Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 2, 2018
Court of Appeals
S In The
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-16-00742-CV
AZEB RUDER, Appellant
V.
WILLIAM JORDAN D/B/A WILLIAM DAVIS REALTY, WILLIAM DAVIS REAL
ESTATE SERVICES, LLC D/B/A WILLIAM DAVIS REALTY AND KATHY JABRI,
Appellees
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 004-01346-2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Brown, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Whitehill
A jury awarded damages and attorney’s fees to William Jordon D/B/A William Davis
Realty, William Davis Real Estate Services, LLC D/B/A William Davis Realty and Kathy Jabri
(collectively, Appellees) after finding that Azeb Ruder breached a listing agreement that required
payment of a brokerage commission to her agent Jabri. The damages were offset by attorney’s
fees and costs awarded to Ruder on an earlier TCPA motion to dismiss.1
In thirteen issues that can be generally distilled to three, Ruder argues that: (i) the trial court
failed to apply the proper standard in awarding mandatory costs and attorney’s fees under the
1
The Texas Citizens Participation Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.009(a)(1).
TCPA because the evidence showed that she billed more time and expenses than were awarded
and the trial court improperly included “equitable and just” considerations in determining the
amount to award; (ii) the judgment on the contract claim should be reversed as a matter of law
because she lost title to the property through no fault of her own; and (iii) the trial court erred by
denying her motion for new trial because Appellees’ counsel made incurable jury argument.
We conclude that (i) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining and awarding
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under the TCPA because the evidence is sufficient to support
the award and there is no indication that the court included “equitable and just” considerations in
its determination; (ii) Ruder was not entitled to judgment on the breach of contract claim as a
matter of law because there was evidence Ruder caused the transaction to not close; and (iii) the
jury argument was proper because it did not violate the court’s limine order and invited the jury to
draw a reasonable inference from the evidence. Moreover, even if the argument was improper, it
was not incurable. We thus affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Ruder and her husband were divorced in 2009, and the court awarded her sole ownership
of the couple’s house in Plano (the Property).
In 2013, Ruder decided to sell the Property so she could move to Frisco and enroll her
children in school there. Her ex-husband was upset when he learned of her plans because he did
not want Ruder to move. So on August 18, 2013, he initiated another divorce proceeding alleging
a common law marriage. On September 19, 2013, the court conducted a hearing in the divorce
case and issued an order allowing Ruder to sell the house.
In January 2014, Ruder met with Jabri and signed a residential real estate agreement (the
Listing Agreement). The Listing Agreement provides that Ruder is the seller and William Davis
Realty (the Company) is the broker. Jabri is the Company’s agent. Section Five of the agreement
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provides that Ruder will pay the Company 5% of the sales price when the Company procures a
buyer for the Property.
Ruder did not disclose the pending divorce proceeding on the seller’s disclosure
accompanying the Listing Agreement. She said she did not disclose it because she owned the
house and she had a court order saying she could sell it.
Jabri marketed the Property and procured a buyer in February, 2014. The sales agreement
between Ruder and the buyer provided that Ruder would make certain repairs on the Property,
including replacing the roof at least seventy-two hours before the March 14, 2014 closing.
The day after the sales contract was signed, Ruder changed her mind about the roof,
contacted Jabri, and demanded that the buyer pay for part of the roof replacement. When Jabri
explained that there was a binding contract, Ruder told her that her ex-husband did not want her
to sell and would create a way for her to get out of the contract.
After Jabri confirmed that the buyer would not contribute to the roof replacement, Ruder
told her she did not want to sell. She asked Jabri to forward the sales agreement to her attorney
for review. After she consulted with her attorney, however, Ruder advised Jabri that she would
proceed with the sale.
On February 19, 2014, the title company asked Jabri if Ruder’s ex-husband would sign off
on the deed in light of the pending divorce proceeding. Although Ruder claimed she told Jabri
about the pending divorce before she signed the Listing Agreement, Jabri testified that the
February 19 title company communication was the first she heard of it. On cross-examination,
Ruder said that she told Jabri about the divorce proceeding around February 2 (three weeks after
the Listing Agreement was signed).
Eileen Fisher, the title company representative, communicated with Ruder about the title
issue that the pending divorce proceeding caused and the steps needed to resolve the issue. Fisher
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told Ruder that she needed to provide either a ruling from the divorce court or have her ex-husband
sign off on the deed. But Ruder did not send the title company any documents and said she did
not want her ex-husband to sign off on the deed.
When the matter was not resolved by March 13, the title company sought an extension on
the closing date from the buyer. The buyer refused, and on March 14, terminated the sales
agreement because Ruder had not replaced the roof or resolved the cloud on the Property’s title.
Ruder later posted an unfavorable review of Jabri on Zillow.com. Jabri demanded that
Ruder pay her commission, but Ruder refused. Thereafter, Jabri and the Company sued Ruder for
defamation and breach of contract.
Ruder answered, and filed a TCPA motion to dismiss the defamation claim seeking
attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion, and Ruder appealed. This court
reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for a determination of attorney’s fees and costs.
Ruder submitted her attorney’s affidavit on costs and attorney’s fees, and Appellee’s
counsel filed a controverting affidavit. Although Ruder requested $30,380.00 in attorney’s fees
and $5,464.70 in costs, the trial court awarded $9,000 for attorney’s fees and $600 for costs.
The parties tried the breach of contract claim to a jury. The jury found that the broker’s
commission in the Listing Agreement was payable. Thereafter, the court awarded Appellees
$10,750 in damages and $41,560 in attorney’s fees, offset by the $9,600 in TCPA attorney’s fees
and costs awarded to Ruder.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Issues One, Two, Three, and Four: Did the trial court err in determining the TCPA
attorney’s fees award amount?
Ruder’s first four issues complain about the amount of her TCPA attorney’s fees award.
Specifically, she argues that: (i) the trial court erred by failing to award reasonable attorney’s fees,
costs, and expenses under the TCPA; (ii) the $9,000 attorney’s fees award was unreasonable in
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light of the time counsel expended researching, drafting, preparing for hearings, and successfully
appealing an order denying dismissal of the defamation claim; (iii) the $600 cost award was
unreasonable because she incurred a $4,300 Lexis research expense and a $310 appellate filing fee
expense; and (iv) the trial court should be required to reconsider the award “in light of the Texas
Supreme Court’s rejection of ‘considerations of justice and equity’ in connection with reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs under the TCPA.” As explained below, we are not persuaded by these
arguments.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The TCPA provides for the expedited dismissal of a legal action that implicates a
defendant’s right of free speech or other First Amendment right when the party filing the action
cannot establish the Act’s threshold requirement of a prima facie case. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 27.005. A successful motion to dismiss under the Act entitles the moving party to
an award of court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other expenses incurred in defending
against the legal action. Id. § 27.009(a).
Fixing a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its judgment will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Rowley v.
Lake Area Nat. Bank, 976 S.W.2d 715, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
Under this standard, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent grounds of error, but rather
are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Beaumont Bank,
N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.1991); see also Martin v. Brasuel, No. 05-06-01626-
CV, 2008 WL 152175, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (the reasonable and
necessary aspect of a fee award is reviewed for sufficiency of evidence).
Whether attorney’s fees are reasonable and necessary is a fact question. See Garcia v.
Gomez, 319 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tex. 2010). Thus, an abuse of discretion does not occur where the
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trial court bases its decision on conflicting evidence. See Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862
(Tex. 1978). The fact finder can consider the nature and complexity of the case, the amount in
controversy, the amount of time and effort required, and the expertise of counsel in arriving at a
reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. See, e.g., Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600,
607 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ) (factors to be considered include nature of the case, time
spent, and skill and experience required). The amount and reasonableness of attorney’s fees also
involves several intangible factors, and the trial court can draw on its own expertise in that
decision-making. See id. at 606–07.
The party seeking attorney’s fees has the burden of proof on the amount and reasonableness
of the fees sought. El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 762–63 (Tex. 2012). “A
‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee ‘is one that is not excessive or extreme, but rather moderate or fair.’”
Sullivan v. Abraham, 488 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Tex. 2016). While the determination is within the
trial court’s discretion, under the TCPA, that discretion does not include considerations of justice
and equity. Id.
Ruder requested $30,380 for attorney time and $5,464 for costs and expenses related to the
defamation claim and TCPA motion to dismiss. In support of her request, she submitted her
attorney’s affidavit, which included a description of the hours billed, billing rates, and a description
of the tasks performed.
Appellees challenged the reasonableness and necessity of the fees and expenses, as well as
the absence of segregation between the contract claim and the defamation claim. Specifically,
appellees’ evidence, set forth in their attorney’s affidavit, challenged and addressed:
$2,100.00 in attorneys’ fees where the description of the legal services related
only to the breach of contract claims;
$14,950.00 in attorneys’ fees where the legal services relating to the breach of
contract claim were not segregated from the defamation claim;
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$4,441.64 in electronic research expenses where the breach of contract claim was
not segregated from the defamation claim;
A $250.00 charge (0.5 hours at $500 per hour) for a three-sentence letter;
13.1 hours for drafting a 10 page reply brief, five (5) of which pertained to
Appellant’s motion to dismiss the contract claims;
38.9 hours for researching and drafting a 20-page appellate brief, which included
10 hours of research pertaining to the TCPA over and above 8.5 hours previously
charged for researching the same topics in connection with the motion to dismiss.;
.5 hours expended on researching defamation issues for the response brief in the
interlocutory appeal, of which many of the same topics were previously researched;
18.7 hours expended by one attorney to draft an 18-page reply brief for the
interlocutory appeal, with additional time expended by another attorney on the
same task, of which only 2.0 hours is specifically segregated from time spent on
breach of contract matters.
Appellees also controverted Ruder’s counsel’s claim that the fee charged was the type customarily
charged in that location for similar services.
Ruder replied, arguing that some of the work on the defamation claim was intertwined with
the contract claim, and the fees were adequately segregated. Ruder further argued that the billing
rates and the time expended for various tasks was reasonable.
While Ruder’s fees affidavit provided competent evidence, it was not conclusive. In fact,
it was controverted by an equally competent opposing affidavit. Thus, in making its final decision,
the trial court had before it conflicting evidence raising a fact question on the reasonableness of
the fees and expenses, and exercised its discretion in resolving that question.
Ruder insists that the case should be remanded because the trial court improperly
considered justice and equity in making the award. We agree that justice and equity are not part
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of the TCPA attorney’s fees equation. See Sullivan, 488 S.W.3d at 299. But nothing suggests that
the trial court included these considerations in its award.
Neither the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees and costs, nor the final judgment
incorporating the order include fact findings or legal conclusions. Instead, without explaining its
basis for doing so, the court awarded $9,000 for attorney’s fees and $600 for costs. Our record
does not include a transcript of the hearing on the motion for attorney’s fees, or the motion for
reconsideration of attorney’s fees. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the trial court
improperly considered justice and equity in making the attorney’s fees award.
Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support the amount of fees and expenses
awarded, and there is nothing further to establish an abuse of discretion. We therefore resolve
Ruder’s first four issues against her.
B. Issues Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine: Should the judgment on the contract claim
be reversed?
Ruder moved for a directed verdict, a JNOV, and for a new trial, all of which were denied.
In her next five issues, she argues that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the
Listing Agreement unambiguously provided that she did not owe a broker’s fee if she was unable
to deliver clear title through no fault of her own due to “loss of ownership as a result of a legal
proceeding.” According to Ruder, the evidence establishes that both conditions occurred here.
1. Standard of Review
A directed verdict is warranted when the evidence is such that no other verdict can be
reached and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Blackstone Med., Inc.
v. Phoenix Surgicals, L.L.C., 470 S.W.3d 636, 645 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). A directed
verdict for a defendant may be proper in three situations when: (i) a plaintiff fails to present
evidence raising a fact issue essential to the plaintiff’s right of recovery; (ii) the plaintiff either
admits or the evidence conclusively establishes a defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action; or (iii)
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a legal principle precludes recovery. See Prudential Ins. v. Fin. Review Servs., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77
(Tex. 2000).
To the extent that a trial court’s denial of a directed verdict is based on the evidence, the
standard of review is a legal sufficiency or “no evidence” standard of review. See Flagstar Bank,
FSB v. Walker, 451 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). In such a review, an
appellate court considers all the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, and resolves
all reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence admitted at the trial in the nonmovant’s favor.
See King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003). If a fact issue is raised
on a material question, a directed verdict is not proper and the issue must go to the jury. See Exxon
Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 220–21 (Tex. 2011). On the other hand, to the
extent that the trial court’s ruling on a directed verdict is based on a question of law, an appellate
court reviews that ruling de novo. See JSC Neftegas-Impex v. Citibank, N.A., 365 S.W.3d 387,
398 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper when a directed verdict would have been
proper. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Fort Bend Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 394
(Tex. 1991). And the standard of review for the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is the same as for the denial of a motion for directed verdict. City of Keller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005) (“the test for legal sufficiency should be the same for summary
judgments, directed verdicts, judgments notwithstanding the verdict, and appellate no-evidence
review”).
An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.
See Hodges v. Rajpal, 459 S.W.3d 237, 250 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). A trial court
abuses its discretion when its actions are arbitrary or unreasonable, or when it acts without
reference to any guiding rules or principles. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701
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S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). A court has no discretion to misconstrue the law or misapply
the law to the facts. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). A trial court therefore
abuses its discretion when it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. In re E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam).
2. The Evidence at Trial
The Listing Agreement provides that a broker’s compensation is earned when “Broker
individually or in cooperation with another broker procures a buyer ready, willing, and able to buy
the property at the listing price or at any other price acceptable to the seller.” The parties stipulated
that there was a valid and enforceable contract and that this condition occurred. Thus, there was
no issue concerning whether the broker’s commission was earned; rather, the only issue was
whether the fee was payable.
The Listing Agreement describes when a broker’s commission is payable and when it is
not payable. Concerning the latter, the agreement provides:
Broker’s compensation is not payable if a sale of the Property does not close or
fund as a result of (i) Seller’s failure, without fault of Seller, to deliver to a buyer a
deed or title policy as required by the contract to sell; (ii) loss of ownership due to
foreclosure or other legal proceeding . . . .
The parties agree, and the evidence shows, that the divorce proceeding created a cloud on
the Property’s title, and, as a result, the title company could not issue a title policy as required by
the sales agreement. This is the alleged “loss of ownership resulting from a legal proceeding”
upon which Ruder relies.
By definition, however, a cloud on title does not equate to a loss of ownership. “A cloud
on title exists when an outstanding claim or encumbrance is shown, which, on its face, if valid,
would affect or impair” the owner’s title to the property. See Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 531
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). Thus, a cloud is something with the potential
to affect ownership if and when it is established as valid. No such validity was established here.
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The 2009 decree in the original divorce awarded Ruder sole ownership of the Property.
Ruder consistently acknowledged that she owned the Property, and insisted that she had the right
to sell it.
When the cloud on the title was discovered, Fisher (the title company representative),
contacted Jabri and then Ruder. She told Ruder that the pending divorce created a cloud on the
title, and as a result, Ruder needed to either (i) have her ex-husband sign off on the deed, or (ii)
provide documentation showing a ruling from the court. Ruder, however, believed that she had
the authority to sell without complying with the title company requests. She did not keep the title
company apprised of the status of the divorce proceeding; and, although she claimed to have
transcripts and orders that resolved the issue, she never provided this documentation. She also
refused to ask her ex-husband to sign off on the deed.
In the interim, while the sale was pending, Ruder demanded that the buyer increase the
purchase price and allow her to lease back the Property after closing. The buyer refused and began
to express concerns that the roof had not been replaced.
In early March, Jabri tried to help resolve the issue by sending an email to Ruder’s ex-
husband asking him to contact the title company. Fifteen minutes later, Ruder sent Jabri a text
message saying that Jabri no longer represented her and should not act on her behalf.
Throughout the process, Ruder retained title to the Property. There was no evidence that
her ownership changed from the time she acquired sole title in 2009 through the time the sale failed
to close. In fact, on April 30, 2014 (after the sales contract terminated), the divorce court issued
an order confirming that the Property was Ruder’s sole and separate property.2
Other than evidence showing Ruder’s ownership, the only evidence concerning title
pertained to the cloud on title; that is, evidence of a claim potentially affecting or impairing Ruder’s
2
The court subsequently ruled, in June, 2014, that there was no common law marriage and dismissed the divorce proceeding.
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ownership interest. Significantly, that cloud existed six months before the Listing Agreement was
signed. Thus, it was not just Ruder’s ownership that remained unchanged—after the Listing
Agreement was signed there was no change to the title’s status at all.
In addition, the evidence does not conclusively establish Ruder’s claim that the failure to
deliver a deed or title policy was “without fault of seller.” Ruder did not complete the roof
replacement required by the sales contract. And although she claimed to have court documents
confirming her right to sell the Property, she provided nothing to the title company. She refused
to ask her ex-husband to sign off on the deed. And she told Jabri shortly after the sales contract
was signed that she no longer wanted to sell. In short, although she claimed to have title to the
Property, she made no effort to address the cloud on that title that precluded the issuance of a title
policy and ultimately, the closing.
As a result, Ruder was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in so concluding. We resolve Ruder’s fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and
ninth issues against her.
C. Issues Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Thirteen: Was it error to deny Ruder’s motion for
new trial based on incurable jury argument?
In her last four issues, Ruder argues the trial court erred by denying her motion for new
trial because Appellees’ counsel made improper, incurable jury argument as follows:
[Ruder] knew that there was a way she could get out of the contract, because she
talked to her husband. And knew that if she just let this ride out and didn’t try to
address any issues, that the contract would fall through. And you know why else
we know she didn’t want to sell? Here we are. 2016, and where is she living? In
that same house.
According to Ruder, “Counsel’s statement that [she] and her ex-husband colluded to ‘walk
away’ from the sale agreement with the buyer, combined with an innuendo that explained why
“Ruder was still living in that same house,’ all but doomed any chance the jury would focus on the
actual evidence presented at trial.” We disagree.
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A complaint of improper jury argument must be preserved by a timely objection and
request for an instruction that the jury disregard the improper remark. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a);
Phillips v. Bramlett, 288 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. 2009). In rare cases, however, the probable harm
or prejudice cannot be cured and the improper argument is incurable. Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n
v. Haywood, 266 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. 1954). A complaint of incurable jury argument may be
preserved in a motion for new trial even without an objection and ruling during the trial. Phillips,
288 S.W.3d at 883; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(5).
To rise to the level of being incurable, the complaining party generally must show that the
improper argument “strikes at the very core of the judicial process,” Phillips, 288 S.W.3d at 883,
and “by its nature, degree, and extent constitute[s] such error that an instruction from the court or
retraction of the argument could not remove its effects.” Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Penalver, 256
S.W.3d 678, 680–81 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam). Examples of incurable arguments are appeals to
racial prejudice, extreme unsupported personal attacks on parties or witnesses, and unfounded
accusations of manipulating a witness. PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo, LLC, 350 S.W.3d
699, 721 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). The complaining party must show that based on
the record as a whole, the offensive argument was so extreme that a “juror of ordinary intelligence
could have been persuaded by that argument to agree to a verdict contrary to that to which he
would have agreed but for such argument.” Phillips, 288 S.W.3d at 883
Here, there was no trial objection, but Ruder raised part of her appellate complaint in her
motion for new trial. In that motion, she complained about the reference to her residing in the
house at the time of trial because this allegedly violated the court’s limine order precluding
mention of “any post-closing occurrences.” But the motion did not complain about Ruder’s
conversation with her husband or any alleged collusion, so that portion of her issue was not
preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(5). We therefore
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consider only whether the argument that Ruder still lived in the house was improper, and if so,
was of the magnitude of error such that an instruction from the court or retraction of the argument
could not cure its effects.
The record does not support a conclusion that the argument was improper. Ruder’s
attorney asked her on direct examination whether she was still living in the house, and she replied
affirmatively. Once she opened the door and the evidence was in the record, it was in for all
purposes and a proper subject of closing argument. See Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. v. Bush,
No., 05-14-01148-CV, 2017 WL 1550036, at *18 (Tex. App—Dallas Apr. 28, 2017, pet. filed)
(mem. op.).3 Moreover, attorneys may argue reasonable deductions and inferences from the facts
in closing argument. See Anderson v. Vinson Expl., Inc., 832 S.W.2d 657, 667 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 1992, writ denied). And there was evidence suggesting that Ruder did not want to sell. She
told Jabri that her ex-husband could get her out of the contract. She increased her demands twice
after the sales contract was signed, and when her first demand was refused, told Jabri she no longer
wanted to sell. She did not complete the roof repairs, nor did she provide the title company with
the documentation she claimed to have that would establish her right to proceed with the sale.
Under these circumstances, Appellees’ counsel could properly argue that Ruder was still living in
the house because she did not want to sell it.
There is also no support for Ruder’s contention that the argument violated the court’s
limine order and the parties’ agreement. There is no agreement about excluded topics in the record
and the only discussion with the court pertaining to the limine order concerns other matters;
therefore, we cannot evaluate the alleged violation beyond what is expressly identified in the order.
And the limine order does not expressly preclude mention of Ruder living in the house. Rather,
3
Likewise, even had Ruder preserved her argument about the conversation with her Husband, the details of that conversation were also in
evidence without objection.
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the limine order prohibits, “Any reference or evidence related to any dispute between plaintiffs
and defendant regarding the status of the MLS listing for defendant’s property after March 14,
2014.”4 Ruder maintains that evidence concerning the MLS listing dispute would have informed
the jury why she did not sell the house. While there is no question that the order’s exclusion
language is broad, it is still not accurate to characterize the complained-of argument as violating
of the order.
Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument only that the argument violated the order,
Ruder offers no support for her premise that there was no way to “cure the improper argument or
correct its prejudicial effect on the jury.” Having reviewed the record, we find no basis for
concluding that the argument strikes at the core of the judicial process or that the average juror
would have been persuaded to vote differently as a result of the argument. We thus resolve Ruder’s
remaining issues against her.
III. CONCLUSION
Having resolved all of Ruder’s issues against her, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Bill Whitehill/
BILL WHITEHILL
JUSTICE
160742F.P05
4
There was a dispute about the MLS listing taking the Property off the market after the sale failed to close. Jabri said the listing status was
necessary because the sales contract escrow money had not been released, but Ruder ascribed it to a nefarious purpose.
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
AZEB RUDER, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at Law
No. 4, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-16-00742-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. 004-01346-2014.
Opinion delivered by Justice Whitehill.
WILLIAM JORDAN D/B/A WILLIAM Justices Lang and Brown participating.
DAVIS REALTY, WILLIAM DAVIS
REAL ESTATE SERVICES, LLC D/B/A
WILLIAM DAVIS REALTY AND
KATHY JABRI, Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee WILLIAM JORDAN D/B/A WILLIAM DAVIS
REALTY, WILLIAM DAVIS REAL ESTATE SERVICES, LLC D/B/A WILLIAM DAVIS
REALTY AND KATHY JABRI recover {his/her/its/their} costs of this appeal from appellant
AZEB RUDER.
Judgment entered February 2, 2018.
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