16‐2950‐bk
In re: Residential Capital, LLC
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 4th day of October, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT:
DENNY CHIN,
CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
Circuit Judges,
JANE A. RESTANI,
Judge.*
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IN RE: RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL, LLC,
Debtor,
MICHAEL EDWARD BOYD,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 16‐2950‐bk
* Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
RESCAP BORROWER CLAIMS TRUST,
Defendant‐Appellee.
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FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: Michael Edward Boyd, pro se, Soquel,
California.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: Norman S. Rosenbaum, Jordan A. Wishnew,
Jessica J. Arett, Morrison & Foerster LLP, New
York, New York.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Castel, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐appellant Michael Edward Boyd, proceeding pro se, appeals from
the district courtʹs judgment entered July 29, 2016, affirming an order of the bankruptcy
court for the Southern District of New York (Glenn, B.J.). Boyd filed a proof of claim
with the bankruptcy court based on claims he raised in a 2011 lawsuit in the Northern
District of California against GMAC Mortgage, LLC (ʺGMACMʺ), the servicer of loans
secured by mortgages on two of Boydʹs California properties. The Northern District of
California dismissed the claims, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. The bankruptcy court sustained the objection of defendant‐appellee
ResCap Borrower Claims Trust (the ʺTrustʺ) to Boydʹs proof of claim in an order entered
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September 8, 2015, concluding that his claim was barred by res judicata. We assume the
partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the
issues on appeal.
On appeal, Boyd argues principally that the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction to resolve his state law claims. Boyd also seeks review of the New York
district courtʹs denial of his motion to transfer the case to the California district court.
ʺIn an appeal from a district courtʹs review of a bankruptcy court decision,
we review the bankruptcy court decision independently, accepting its factual findings
unless clearly erroneous but reviewing its conclusions of law de novo.ʺ In re Enron Corp.,
419 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting In re AroChem Corp., 176 F.3d 610, 620 (2d Cir.
1999)).
We agree with the district court that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction
over Boydʹs claim. A bankruptcy courtʹs ʺpower to enter appropriate orders and
judgments . . . hinges on whether the proceeding is core or related.ʺ In re CBI Holding,
Co., 529 F.3d 432, 460 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Core proceedings include ʺallowance or disallowance of claims against the estate.ʺ 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B). A claimant who files a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court
ʺtriggers the process of ʹallowance and disallowance of claims,ʹ and, therefore, a creditor
who files such a claim subjects itself to the bankruptcy courtʹs equitable jurisdiction in
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proceedings affecting that claim.ʺ In re CBI Holding, 529 F.3d at 466 (citation omitted).
When Boyd filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court in 2011, he ʺinvoke[d] the
special rules of bankruptcy concerning objections to the claim.ʺ In re S.G. Phillips
Constructors, Inc., 45 F.3d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Boydʹs proof of claim was based on his state law claims, and by filing the
proof of claim, he submitted to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Hence, the
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over Boydʹs claim.
We also agree with the district courtʹs denial of Boydʹs request to transfer
his appeal to the Northern District of California. Appeal is permitted only ʺto the
district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy judge is serving,ʺ in this
case, the Southern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Boyd failed to put
forth any argument in support of his challenge to the denial of venue transfer.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying transfer.
. . .
We have considered Boydʹs remaining arguments and find them to be
without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
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