[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-12036 SEPTEMBER 28, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-00350-CV-HLM-4
DAVID POLLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 28, 2005)
Before CARNES, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David Polley (“Polley”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Mohawk Industries, Inc. (“Mohawk”) on his claims of age
discrimination, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and breach of contract. After
review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1991, plaintiff Polley began working as the president and chief executive
officer (“CEO”) of World Carpets, Inc. (“World Carpets”). In November 1998,
defendant Mohawk purchased World Carpets and entered into a three-year
employment agreement with Polley, dated November 5, 1998. Pursuant to the
employment agreement, Mohawk employed Polley in a newly-formed position
titled “President of Mohawk’s Residential Division.” Mohawk’s president and
CEO, Jeffery Lorberbaum (“Lorberbaum”), created the position specifically for
Polley. On November 5, 2001, Polley’s employment agreement with Mohawk
expired and the parties did not renew the contract. While Polley continued to work
as “President of Mohawk’s Residential Division,” Polley no longer had an
employment agreement, but became an at-will employee.
On December 1, 2001, Lorberbaum created the position of President of
Mohawk’s Carpet Group and appointed Montgomery Thornton (“Thornton”) to
that position. As President of the Carpet Group, Thornton had general
management responsibility for sales, marketing, and product development of
Mohawk’s carpet and hard surface products. Thornton reported directly to
Lorberbaum, and Polley reported to Thornton.
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In early June 2002, Thornton decided to eliminate Polley’s position and
terminate Polley’s employment. According to Thornton, he decided to terminate
Polley’s employment because he “felt [he] could effectively manage all of the sales
and marketing functions of [Mohawk’s] Carpet Group without [Polley’s]
assistance as President of the Residential Division.” Thornton informed
Lorberbaum of the decision, and Lorberbaum approved it.
On June 6 or 7, 2002, Thornton met with Polley and informed him that his
position was being eliminated and that his employment was being terminated.
According to Polley, Polley asked for the cause for the termination, and Thornton
replied “let’s just say it’s to make way for the future.” At the time of his
termination, Polley was 68 years old. However, it is undisputed that Polley’s
position was eliminated and that Mohawk did not hire anyone to fill the eliminated
position.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Polley argues that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on his age discrimination claim. Polley also raises several breach of
contract claims relating to his deferred compensation, severance pay, and the
company car that he used while employed with Mohawk.
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A. Polley’s Age Discrimination Claim
The district court determined that although Polley satisfied his burden of
establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination, Polley was unable to show
that Mohawk’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Polley’s termination –
elimination of the position – was a pretext for discrimination.
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination using
circumstantial evidence by employing the analytical framework established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), and
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct.
1089 (1981). If the plaintiff satisfies his burden of establishing a prima facie case,
“the employer then must offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
employment action.” Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999).
“If the employer does so, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating
that the employer’s proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination.” Id.
We need not decide whether Polley satisfied his burden of establishing a
prima facie case, because Mowhawk clearly had a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for Polley’s termination, and we agree with the district court that Polley is
unable to show pretext in any event. Polley argues that the decision to terminate
him was actually made by Lorberbaum, not Thornton, and that Lorberbaum
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terminated Polley because of Polley’s age. However, both Lorberbaum and
Thornton testified that the decision to terminate Polley was Thornton’s and that
Thornton terminated Polley because his position had become unnecessary.
Further, it is undisputed that Polley’s position was eliminated and that Mohawk did
not hire anyone to fill the eliminated position. Like the district court, we are
unable to find any evidence that would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude
that Mohawk’s reason for terminating Polley was pretext for discrimination.1
Thus, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Mohawk
on Polley’s age discrimination claim.
B. Polley’s Breach of Contract Claims
On appeal, Polley raises several breach of contract claims with respect to
deferred compensation, severance pay, and the company car that he used while
employed with Mohawk.
After review, we conclude that all of the plaintiff’s breach of contract claims
lack merit, and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
Polley’s contract claims for the reasons stated in the district court’s well-reasoned
and thorough March 9, 2005 order.
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We reject Polley’s argument that pretext is evidenced by Thornton’s statement that
Polley’s termination was to “make way for the future.” We do not think there is any evidence of
discriminatory intent to be inferred by this statement.
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AFFIRMED.
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