NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AUG 25 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
RAMZAN ALI CHAUDHRY, No. 14-71654
Petitioner, Agency No. A072-175-541
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney
General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 11, 2017**
San Francisco, California
Before: BEA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and LYNN,*** Chief District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Barbara M. G. Lynn, Chief United States District
Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Ramzan Ali Chaudhry appeals the denial of his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”) by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
Chaudhry does not challenge the denial of his asylum application as a proper
exercise of discretion nor the denial of his application for CAT protection. As a
result, he has waived any challenge to the agency’s discretionary denial of his
asylum application as well as the agency’s denial of his application for CAT
protection. See Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010);
Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).
In regard to withholding of removal, Chaudhry challenges the determination
by the immigration judge (“IJ”) that he failed to present any evidence of an
objectively reasonable fear of future persecution based on the possibility that he
will be singled out individually for persecution if removed to Pakistan. See
Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009). Chaudhry does not cite
any documentary evidence establishing that anyone in Pakistan was familiar with
him or his moderate political opinion. Moreover, the IJ properly afforded
Chaudhry’s testimony little weight because she found him to be not credible. The
IJ also properly gave little weight to expert witness Dr. Gabbay’s testimony
2
because his conclusions were based on Chaudhry’s exaggerations and Dr.
Gabbay’s own speculation.
Chaudhry also challenges the agency’s determination that he failed to
demonstrate a “systematic pattern or practice of persecution against the group to
which he belongs in his home country.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Specifically, Chaudhry challenges the agency’s determination that he did not
demonstrate that “individuals who return after a prolonged residence in the United
States” constitutes a cognizable social group under the Immigration and
Nationality Act. A group must be defined with sufficient particularity and have
adequate social distinction in order to constitute a cognizable group. Matter of
S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584-88 (BIA 2008). Chaudhry does not point to any
evidence indicating that Pakistani society perceives people returning from the
United States to be a distinct group. In addition, Chaudhry does not challenge the
BIA’s determination that he failed to demonstrate that his proposed group satisfied
the particularity requirement, so he has waived any challenge to this determination.
See Tijani, 628 F.3d at 1080; Lopez-Vasquez, 706 F.3d at 1079-80.
Next, Chaudhry challenges the agency’s determination that he did not
demonstrate a nexus between the harm he fears in Pakistan and his alleged
protected grounds. Chaudhry fails to demonstrate that his political opinion or
3
membership in a particular social group of people returning to Pakistan after living
in the United States would be a central reason for the harm that he fears in
Pakistan. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (“To establish that the applicant is a
refugee . . . , the applicant must establish that race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least
one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” (emphasis added)). The only
record evidence of the Taliban targeting a returnee from the United States consists
of a New York Times article cited by Dr. Gabbay. That article discusses a Pakistani
national who returned to Pakistan after living in New York for three years. He was
abducted by Taliban fighters and accused of being an American spy. The man was
released after a ransom was paid. The specific circumstances of the New York
man’s abduction are open to interpretation, particularly where there is nothing in
the article to suggest that the Taliban was motivated by the man’s status as a
returnee. A reasonable factfinder could infer that the man was abducted out of a
desire to receive a ransom for his release. Moreover, fear of generalized or
widespread violence in Pakistan does not establish a nexus to a protected ground.
See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
4