SECOND DIVISION
MILLER, P. J.,
DOYLE and REESE, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
October 25, 2017
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A17A1284. EMANUEL, et al. v. KAUTZ.
MILLER, Presiding Judge.
This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. In Kautz v. Powell,
297 Ga. 283 (773 SE2d 690) (2015) (Kautz I), the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed
this Court and the trial court by finding that Kelly D. Kautz had authority to terminate
the City Attorney when she was mayor of the City of Snellville. Id. at 284. On
remand, the trial court awarded Kautz the attorney fees she incurred in successfully
pursuing her appeal in Kautz I. In this case, Dave Emanuel, in his official capacity as
Council Member, along with the other city council members (collectively the “City”),
appeal from the trial court’s award of fees, alleging that an award of appellate
attorney fees is not permitted. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Kautz
was entitled to an award of reasonable fees for the work done on appeal which was
necessitated by her inability to obtain the relief requested from the trial court.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s award of appellate attorney fees to Kautz.
Although the facts surrounding the various disputes between Kautz and the
City are lengthy and have sparked three separate appeals,1 the facts relevant to the
present appeal are simple. Due to a conflict of interest between Kautz and the City
Attorney that she was seeking to terminate, Kautz, in her official capacity, retained
independent counsel to litigate the issue of her authority to terminate the City
Attorney. After prevailing in Kautz I, Kautz moved for attorney fees in the trial court.
It is undisputed that the City and Kautz reached a resolution concerning payment of
fees incurred by Kautz at the trial level. At issue in this appeal are solely the attorney
fees billed for the successful appellate work in Kautz I. The trial court held hearings,
heard testimony, and ultimately awarded Kautz $52,005.00 in appellate fees and
$8,094.45 in appellate expenses.
1. The City contends that the trial court erred in awarding fees incurred for
appellate work to Kautz. We disagree.
1
This Court decided an appeal over attorney fees for a separate dispute in
October 31, 2016. Bender et al. v. Kautz (A16A0787, October 31, 2016).
2
[W]here, as here, an official, acting in [her] official capacity, is required
to hire outside counsel to assert a legal position the local government
attorney cannot (because of a conflict in representing the local
government) or will not assert, and the official is successful in asserting
his or her position, the local government must pay the official’s attorney
fees. This is not because of any bad faith or improper conduct on the
part of the local government . . . Rather, attorney fees in this instance are
simply an expense of government operation.
Gwinnett County. v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504, 508-509 (2) (458 SE2d 791) (1995). This
Court has specifically found this rule to apply to municipal government officials. City
of Stockbridge v. Stuart, 329 Ga. App. 323, 329 (3) (765 SE2d 16) (2014). The City
does not dispute that Kautz was acting in her official capacity in pursuing Kautz I,
that she prevailed in Kautz I, or that a conflict existed which prevented the City
Attorney from representing Kautz. Thus, the only question is whether fees are
available for work done on appeal.
We conclude that Kautz is entitled to fees for her appeal. The purpose of Yates
fees is to reimburse a government official for “an expense of government operation.”
Yates, supra, 25 Ga. at 509 (2). “[T]he official’s entitlement to attorney fees depends
on [her] success in asserting [her] position in court.” Heiskell v. Roberts, 295 Ga. 795,
803 (4) (764 SE2d 368) (2014). Although Kautz was unsuccessful before the trial
3
court, she ultimately prevailed in her appeal. To award her attorney fees for trial but
not for the appeal, where she was successful in asserting her position, would both
contravene the language of Yates and disregard the fundamental purpose of Yates
fees.
In Jennings v. McIntosh County. Bd. of Comm’rs, 276 Ga. 842, 847 (5) (583
SE2d 839) (2003), our Supreme Court cited Yates and concluded that the county
official was entitled to fees because she prevailed on her principal claim. In a
seemingly incongruous footnote in Jennings, however, the Court made a passing
reference that “Jennings is incorrect in her assertion in argument that her award of
costs should include her attorney fees in bringing this appeal.” See id. fn. 8 (relying
on David G. Brown, P.E. v. Kent, 274 Ga. 849 (561 SE2d 89) (2002)).
We find the footnote in Jennings to be limited to the facts of that case, and we
do not interpret it to dictate the outcome of the case before us. First, the Court in
Jennings relied on Boswell v. Bramlett, 274 Ga. 50 (549 SE2d 100) (2001), a case
procedurally indistinguishable from the instant case, in which the county official lost
in the trial court but prevailed on appeal. In Boswell, our Supreme Court expressly
stated that the government official was entitled to attorney fees. 274 Ga. at 52-53 (3).
Additionally, neither Yates nor Boswell, which are cited in the text of the Jennings
4
opinion, explicitly confined the award of fees to those incurred at the trial level. See
Jennings, supra, at 844 (5); Boswell, supra, 272 Ga. at 53 (3); Yates, supra, 265 Ga.
at 509 (2). Moreover, the Jennings footnote cites to a case that involved an award of
fees under OCGA § 13-6-11. See David G. Brown, supra, 274 Ga. at 90. That statute
addresses permissible fees when a defendant has acted in bad faith, has been
stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense. See
OCGA § 13-6-11. As our case involves fees under Yates, which serves an entirely
different purpose than the fees in § 13-6-11, we do not construe this footnote to
render appellate fees inapplicable in Kautz’s case. See Yates, 265 Ga. at 508-509 (2)
(recognizing that purpose of awarding fees has nothing to do with bad faith or
improper conduct on the part of the governmental authority).
The rule in Yates is clear: attorney fees are proper when the county official
prevails in a suit that is part of the government expense. That the official prevailed
on appeal, rather than before the trial court, does not negate that the attorney fees
incurred are an expense of government operations. Following the reasoning of Yates
and Boswell, we thus conclude that Kautz is entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney fees for the work done on appeal.
5
2. We next turn to whether the amount of fees is reasonable. The appellants
argue that the amount of fees is not reasonable, and the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding that amount. We find no error.
We review the trial court’s assessment of reasonable fees for abuse of
discretion. See City of Stockbridge v. Stuart, 329 Ga. App. 323, 329 (3) (765 SE2d
16) (2014).
Here, the trial court considered expert testimony about the reasonable and
customary hourly rate, and concluded that $150 per hour was a reasonable amount.
Counsel submitted copies of their invoices, and the parties stipulated that the invoices
were correct. To show the amount awarded was unreasonable, appellants argue only
that there were three law firms involved in solely a minimal amount of work, but they
cite no case law in support of their position. Based on the invoices submitted by
Kautz’s attorneys, the trial court concluded that the work provided was “reasonable,
necessary and valuable,” but significantly reduced the award of fees from the nearly
$100,000 requested to $52,005. The appellants have not shown that the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding this reduced sum. Accordingly, we affirm both
Kautz’s entitlement to fees and the amount of fees awarded.
Judgment affirmed. Doyle and Reese, JJ., concur.
6