IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 16–1290
Filed October 20, 2017
BRIAN JAMES MAXWELL,
Appellant,
vs.
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P.
McLellan, Judge.
Defendant convicted of sex offense appeals district court ruling
requiring him to register as a sex offender while he appealed his
conviction after posting an appeal bond. AFFIRMED.
Brandon Brown and Gina Messamer of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn
Boles Gribble Gentry Brown & Bergmann L.L.P., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and John R. Lundquist,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
2
WATERMAN, Justice.
This appeal raises a question of first impression: whether a
defendant convicted of a sex offense must register as a sex offender
under Iowa Code chapter 692A (2015) during his direct appeal of the
conviction. The defendant argues he had no obligation to register after
posting an appeal bond to stay execution of the underlying criminal
judgment and before he began serving any prison sentence or was placed
on probation. The Iowa Department of Public Safety (DPS), however,
construed the statute to require his registration upon his conviction for
the sex offense, notwithstanding his appeal. He challenged the DPS’s
legal conclusion in a petition for judicial review under Iowa Code chapter
17A. The district court ruled he was required to register as of the date
he was sentenced to prison for the sex offense and was released on the
appeal bond. His conviction for the underlying sex offense was later
affirmed on direct appeal. Meanwhile, he now faces new criminal
charges for violating chapter 692A’s sex offender residency restrictions
before his conviction was affirmed. The parties urge us to decide the
registration issue through this chapter 17A appeal under the public-
interest exception to the mootness doctrine. We retained this appeal to
do so. 1
On our review, we hold the defendant was required to register as a
sex offender under section 692A.103(1) upon his conviction of the sex
1We reach the merits because “the underlying question is one of public
importance that is likely to reoccur.” Dykstra v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 783 N.W.2d 473, 477
n.2 (Iowa 2010); see also Breeden v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 887 N.W.2d 602, 604 n.3 (Iowa
2016) (applying public-interest exception to mootness doctrine to decide earned-time
credit issue after offender’s release from prison). Moreover, Maxwell argues the
outcome of this appeal still has practical consequences for him because an appellate
reversal would lead to dismissal of the pending criminal charges against him for
violating chapter 692A’s residency restrictions.
3
offense and release on bond, notwithstanding his appeal. The stay of
execution on his criminal judgment during his appeal did not delay the
automatic administrative registration requirement for convicted sex
offenders, and his release on the appeal bond constituted a “release from
incarceration” within the meaning of section 692A.103(1). Accordingly,
we affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On May 11, 2015, Brian James Maxwell was convicted in a
nonjury trial of lascivious conduct with a minor, in violation of Iowa Code
section 709.14. The court of appeals decision affirming his conviction
gave this summary of the evidence:
Maxwell was hired March 1, 2014, to serve as a youth
coordinator for two churches in the Winterset area. During
his introduction to the youth group, Maxwell met the
complaining witness, then age sixteen, and he and his wife
decided to mentor her after she approached them with some
of her personal struggles. . . .
The complaining witness testified Maxwell assaulted
her on March 17 in the downstairs youth room at one of the
churches by undoing her bra and having her lift up her
shirt. She asserted Maxwell then touched, kissed, and
licked her breasts, and rubbed her between her legs over her
clothing . . . .
A week after the incident, the complaining witness
broke down at home and disclosed the events of March 17 to
her father and other members of her family. The police were
called, and the complaining witness underwent a forensic
interview with Mikki Hamdorf at the Blank Children’s
Hospital Regional Child Protection Center. After the
interview and the investigation were completed, charges were
filed against Maxwell that proceeded to trial to the court on
April 21, 2015. After hearing testimony from the victim and
her family, the investigating officer, the pastor and other
staff and members of the church, another member of the
youth group, and Maxwell’s wife and his two sons, the court
issued its verdict finding Maxwell guilty as charged. The
court stated in its ruling that it found “the State’s witnesses
to be credible and the Defendant’s witnesses to not be
credible.”
4
State v. Maxwell, No. 15–1392, 2016 WL 6652361, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Nov. 9, 2016).
Maxwell was never incarcerated while his criminal case was
pending. On August 18, 2015, the district court imposed a one-year
sentence, to begin immediately, and ordered that “after Defendant has
served one hundred twenty (120) days of the sentence, the remainder is
suspended and Defendant is placed on probation for a period of two (2)
years.” Maxwell was also sentenced to a ten-year special sentence
pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.2. The same day, however, Maxwell
filed a notice of appeal and posted an appeal bond. He remained free on
bond.
Two days later, the Fifth Judicial District Department of
Correctional Services (DCS) informed Maxwell that he would not be
required to report for probation or register with the sex offender registry.
However, a month later, the DPS informed Maxwell by letter that he was
required to report to the Madison County sheriff to register as a sex
offender. The letter explained that “unless the attendant conviction has
been ‘reversed or otherwise set aside’ as per IA §692A.101(7), the
conviction qualifies for registration under Iowa Code Chapter 692A.”
Maxwell reported to the Madison County sheriff’s office to complete the
registration process on October 12. Maxwell is currently registered as a
sex offender.
After registering, Maxwell commenced an administrative appeal
through an “Application for Determination” to the DPS. Maxwell also
filed a “Petition for Judicial Review and Application for Injunctive Relief,”
to enjoin the DPS from placing him on the sex offender registry during
his criminal appeal.
5
The DPS issued a “Decision of Determination” on December 30,
concluding that Maxwell was required to register despite his pending
appeal because the conviction had not been “overturned or otherwise set
aside.” DPS identified August 18, 2015, as the date of his placement on
probation.
On April 7, 2016, the district court entered its ruling. The court
initially incorrectly found that Maxwell had served 120 days of his
sentence and was placed on probation. The court concluded Maxwell
had been “released” from incarceration, which triggered his duty to
register. Maxwell filed a “Motion to Enlarge or Amend Findings and to
Reconsider” to address the court’s mistaken assumption that he had
already served time behind bars. DPS agreed that the court’s factual
assumption was mistaken. The district court entered an amended order
acknowledging that Maxwell had not yet served any prison time and was
not yet on probation. The court further noted that DPS had made the
same factual error when it determined that Maxwell was placed on
probation on August 18, 2015—the date of his sentencing. Nevertheless,
the district court reaffirmed that Maxwell was required to register as of
that date notwithstanding his pending appeal of the underlying
conviction while he remained free on bond.
Maxwell filed a “Second Motion to Enlarge or Amend Findings and
to Reconsider.” On July 26, the district court denied the motion, and
Maxwell timely appealed. Meanwhile, the State charged Maxwell with
three counts of “Failure to Comply Sex Offender Registry, Exclusion
Zones,” in violation of Iowa Code section 692A.113. These charges are
set for trial on November 13, 2017.
The court of appeals ultimately affirmed Maxwell’s sex-offense
conviction in his direct appeal. Maxwell, 2016 WL 6652361, at *13.
6
Maxwell applied for further review, which we denied on January 17,
2017. We retained this separate appeal from Maxwell’s judicial review
action.
II. Standard of Review.
This appeal turns on the interpretation of Iowa Code section
692A.103(1) and related provisions. Chapter 692A codifies definitions of
key terms and does not clearly vest the DPS with interpretive authority.
Accordingly, we review the district court’s ruling on statutory
interpretation for correction of errors at law. SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 449 (Iowa 2014); Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 847 N.W.2d 199, 208–09 (Iowa 2014); see also Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(c).
III. Analysis.
We must decide whether Maxwell was required to register as a sex
offender before serving any time while free on bond during his appeal of
the underlying conviction. Iowa Code chapter 692A is entitled “Sex
Offender Registry.” We construe the statute “in light of the legislative
purpose.” In re A.J.M., 847 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa 2014) (quoting State
v. Erbe, 519 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa 1994)). “[T]he purpose of the registry
is protection of the health and safety of individuals, and particularly
children, from individuals who, by virtue of probation, parole, or other
release, have been given access to members of the public.” State v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 843 N.W.2d 76, 81 (Iowa 2014).
Criminal liability can be imposed on a sex offender who violates
chapter 692A. See Iowa Code § 692A.111(1) (“A sex offender who violates
any requirement[] . . . commits an aggravated misdemeanor for a first
offense and a class ‘D’ felony for a second or subsequent offense.”). We
strictly construe the penal provisions of chapter 692A, requiring fair
7
warning of the conduct prohibited, with doubt resolved in favor of the
accused. See State v. Reiter, 601 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa 1999)
(per curiam). We interpret chapter 692A “by considering all parts of the
enactment.” In re A.J.M., 847 N.W.2d at 605.
We begin our analysis with the text of section 692A.103(1), which
provides,
A person who has been convicted of any . . . tier I, tier II, or
tier III [sex] offense . . . shall register as a sex offender as
provided in this chapter if the offender resides, is employed,
or attends school in this state. A sex offender shall, upon a
first or subsequent conviction, register in compliance with
the procedures specified in this chapter, for the duration of
time specified in this chapter, commencing as follows:
a. From the date of placement on probation.
b. From the date of release on parole or work release.
c. From the date of release from incarceration.
....
f. From the date of conviction for a sex offense
requiring registration if probation, incarceration, or
placement ordered pursuant to section 232.52 in a juvenile
facility is not included in the sentencing, order, or decree of
the court, except as otherwise provided in this section for
juvenile cases. 2
Iowa Code § 692A.103(1).
The statute defines “convicted” to mean “found guilty of, pleads
guilty to, or is sentenced or adjudicated delinquent for an act which is an
indictable offense in this state.” Id. § 692A.101(7). But “ ‘[c]onvicted’
does not mean a plea, sentence, adjudication, deferred sentence, or
deferred judgment which has been reversed or otherwise set aside.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). The parties agree that Maxwell was convicted of an
2Paragraphs d and e are inapplicable because those provisions expressly apply
only to minors adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court. Maxwell is an adult who was
tried and convicted as an adult.
8
offense that requires registration. See id. § 692A.102(1)(b)(10) (listing
conviction for “[l]ascivious conduct with a minor in violation of section
709.14” as a tier II offense). Based on this conviction and the ten-year
special sentence he received, Maxwell is required to register for ten
years. 3 His conviction was never reversed or set aside. To the contrary,
Maxwell’s conviction was affirmed on his direct appeal. The fighting
issue is whether Maxwell was required to register during his appeal after
posting an appeal bond and before his incarceration.
Maxwell argues registration should be delayed during his appeal
that challenged the very conviction requiring registration. He notes “[t]he
appeal process exists . . . to weed out error” and that “registration on the
sex offender registry is a severe collateral consequence.” DPS argues
registration is automatically required upon the conviction of a sex offense
and that to delay registration while the defendant is free on bond
pending appeal would leave a convicted sex offender at large without
alerting the community. We conclude, based on the statutory language,
that the legislature has resolved these competing policy choices in favor
of registration.
Unlike other enactments imposing collateral consequences for
criminal convictions, chapter 692A does not require that the conviction
become “final” or otherwise provide for a stay of the registration
requirements pending an appeal of the conviction. To the contrary, the
definition of “convicted” excludes those that are “reversed or otherwise
3See Iowa Code § 692A.106(2) (“A sex offender who has been sentenced to a
special sentence under section 903B.1 or 903B.2, shall be required to register for a
period equal to the term of the special sentence, but in no case not less than the period
specified in subsection 1.”); see also id. § 692A.106(1) (“Except as otherwise provided
. . . , the duration of registration required under this chapter shall be for a period of ten
years.”).
9
set aside.” Id. § 692A.101(7). Neither Maxwell’s appeal nor his appeal
bond reversed or set aside his judgment of conviction. See
Iowa R. App. P. 6.601(4) (governing appeal bonds and stating that “[n]o
appeal shall vacate or affect the judgment or order appealed from”); cf.
Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Van Haaften, 815 N.W.2d 17, 25 (Iowa 2012)
(“[J]udgments are given res judicata effect during appeals.”); Peterson v.
Eitzen, 173 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Iowa 1970) (“The judgment of the trial
court is res judicata until set aside, modified or reversed.”). The
legislature knows how to delay collateral consequences of a conviction
pending an appeal, as shown in several provisions requiring revocation of
driver’s licenses. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 321.209 (“The department . . .
shall revoke the license or operating privilege of an operator upon
receiving a record of the operator’s conviction for any of the following
offenses, when such conviction has become final . . . .” (Emphasis
added.)); Schilling v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa
2002) (“A conviction is final if the defendant has exhausted or waived any
postorder challenge.”); Maguire v. Fulton, 179 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Iowa
1970) (“[W]hen an appeal is taken the conviction is not final until the
avenues of review are exhausted.”); see also Iowa Code § 321J.13(4)
(providing for stay of license revocation pending judicial review). If the
legislature had intended to delay the obligation to register as a sex
offender during an appeal of the sex-offense conviction, presumably it
would have said so by providing for a stay of registration or requiring the
sex-offense conviction to first become final. See State v. Beach, 630
N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 2001) (“Intent may be expressed by the omission,
as well as the inclusion, of statutory terms.”); Farmers Coop. Co. v.
DeCoster, 528 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Iowa 1995) (“[W]here a statute with
respect to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such
10
provision from a similar statute is significant to show a different
intention existed.”).
Under the plain meaning of Iowa Code section 692A.103(1), read
together with the statutory definition of “convicted,” registration is
automatically required for an Iowa resident upon the conviction of the
sex offense unless and until that conviction is reversed or set aside. See
Kruse v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 712 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Iowa 2006) (“[I]t is the
operative command of [Iowa Code chapter 692A] that impose[s] the
registration requirement on the convicted party rather than the judgment
of the court.”).
The parties disagree whether one of the events listed in section
692A.103(1)(a)–(f) such as placement on probation or release from
incarceration must occur to trigger the defendant’s obligation to register
as a sex offender or, rather, whether those events merely start the clock
running to measure “the duration of time specified” in the statute to
remain registered. The DPS argues Maxwell’s conviction and Iowa
residency triggered his duty to register while he was released on the
appeal bond. See Iowa Code § 692A.103(1) (“A person who has been
convicted of any [specified] sex offense . . . shall register as a sex offender
. . . if the offender resides, is employed, or attends school in this state.”
(Emphasis added.)). The qualifying conviction and local residency plainly
are prerequisites to registration under section 692A.103(1). The question
is whether Maxwell, who had not yet been incarcerated or placed on
probation, had to register while free on bond pending his appeal. We
agree with the district court’s conclusion that Maxwell’s release on bond
the day of his sentencing constituted a “release from incarceration”
under section 692A.103(1)(c) that required him to register at that time.
11
Chapter 692A codifies this definition:
“Incarcerated” means to be imprisoned by placing a person in
a jail, prison, penitentiary, juvenile facility, or other
correctional institution or facility or a place or condition of
confinement or forcible restraint regardless of the nature of
the institution in which the person serves a sentence for a
conviction.
Id. § 692A.101(14). The statute does not define “release.” Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “release” as “[t]he action of freeing or the fact of being
freed from restraint or confinement.” Release, Black’s Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014). Maxwell argues he was not “released from
incarceration” because he had not yet been incarcerated when he
appealed and posted his appeal bond to remain free. We disagree. We
previously rejected a similar argument and stated,
The purpose of chapter 692A is clear: to require
registration of sex offenders and thereby protect society from
those who because of probation, parole, or other release are
given access to members of the public. This, we believe, is
the sense in which “release” is used in section 692A.2(1); it is
simply the antithesis of incarceration.
In re S.M.M., 558 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1997) (construing the 1995
Code, which required registration on “the date of placement on
probation, parole, work release, or other release from custody” (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Iowa Code § 692A.2(1) (Supp. 1995))). In that case, we
held registration was required for a juvenile sex offender who was
allowed to remain with his parents and never incarcerated or placed on
probation, parole, or work release. Id. We reach the same conclusion
under section 692A.103(1)(c) (2015)—release means the antithesis of
incarceration and includes release on an appeal bond. 4
4Maxwell devotes four pages in his appellate reply brief to arguing that In re
S.M.M. was abrogated by the 2009 amendments to chapter 692A. See generally 2009
Iowa Acts ch. 119 (rewriting Iowa Code ch. 692A). We see no indication that the 2009
12
The statute distinguishes between incarceration and release
because an incarcerated offender is not required to register, and time
behind bars does not count towards the ten-year period of registration.
Iowa Code § 692A.103(2) (“A sex offender is not required to register while
incarcerated. However, the running of the period of registration is tolled
pursuant to section 692A.107 if a sex offender is incarcerated.”). This
makes sense in light of the purpose of the registry to protect the public
_______________________
amendment abrogated our holding equating release with the antithesis of incarceration.
The 2009 amendment repealed a provision that triggered registration upon placement
on probation, parole, work release, or “other release from custody,” Iowa Code
§ 692A.2(1) (2007) (emphasis added), and replaced that language with section
692A.103(1), including the phrase “release from incarceration,” Iowa Code
§ 692A.103(1)(c) (2015). Incarceration is a form of custody, so a “release from
incarceration” constitutes a “release from custody.” The 2009 amendment does not aid
Maxwell.
Moreover, the 2009 amendment was intended to more closely conform Iowa’s sex
offender registry law to the Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA), Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006. See Div. of
Criminal & Juvenile Justice Planning, Iowa Dep’t of Human Rights, Iowa Sex Offender
Research Council Report to the Iowa General Assembly 5 (2013),
https://humanrights.Iowa.gov/sites/default/files/media/SORC_1-15-13_Final_Report_
%5B1%5D.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20170323233135/https://humanrights.iowa.gov
/sites/default/files/media/SORC_1-15-13_Final_Report[1].pdf]; see also Iowa Code
§ 692A.101(32). Congress enacted the 2006 legislation “based on its conclusion that
existing sex-offender registration and reporting requirements were too readily
circumvented . . . .” United States v. Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir.
2011).
[T]he purpose of SORNA was to “strengthen and increase the
effectiveness of sex offender registration and notification for the
protection of the public, and to eliminate potential gaps and loopholes
under the pre-existing standards by means of which sex offenders could
attempt to evade registration requirements or the consequences of
registration violations.”
Starkey v. Okla. Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004, 1032 n.4 (Okla. 2013) (Winchester, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72
Fed. Reg. 8894, 8895 (interim rule Feb. 28, 2007)). Against that backdrop, we see no
indication the Iowa legislature intended the 2009 amendment to avoid registration for
convicted sex offenders free on bond.
13
from sex offenders living nearby. No protection is needed from an
offender who is behind bars. 5
Thus, other provisions of chapter 692A consistently implement the
immediate registration requirement when the sex “offender is convicted
but not incarcerated.” Id. § 692A.109(2)(a) (The “court shall verify that
the person has completed initial or subsequent registration forms, and
accept the forms on behalf of the sheriff of the county of registration.”);
see also id. § 692A.103(1)(f) (requiring registration from the date of
conviction if no period of probation or incarceration is included in the
sentencing order). Maxwell’s interpretation conflicts with those
provisions. No provision delays registration pending an appeal of the
sex-offense conviction.
The sentencing order committed Maxwell to the custody to the
Madison County sheriff the same day, to begin serving his sentence in
the jail there. Maxwell delayed his 120-day term of incarceration
through the appeal bond—that is, he was “released on bail.” See Iowa
Code § 814.13 (“An appeal or application for discretionary review taken
by the defendant does not stay the execution of the judgment unless the
defendant is released on bail or otherwise as provided by law.”); Iowa
R. Crim. P. 2.26(2)(a) (“A sentence of confinement shall be stayed if an
appeal is taken and the defendant is released pending disposition of
appeal pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 814.”). Put another way, Maxwell,
“by posting the bond, obtained his liberty” until his appeal was
concluded. State v. Friend, 212 Iowa 136, 142, 236 N.W. 20, 23 (1931).
5Maxwell argues that requiring registration before his incarceration would
extend the ten-year registration period. Not so. The ten-year clock stops while he is
incarcerated, but his time on the registry while free on the appeal bond before he serves
time counts day-for-day toward his ten-year period on the registry. Iowa Code
§§ 692A.103(2), .107(1).
14
But his registration as a sex offender is an administrative matter
committed to the DPS, not the sentencing court. See State v. Bullock,
638 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Iowa 2002) (“[T]he length of any required
registration [under chapter 692A] is an administrative decision initially
committed to the Department of Public Safety.”). Thus, no execution on
the judgment of conviction is necessary to trigger placement on the sex
offender registry. For that reason, the appeal bond that delayed
execution of the criminal judgment and sentence had no effect on the
registration requirement automatically triggered by his conviction. See
Iowa Code § 692A.103(1); see also Kruse, 712 N.W.2d at 699 (registration
automatically required under chapter 692A upon a sex-offense
conviction). We found no cases applying equivalent sex offender registry
statutes that allow an appeal bond to delay registration.
IV. Disposition.
For those reasons, we affirm the ruling of the district court
upholding the DPS determination that Maxwell was required to register
as a sex offender while free on bond during his direct appeal.
AFFIRMED.