NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 28 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SOPHIA RACHELLE WILSON, No. 17-15018
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02407-JJT
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STREAM GLOBAL SERVICES - AZ
INCORPORATED; UNKNOWN
PARTIES,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 26, 2018**
Before: TROTT, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Sophia Rachelle Wilson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her action alleging federal and state law claims against her former
employer. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s race
discrimination claim under Title VII because Wilson failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for its actions were pretextual. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349
F.3d 634, 640–42 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth the burden shifting
framework for Title VII employment discrimination claims).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s hostile
work environment claim under Title VII because Wilson failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s conduct created a hostile work
environment. See id. at 642 (setting forth elements of a hostile work environment
claim under Title VII).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s
retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because Wilson failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal connection between her
protected activity and placing Wilson on job performance success plans. See
Manatt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth
elements of a retaliation claim under § 1981).
2 17-15018
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wilson’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because Wilson failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether conduct by defendants was extreme
and outrageous, or that defendants intended to cause her emotional distress. See
Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth elements
of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arizona law).
We reject as without merit Wilson’s contentions that the district court
improperly made credibility determinations, did not consider evidence, or failed to
provide Wilson with an opportunity to remedy various issues with her filings or
properly argue her case.
In summary, the record amply supports the district court’s analysis of
Wilson’s case:
Despite the Plaintiff’s lack of citation and
compliance with local rules, the Court has searched the
entirety of the record endeavoring to discern the
existence of a triable issue. Having found none, even
when viewing the record in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims untenable,
with no genuine issue of material fact as to any of the
vital elements of her claims. At bottom, all of Plaintiff’s
claims fail for one reason: after the Defendant met its
initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine
issue of material fact, see Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, Plaintiff
failed entirely to counter with a showing of evidence
3 17-15018
sufficient to provide a reasonable jury with a basis to rule
in her favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 254.
Plaintiff’s evidence to substantiate her claims consists
largely of unauthenticated and inadmissible documents,
inadmissible hearsay, unsupported and improbable
inferences, and unsubstantiated testimony and
attestations.
We agree with the district court.
AFFIRMED.
4 17-15018