NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE )
CORPORATION, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D16-616
)
MEGHAN ANDERSON, )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed February 14, 2018.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco
County; Linda H. Babb, Judge.
Scot E. Samis of Traub Lieberman Straus
& Shrewsberry LLP, St. Petersburg, for
Appellant.
Mark A. Nation and Paul W. Pritchard of
The Nation Law Firm, Longwood, for
Appellee.
MORRIS, Judge.
Citizens Property Insurance Corporation appeals a final judgment
awarding attorneys' fees, including a 1.7 contingent fee multiplier,1 to Meghan
Anderson. The fee award was based on the verdict rendered in Anderson's favor in her
1Although this enhancement is frequently referred to as a contingency fee
multiplier, we refer to it in the manner used by the trial court.
breach of contract action against Citizens for failure to pay for a sinkhole loss. After
prevailing at trial, Anderson sought attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to sections
57.041, 92.231, and 627.428, Florida Statutes (2014). Following an evidentiary hearing
that was conducted without a court reporter, the trial court awarded a total of
$493,246.50 in attorneys' fees which included the 1.7 contingent fee multiplier. Citizens
argues that the trial court's failure to make a finding as to whether the market required a
contingent fee multiplier pursuant to Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom,
555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990), is an error apparent on the face of the record and,
therefore, that the transcript of the evidentiary hearing is not required. We agree and
reverse the trial court's order.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this appeal involves an attorneys' fees award—rather than the
underlying civil judgment—a complete recitation of the facts underlying the breach of
contract action is unnecessary. Rather, it is sufficient to note that there was a dispute
between Anderson and Citizens as to whether cracking damage in her home was
caused by a sinkhole. Ultimately, Citizens denied Anderson's sinkhole claim, and
Anderson filed suit. The jury rendered a verdict in Anderson's favor and awarded her
$84,000. Shortly thereafter, she filed her motion for attorneys' fees.
It is undisputed that Anderson did not testify at the fee hearing. The court
did take testimony from counsel for both parties and from the parties' experts, but the
hearing was not transcribed.
In the judgment awarding attorneys' fees, the trial court awarded $290,145
in base attorneys' fees which was the total amount of fees for four attorneys who
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represented Anderson with each being awarded the equivalent of $500-$600 per hour.
On the issue of the 1.7 contingent fee multiplier, the trial court found the use of the
multiplier was appropriate under the guidelines set forth in Florida Patient's
Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), and Quanstrom. As a
further basis for applying the multiplier, the court explained that "at the outset of the
handling of the case, [Anderson's] chances of success were 50/50" and that out of all
the sinkholes cases tried by the trial court, "there have only been two cases won by the
policyholder." The total attorneys' fees award after application of the 1.7 contingent fee
multiplier, but exclusive of costs and interest, came to $493,246.50.
After filing its appeal from the attorneys' fee judgment, Citizens moved to
relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court so that Citizens could, pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.200(b)(4), seek preparation of a statement of the evidence in lieu
of a transcript of the fee hearing. However, the parties could not agree on the
substance of such a statement, and the trial court judge indicated she had an
insufficient memory of the witnesses' testimony. As a result, this appeal comes to us
without a transcript, and the trial court's order on the proposed statement of the
evidence lists only the names of the witnesses who testified and the documentary
evidence that was presented.
II. ANALYSIS
We review an order applying a multiplier to a fee award for abuse of
discretion. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prime Care Chiropractic Ctrs., P.A., 93 So. 3d 345,
347 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). We must reverse the application of a multiplier if it is not
supported by competent, substantial evidence. Id. Reversal is also required if a trial
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court fails to include specific findings supporting the application of a multiplier. Speer v.
Mason, 769 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs.
v. Schick, 553 So. 2d 361, 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (explaining that judgments are
deficient if they fail to include specific findings to support an enhancement factor in
attorneys' fees awards).
Citizens contends that there is insufficient evidence in the record
regarding whether the market required the application of a contingent fee multiplier, and
it argues that the final judgment is erroneous on its face because it fails to include a
finding as to that factor. While the lack of a transcript or stipulated statement of the
facts might require an affirmance in other cases, that rule is not applicable where a trial
court order is fundamentally erroneous on its face for failure to make required findings.
See Wolfe v. Nazaire, 758 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (reversing and
remanding attorneys' fees award despite lack of a transcript where court failed to
explain its reasons for using a multiplier); Guardianship of Halpert v. Martin S.
Rosenbloom, P.A., 698 So. 2d 938, 939-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (reversing and
remanding attorneys' fees award despite lack of transcript where order failed to contain
findings as to the hourly rate or the number of hours reasonably expended); Giltex Corp.
v. Diehl, 583 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (reversing and remanding attorneys'
fees award despite lack of a transcript where order failed to contain findings required by
Rowe).
The dissent would have us affirm based on Citizens' failure to provide a
transcript or a stipulated statement of the facts, citing Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261,
1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), for the proposition that "[t]he most salient impediment to
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meaningful review of the trial court's decision is not the absence of findings, but the
absence of a transcript." However, Esaw did not involve the issue of an award of
attorneys' fees, and notably, we acknowledged
that there are circumstances in which a claim of inadequate
findings can lead to reversal even in the absence of a
transcript or appropriate substitute. In particular, an award
of attorney's fees without adequate findings justifying the
amount of the award is reversible even where the appellant
has provided an inadequate record of the trial court
proceedings.
Id. at 1265 (emphasis added). This is the type of case referenced in Esaw.
In setting reasonable attorneys' fees, Florida courts use the federal
lodestar approach which requires a determination of the number of hours reasonably
expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150-51.
Once the lodestar amount is determined, the trial court may add or subtract from that
amount based upon a "contingency risk" factor and the "results obtained." Id. at 1151;
see also Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 831.
In determining whether a contingent fee multiplier is necessary in a
contract case—such as this one—the trial court should consider
whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee
multiplier to obtain competent counsel[,2] whether the
attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any
way[,] and . . . whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe
are applicable, especially, the amount involved, the results
2Although Citizens generally asserts that the trial court's order was
deficient for failing to mention any of the Quanstrom criteria, Citizens primarily focuses
on the first factor pertaining to whether the relevant market requires the application of a
contingent fee multiplier. "A primary rationale for the contingency risk multiplier is to
provide access to competent counsel for those who could not otherwise afford it." Bell
v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., Inc., 734 So. 2d 403, 411 (Fla. 1999).
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obtained, and the type of fee arrangement between the
attorney and his client.
Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834; see also Prime Care Chiropractic Ctrs., P.A., 93 So. 3d
at 347. "Evidence of these factors must be presented to justify the utilization of a
multiplier." Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834; see also Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., Inc.,
734 So. 2d 403, 410 (Fla. 1999) (recognizing that courts may consider applying
multiplier "if evidence in the record supports the need for one"). "If there is no evidence
that the relevant market required a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent
counsel, then a multiplier should not be awarded." Prime Care Chiropractic Ctrs., P.A.,
93 So. 3d at 347. And "[i]f the court decides to adjust the lodestar, it must state the
grounds on which it justifies the enhancement or reduction." Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151;
Wolfe, 758 So. 2d at 733; Giltex Corp., 583 So. 2d at 735. Indeed, Rowe holds that trial
courts must make specific findings as to "the hourly rate, the number of hours
reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of the reduction or enhancement
factors." 472 So. 2d at 1151 (emphasis added).
Here, the final judgment awarding attorneys' fees states that the case was
"appropriate for the use of a multiplier under the Rowe and Quanstrom guidelines."
Beyond that conclusory statement, the only rationale provided by the trial court involved
Anderson's chance of prevailing and a reference to the number of other sinkhole cases
that the trial court had tried wherein the policyholder won. The dissent notes that the
trial court also stated that "this case was by far the best tried sinkhole case [she had]
ever seen." But that statement was made in the context of the trial court's determination
of a reasonable hourly rate, not in the finding relating to the application of the contingent
fee multiplier. Furthermore, it is merely an opinion, not a factual finding relating to
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whether the relevant market required the application of the contingent fee multiplier.
There was simply no specific finding regarding any difficulty Anderson might have
experienced in retaining counsel to handle the case, nor was there any other specific
finding regarding the relevant market which would support application of the contingent
fee multiplier. And it is undisputed that Anderson did not testify so she clearly did not
provide testimony on this issue.3
We acknowledge that Anderson presented witnesses at the hearing,
though we do not know the substance of their testimony due to the lack of a transcript or
a more thorough statement of the evidence. We further acknowledge that the First
District has held that expert testimony can be sufficient to support the application of a
multiplier. See Massie v. Progressive Express Ins. Co., 25 So. 3d 584, 585 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2009). Anderson asks us to affirm based on the assumption that the expert
testimony provided at the hearing could have supported the application of the multiplier,
and Anderson cites to a case wherein the appellate court affirmed based on lack of a
transcript after refusing to speculate as to whether the trial court made oral findings at a
hearing. Cf. Nunes v. Nunes, 112 So. 3d 696, 700-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). But as we
have already explained, because the trial court awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to
Rowe and Quanstrom, it was required to make specific findings on any enhancement
factors, including the issue of the contingent fee multiplier. Esaw, 965 So. 2d at 1265.
And under the unusual circumstances here, we simply cannot affirm due to lack of a
3Whether the party seeking fees testifies regarding the difficulty in
obtaining competent counsel is a factor to consider when determining whether to apply
the contingency fee multiplier. Cf. Eckhardt v. 424 Hintze Mgmt., LLC, 969 So. 2d
1219, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (explaining that where party seeking fees did not testify
at hearing, "there was no evidence to suggest that the [party] had difficulty in securing
competent counsel").
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transcript or a more thorough statement of the evidence. The trial court itself was
unable to remember the testimony presented at the fee hearing. If the trial court itself
cannot remember the basis for its award, then we will not assume Anderson presented
sufficient evidence or that the trial court made any oral findings regarding whether the
relevant market required application of the contingent fee multiplier.
The dissent suggests that we are concluding that there was insufficient
evidence presented to the trial court on the issue of the contingent fee multiplier. We
make no such conclusion. Rather, we simply refuse to make an assumption that
competent, substantial evidence was presented in these unusual circumstances where
the trial court's inability to recall any of the testimony has prevented us from otherwise
concluding that the trial court considered the issue of whether the relevant market
required the application of the contingent fee multiplier and where the order is deficient
on its face for failing to contain the required finding on that issue. Cf. Speer, 769 So. 2d
at 1104-05 (concluding that where trial court approved a statement of the evidence that
included some facts specifically recalled by the judge, the judge's inability to have total
recall of the entire proceedings did not "render the record inadequate" because the
appellant conceded the record was "nonetheless sufficient to justify entitlement to a
multiplier" (emphasis added)).
The dissent also argues that the findings in the order were sufficient
because the trial court indicated that it had expressed its reasoning in further detail at
the hearing. However, that reference was made in the portion of the trial court's order
entitled "Hourly Rate" wherein the trial court explained that after "[c]onsidering [the]
factors [set forth in Rowe], and for the reasons expressed at the hearing, the Court finds
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that the following hourly rates are reasonable for Plaintiff's counsel in this case." In
another portion of the order separately entitled "Contingent Fee Multiplier," the trial court
makes no reference to any findings it previously made on this issue. Thus, contrary to
the dissent's assertion, we are not speculating about the substance of the trial court's
oral findings. Rather, we merely refer to the order itself to determine whether the trial
court made the required findings relating to the contingent fee multiplier. Yet even if
that statement related to the application of the contingent fee multiplier, we would be
constrained to reverse. A trial court's generic reference to "reasons expressed at the
hearing" is not the equivalent of a specific finding that the relevant market required the
application of a contingent fee multiplier. Indeed, there could be any number of
"reasons" on any number of topics that a trial court orally expresses at a hearing.
Rather than improperly exceeding the scope of our review, we are simply holding the
trial court to its responsibility to include specific findings on an enhancement factor
pursuant to Rowe and Quanstrom and we are refusing to speculate on what might have
occurred at the fee hearing where the trial court itself is unable to remember what
testimony was presented.
The trial court's inability to recall any of the testimony presented in this
case leaves us in the same review posture as the court in Wolfe, where no testimony
was provided. 758 So. 2d at 733. And though Rosenbloom did not involve the
application of the multiplier, it supports our conclusion that a reversal is required, even
in the absence of a transcript, where an order fails to contain specific findings pursuant
to Rowe. While we acknowledge that the order here contains minimal findings relating
to the reasonable hourly rates and reasonable hours expended, Rowe also requires
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specific findings on the "appropriateness of the reduction or enhancement factors." 472
So. 2d at 1151. Thus the principle espoused in Rosenbloom is applicable here,
particularly where the Rosenbloom court implied that findings relating to the multiplier
enhancement are even more critical than findings on the other factors.4 The dissent
asserts that it is important for the contingent fee multiplier to be considered "any time
the requirements for a multiplier are met," and we do not disagree with that proposition.
However, in this case, under these facts, we cannot determine whether the
requirements were met. And it is precisely because of the important nature of the
contingent fee multiplier that Florida law requires a specific finding on that issue. The
dissent's conclusion that the findings and reasoning provided by the trial court here are
sufficient because the trial court determined a reasonable hourly rate and the number of
hours reasonably expended stops short of the Rowe requirements as clarified by
Quanstrom.
The order under review is fundamentally erroneous on its face because it
fails to contain a specific finding regarding whether the relevant market required the
application of the contingent fee multiplier. And under the unique facts of this case, we
are unable to determine what, if any, evidence was presented on that issue or even
whether the trial court considered it.5 Cf. In re Guardianship of Ansley, 94 So. 3d 711,
4Inanalyzing the trial court's failure to make findings relating to the hourly
rate or number of hours reasonably expended, the court in Rosenbloom explained that
"[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, we might consider this error harmless, particularly as
the award does not involve a multiplier enhancement." 698 So. 2d at 940 (emphasis
added).
5We note that the trial court also failed to specifically make findings on the
other two factors discussed in Quanstrom. However, we do not base our decision on
those omissions as they were not the issues in dispute.
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714 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (reversing and remanding fee award which failed to contain
meaningful factual findings pursuant to Rowe thereby leaving us "unable to determine
the basis for the circuit court's award" as well as unable to "determine whether there is
competent, substantial evidence in the record to support the award").
In concluding that a reversal is required, we are not radically shifting the
law or extending the holding of Rowe and Quanstrom to require written findings in all
instances. We acknowledge that a trial court can make oral findings in support of a fee
award. Yet in this case there is simply nothing to indicate that the trial court made oral
findings on the issue. There is no transcript of the hearing, there is no reference in the
order to even an oral finding on the issue of whether the market required the application
of the contingent fee multiplier, and the trial judge conceded that she did not remember
what transpired at the hearing. It is the combination of these unusual facts that requires
us to reverse in this case. But we do not mean to suggest that a reversal would be
required in any case where a trial court fails to include a written finding on a factor in
awarding attorneys' fees. This is simply a case where the lack of a transcript does not
preclude reversal because the order is insufficient on its face. See Esaw, 965 So. 2d at
1265.
Finally, we note that we have not overlooked the recent Florida Supreme
Court decision in Joyce v. Federated National Insurance Co., 228 So. 3d 1122 (Fla.
2017). We acknowledge that the court clarified that the contingent fee multiplier is not
limited to rare and exceptional circumstances and that it should be considered
whenever the requirements for its application are met. Id. at 1131-32. In reversing the
order here, we are not, as the dissent suggests, applying a stricter standard for
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application of the multiplier than is required by Rowe and Quanstrom. Rather, we are
refusing to presume—under the unusual facts of this case—that the required specific
findings were or were not made below. And we note that our reversal does not mean
that Anderson will not ultimately prevail in obtaining an award of attorneys' fees that
includes a contingent fee multiplier. The reversal simply remands the case back to the
trial court to consider the issue anew.
We therefore reverse the attorneys' fees award and remand for further
proceedings in conformance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
BLACK, J., Concurs.
KHOUZAM, J., Dissents with opinion.
KHOUZAM, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority's analysis and result. The fee
judgment on its face shows no error, and without a transcript Citizens simply cannot
demonstrate that the trial court erred in its findings and conclusions. By holding
otherwise, the majority extends the Florida Supreme Court's holdings in Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), and Standard
Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990), beyond their actual
language to impose a new requirement that all findings supporting an attorneys' fee
award must be reflected in the court's written judgment. In doing so, the majority
radically shifts well-established jurisprudence regarding an appellant's burden on appeal
and this court's scope of review. I would affirm.
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It is undisputed that the trial judge conducted a three-hour fee hearing,
during which she listened to the examination and cross-examination of six witnesses,
including both parties' experts. Documents were received into evidence, and counsel
made legal arguments. The fee hearing was before the same trial judge who presided
over the jury trial, which lasted six days. The trial judge made factual determinations
and resolved the issues concerning the application and amount of a multiplier based on
the evidence she received. She was in the best position to observe what was
presented at trial and at the fee hearing.
The written order set forth specific findings as to the hourly rate, the
number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of the enhancement
factors. The order made clear that these findings were based on the expert testimony
presented and that the court had expressed its reasoning in further detail at the hearing.
The order clearly stated that the court applied a 1.7 contingent fee multiplier based on
the factors set forth in Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.5(b)(1)(A)-(H), Rowe,
and Quanstrom. The order also indicated that plaintiff's chances of success were 50/50
and noted that of the many sinkhole cases tried before the court, only two cases were
won by the policyholder. Finally, the judge stated that she had tried many sinkhole
cases and that "this case was by far the best tried sinkhole case [she had] ever seen."
Our review of the fee award in this case is limited. The award of attorneys'
fees is a matter committed to sound judicial discretion and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. DiStefano Constr. Inc. v. Fid. &
Deposit Co. of Md., 597 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla. 1992). Our review of an order applying a
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multiplier to a fee award is also one of abuse of discretion. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Prime Care Chiropractic Ctrs., P.A., 93 So. 3d 345, 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012).
Our review here is hampered because Citizens has the burden to
demonstrate error on appeal yet failed to provide this court with a transcript of the
evidentiary hearing, which would have included the court's reasoning as was noted in
the order. See Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.
1979). By not providing a transcript or a proper substitute, Citizens has thwarted this
court's ability to meaningfully review the trial court's reasoning; for that reason, the lack
of a transcript is generally a fatal flaw in an appellant's case. Id. "In the absence of a
transcript, the trial court's factual findings are presumed correct, and our review is
limited to errors apparent on the face of the judgment." O'Connor v. O'Connor, 184 So.
3d 1149, 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (citing Mobley v. Mobley, 18 So. 3d 724, 725 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2009)).
Even where the court's written order lacks findings, "[t]he most salient
impediment to meaningful review of the trial court's decision is not the absence of
findings, but the absence of a transcript." Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261, 1264 (Fla.
2d DCA 2007). This is because the trial court may have orally pronounced its findings
at the hearing. See Nunes v. Nunes, 112 So. 3d 696, 700-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
This court should "not speculate to the contrary" or "assume that the trial court
committed reversible error during the course of a hearing that we cannot review." Id.
Under this extremely narrow standard, Citizens cannot show any error,
much less fundamental error. In addition to those findings reflected on the face of the
order, the court made oral findings regarding the fee award and, in the order,
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specifically noted that she had made such findings and incorporated them by reference.
Without the benefit of a transcript reflecting the oral findings, this court cannot
meaningfully review the trial court's findings and must defer to the court's judgment.
The majority suggests that the reference to the judge's oral findings made
at the hearing related only to the question of whether the attorneys' hourly rates were
reasonable. This is pure speculation unsupported by anything in this record. Without
the transcript of the hearing, the majority simply assumes that the judge's oral findings
or reasons were so limited in order to reach its result. And even if the trial court's order
is construed as reflecting findings related only to the question of whether the attorneys'
hourly rates were reasonable, this issue is intertwined and overlaps with the question of
whether the contingent fee multiplier was appropriate. See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150-
52. We therefore cannot guess––as the majority essentially does––that the trial court
failed to make any oral findings regarding the contingent fee multiplier. To suggest
otherwise, through parsing of the trial court's written order, is to erode the bedrock
presumption of correctness that clothes the trial court's order. Accordingly, without a
transcript, we simply cannot second guess what oral findings the court made or did not
make at the hearing. Nor should we fault the trial court for being unable to remember
the testimony that was presented at the hearing when the parties are responsible for
producing the transcript. Indeed, that is the very reason why an appellant has the
burden to provide an adequate record to support its arguments.
The majority's approach also extends the holdings in Rowe and
Quanstrom to require written findings to support all aspects of a fee award. Neither
these cases nor any of the other cases that the majority has cited delineate such a
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requirement. Rather, these cases stand for the proposition that findings supporting an
award of attorneys' fees must be express and specific, regardless of whether they are
oral or written. Indeed, this court has specifically held that such factual findings may be
made orally at the hearing or set forth in the written judgment. Perez v. Perez, 100 So.
3d 769, 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also Ortiz v. Ortiz, 227 So. 3d 730, 733 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2017) (quoting Perez with approval).
Creating this additional requirement radically shifts well-established
jurisprudence that the trial court's decision comes to the appellate court with a
presumption of correctness, that it is the appellant's burden to demonstrate error, and
that this court is unable to meaningfully review the trial court's reasoning without a
transcript or a proper substitute. See Applegate, 377 So. 2d at 1152. It would also
undermine the foundational principle that the appellate court must defer to the factfinder
on questions of fact; it is axiomatic that it is not the function of the appellate court to
reweigh the evidence or speculate about what may or may not have happened below.
See, e.g., Gunsby v. State, 574 So. 2d 1085, 1090 (Fla. 1991) ("The resolution of
factual conflicts is solely the responsibility and duty of the trial judge, and, as the
appellate court, we have no authority to reweigh that evidence.").
I am also troubled that the majority appears to ignore the recent Florida
Supreme Court decision in Joyce v. Federated National Insurance Co., 228 So. 3d 1122
(Fla. 2017). In Joyce, the supreme court clarified that under Florida law there is no
presumption that the lodestar amount represents the reasonable fee and the
contingency fee multiplier has never been limited to rare or exceptional circumstances.
Id. at 1131-32. Rather, Florida courts should consider the contingency fee multiplier
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any time the requirements for a multiplier are met. Id. at 1132. Indeed, it is important
for the contingency fee multiplier to be considered where appropriate because
"[I]t assists parties with legitimate causes of action or
defenses in obtaining competent legal representation even if
they are unable to pay an attorney on an hourly basis. In
this way, the availability of the multiplier levels
the playing field between parties with unequal abilities to
secure legal representation."
Id. at 1130 (quoting Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., Inc., 734 So. 2d 403, 411 (Fla.
1999)).
Despite the supreme court's recent decision in Joyce, the majority appears
to incorrectly presume that the lodestar amount represents the reasonable fee in this
case and assume that the contingency fee multiplier is limited to rare or exceptional
circumstances that it contends are not present here. Without the majority's unfounded
presumptions, it becomes even clearer that the trial court's decision should be affirmed
because it is entirely appropriate for Florida courts to consider the contingency fee
multiplier any time the requirements for a multiplier are met.
Accordingly, for all of the aforementioned reasons, I would affirm.
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