NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 19 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARCIA WILSON, No. 17-16264
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:15-cv-00418-BMK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF HAWAII; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Barry M. Kurren, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted January 16, 2018***
Before: REINHARDT, TROTT, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Marcia Wilson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
her employment action alleging violations of Title VII. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1996). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s Title VII
retaliation claim related to her suspension in October 2012 because Wilson failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal
connection between any alleged protected activity and the alleged adverse
employment action. See Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement &
Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth prima facie case
of retaliation under Title VII).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s Title VII
retaliation claim related to the termination of her employment because Wilson
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions were pretextual. See id.
(explaining application of burden-shifting to Title VII retaliation claims); Bradley,
104 F.3d at 270 (to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must “produce specific,
substantial evidence of pretext” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s Title VII
discrimination claim related to the termination of her employment because Wilson
failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether similarly situated
2 17-16264
employees not of her protected class were treated more favorably. See Bergene,
272 F.3d at 1140 (elements of prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 17-16264