UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4386
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE D. CLARK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., District Judge. (3:04-cr-00056-JAG-1)
Submitted: December 21, 2017 Decided: December 27, 2017
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Mary Maguire, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Stephen Eugene Anthony,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrance D. Clark appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised
release and imposing a sentence of 12 months of imprisonment. Appellate counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the reasonableness of Clark’s
sentence. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “In making this determination, we
first consider whether the [revocation] sentence imposed is procedurally or substantively
is unreasonable.” Id. A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court
adequately explains the sentence after considering the policy statements in Chapter Seven
of the Sentencing Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); see also United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207-09 (4th
Cir. 2017); United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2010). “And a
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court sufficiently states a proper basis
for its conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872
F.3d at 207 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the district
court’s explanation of Clark’s within-policy-statement-range sentence, in discussing the
need for future deterrence in light of Clark’s background and criminal history and pointing
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out Clark’s repeated noncompliance with the terms of his supervised release, easily
satisfies this standard.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Clark, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Clark requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Clark.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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