J-A24005-17
2017 PA Super 361
WALDRON ELECTRIC HEATING AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
COOLING, INC., : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
:
DANIEL P. CASEBER AND MARGARET :
A. CASEBER : No. 161 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-790
BEFORE: MOULTON, J., SOLANO, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2017
I must respectfully disagree with the Majority’s interpretation and
application of 73 P.S. § 517.7(b) and (g).
In this case, the Casebers signed an Agreement pursuant to which
Waldron Electric would install surge and lightning protection for their
residence. On the first business day following the execution of the
Agreement, the Casebers rescinded the Agreement. In the interim,
however, Waldron Electric had installed equipment in the Casebers’
residence. The Majority would hold that, pursuant to section 517.7(g) of the
Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (“HICPA”), Waldron Electric is
permitted to recover the reasonable value of services performed. I believe
that the Majority’s interpretation of HICPA section 517.7 is not consistent
with the statutory construction act, and the plain language of the statute.
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“The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every
statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). “When the words of a statute are clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to look beyond the plain meaning of the
statute “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. § 1921(b). Only
“[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit” may a court resort to the
rules of statutory construction, including those provided in 1 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 1921(c). A statute is ambiguous when there are at least two reasonable
interpretations of the text under review.” Warrantech Consumer Prods.
Servs., Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co. in Liquidation, 96 A.3d 346, 354-55
(Pa. 2014) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
By its plain and clear language, HICPA section 517.7(b) provides for a
right of rescission:
(b) Right of rescission.—An individual signing a home
improvement contract, except as provided in the emergency
provisions of section 7 of the act of December 17, 1968 (P.L.
1224, No. 387), known as the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law, shall be permitted to rescind the
contract without penalty regardless of where the contract was
signed, within three business days of the date of signing.
73 P.S. § 517.7(b) (footnote omitted).
The Majority relies on subsection (g) as supporting the contractor’s
right to seek compensation for work performed in this case. Subsection(g)
provides as follows:
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(g) Contractor’s recovery right.—Nothing in this section shall
preclude a contractor who has complied with subsection (a) from
the recovery of payment for work performed based on the
reasonable value of services which were requested by the owner
if a court determines that it would be inequitable to deny such
recovery.
Id. § 517.7(g).1
In practice, the Majority’s interpretation eviscerates the protection
expressly granted to consumers under HICPA section 517.7(b). Subsection
(b) provides a consumer three days within which to rescind the contract.
Id. § 517.7(b). Under the Majority’s interpretation, a contractor need only
commence work within the three-day period to avoid rescission of the
contract for the work performed within those three days. Such a result is
unreasonable and absurd, given the protections conferred upon the
consumer by the plain language of subsection (b). See 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1922(1) (setting forth the presumption of statutory construction that the
General Assembly “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of
execution or unreasonable.”). Consequently, I would affirm the judgment
entered by the trial court.
____________________________________________
1
Further, it would not be “inequitable to deny such a recovery” to Waldon
Electric. The Casebers presented evidence that before the magistrate’s
hearing, they attempted to return the equipment installed by Waldron
Electric to Mr. Waldron. See Slip Opinion at 5. However, Mr. Waldron
refused the equipment stating, “They’re junk. I don’t want them, they’re
junk.” Id. Where, as here, Waldron Electric performed work during the
three-day rescission period, refused return of its equipment, and told the
consumer that the equipment was “junk,” the equities would not favor
requiring the consumer to pay Waldron Electric.
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