UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4348
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAINE DEVON HAYES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:16-cr-00409-TDS-1)
Submitted: December 18, 2017 Decided: January 11, 2018
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Ira Knight, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Mcrae Alsup, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamaine Devon Hayes pled guilty to possession of firearms by a convicted felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). The district court calculated
Hayes’ Guidelines range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2016) at 108 to
120 months’ imprisonment and sentenced him to 117 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence because it did not find that the
condition of a firearm Hayes possessed warranted a downward variance. Hayes was
informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so.
The Government declined to file a brief. We affirm.
We review Hayes’ sentence for reasonableness under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 51 (2007); United States v.
Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111-12 (4th Cir. 2015). In doing so, we examine the sentence for
procedural error, which includes “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 111-12
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). We also review the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Any sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Such a presumption can only be rebutted by a showing that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
We conclude after review of the record that the district court did not abuse its
discretion as Hayes suggests. The firearm’s condition was noted in the presentence
report’s description of Hayes’ offense conduct, and Hayes invoked the condition of the
firearm in his argument at sentencing for a sentence of 108 months or less. The district
court adopted the presentence report in its entirety, heard Hayes’ argument, and
concluded that a 117-month sentence was warranted in light of the nature of Hayes’
offense conduct, his history and characteristics, and the need for the sentence to provide
adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide just punishment, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(C) (2012). In assigning weight to concerns stemming from these
factors and declining to impose a downward variance, the district court did not abuse its
discretion. See United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating
it was within district court’s discretion to accord more weight to a host of aggravating
factors in defendant’s case and decide that the sentence imposed would serve the § 3553
factors on the whole).
Finally, in accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the remainder of the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the
criminal judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Hayes, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Hayes requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
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counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Hayes.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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