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SJC-12354
COMMONWEALTH vs. NEWTON N., a juvenile.
Berkshire. November 7, 2017. - February 5, 2018.
Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, &
Kafker, JJ.
Delinquent Child. Probable Cause. Insanity. Mental
Impairment. Juvenile Court, Delinquent child. Practice,
Criminal, Juvenile delinquency proceeding, Complaint,
Arraignment, Dismissal.
Complaint received and sworn to in the Berkshire County
Division of the Juvenile Court Department on June 2, 2016.
A motion to dismiss was heard by Judith A. Locke, J.
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.
Kyle G. Christensen, Assistant District Attorney (Joseph A.
Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the
Commonwealth.
Laura Chrismer Edmonds for the juvenile.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
Miriam H. Ruttenberg, Jennifer Honig, & Phillip Kassel for
Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee & others.
Ryan M. Schiff, Committee for Public Counsel Services, &
Joseph N. Schneiderman for Youth Advocacy Division of the
Committee for Public Counsel Services.
Daniel F. Conley, District Attorney for the Suffolk
2
District, & John P. Zanini, Assistant District Attorney, for
District Attorney for the Suffolk District.
GANTS, C.J. This case presents two important issues
relevant to a Juvenile Court judge's consideration of a
prearraignment motion to dismiss a delinquency complaint.
First, we hold that a judge, in weighing whether the information
contained within the "four corners" of the complaint application
and related exhibits constitutes probable cause, may not
consider whether a juvenile was criminally responsible for the
charged offenses or whether the juvenile's mental impairment
rendered the juvenile incapable of having the requisite criminal
intent. Second, we hold that, where a prosecutor exercises his
or her discretion to proceed to arraignment on a delinquency
complaint supported by probable cause, the judge may not dismiss
the complaint before arraignment on the grounds that dismissal
of the complaint is in the best interests of the child and in
the interests of justice. Because the judge in this case
dismissed the delinquency complaint before arraignment where the
complaint was supported by probable cause and where the
prosecutor wished to proceed to arraignment, we vacate the
dismissal and remand the case to the Juvenile Court. 1
1
We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the district
attorney for the Suffolk district; the youth advocacy division
of the Committee for Public Counsel Services; and the Mental
Health Legal Advisors Committee, on behalf of the Center for
3
Background. On May 25, 2016, a police officer applied for
and obtained a delinquency complaint from a clerk-magistrate,
charging the juvenile with breaking and entering into a building
in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony, in
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 16; breaking and entering into a
vehicle in the nighttime with the intent to commit a felony, in
violation of G. L. c. 266, § 16; larceny over $250, in violation
of G. L. c. 266, § 30 (1); and disorderly conduct, in violation
of G. L. c. 272, § 53. The Commonwealth moved for arraignment
and the juvenile moved prearraignment to dismiss the delinquency
complaint. The Juvenile Court judge, based on the documents
that were submitted as part of the police officer's complaint
application, allowed the juvenile's motion to dismiss and later
issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law.
We summarize the judge's material findings. On May 19,
2016, at approximately 1:35 A.M., police officers were
dispatched to a multiunit apartment complex in North Adams in
response to a report that a young boy wearing an orange shirt
and shorts was making noise and carrying a gun. When the
officers arrived on the scene, they found two long rifles on the
ground near one of the apartments. The officers later recovered
a revolver in the area.
Public Representation, Massachusetts Advocates for Children,
Strategies for Youth, Citizens for Juvenile Justice, and the
Center for Civil Rights Remedies.
4
Officer Ivan Cardeno spoke to the person who had reported
the incident, who told him that she had observed a young male,
approximately ten to twelve years old, enter two vehicles in the
parking lot while carrying a long rifle. She noted that she saw
the boy holding the rifle up and repeatedly pulling the trigger,
without aiming it.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Cardeno was informed that the
boy had been located. As Officer Cardeno approached the boy,
who was wearing an orange T-shirt and shorts and whom he
recognized as the juvenile, he heard the boy loudly cursing at
the officers and attempting to pull away from them. The
juvenile continued this behavior as the officers escorted him
home. The boy sounded "deranged[,] making no sense at times."
The juvenile's behavior and "deranged statements" continued
after he arrived home. He declared himself to be "Satan" and
said "we have weapons" and "we are going to kill everyone." 2 His
mother informed the officers that he had experienced an outburst
earlier that day in Albany, New York, to which the police had
responded, but that nothing had been done then.
Officer Cardeno determined that the juvenile was in need of
a mental evaluation and called for an ambulance. As the
juvenile waited for the ambulance, he thrashed on the couch, hit
himself on the head with closed fists, and rubbed his head with
2
His mother denied that they had any firearms in the home.
5
his fists "in a very hard manner." When he was asked where he
had found the weapons, he said he got them from the house "with
the blue light" and agreed to show the officers the location of
the house. He walked with the officers to an apartment near
where the police had first responded. The officers knocked on
the door and, after receiving no answer, noted that the door was
unlocked and entered the apartment. After opening the door,
they saw a night light that displayed a "bluish light." When
the two occupants of the apartment were awakened, one of them
informed the officers that he had two black powder rifles and a
revolver in the home, but discovered that the weapons were
missing when he brought Officer Cardeno to see them.
When the juvenile was being transported by ambulance to the
hospital, he began punching himself in the genitals with his
closed fists and had to be placed in restraints. The ambulance
report indicated that the juvenile had an autism diagnosis and
that he had not received his morning medication.
In explaining her reasons for allowing the motion to
dismiss all four charges contained in the delinquency complaint,
the judge noted that each of the alleged offenses included an
element of specific intent. The judge concluded, "[b]ased on
the totality of the evidence," 3 that there was not sufficient
3
The record appears to reflect that, at the motion to
dismiss hearing, the juvenile's counsel provided the judge,
6
evidence as to the element of intent or the element of
recklessness (for the charge of disorderly conduct) to support a
finding of probable cause. The judge determined, based on the
juvenile's statements and actions, that the juvenile "was acting
in a diminished, if not psychotic state, and therefore could not
have possessed the requisite mental state."
Apart from what the judge characterized as "the extensive
evidence of [the juvenile's] deranged mental state," the judge
further reasoned that the juvenile's age -- twelve years old at
the time of the offense -- was a "relevant" consideration in
determining probable cause. She noted that "adolescent brains
are not as developed as [the brains of] adults when it comes to
controlling impulses, foreseeing consequences, and tempering
emotions," and that the juvenile was unable to control "any of
the three."
The judge added:
"It is not only in the best interest of [the juvenile]
without objection, with three exhibits that were not attached to
the application: (1) the medical record from the hospital the
juvenile was admitted to from May 25, 2016, to June 2, 2016; (2)
an undated psychological evaluation of the juvenile; and (3) a
letter dated June 22, 2016, from the Department of Developmental
Services informing the juvenile that his charges were preventing
his placement at a supervised residential placement program. In
her findings of fact, however, the judge stated that she relied
solely on the complaint application and the single exhibit
attached to that application. The Commonwealth does not contend
that the judge reached beyond the "four corners" of the
complaint application and its attached exhibit in formulating
her findings of fact.
7
but in the interest of justice to dismiss these four
charges prior to arraignment. [The juvenile] is a child in
need of aid. He needs resources that will help him
understand his mental health status and how to ensure
stabilization moving forward. What [the juvenile] does not
need is the risk of a [court activity record information
(CARI)] affecting access to necessary services or having
any other impact on [the juvenile's] future needs."
The Commonwealth appealed from the dismissal of the delinquency
complaint, and we transferred the case to this court on our own
motion.
Discussion. 1. Probable cause determination. The
Commonwealth contends that the judge erred in granting the
juvenile's prearraignment motion to dismiss because the
complaint application and its attached exhibit established
probable cause that the juvenile had committed the four charged
offenses. Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that the
judge erred by concluding that, because of the juvenile's
"diminished, if not psychotic state," and the juvenile's age,
there was not probable cause regarding the intent required in
any of the four offenses.
"[A] motion to dismiss a complaint [for lack of probable
cause] 'is decided from the four corners of the complaint
application, without evidentiary hearing.'" Commonwealth
v. Humberto H., 466 Mass. 562, 565 (2013), quoting Commonwealth
v. Huggins, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 107, 111 (2013). "To establish
probable cause, the complaint application must set forth
8
'reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a
reasonable or prudent person in believing that the defendant has
committed the offense.'" Humberto H., supra,
quoting Commonwealth v. Roman, 414 Mass. 642, 643 (1993). "The
complaint application must include information to support
probable cause as to each essential element of the
offense." Humberto H., supra at 565-566. Probable cause
requires "more than mere suspicion," id. at 565,
quoting Roman, supra, but "considerably less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, so evidence that is insufficient to support a
guilty verdict might be more than sufficient to establish
probable cause." Humberto H., supra. See Commonwealth
v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445, 451 (1984), quoting K.B. Smith,
Criminal Practice and Procedure § 104 (1983) ("Probable cause
does not require the same type of specific evidence of each
element of the offense as would be needed to support a
conviction"). Because the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish probable cause is a question of law, we review the
judge's probable cause determination de novo. See Humberto
H., supra at 566.
Here, there is abundant evidence contained in the complaint
application and the attached exhibit to support a finding of
probable cause that the juvenile committed the acts alleged in
each of the charged offenses. The judge's probable cause
9
finding, however, rested on her determination that the
information within the four corners of the complaint application
was insufficient to support a finding that the juvenile acted
with the requisite intent because the juvenile was either not
criminally responsible for his actions or was incapable of
forming the requisite intent due to mental impairment. We need
not evaluate the weight of the information in the complaint
application regarding criminal responsibility or the juvenile's
capacity to form the requisite intent because questions of
criminal responsibility and mental impairment are not relevant
considerations in determining probable cause. See Commonwealth
v. Matthews, 406 Mass. 380, 388 (1990).
Criminal responsibility is not an element of an offense for
which probable cause need be found. Rather, lack of criminal
responsibility is an affirmative defense in which the
Commonwealth bears the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable
doubt that the [juvenile] was criminally responsible" once the
juvenile proffers "some evidence" at trial that, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the juvenile, "would permit a
reasonable finder of fact to have a reasonable doubt whether the
[juvenile] was criminally responsible at the time of the
offense." Commonwealth v. Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 811-812
(2016). See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (A), as appearing in
463 Mass. 1501 (2012) (if juvenile intends at trial to raise
10
defense of lack of criminal responsibility, juvenile must notify
prosecutor in writing of such intention within time provided for
filing of pretrial motions).
Mental impairment, often characterized as diminished
capacity, is not an affirmative defense. See Commonwealth
v. Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 45 n.7 (2005), quoting Commonwealth
v. Hardy, 426 Mass. 725, 729 n.5 (1998) (although "mental
impairment" is often colloquially referred to as "diminished
capacity," "[t]here is no 'diminished capacity' defense in this
Commonwealth"). Rather, consideration of a juvenile's mental
impairment "is merely an application of the ordinary rules of
law pertaining to the requisite mental state for conviction of a
particular crime charged." Commonwealth v. Mazza, 366 Mass. 30,
34 (1974). But, due to the complex nature of mental impairment,
evidence of which is often presented at trial through expert
testimony, we require defendants to provide the same notice
regarding their intent to raise an issue of mental impairment at
trial as we do their intent to raise a defense of criminal
responsibility. See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (A) and
Reporter's Notes (Revised, 2004), Massachusetts Rules of Court,
at 186, 195 (Thomson Reuters 2016); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 431
Mass. 822, 829 (2000) ("this court has implicitly recognized
that the procedures set forth in [Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372
Mass. 753, 766-769 (1977),] and [Mass. R. Crim. P.]
11
14 [b] [2] [B] should be applied where the defendant raises an
issue regarding his mental impairment").
The probable cause determination made by a judge or clerk-
magistrate based on the information in a complaint application
is the same determination police officers must make in deciding
whether to arrest. We do not reasonably expect either a police
officer or a judicial officer at this incipient stage of a
juvenile delinquency proceeding to have the information
necessary to engage in any meaningful assessment of possible
mental impairments or lack of criminal responsibility. Whether
a juvenile's mental impairment renders him or her unable to form
the requisite intent for a charged offense is an issue for
trial, to be decided with the benefit of fair notice and perhaps
expert testimony; it is not an issue that is appropriately part
of the probable cause calculus. Accordingly, the judge erred in
finding no probable cause based on the juvenile's inability to
form the requisite intent as a result of the juvenile's mental
impairment.
The judge also erred by considering the juvenile's age in
determining his capacity to form the requisite intent. A
juvenile's age may be given due consideration when evaluating
the weight to give an inference of consciousness of guilt from a
juvenile's nervousness when stopped by the police.
See Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 632 (2015). But the
12
judge treated the juvenile's age as if it were akin to some form
of mental impairment arising from the limitations of the
adolescent brain to control impulses, foresee consequences, and
temper emotions. Mental impairment -- regardless of whether it
arises from an intellectual or psychological disorder, or from
an immature, developing brain -- is simply not within the
probable cause calculus.
2. Prearraignment dismissal based on best interests of the
child and interests of justice. The juvenile contends that,
even if the complaint application were sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause, the judge did not abuse her
discretion in dismissing the complaint prior to arraignment
because she found that dismissal was both in the best interests
of the child and in the interests of justice. The juvenile
contends that, in Humberto H., 466 Mass. at 576, we broadened
the power of dismissal for Juvenile Court judges by permitting
them to dismiss a complaint prior to arraignment even where the
judge finds probable cause to support the complaint, provided
the judge finds that dismissal is in the best interests of the
child and the interests of justice. The juvenile misconstrues
our holding in Humberto H. We did not then, and do not now,
grant a Juvenile Court judge the authority to dismiss a
complaint before arraignment where the prosecutor moves for
arraignment and where the complaint is supported by probable
13
cause.
Our opinion in Humberto H. must be understood in light of
its procedural context. The Juvenile Court judge in that case
had continued the juvenile's arraignment on the delinquency
complaint alleging possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute "in order to determine whether the complaint was
issued based on probable cause." Id. at 564. The Commonwealth
filed a petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, asking a single
justice of this court to vacate the order of continuance. Id.
While the petition was pending, the juvenile filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. Id. The
single justice denied the Commonwealth's petition on the ground
that the mere continuance of an arraignment is not the type of
order that warrants extraordinary relief, but declared in dictum
that, where the complaint had issued, the judge was "without
power to decline to arraign him on the charge." Id. At the
subsequent hearing on the motion to dismiss, the judge indicated
that he believed he had no authority to decline to arraign the
juvenile if the Commonwealth chose to proceed with the
arraignment, but declared that he would dismiss the case
immediately after arraignment. Id. After the prosecutor
declared her intent to go forward with the arraignment, the
judge, in keeping with the single justice's dictum, arraigned
the juvenile, but then heard argument on the juvenile's motion
14
to dismiss and granted the motion, finding no probable cause
that the juvenile possessed the marijuana with the intent to
distribute. Id. The Commonwealth then appealed from the
dismissal. Id.
We affirmed the judge's dismissal of the complaint for lack
of probable cause, id. at 569, but went on to address the
question whether a Juvenile Court judge has the authority to
dismiss a complaint for lack of probable cause before
arraignment. Id. at 571-576. We concluded that, where "a
juvenile files a motion to dismiss a complaint before
arraignment based on the absence of probable cause, and where a
judge, after reviewing the 'four corners' of the complaint
application, concludes that there is a substantial likelihood
that the motion is meritorious, a judge does not abuse his
discretion in deciding to hear and rule on that motion before
arraignment to protect the child from the potential adverse
consequences of a CARI record." Id. at 575. We noted that,
"[a]fter arraignment, the juvenile's name and delinquency charge
become part of the juvenile's permanent CARI record, and may not
be expunged, even where the charge is immediately dismissed for
lack of probable cause." Id. at 572. Mindful of the importance
of "[p]rotecting a child from the stigma of being perceived to
be a criminal and from the collateral consequences of a
delinquency charge," we determined that the authority to rule on
15
a motion to dismiss before arraignment to spare a child from a
CARI record where the complaint was without probable cause was
within the discretion of a Juvenile Court judge to "protect the
best interests of children consistent with the interests of
justice." Id. at 576. We did not grant judges the authority to
dismiss a delinquency complaint before arraignment where the
complaint was supported by probable cause; nor were we asked to
grant such authority. Instead, we simply recognized that the
best interests of children and the interests of justice are
served by giving Juvenile Court judges the authority to dismiss
a complaint before arraignment where the complaint is not
supported by probable cause.
Here, the juvenile asks that we grant Juvenile Court judges
the authority to dismiss a delinquency complaint before
arraignment that is supported by probable cause where the judge
determines that dismissal before arraignment would serve the
best interests of the child and the interests of justice. We
decline to grant Juvenile Court judges this authority.
Generally, where a complaint is supported by probable
cause, the decision to proceed with the prosecution rests in the
broad and exclusive discretion of the prosecutor.
See Commonwealth v. Cheney, 440 Mass. 568, 574 (2003).
"Judicial review of decisions which are within the executive
discretion of [a prosecutor] 'would constitute an intolerable
16
interference by the judiciary in the executive department of the
government and would be in violation of art. 30 of the
[Massachusetts] Declaration of Rights.'" 4 Shepard v. Attorney
Gen., 409 Mass. 398, 401 (1991), quoting Ames v. Attorney Gen.,
332 Mass. 246, 253 (1955). See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 410
Mass. 498, 500 (1991) (art. 30 instructs that judges may not
"exercise[] discretionary decision-making power to decide
whether a complaint, legally valid, should be pursued"). The
Legislature may authorize judges to dismiss a valid complaint
over a prosecutor's objection "without offending art. 30," as it
has, for instance, in certain cases where defendants who are
military veterans or active duty service members have
successfully completed a pretrial diversion
program. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 780 (2017).
But in the absence of such legislative authorization, a judge
does not have the authority to dismiss a legally valid complaint
that a prosecutor chooses to prosecute, whether that be a
criminal complaint or a delinquency complaint. See Victory
4
Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the
separation of powers doctrine, provides:
"In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial
powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the
judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government
of laws and not of men."
17
Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 435 Mass.
136, 143 (2001).
We recognize that the Legislature has granted Juvenile
Court judges considerable discretion regarding the disposition
of a juvenile after an adjudication of delinquency. See G. L.
c. 119, § 58; Commonwealth v. Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 631
(2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 808
(2013) ("Juvenile Court judges have broad 'discretion . . . to
render individualized dispositions consistent with the best
interests of the child'"). Where allegations are proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, the judge may adjudicate the child to be
delinquent, or may continue the case without a finding and, with
the consent of the child and at least one parent or guardian,
place the child on probation. G. L. c. 119, § 58.
See Commonwealth v. Magnus M., 461 Mass. 459, 466 (2012). The
judge may even place the case on file after a child is
adjudicated delinquent on a complaint. Id. at 463. And, in all
juvenile proceedings, the statutory provisions regarding
delinquency, G. L. c. 119, §§ 52-63, "shall be liberally
construed so that the care, custody and discipline of the
children brought before the court shall approximate as nearly as
possible that which they should receive from their parents, and
that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, not as
criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement and
18
guidance." G. L. c. 119, § 53. But the Legislature has not
authorized Juvenile Court judges to dismiss valid delinquency
complaints before arraignment over the objection of a
prosecutor, and we do not infer from the aspirational language
of § 53 the legislative grant of such authority.
Although a Juvenile Court judge is without authority to
dismiss a complaint supported by probable cause before
arraignment, we rely upon prosecutors to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding whether to proceed with the arraignment
of a juvenile, even where there is probable cause, and consider
whether prosecution will serve the best interests of the child
and the interests of justice. See Carroll, petitioner, 453
Mass. 1006, 1006 (2009) (district attorney's authority to nol
pros criminal complaint may be exercised before
arraignment); Manning v. Municipal Court of the Roxbury Dist.,
372 Mass. 315, 318 (1977), quoting Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, 239
Mass. 458, 489 (1921) (where finding of probable cause has been
made, prosecutor has "[t]he authority vested in him by law to
refuse on his own judgment alone to prosecute a complaint or
indictment"). See generally Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935) (prosecutor's interest in criminal prosecution "is
not that [he or she] shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done"); Robert H. Jackson, United States Attorney General, The
Federal Prosecutor, Address at Second Annual Conference of
19
United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940) ("the citizen's safety
lies in the prosecutor who tempers zeal with human kindness, who
seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not
factional purposes, and who approaches his task with humility").
Nowhere is the exercise of sound discretion more important than
in cases involving juveniles with mental health challenges. 5 In
cases where a juvenile is eligible, prosecutors also have the
option of considering diversion programs prior to arraignment as
an alternative to prosecution. We note that the vast majority
of district attorneys have established such juvenile pretrial
diversion programs. 6
5
According to a 2006 nationally representative survey of
over 7,000 incarcerated youth, the majority of juvenile
offenders in residential facilities are diagnosed with at least
one mental illness, and the prevalence of severe mental health
illness among incarcerated youth (twenty-seven per cent) is two
to four times higher than the national rate of all youth. The
survey demonstrated that the majority of juvenile residential
facilities are ill prepared to adequately address the needs of
youth in their custody. See D. Gottesman & S.W. Schwarz,
National Center for Children in Poverty, Juvenile Justice in the
U.S.: Facts for Policymakers, at 3, 4 (July, 2011),
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_1038.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/BP3U-SXGN].
6
As of 2015, ten of the eleven district attorneys in the
Commonwealth indicated that their office used pretrial diversion
programs for juvenile defendants in some capacity (informal or
formal). See E. Niedzwiecki, S. Irazola, C. Churchill, & M.
Field, ICF International, Massachusetts Juvenile Diversion
Assessment Study, at i (Jan., 2015), https://static1.squarespace
.com/static/58ea378e414fb5fae5ba06c7/t/593709d2197aeac077e3f2f9/
1496779220634/MADiversion_FinalReport_2015+01+14-FINAL.PDF
[https://perma.cc/WW2S-SRHV]. While most offices used diversion
prior to arraignment, "four offices indicated that diversion may
20
In this case, although we vacate the dismissal of the
delinquency complaint, the prosecutor needs to decide whether to
proceed anew with the arraignment, and, as part of that
discretionary decision, may consider all that has been learned
about the juvenile since the hearing on the motion to dismiss.
Conclusion. We vacate the order of dismissal of the
delinquency complaint and remand the matter to the Juvenile
Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
also occur during the pre-complaint stage in cases where youth
are referred directly by law enforcement or a clerk[-]magistrate
to the [district attorney's] office." Id. at 23. In February,
2017, the district attorney for the Suffolk district launched
the Juvenile Alternative Resolution pilot program, which screens
"eligible juvenile offenders to determine their risk level and
service needs in order to connect them with individually-
tailored support networks." Juveniles who complete their
diversion programs successfully "will see their cases resolved
without convictions." See Press Release, DA Conley Launches
Juvenile Diversion Program with UMass Boston, Community Partners
(Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/da-umass-
community-partners-join-forces-in-historic-juvenile-diversion-
program [https://perma.cc/6XEZ-SU8X].