J-S59039-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
JAMES POWELL
No. 2460 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order July 31, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division
at No(s): MC-51-CR-0048966-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and FITZGERALD,* J.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2017
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”), which granted Appellee James
Powell’s petition to file an interlocutory appeal and dismissed his
misdemeanor driving under the influence (“DUI”) charge pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S. § 110. The Commonwealth argues it is not required to bring all
summary, misdemeanor, and felony charges in a single court proceeding.
Pursuant to this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto,
___ A.3d ___, 2017 PA Super 281, 2017 WL _____ (Aug. 30, 2017) (en
banc), we reverse the CCP’s order and remand for further proceedings.
The CCP summarizes the relevant facts and procedural history of this
case as follows:
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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[O]n December 1, 2012, Appellee . . . was arrested in
Philadelphia after officers observed him disregard a red
light, and observed that he had bloodshot eyes, a relaxed
demeanor, and that there was a moderate odor of
marijuana coming from the automobile. [Appellee] was
arrested and subsequently charged with the misdemeanor
offense of [DUI], and summary offenses for traffic
violations, including: Disregarding a Red Light, Driving
Without a License, and Driving a Vehicle with Registration
Suspended. On February 14, 2013, [Appellee] was found
guilty in [absentia of] all three traffic code violations in the
Philadelphia Traffic Court; the DUI charge was not
adjudicated on that date. On June 12, 2015, [Appellee]
moved to dismiss the DUI charge in Municipal Court . . .
arguing that the Commonwealth was barred from
prosecuting him under the compulsory joinder provisions
of 18 Pa.C.S. § 110[(1)](ii) because he was previously
prosecuted for and convicted of traffic violations arising
from the same criminal episode. On that date, [the
Municipal Court] denied [Appellee’s] motion. [Appellee]
then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal to the [CCP].
On July 31, 2015, the [CCP] granted [Appellee’s] petition
and dismissed the charges pursuant to Rule 110.
Trial Ct. Op., 1/28/16, at 1-2 (footnote and record citation omitted). The
Commonwealth timely appealed and filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issue: “Did the
[CCP] err when, in contravention of Supreme Court precedent, it dismissed
misdemeanor charges pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 based on the prior
adjudication of summary traffic offenses?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder statute states, in relevant part:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense
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Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is
based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in
a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating
to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the
same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
* * *
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or
arising from the same criminal episode, if such
offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting
officer at the time of the commencement of the first
trial and occurred within the same judicial
district as the former prosecution unless the
court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such
offense[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
In Perfetto, this Court determined that 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302, which
governs the jurisdiction of traffic courts, creates an exception to the
compulsory joinder rule. Perfetto at *13. The Perfetto Court reasoned
that under Section 1302 traffic courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
summary traffic violations. Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(b) (“[t]he
jurisdiction of a traffic court under this section shall be exclusive of the
courts of common pleas . . . .”) We concluded, “[W]here a defendant is
charged with a summary traffic violation, a misdemeanor, and a felony, in
judicial districts with a traffic court, the Title 75 summary offense may be
disposed of in a prior proceeding in the traffic court, which has exclusive
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jurisdiction to hear it, without violating the compulsory joinder rule.”
Perfetto at *14.
Here, an earlier prosecution in the former Philadelphia Traffic Court1
resulted in a conviction of Appellee’s summary traffic violations, the DUI
offense arose from the same criminal episode as the summary offenses, and
the prosecutor during the traffic court proceeding would have known of the
DUI offense, as it was charged at the same time as the summary offenses.
See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1)(ii). Furthermore, all of Appellee’s offenses
occurred within the single judicial district of Philadelphia. See id.
Nevertheless, Philadelphia has a designated traffic court that had exclusive
jurisdiction to hear Appellee’s summary traffic violations. See Perfetto at
*13-14; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302(b). Accordingly, Perfetto applies in
this case and dictates that a subsequent prosecution for DUI in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court General Division is permissible under the
compulsory joinder rule. See Perfetto at *13-14. Therefore, we conclude
that the CCP erred in granting Appellee’s petition to dismiss the DUI charge
under Section 110, and we reverse the order and remand for further
proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
1
At the time of Appellee’s offenses, Philadelphia had a separate traffic court
that adjudicated his summary traffic violations. However, as of June 19,
2013, Philadelphia restructured the Municipal Court into two sections, the
General Division and the Traffic Division, which absorbed the former Traffic
Court.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/22/2017
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