FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
TENTH CIRCUIT December 7, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 17-4021
v. (D. Utah)
(D.C. No. 2:15-CR-00161-TS-1)
CASEY CHESTER ROBERTS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
This appeal grew out of a traffic stop. A highway-patrol trooper
stopped Mr. Casey Roberts for a broken tail light and discovered
contraband in the vehicle. Mr. Roberts unsuccessfully moved to suppress
evidence of the contraband, arguing that the trooper lacked reasonable
suspicion for the traffic stop. We disagree.
The parties agree on most of the underlying facts. Two highway
patrol troopers (Trooper Neighbor and Trooper Harwood) thought that Mr.
*
Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Roberts had a broken tail light and followed him in separate cars. This was
the sequence of cars:
After following for about a minute, Trooper Harwood thought that he saw
the tail light illuminate, so he turned his car around and drove in the
opposite direction. When he did, Trooper Neighbor moved directly behind
Mr. Roberts, following for about eight seconds, which is captured on
videotape. After about eight seconds, Trooper Neighbor initiated a traffic
stop for a broken tail light. 1 Mr. Roberts challenged the stop on the ground
that Trooper Neighbor could not have seen whether the tail light was out.
The district court rejected this challenge, finding that Trooper
Neighbor had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. We review this
finding under the clear-error standard. United States v. Beckstead, 500
F.3d 1154, 1162 (10th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d
1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that the clear-error standard applies to
the review of factual findings “even when . . . there is video tape of the
[traffic] stop”). To apply this standard, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government. Beckstead, 500 F.3d at 1162. We can
1
Under Utah law, cars can be driven only if their lights are in proper
condition. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1601(1)(a)(ii).
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reverse only if the district court’s finding lacks any factual support or if
the entirety of the evidence definitely and firmly convinces us that a
mistake has been made. United States v. Cash, 733 F.3d 1264, 1273 (10th
Cir. 2013).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
we conclude that the district court did not commit clear error. The district
court could base its finding of reasonable suspicion on
testimony by Trooper Neighbor and Trooper Harwood,
testimony by an employee of a tow company, and
testing of the tail lights.
Trooper Neighbor testified that he could see the tail lights illuminate
several times on the passenger’s side and the middle, but each time, the tail
light on the driver’s side remained dark or dim. Trooper Harwood also
testified that he had initially thought that the tail light on the driver’s side
was out. But he changed his mind, thinking that the tail light was working
even though it remained “extremely dim.” R. vol. 1, at 48.
After the stop, Mr. Roberts’s car was driven to an impound lot. The
car was followed by Ms. Tonya Thomas, who worked for a towing
company. She too observed that the tail light on the driver’s side was not
working.
This observation was confirmed by testing of the tail lights by
Trooper Neighbor and Ms. Thomas. During the traffic stop, Trooper
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Neighbor told Mr. Roberts to tap his brakes to see if the tail lights worked.
At first, the tail light on the driver’s side didn’t appear to work. But then
Trooper Neighbor shielded his eyes from the sun and saw a faint glow
inside the driver’s tail light. Similarly, Ms. Thomas checked the tail lights
when the car was at the impound lot. She confirmed that the tail light
sometimes worked and sometimes didn’t.
Mr. Roberts contends that Trooper Neighbor could not have known
whether the tail light on the driver side was working. For this contention,
Mr. Roberts states that
Trooper Neighbor had been behind Trooper Harwood and
videotape of the pursuit does not show a broken tail light.
We must uphold the district court’s finding unless it is “blatantly
contradicted” by the video evidence. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81
(2007).
The video evidence provides little help, for it shows only about eight
seconds of the pursuit and does not necessarily show what Trooper
Neighbor could have seen. For example, Trooper Neighbor testified that he
had been able to see Mr. Roberts’s tail lights as the two cars went uphill,
but the videotape does not show the uphill portion of the pursuit. And we
cannot tell from the videotape whether Trooper Neighbor could have seen
Mr. Roberts’s tail lights illuminate during the eight-second pursuit, for the
videotape does not necessarily capture the entirety of Trooper Neighbor’s
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field of vision. 2 Thus, the videotape is inconclusive, failing to show
whether Mr. Roberts’s tail lights would have been visible to Trooper
Neighbor. In these circumstances, we do not regard the district court’s
finding as clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
2
Mr. Roberts testified that he had not used his brakes during this
eight-second clip. But the district court could reasonably decline to credit
this testimony. La Resolana Architects v. Reno, Inc., 555 F.3d 1171, 1180
(10th Cir. 2009) (noting that a district court does not commit clear error
simply by choosing to credit the testimony of one witness over another).
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