IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 15–0829
Filed October 27, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
KHASIF RASHEED WHITE,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey D.
Farrell, Judge.
Appellant challenges imposition of minimum term of incarceration
without eligibility for parole following a resentencing hearing. DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Jane M. White of Jane White Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and James Ward,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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CADY, Chief Justice.
In this case, we must decide if the hearing conducted by the
district court to determine if a juvenile offender should be sentenced to a
minimum term of incarceration without eligibility for parole complied
with constitutional safeguards. We conclude it did not. We vacate the
decision of the court of appeals, reverse the sentence of the district court,
and remand for resentencing.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Khasif White was convicted and sentenced for three separate
crimes of robbery in the second degree. The crimes were committed over
a period of seven months, while White was seventeen years old. The first
crime occurred on August 1, 2009. White shoplifted a bottle of liquor
from a grocery store and assaulted a store employee who attempted to
detain him. The second crime occurred on September 12, 2009. White
shoplifted merchandise from a clothing store and assaulted a store
employee who attempted to detain him. The third crime occurred five
months later on February 20, 2010. White assaulted another person and
attempted to take money from him. On each occasion, White was aided
in his crimes by other individuals.
White was sentenced for his crimes on July 27, 2010. The court
imposed a ten-year term of incarceration for each offense and imposed a
statutory seven-year mandatory minimum period of incarceration
without parole pursuant to Iowa Code section 902.12(5) (2009). The
court ordered the three sentences to be served concurrently.
Four years later, the statutory period of incarceration before
eligibility for parole for juveniles was found to be unconstitutional
without an individualized assessment by the district court. See State v.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 400–04 (Iowa 2014). On April 30, 2015, White
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appeared for resentencing to allow the district court to consider if he
should serve the seven-year period of incarceration before becoming
eligible for parole. White testified at the hearing, as did his mother. The
State introduced a summary of White’s record of disciplinary actions
while in prison.
The district court concluded White should serve the seven-year
period of incarceration before eligibility for parole. It primarily relied on
two factors. First, it found that White’s repeated arrests for criminal
behavior as a juvenile revealed he had gained an understanding of the
risks and consequences of his actions. It reasoned this greater
understanding made him more mature and less impetuous. Second, it
found White’s prison record showed he had not grown more amenable to
rehabilitation while in prison.
White appealed and raised two claims of error. First, White
claimed the district court failed to properly consider all relevant
sentencing factors, including his family and home environment. He also
claimed the district court improperly considered the circumstances of his
three arrests as an aggravating factor, instead of as a mitigating factor.
He further argued the district court misused his prison record in
considering his capacity for rehabilitation.
Second, White claimed the district court had no authority to
impose a minimum period of incarceration without parole under Iowa
Code section 902.12 (2015). He claims the statute is unconstitutional as
applied to juveniles.
We transferred the case to the court of appeals. It rejected both
claims of error. It concluded the district court properly considered the
relevant sentencing factors. It also concluded the resentencing hearing
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cured the constitutional infirmity of the mandatory minimum sentencing
under section 902.12. White sought, and we granted, further review.
II. Standard of Review.
Our standard of review from a decision by the district court to
impose a period of incarceration without parole on a juvenile is for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137–38 (Iowa 2017).
III. Application of Sentencing Factors.
We recently elaborated on the role of the district court in
considering the eligibility of the juvenile offender for parole and how the
primary factors relevant to the decision are to be considered at the
sentencing hearing. Id. at 143–48. In particular, we emphasized the
important role of expert testimony when applying the relevant factors.
Id. at 145–48. The same scientific evidence responsible for revealing the
constitutional infirmity of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes for
juveniles must continue to inform judges in performing their difficult job
of applying the relevant factors to decide if juveniles should be ineligible
for parole for a minimum period of their incarceration. This testimony
can help to explain juvenile behavior in the context of the relevant factors
and give new understanding of the factors. It may even caution judges
against using past attitudes and reasoning about juvenile crimes when
applying the factors. Under this approach, actual sentencing outcomes
will become better aligned with the purpose and goal of eliminating overly
harsh sentences for juveniles.
In this case, the critical conclusions drawn by the district court at
the sentencing hearing were not grounded in science but rather based on
generalized attitudes of criminal behavior that may or may not be correct
as applied to juveniles. Juvenile sentencing is now driven in large part
by the development of brain science, and more evidence was needed for
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the district court to properly conclude White was more mature and less
impetuous because his three arrests gave him a greater appreciation of
the risks and consequences of his actions. Likewise, more evidence was
needed to conclude White’s discipline record in prison made him less
amenable to rehabilitation.
We recognize the district court in this case did not have the benefit
of Roby at the time of the resentencing hearing. Had the decision been
available, we are confident the district court would have followed a more
rigorous and careful analysis of the relevant sentencing factors.
Nevertheless, an abuse of discretion occurred and White is entitled to be
resentenced under the approach identified in Roby.
IV. Sentencing Authority of the District Court.
We reject the claim by White that the district court had no
authority to resentence him under Iowa Code section 902.12. In Lyle, we
found the statute unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Iowa Constitution, but only because the period
of incarceration without parole was imposed without an individualized
hearing. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402–03. Thus, Lyle did not declare the
entire statute unconstitutional, but merely wrote into the statute the
requirement of an individualized assessment hearing.
V. Conclusion.
We conclude White is entitled to be resentenced in light of Roby.
Accordingly, we reverse the resentencing order of the district court and
remand the case for resentencing.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Wiggins, Hecht, and Appel, JJ., join this opinion. Hecht, J.,
separately files a special concurrence. Appel, J., separately files a special
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concurrence in which Wiggins, J., joins. Mansfield, J., files a dissenting
opinion in which Waterman and Zager, JJ., join.
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#15–0829, State v. White
HECHT, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the court’s determination that Khasif White’s sentence
must be vacated. I again write separately because I have concluded “that
article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits a mandatory term
of incarceration for any offense committed by a juvenile offender.” State
v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 149 (Iowa 2017) (Hecht, J., concurring
specially).
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#15–0829, State v. White
APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
For the reasons stated in my special concurrence in State v. Roby,
for now I join the court’s opinion. 897 N.W.2d 127, 150 (Iowa 2017)
(Appel, J., concurring). I reiterate, “If implementation of this decision
proves inconsistent, confusing, difficult, or unworkable, the obvious
solution would be to move to the analysis in [State v.] Sweet, [879
N.W.2d 811 (Iowa 2016),] and categorically eliminate the application of
adult mandatory minimum sentences to juvenile offenders.” Id.
Wiggins, J., joins this special concurrence.
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#15–0829, State v. White
MANSFIELD, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would not find that the district court
abused its discretion. As a practical matter, the district court’s April 30,
2015 resentencing order required Mr. White to serve approximately two
more years in prison before becoming eligible for parole. This falls well
within the district court’s “broad discretion” in these matters. See State
v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 161 (Iowa 2017) (Zager, J., dissenting).
As noted by the majority, White was convicted of three second-
degree robberies. The most serious was the third, which White
committed in February 2010 when he was less than two months short of
his eighteenth birthday. White and two companions waited as an
immigrant who spoke little English cashed a $480 check at a
convenience store. They then followed this man back to his apartment.
While one companion held the man down, White punched and kicked the
man in the face and demanded the money. Others in the apartment
building apparently heard the commotion and came to the man’s
assistance. White and the companions ran off but were apprehended.
The man suffered visible abrasions on his forehead, nose, and leg as a
result of White’s assault.
White pled guilty to all three robberies under an agreement that
the parties would recommend concurrent sentences. Second-degree
robbery carries a ten-year sentence and, at that time, a requirement that
the person serve seventy percent of the sentence before being eligible for
parole. See Iowa Code § 711.3; id. §§ 902.9(4), .12(5) (2009). White
received the jointly recommended concurrent sentences in July 2010.
In September 2014, White filed for resentencing in light of State v.
Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa 2014). Before his resentencing took place,
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the district court ordered the department of corrections to provide a
progress report. The report described White’s “lengthy history of
disciplinary action” including “thirty-two major reports.” Notably, even
as the resentencing proceeding was pending, White incurred three
additional major reports. By then, White was almost twenty-three years
old. He was at offender privilege level 1 (on a 0 to 4 scale) and was not
eligible for a job or any prison programming at that level.
Reasonable people can debate the appropriateness of the sentence
in this case. Personally, I am convinced that White would have
committed more crimes if he had not been incarcerated in 2010, but I
question the length of time he has been required to serve. This seems
too severe to me.
Yet I see no basis for my views to displace those of the district
court. That court clearly considered all the Miller/Ragland factors. Here
are the factors:
(1) the “chronological age” of the youth and the features of
youth, including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the “family and
home environment” that surrounded the youth; (3) “the
circumstances of the . . . offense, including the extent of [the
youth’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial
and peer pressures may have affected [the youth]”; (4) the
“incompetencies associated with youth—for example, [the
youth’s] inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors
(including on a plea agreement) or [the youth’s] incapacity to
assist [the youth’s] own attorneys”; and (5) “the possibility of
rehabilitation.”
State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 n.6 (Iowa 2013) (alterations in
original) (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78, 132 S. Ct.
2455, 2468 (2012)). And here are some relevant excerpts from what the
court said at the resentencing:
You had a very experienced public defender assisting you,
although you were new to the criminal process in the sense
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of, you know, being in adult court facing felony charges. So I
appreciate that and I understand that.
Your family and home environment is something that
we learned a little bit about today from your mother with
regard to your father. I think that’s something that the
higher court wants the court, such as a judge such as
myself, to consider, because it does have an impact when
you see . . . someone, in your case father figure, committing
harmful acts, potential criminal acts, and the way youth
react to that. We understand it’s not always positive and
you’re getting leadership in the wrong way. So I do
appreciate that.
....
. . . [T]hose three offenses, I think, need to be
considered more seriously than the instance where there’s
just the one. That . . . plays directly into factor number
three, but I think also it plays to factor number one. . . . I
think the failure to appreciate risk and consequences go
down as there are additional offenses. If you commit one
and you do it again and then you do it again, I think as you
repeated offenses, the appreciation of the risk and
consequences becomes greater through the additional
offenses.
So we get down to five. Possibility of rehabilitation,
capacity for change. That’s something that’s really
important for me. . . .
Your record isn’t that good. And I appreciate what you
say and particularly appreciate what your mother said. . . .
But, you know, a lot of times actions speak louder than
words. I would understand going to prison at 17 and having
some problems adjusting, that I would understand. But
your problems went on from 2010 through 2011 into 2012 to
the point where you got into this program that sent you over
to Fort Madison. There you did pretty well. And if that had
been sustained in total, maybe I would look at it a little
differently, though it would be tougher.
Then you got back to Anamosa and you had three
major reports, including another assault. And the assault,
you spoke to that, which I appreciate, but the assault is of
concern.
Today’s decision holds that what the district court did wasn’t good
enough. The district court not only needed to apply the Miller/Ragland
factors to Mr. White, something it clearly did, but it also needed to
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ground its application in juvenile brain science as filtered through expert
testimony. Justice Zager has already thoroughly critiqued this
fundamental redefinition of the Miller/Ragland factors. See Roby, 897
N.W.2d at 154–57, 161. I will not restate what he said in his Roby
dissent. I will offer only two additional, hopefully new observations.
First, the majority confuses the general and the specific. It is one
thing to say that science indicates that the brains of juveniles, in general,
are less developed than those of adults. This was what the United States
Supreme Court concluded in Miller. In the Supreme Court’s view, this
difference justified the elimination of a particularly harsh sentencing
option for juveniles—mandatory life-without-parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at
470–71, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
However, it is quite another thing to say it is possible to
scientifically calibrate the sentence of any particular juvenile offender.
This seems to me a fool’s errand given what we know today. Criminal
sentencing may be many things, but it isn’t science.
To quote one observer who is sympathetic to the recent shift in
juvenile sentencing law:
We can look at a brain scan of a broad cross-section of
adolescents and compare that with a brain scan of a broad
cross-section of adults and see significant differences that
might well justify substantial legal distinctions. But we
neither know, nor even could know, where a particular
adolescent is on the developmental curve.
Paul S. Davies & Peter A. Alces, Neuroscience Changes More than You
Can Think, 2017 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 141, 155 (2017).
Reread the five Miller/Ragland factors I’ve quoted above. These
aren’t matters of science. They are more accurately described as “tools
for weighing juvenile culpability.” That is why no one, until this court in
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Roby, found that they needed to be presented to the sentencing court
through expert testimony.
I fear that requiring a “scientific” basis for any mandatory
minimum sentence, regardless of the crimes committed or the length of
sentence, is simply a backdoor way of eliminating mandatory minimums.
Second, the majority continues to focus only on procedure, not
substance. Telling district courts they need to utilize science and expert
testimony in making their findings isn’t helpful until you tell them what
they need to find. In the context of life-without-parole sentences, the
United States Supreme Court has been clear: no life-without-parole
sentence unless the “crime[] reflects irreparable corruption.” Montgomery
v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (quoting Miller,
567 U.S. at 479–80, 132 S. Ct. at 2469).
Similar clarity regarding the Iowa standard would benefit our
district judges. Our court has extended Miller to all mandatory
minimums but has yet to say what the substantive standard is. Plainly
it isn’t “irreparable corruption”; we are talking in this case about a seven-
year mandatory minimum. Still, our court hasn’t told district courts
what that standard is. This isn’t about moving the goal posts. The court
has yet to erect the goal posts.
Again, I fear the court’s reluctance to provide some description of a
constitutionally adequate mandatory minimum sentence for a juvenile
means we are just on a way station toward eliminating all mandatory
minimums for juveniles.
For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in Justice Zager’s
Roby dissent, I would affirm the district court’s resentencing order.
Waterman and Zager, JJ., join this dissent.