NO. 12-17-00175-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
RANDRICK RAMAR DUNCAN, § APPEAL FROM THE 7TH
APPELLANT
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Randrick Ramar Duncan appeals the trial court’s assessment of court costs. In one issue,
he argues that some of the court costs imposed on him are unconstitutional. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged by indictment with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit
a felony and the commission of a felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Appellant
pleaded “guilty.” The trial court deferred finding Appellant “guilty” and placed him on
community supervision for ten years.
Thereafter, the State filed a motion to proceed to final adjudication alleging that
Appellant violated certain terms and conditions of his community supervision. At the hearing on
the State’s motion, Appellant pleaded “true” to the allegations in the State’s motion. Ultimately,
the trial court found the allegations in the State’s motion to be “true,” revoked Appellant’s
community supervision, adjudicated him “guilty” as originally charged, and sentenced him to
imprisonment for fifteen years. This appeal followed.
COURT COSTS
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that we should modify the trial court’s judgment and
withdrawal order to remove certain unconstitutional court costs.
Applicable Law
The imposition of court costs upon a criminal defendant is a “nonpunitive recoupment of
the costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the trial of the case.” Johnson v.
State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The consolidated fee statute requires a
defendant to pay a court cost of $133.00 on conviction of a felony. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 133.102(a)(1) (West Supp. 2017). The money received is divided among a variety of state
government accounts according to percentages dictated by the statute. See id. § 133.102(e)
(West Supp. 2017); Salinas v. State, 523 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
In Salinas, the court of criminal appeals held the statute to be unconstitutional with
respect to two of these accounts––an account for “abused children’s counseling” and an account
for “comprehensive rehabilitation.” See Salinas, 523 S.W.3d at 105. As a result, the court set
forth that any fee assessed pursuant to the statute must be reduced pro rata to eliminate the
percentage of the fee associated with these accounts. See id. The court further held that its
holding applies only to (1) a defendant who raised the appropriate claim in a petition for
discretionary review before the date of the court’s opinion, if that petition is still pending on that
date and the claim would otherwise be properly before the court on discretionary review or (2) a
defendant whose trial ends after the mandate in Salinas issues. See id. at 112–13.
Discussion
The State argues that Appellant waived his right to consideration of this issue because he
failed to appeal timely the assessment of costs at the time the trial court rendered its order
placing him on community supervision.
Where an appellant fails to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of being placed on
deferred adjudication community supervision, an appeal raising issues concerning court costs
after final adjudication is not timely with respect to the court costs that were assessed in the order
of deferred adjudication. See Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see also
Wiley v. State, 410 S.W.3d 313, 318, (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (defendant whose community
supervision was revoked forfeited challenge to the court appointed attorney fees as court costs by
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failing to bring direct appeal from order originally imposing community supervision); Manuel v.
State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
In the instant case, when Appellant pleaded “guilty” and was placed on deferred
adjudication community supervision, he explicitly waived his right to appeal. The record further
reflects that Appellant acknowledged in writing his obligation to pay court costs as a condition of
his community supervision. The trial court’s deferred adjudication order sets forth the amount of
court costs at $864.00. Thus, we conclude that Appellant waived his right to appeal the
assessment of the costs at issue. See Perez, 424 S.W.3d at 85; Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 318.
Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BRIAN HOYLE
Justice
Opinion delivered January 3, 2018.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
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COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
JANUARY 3, 2017
NO. 12-17-00175-CR
RANDRICK RAMAR DUNCAN,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
Appeal from the 7th District Court
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-1664-15)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.
Brian Hoyle, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.