitutional right to drive).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laine’s Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim because Laine failed to
raise a triable dispute as to whether defendants engaged in racketeering activity.
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See Sun Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir. 1987) (setting
forth RICO elements and defining racketeering activity).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laine’s claim that
Officer Thompson committed treason because Laine lacked standing. See Aldabe
v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980) (criminal provisions provide no
basis for civil liability).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Laine’s false
imprisonment claim because Laine failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether
Thompson acted outside the scope of her authority and the detention was unlawful.
See Cal. Penal Code § 847(b) (peace officer is not liable for false imprisonment if
she was acting within the scope of her authority and the arrest was lawful).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Laine only
nominal damages. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263-264 (1978) (holding
that no award for compensatory damages was justified without proof that such
injury was actually caused by denial of procedural due process itself); Soffer v.
City of Costa Mesa, 798 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of review).
We reject as unsupported Laine’s contention that his due process rights were
violated throughout the case.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
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AFFIRMED.
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