NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0485n.06
No. 16-2726 FILED
Aug 22, 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JOHN BUTLER, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
FCA US, LLC, ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
)
Before: GUY, ROGERS, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. John Butler worked for Chrysler for more than 40 years.
He purchased accident insurance through the company, and filed a claim for benefits when a car
crash left him unable to work. Chrysler’s successor, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles US, LLC (whom
we refer to simply as Chrysler) denied the claim through the insurer then administering the
accident-insurance plan, MetLife. Butler then sued Chrysler under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), arguing that he was entitled to benefits and that Chrysler
had wrongfully refused to provide him with plan documents. The district court granted summary
judgment to Chrysler. We affirm.
I.
Butler was injured in a car crash in July 2008. After the crash, he was diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder, post-concussion syndrome, double vision, and hearing loss.
No. 16-2726, Butler v. FCA US, LLC
Chrysler placed Butler on disability leave until he retired in May 2011. At that point, Butler
began to receive a disability pension.
Six days after retiring, Butler filed a claim for additional benefits under Chrysler’s
accident-insurance plan. The insurer then administering the plan, MetLife, construed Butler’s
claim as one for “Traumatic Brain Injury Benefit[s]” as defined by the insurance policy in effect
in July 2008. MetLife denied the claim and upheld its decision when Butler appealed. Butler
responded by requesting a copy of the 2008 policy—first from MetLife, and then from Benefits
Express, another company that helped Chrysler administer its employee-benefit plans. Before he
received the policy, Butler consulted the plan’s latest “summary plan description”—a document
that describes the terms of an ERISA plan in terms “calculated to be understood by the average
plan participant.” 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a). Butler wrote to MetLife, asserting that he was entitled to
“Total Permanent Disability Benefit[s]” under the summary. MetLife responded that Chrysler’s
accident insurance did not include such a benefit.
Butler thereafter brought this lawsuit, alleging (among other things) that Chrysler
improperly denied him benefits in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and failed to provide
him with plan documents in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). Chrysler moved for summary
judgment, which the district court granted. The court held that Chrysler’s accident insurance did
not cover total and permanent disabilities, and that nothing in the summary plan description
should have led Butler to believe otherwise. The court also held that Butler’s requests for a copy
of the 2008 policy did not trigger Chrysler’s statutory duty to produce the document. This
appeal followed.
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No. 16-2726, Butler v. FCA US, LLC
II.
A.
We review de novo the district court’s decision that Butler was not entitled to benefits.
McClain v. Eaton Corp. Disability Plan, 740 F.3d 1059, 1064 (6th Cir. 2014).
A participant in an ERISA plan can sue “to recover benefits due to him under the terms
of his plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). A plan’s terms must be memorialized in a “written
instrument.” Id. at § 1102(a)(1). A summary plan description can be part of a plan’s governing
instrument, but only if the summary itself so provides. See Bd. of Trs. v. Moore, 800 F.3d 214,
220 (6th Cir. 2015). Here, the 2007 summary—the one in effect when Butler was injured in July
2008—provides that “[t]his handbook is intended to be the summary plan description as well as
the plan document.” But the summary also states that, if the summary conflicts with the
accident-insurance policy, then “the terms of the . . . policy will prevail.” Thus, if the policy
does not list the benefit that Butler now seeks, he cannot recover it under § 1132(a)(1)(B)—
regardless of whether the summary lists the benefit.
The document that the parties refer to as the MetLife Certificate is “part of the . . .
policy” that was in effect when Butler was injured. That document lists each of the benefits
included in Chrysler’s accident insurance. A benefit for total and permanent disabilities is not
among them, which means that the policy does not include that benefit. Butler therefore cannot
recover under § 1132(a)(1)(B).
Butler next argues that the 2007 summary plan description is misleading. If a summary
would lead an average plan participant to believe that a benefit is included when it is not, then a
participant can recover under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), which authorizes district courts to remedy
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“false or misleading” statements in summaries with “appropriate equitable relief.” See CIGNA
Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 438-42 (2011).
Here, Butler points to two sentences in the 2007 summary that, he says, led him to
believe that Chrysler’s policy covered total and permanent disabilities. First, the summary states
that it is “describ[ing] the [accident-insurance plan] in effect as of April 1, 2004, and the benefits
for . . . accidental injuries sustained on or after that date.” In Butler’s view, that means that every
benefit available in April 2004 was still available in 2007, including the total-permanent-
disability benefit, which was listed in a 2002 summary plan description, and remained part of the
plan after it was amended on April 1, 2004.
If an average plan participant read only that sentence, we agree that he might be misled.
But we presume that participants read the entire summary, interpreting provisions in context.
See Kolkowski v. Goodrich Corp., 448 F.3d 843, 851 (6th Cir. 2006). The 2007 summary
discusses in detail each benefit included in Chrysler’s accident insurance. The total-permanent-
disability benefit is not mentioned, much less explained. That should have alerted participants
that the benefit was no longer part of the policy. Butler responds that, given the summary’s
reference to the benefits available in 2004, the omission of this benefit might have been a
“drafting gaffe.” Appellant’s Br. at 27. But the 2007 summary recited at least a dozen other
changes to Chrysler’s accident insurance, e.g., a new benefit for injuries sustained in a car
accident where an airbag deploys. That makes reasonably clear that Chrysler removed the total-
permanent-disability benefit deliberately, as one change among many that year.
Second, Butler contends that the summary’s statement that the “Total Permanent
Disability Benefit . . . may be taxable as ordinary income” implies that the benefit remained part
of the policy. Some plan participants who qualified for the total-permanent-disability benefit
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No. 16-2726, Butler v. FCA US, LLC
before it was removed from the plan, however, might have received their benefit payment
afterward. The warning thus does not imply that the benefit remained available.
Butler’s final point with respect to benefits is that, in response to Butler’s interrogatories,
Chrysler admitted that the total-permanent-disability benefit was available until February 28,
2008. By that admission, Butler contends, Chrysler conceded that the 2007 summary did cover
total and permanent disabilities. But again, Butler’s inference is mistaken. The policy that was
in effect through February 2008 explicitly covered total and permanent disabilities. Thus,
Chrysler’s admission was simply an acknowledgment that, up until March 2008, the policy
conflicted with the 2007 summary—and that the policy therefore governed. Once the new policy
took effect, there was no conflict, and the total-permanent-disability benefit became unavailable.
Butler responds that he was not notified when the change took effect on March 1, 2008. But the
2007 summary was itself notice that the benefit would be discontinued. That Butler actually
received several additional months of coverage did not require Chrysler to notify him again when
the extra coverage ended. Butler’s claim for benefits fails.
B.
Butler also argues that Chrysler refused to give him plan documents in violation of
29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). Under that provision, if a plan participant requests in writing certain
plan documents—including the “instrument[] under which the plan is established or operated”—
the employer must provide the documents within 30 days. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). If the
employer fails to do so, then a district court “may in [its] discretion” award the participant up to
$100 per day in damages. Id. at § 1132(c)(1). We review for an abuse of discretion a district
court’s decision not to award damages. Cultrona v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 698, 706
(6th Cir. 2014).
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As noted above, Butler wrote to MetLife in December 2012, requesting “a copy of the
Group Certificate and the Group Policy” under “which [Butler] was covered on the date of his
accident.” MetLife referred Butler to Benefits Express, another company that helped Chrysler
administer its employee-benefit plans. Butler sent Benefits Express the same letter he had sent
MetLife, but he never heard back from them. Thus he emailed Chrysler directly on February 14
and 22, 2013—both times requesting “information regarding the Total Permanent Disability
Benefit.” On March 11, 2013, Chrysler emailed Butler the MetLife Certificate, which, at the
time Butler was injured, also served as the plan policy.
Butler first contends that Chrysler violated § 1024(b)(4) because they took three months
to produce the MetLife Certificate. As an initial matter, however, we doubt that Butler’s letters
to MetLife and Benefits Express triggered Chrysler’s duty to produce, which arises only when a
plan participant writes to the employer itself. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Ameritech Pub., Inc.,
763 F.3d 469, 485 (6th Cir. 2014). Moreover, the district court properly considered whether the
delay prejudiced Butler. Cultrona, 748 F.3d at 708. And Butler presented no evidence of
prejudice.
Butler also contends that, although he possessed the 2007 summary, he was entitled to the
2007 policy itself, which Chrysler failed to produce. But an employer need produce a document
only if a participant provides “clear notice” that he wants it. Cultrona, 748 F.3d at 707.
In Butler’s letters, he requested only the policy under “which [he] was covered on the date of his
accident”—that is, the 2008 policy. And in Butler’s emails, he did not request any specific
documents at all. Moreover, given that the 2007 policy was not in effect when Butler was
injured, he could not recover benefits under that policy. Chrysler’s failure to produce the
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No. 16-2726, Butler v. FCA US, LLC
2007 policy therefore did not prejudice Butler. Hence the district court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to award Butler damages.
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
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