[Cite as G.M. v. Springfield Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2017-Ohio-7767.]
STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
G.M., BY AND THROUGH PARENTS ) CASE NO. 16 MA 0140
AND NATURAL GUARDIANS )
)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT )
)
VS. ) OPINION
)
BOARD OF EDUCATION, )
SPRINGFIELD LOCAL SCHOOLS )
)
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 15 CV 2229
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant: Atty. Scott R. Cochran
19 E. Front St.
Youngstown, Ohio 44503
For Defendant-Appellee: Atty. James E. Roberts
Atty. Christine Z. Papa
Roth, Blair, Roberts, Strasfeld
& Lodge, L.P.A.
100 E. Federal Street, Suite 60o
Youngstown, OH 44503
JUDGES:
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Hon. Carol Ann Robb
Dated: September 21, 2017
[Cite as G.M. v. Springfield Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2017-Ohio-7767.]
WAITE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, G.M., by and through parents and natural guardians Gregory
and Jeanine Mincher, appeals from a judgment of the Mahoning County Court of
Common Pleas affirming Springfield Local School District Board of Education
following an administrative appeal hearing in which the Board affirmed a two-day out-
of-school disciplinary suspension of Appellant. For the following reasons, Appellant’s
assignments of error are moot. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
History and Factual Background
{¶2} G.M. was a junior at Springfield High School (“School”) during the time
of the disciplinary action at issue. On May 11, 2015, during the second semester of
the school year, Appellant arrived late for school at 10:05 a.m. It was Appellant’s
fourth tardy for the second semester of the school year. The School Discipline Policy
provides that the student has two (2) free tardy offenses per semester. On the third
offense of tardiness, disciplinary action consists of an in-school detention. On the
fourth offense of tardiness the disciplinary action is Saturday School detention. If a
student fails to appear for Saturday School, the resulting disciplinary action is a two-
day out-of-school suspension. Pursuant to the School Attendance Policy, tardiness
is considered an unexcused absence and “[a]ll notes and doctor’s excuses must be
submitted to the office within 48 hours.” (Admin. Exh. #1, p. 2.)
{¶3} Appellant contends a doctor’s excuse was faxed to the School on May
11, 2015. The School contends that it has no such record of that fax and Appellant
offered no evidence of its submission below other than a hearsay statement by the
doctor that a member of his staff sent the excuse. On May 15, 2015, Appellant’s
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doctor did fax an excuse to the School for Appellant’s May 11, 2015 tardiness. The
School confirms that it received a fax from the doctor’s office on that date. As the
doctor’s excuse was not received within 48 hours of the infraction, the School
determined that Appellant had incurred his fourth incident of tardiness for the
semester. Appellant was served with a Notice of Saturday School detention on May
14, 2015. The notice stated that Appellant was permitted to serve Saturday School
on either May 16, 2015 or on May 23, 2015. Appellant did not serve the detention on
May 16th and was given a notice on May 22, 2016 to serve the detention the
following day. Appellant failed to appear for the May 23, 2016 Saturday School
detention and failed to appeal from the order to serve such detention.
{¶4} On May 26, 2015, the School Assistant Principal, Anthony Albanese
(“Albanese”), met with Appellant and informed him that he was to receive a two-day
out-of-school suspension for failing to appear at Saturday School. At this point,
Appellant filed an appeal of the two-day out-of-school suspension. Again, Appellant
never appealed his Saturday School suspension.
{¶5} A hearing before the Board Appeal Hearing of Student Suspension was
held on June 30, 2015, in which Albanese testified for Appellee. Appellant,
Appellant’s father (“Gregory Mincher”) and Appellant’s doctor (“Dr. Richard Wise”)
testified on behalf of Appellant. In Resolution No. 16-002, the Board affirmed the
two-day out-of-school suspension. Appellant filed an appeal of the Board’s decision
with the trial court on August 20, 2015. Both parties submitted administrative appeal
briefs with the trial court.
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{¶6} A magistrate’s decision was issued on June 24, 2016, affirming the
decision of the Board and concluding that the Board’s decision was supported by a
“preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence on the whole record.”
(6/24/16 Mag. Dec., p. 6.) The magistrate also concluded that the decision of the
Board was “not unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.” Id.
Appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision and Appellee filed a response.
The trial court, in a judgment entry dated August 3, 2016, overruled Appellant’s
objections to the magistrate’s decision and ordered the matter dismissed. Appellant
filed the instant appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN UPHOLDING
THE SUSPENSION AS ADMITTED HEARSAY EVIDENCE
DEMONSTRATED A DOCTOR'S EXCUSE WAS SUBMITTED TO THE
SCHOOL WITHIN 8 HOURS OF [G.M.'S] TARDINESS.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE SEPTEMBER 15, 2015 EXCUSE RECEIVED BY THE
SCHOOL ERASED THE UNEXCUSED TARDINESS AND,
THEREFORE, A BASIS FOR THE DISCIPLINARY ACTION.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred
in not concluding Appellant’s tardiness was excused based on the hearsay testimony
of Dr. Wise. In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court
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erred in not concluding the May 15, 2015, excuse “erased” Appellant’s unexcused
tardy.
{¶8} The court of common pleas reviews appeals from Boards of Education
pursuant to the standard as set forth in R.C. 2506.04. The court of common pleas
must affirm the board’s administrative decision unless it finds the decision is
“unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the
preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record.”
Id. The appeal to the court of appeals is more limited. An appellate court is required
to affirm the decision of the court of common pleas unless it concludes, as a matter of
law, that the decision is unsupported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and
substantial evidence. Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 465 N.E.2d 848
(1984). Courts may not rewrite or amend policies of the boards of education in Ohio
absent a clear abuse of discretion or violation of law. Cross v. Princeton City School
Dist. Bd. of Education, 49 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 2, 550 N.E.2d 219 (1989). Moreover, the
court of common pleas is confined to the transcript of the proceedings before the
board in making its findings. R.C. 2506.01(A).
{¶9} There is a crucial preliminary issue not raised by either party on appeal.
Appellant was a high school junior when the instant disciplinary issue occurred.
There is no evidence that Appellant failed to move ahead to his next year of school,
graduate from high school or any evidence presented that the suspension was made
part of Appellant’s permanent record. In fact, Appellant neither below nor here
presents evidence of any damages as part of his claim. Appellant did not request an
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expungement, nor did he seek monetary damages. Appellant asks only that the
court find the Board policy unconstitutional.
{¶10} Recently the Eight District held that a student seeking judicial review of
a school district’s decision to expel him was moot and the matter was dismissed.
Burton v. Cleveland Hts.–Univ. Hts. School Dist., 8th Dist. No. 103415, 2016-Ohio-
2841. In Burton, the appellate court concluded that the mootness doctrine precluded
a review of the appeal, concluding that although graduation from high school does
not automatically render an appeal moot, if the student’s permanent record does not
contain any reference to the discipline, the administrative appeal is moot. Id. at ¶ 12
citing, Dreyfus v. Lakewood City Schools, 8th Dist. No. 70004, 1996 WL 502149, *3-4
(Sept. 5, 1996). See also Lewis v. Ohio High School Athletic Assn., 5th Dist. No.
2015CA00009, 2015-Ohio-3459.
{¶11} In the case sub judice, there is no evidence in the record that Appellant
did not graduate. Moreover, there is no evidence that the two-day out-of-school
suspension became part of Appellant’s permanent high school record or, frankly, of
any damages suffered by Appellant. “American courts will not decide * * * cases in
which there is no longer any actual controversy.” In re A.G., 139 Ohio St.3d 572,
2014-Ohio-2597, 13 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 37, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1100 (9th
Ed.2009). “Although a case may be moot with respect to one of the litigants, this
court may hear the appeal where there remains a debatable constitutional question
to resolve, or where the matter appealed is one of great public or general interest.”
Id.
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{¶12} There exists no such issue here, as the issue presented and argued is
clearly factual and does not actually raise a constitutional issue, nor is there a
question that could arguably be of great public interest. Therefore, Appellant’s
appeal is declared moot based on the lack of any justiciable issue ripe for review.
{¶13} We must also note that the record reveals Appellant failed to appeal the
original Saturday School suspension. As it was the failure to report for detention that
lead to the suspension here, and detention was never appealed, this precludes an
appeal of the subsequent two-day suspension.
{¶14} Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant’s assignments of error to be
moot. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DeGenaro, J., concurs in judgment only.
Robb, P.J., concurs.