MICHELE TOUSSAINT VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM(POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3069-15T3

MICHELE TOUSSAINT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE
AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT
SYSTEM,

Respondent-Respondent.

_______________________________

Argued September 12, 2017 – Decided September 21, 2017

Before Judges Fasciale, Sumners and Moynihan.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the
Police and Firemen's Retirement System, Docket
No. 3-10-47799.

Samuel M. Gaylord argued the cause for
appellant (Gaylord Popp, LLC, attorneys; Mr.
Gaylord, on the brief).

Daniel F. Thornton, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Christopher
S. Porrino, Attorney General, attorney;
Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Mr. Thornton, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
 Toussaint appeals from a February 11, 2016 final agency

decision by the Board of Trustees Police and Firemen's Retirement

System (the Board) denying her accidental disability benefits

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:16A-7. There exists sufficient credible

evidence in the record to support the findings that the injury-

producing event was neither undesigned nor unexpected. Because

Toussaint failed to show that she suffered from a traumatic event,

we affirm.

The Department of Corrections (DOC) employed Toussaint as a

senior corrections officer (SCO). She injured herself while

performing her job. Her injury occurred while she was in the

process of unlocking a gate in the jail, something the DOC had

trained her to do, and something she had done previously. As she

approached the gate, her ankle rolled causing her to fall. She

did not trip over anything, and there was otherwise nothing unusual

on the floor that contributed to the fall.

The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded Toussaint failed

to show the external event of unlocking and opening the gate

resulted in "an unanticipated consequence" that was "extraordinary

or unusual in common experience." She appealed to the Board

contending that she was entitled to accidental disability

benefits. The Board issued a comprehensive written opinion dated

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December 31, 2015 and adopted the initial recommendations of the

ALJ.

On appeal, Toussaint argues that the circumstances of her

injury were unusual. Toussaint contends that a code, which in

this case means an officer in distress, is not a common occurrence

during a SCO's shift. Toussaint maintains that she had difficulty

securing the inmates in their cells because the code occurred

during recreational time. Toussaint contends that a series of

"external" events, such as cell gates failing to properly function;

opening gates for other officers to respond; and logging

information during the code, made the incident "unusual and

extraordinary."

Our scope of review of "administrative agency action is

limited. 'An administrative agency's final quasi-judicial

decision will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that

it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that it lacks

fair support in the record.'" Russo v. Bd. of Trs., Police &

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (quoting In re

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)).

"Generally, courts afford substantial deference to an

agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged

with enforcing." Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's

Ret. Sys., 192 N.J. 189, 196 (2007). "Such deference has been

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specifically extended to state agencies that administer pension

statutes[,]" because "'a state agency brings experience and

specialized knowledge to its task of administering and regulating

a legislative enactment within its field of expertise.'" Piatt

v. Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 443 N.J. Super. 80, 99 (App. Div.

2015) (quoting In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No.

01-2008, 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).

To secure accidental disability benefits, an applicant must

prove each of the following elements:

1. that he is permanently and totally
disabled;

2. as a direct result of a traumatic event
that is

a. identifiable as to time and
place,

b. undesigned and unexpected, and

c. caused by a circumstance external
to the member (not the result of
pre-existing disease that is
aggravated or accelerated by the
work);

3. that the traumatic event occurred during
and as a result of the member's regular or
assigned duties;

4. that the disability was not the result of
the member's willful negligence; and

5. that the member is mentally or physically
incapacitated from performing his usual or any
other duty.

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 [Russo, supra, 206 N.J. at 30 (quoting
Richardson, supra, 192 N.J. at 212-13).]

Here, the only disputed issue before the ALJ was whether the

injury-producing event was "undesigned and unexpected."

Our Supreme Court explained a traumatic event "may be found

either in an unintended external event or in an unanticipated

consequence of an intended external event if that consequence is

extraordinary or unusual in common experience." Russo v. Teacher's

Pension & Annuity Fund, 62 N.J. 142, 154 (1973). Thus, a claimant

will not be entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits,

like here, where he or she is injured undertaking his or her

ordinary work effort, even if that effort is particularly

strenuous. Ibid.

Under the arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable standard,

our scope of review is guided by three major inquiries: (l) whether

the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the

decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the

record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the

administrative agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.

In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).

When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord

substantial deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal

conclusions, acknowledging "the agency's 'expertise and superior

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knowledge of a particular field.'" Circus Liquors, Inc. v.

Governing Body of Middletown, 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting

Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)).

We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's even though

we might have reached a different conclusion. Stallworth, supra,

208 N.J. at 194; see also In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-57 (1999)

(discussing the narrow appellate standard of review for

administrative matters).

There are sufficient facts to support the ALJ's findings, and

the final agency decision is not arbitrary. Responding to codes

in jails, like here, is what SCOs do as part of their regular job

duties. The DOC trained Toussaint how to close gates if they

malfunctioned; open gates for officers to respond to a code; and

fill out a log book during a code. Toussaint testified that she

had followed these procedures before the incident occurred. SCOs

handle these situations by design, and Toussaint had done so

previously many times. Here, there is substantial credible

evidence in the record showing that the accident was due to her

own movement, without any attending unusual circumstances. The

incident was therefore neither undesigned nor unexpected, and as

a result, she failed to show she suffered from a "traumatic event."

Affirmed.

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