J-A03004-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ANTONIO HATCHETT :
:
Appellant : No. 15 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 1, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0012786-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 23, 2018
Appellant, Antonio Hatchett, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, after his bench
trial convictions for possession of a firearm prohibited, carrying a firearm
without a license, and carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia.1
We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On October 6, 2015, at about 8:30 p.m., Philadelphia
Highway Patrolmen Timothy Stephan and Keith White were
on routine patrol in the area of the 100 block of East
Rockland Street in Philadelphia when they observed a
vehicle with heavily tinted windows, which they stopped
for violations of the Vehicle Code. The vehicle was
occupied by Appellant, who was in the backseat, Tyreek
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6108, respectively.
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A03004-18
Smith [(“Co-defendant”)], who was in the front passenger
seat, and a third male, who was driving. Upon
approaching the males, Officer Stephan observed that
Appellant had an identification card in his hand. As
Appellant attempted to hand the card to the officer,
[Appellant’s] hand was shaking, and he began to breathe
more heavily as he looked at the officer. The officer also
observed green leafy material on the backseat floor of the
vehicle that he believed was marijuana residue and
detected an odor of burnt marijuana. Officer Stephan
thereafter inspected the inside of the vehicle using his
flashlight and noticed that the headrest attached to the
front passenger [seat] had been stripped of its foam insert
thereby creating a pocket. He also observed that material
had been removed from the back of the front passenger
seat, which he believed could have created a hidden
compartment in the seat.
Upon observing these alterations to the car, along with the
nervousness manifested by the vehicle’s occupants, the
officers became concerned so they returned to their
vehicle and called for back-up. While the officers sat in
their vehicle waiting for back-up, it appeared to them that
the males in the vehicle were moving about inside it.
When back-up arrived, Officer Stephan, Officer White, and
the two back-up officers once again approached the
vehicle. Officer Stephan observed that Appellant was
sweating even more profusely and breathing more heavily
than he was during the initial encounter. After removing
the three males from the vehicle, Officer Stephan
confirmed that alterations had been made to the front
passenger headrest, which had an indentation in the form
of a handgun. He also confirmed alterations to the back of
the front passenger seat. After Officer Stephan made
these observations, Officer White proceeded from the
driver’s side of the vehicle to its passenger side, lifted up
the back seat, which he observed was not locked in to its
bracket and was pulled away from the rear part of the seat
creating a gap. He then recovered an operable black 9
millimeter Ruger handgun loaded with sixteen live rounds,
located directly under where Appellant was seated. A
check of the serial number on the weapon revealed that
the gun had been stolen and, as a result of the discovery
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J-A03004-18
of the gun, Appellant and [Co-defendant], the registered
owner of the vehicle, were taken into custody. Neither
person had a valid permit to carry a firearm.
Prior to the stop of the vehicle in this instance, Officer
Stephan had conversations with Appellant and, on those
occasions, Appellant did not exhibit nervousness or profuse
sweating during those encounters. Officer Stephan
indicated that he did not observe the firearm before it was
recovered and that he did not see Appellant reach under
the seat.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed April 25, 2017, at 2-3).
The court held a bench trial on September 15, 2016, and that same
day, convicted Appellant of possession of a firearm prohibited, carrying a
firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on a public street in
Philadelphia. On December 1, 2016, the court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of six to twelve years’ imprisonment, plus five years’
probation. Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on December 13,
2016, which the court denied the following day. On December 22, 2016,
Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal. The court, on December 28,
2016, ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court appointed appellate
counsel on January 4, 2017, and issued a new Rule 1925(b) order on
January 5, 2017. After the court granted multiple extensions of time,
Appellant timely filed a counseled Rule 1925(b) statement on March 27,
2017.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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J-A03004-18
WERE THE VERDICT OF GUILTY AND JUDGMENT OF
SENTENCE ON ALL OFFENSES (VIOLATION OF THE
UNIFORM FIREARM ACT [18 PA.C.S.A.] § 6105,
VIOLATION OF THE UNIFORM FIREARM ACT [18 PA.C.S.A.]
§ 6106, VIOLATION OF THE UNIFORM FIREARM ACT [18
PA.C.S.A.] § 6108…) AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH COULD NOT
PROVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE
FIREARM, AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT
[APPELLANT] (1) EVER POSSESSED THE FIREARM, AND
(2) HAD KNOWLEDGE OF, OR COULD EXERCISE
CONSCIOUS DOMINION OR CONTROL OVER, THE FIREARM
FOUND UNDER THE REAR SEAT CUSHION IN A VEHICLE
THAT DID NOT BELONG TO HIM, WHEN HE WAS MERELY A
REAR PASSENGER IN THE VEHICLE AND APPEARED
NERVOUS WHEN STOPPED BY THE POLICE?
WAS THE VERDICT OF GUILTY (VIOLATION OF THE
UNIFORM FIREARM ACT [18 PA.C.S.A.] § 6105,
VIOLATION OF THE UNIFORM FIREARM ACT [18 PA.C.S.A.]
§ 6106, VIOLATION OF THE UNIFORM FIREARM ACT [18
PA.C.S.A.] § 6108…) AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH COULD NOT
PROVE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE
FIREARM, AS THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT
[APPELLANT] (1) EVER POSSESSED THE FIREARM, AND
(2) HAD KNOWLEDGE OF, OR COULD EXERCISE
CONSCIOUS DOMINION OR CONTROL OVER, THE FIREARM
FOUND UNDER THE REAR SEAT CUSHION IN A VEHICLE
THAT DID NOT BELONG TO HIM, WHEN HE WAS MERELY A
REAR PASSENGER IN THE VEHICLE AND APPEARED
NERVOUS WHEN STOPPED BY THE POLICE, AND THE
VERDICT SHOCKS THE CONSCIENCE?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5-6).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Daniel D.
McCaffery, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
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J-A03004-18
presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, supra, at 4-8) (finding: (1) evidence
established Appellant constructively possessed firearm in vehicle; Appellant
hastily gave identification to Officer Stephan, even though Appellant knew
Officer Stephan; police saw gun-shaped cut-out in headrest situated in front
of Appellant; alterations had been made to front passenger seat; Appellant
became increasingly and unusually nervous as investigation of vehicle
progressed; rear passenger seat where Appellant sat was unlatched;
occupants of vehicle made noticeable movement inside vehicle after police
initiated traffic stop; police discovered gun directly under Appellant;
therefore, totality of circumstances of traffic stop indicated Appellant knew
gun was present and had intent and power to control gun; (2)
Commonwealth presented credible testimony at trial that Appellant
possessed firearm in public in Philadelphia without license; although police
did not observe Appellant place gun under his seat, circumstantial evidence
allowed court to conclude Appellant’s firearms convictions did not shock
conscience; specifically, police observed Appellant acting visibly nervous
during traffic stop, Appellant’s seat was unhooked and loose, and police
discovered gun directly under Appellant’s seat; court correctly found verdict
was consistent with weight of evidence). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis
of the trial court opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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J-A03004-18
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date:2/23/18
-6-
Circulated 02/15/2018 03:21 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRIAL DIVISION-CRIMINAL SECTION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : PHILADELPHIA COURT
: OF COMMON PLEAS
: CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
v. FILED CP-51-CR-0012786-2015
APR 2 52017
ANTONIO HATCHETT Office of Judicial Recoros
Appeals/Post Tria1
CP-51-CR-0012786·2015 Comm. v. Hatchett, Antonio
Opinion
OPINION
111111111111111 II Ill I I Ill
7938084261
MCCAFFERY, J
Antonio Hatchett (hereinafter "Appellant") appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed by this Court on December l, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, it is suggested that
the judgment of sentence be affirmed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 15, 2016, Appellant was tried before this Court, sitting without a jury, and
found guilty of Possession of a Firearm Prohibited, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, Carrying a Firearm
Without a License, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106, and Carrying a Firearm on a Public Street, 18 Pa.C.S. §
6108.1 On December 1, 2016, this Court imposed an aggregate sentence of six to twelve years'
incarceration followed by five years' probation. Following the imposition of sentence, Appellant
filed a post-sentence motion which this Court denied on December 14, 2016. Appellant
thereafter filed a notice of appeal and a court ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In his
1
Appellant was tried jointly with Tyreek Smith, who was acquitted. Appellant was tried on the 6105 charge after
being convicted of the other two offenses. Following a stipulation to evidence indicating that Appellant had a prior
conviction that made him ineligible to possess a firearm,and all of the evidence presented at trial, he was found
guilty of violating section 6105. (N.T. 58).
1
1925(b) statement, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions,
that the guilty verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and that the Court committed an
abuse of discretion with respect to the admission of certain evidence.
FACTUAL IDSTORY
On October 6, 2015, at about 8:30 p.m., Philadelphia Highway Patrolmen Timothy
Stephan and Keith White were on routine patrol in the area of the 100 block of East Rockland
Street in Philadelphia when they observed a vehicle with heavily tinted windows, which they
stopped for violations of the Vehicle Code. (N.T. 10-11). 2 The vehicle was occupied by
Appellant, who was in the backseat, Tyreek Smith, who was in the front passenger seat, and a
third male, who was driving. (N.T. 10-11). Upon approaching the males, Officer Stephan
observed that Appellant had an identification card in his hand. As Appellant attempted to hand
the card to the officer, his hand was shaking, and he began to breathe more heavily as he looked
at the officer. (N.T. 13, 15). The officer also observed green leafy material on the backseat floor
of the vehicle that he believed was marijuana residue and detected an odor of burnt marijuana.
(N.T. 14).3 Officer Stephan thereafter inspected the inside of the vehicle using his flashlight and
noticed that the headrest attached to the front passenger had been stripped of its foam insert
thereby creating a pocket. (N.T. 17). He also observed that material had been removed from the
back of the front passenger seat, which he believed could have created a hidden compartment in
the seat. (N.T. 17-18).
Upon observing these alterations to the car, along with the nervousness manifested by the
vehicle's occupants, the officers became concerned so they returned to their vehicle and called
for back-up. (N.T. 18, 44). While the officers sat in their vehicle waiting for back-up, it
2
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the record refer to the transcript of Appellant's trial.
3
The other two passengers manifested nervousness as well. (N.T. 15).
2
appeared to them that the males in the vehicle were moving about inside it. (N.T. 18-19, 44).
When back-up arrived, Officer Stephan, Officer White, and the two back-up officers once
again approached the vehicle. Officer Stephan observed that Appellant was sweating even more
profusely and breathing more heavily than he was during the initial encounter. (N.T. 19). After
removing the three males from the vehicle, Officer Stephan confirmed that alterations had been
made to the front passenger headrest, which had an indentation in the form of a handgun. He also
confirmed alterations to the back of the front passenger seat. (N.T. 19, 29). After Officer
Stephan made these observations, Officer White proceeded from the driver's side of the vehicle
to its passenger side, lifted up the back seat, which he observed was not locked in to its bracket
and was pulled away from the rear part of the seat creating a gap. He then recovered an operable
black 9 millimeter Ruger handgun loaded with sixteen live rounds, located directly under where
Appellant was seated .. (N.T. 19-20, 28, 34, 44-45, 49).4 A check of the serial number on the
weapon revealed that the gun had been stolen and, as a result of the discovery of the gun,
Appellant and Smith, the registered owner of the vehicle, were taken into custody. (N.T. 20,
45). Neither person had a valid permit to carry a firearm. (N.T. 20, 48).
Prior to the stop of the vehicle in this instance, Officer Stephan had conversations with
Appellant and, on those occasions, Appellant did not exhibit nervousness or profuse sweating
during the prior encounters. (N.T. 27). Officer Stephan indicated that he did not observe the
firearm before it was recovered and that he did not see Appellant reach under the seat. (N.T. 34,
37).
4
A comparison of the recovered gun to the gun-shaped indentation in the altered headrest revealed that the gun
matched the indentation. (N.T. 28, 46). A DNA test performed on the gun detected male DNA but it could not be
connected to any individual. (N.T. 50).
3
DISCUSSION
In his 1925(b) statement, Appellant argues in his first two claims that the verdicts were
against the weight of the evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdicts
because the Commonwealth failed to establish that Appellant possessed the gun, exercised
dominion and control over the gun, or had knowledge of the presence of the gun under the seat.
He further asserts that these issues have merit because he was merely present in the car and that
the evidence related to his nervousness did not prove his guilt. He lastly claims that this Court
committed an abuse of discretion by permitting the Commonwealth to present evidence that
during prior encounters with Officer Stephan, Appellant did not exhibit nervousness.
With regard to Appellant's sufficiency claim, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
provided the following standard of review:
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction... does not require a
court to 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it must
determine simply whether the evidence believed by the fact-finder
was sufficient to support the verdict. .. [A]ll of the evidence and
any inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner.
Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1235-1236 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis in original).
The Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty, and it may
sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 932
A.2d 226, 231 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). A reviewing court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the fact finder, and where the record contains support for the convictions,
they may not be disturbed. Id. Lastly, the finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the
evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 804 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Section 6105 provides that a person who has been convicted of any of several enumerated
4
felonies, including burglary, "shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or
obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this
Commonwealth." 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 (a)(l). A person commits the crime of carrying a firearm
without a license, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6106, if he or she carries a concealed firearm upon his or her
person while lacking a license. Finally, a person violates 18 Pa. C.S. § 6108, if he or she carries
a "firearm, rifle or shotgun at any time upon the public streets or upon any public property" in
Philadelphia unless licensed to do so or exempt from the license requirement. For purposes of
these sections, a "firearm" is "[a]ny pistol or revolver with a barrel length less than 15 inches,
any shotgun with a barrel length less than 18 inches or any rifle with a barrel length less than 16
inches, or any pistol, revolver, rifle or shotgun with an overall length of less than 26 inches." 18
Pa. C.S. § 6102.
The evidence adduced at trial established that Appellant constructively possessed the
operable firearm discovered in the car. To prove constructive possession, the Commonwealth
must show that the accused "exercise[d] a conscious dominion over the illegal [contraband.]"
Commonwealth v. Valette, 613 A.2d 548, 550 (Pa. 1992). Conscious dominion is the "power to
control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control." Id., citing Corrunonwealth v.
Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. 1986). The Superior Court has noted, .. [c]onstructive
possession by its nature is not amenable to "bright line" tests. We have held, therefore, that it
may be established by the totality of the circumstances." Conunonwealth v. Carroll, 507 A.2d
819, 821 (Pa. 1986). Finally, circumstantial evidence can prove constructive possession,
Corrunonwealth v. Carter, 450 A.2d 142, 144 (Pa. Super. 1982).
Drawing all inferences in favor of the Commonwealth as the law requires, it is clear that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict finding Appellant guilty of the three firearms
5
charges. Starting with Appellant's haste to give Officer Stephan his identification even though
he knew the officer, the gun-shaped cut-out in the headrest situated in front of Appellant, the
alterations made to the front seat, Appellant's unusual and extreme nervousness that worsened as
the investigation continued, the unlatched back seat, the movement of the men in the car after
being stopped by the officers herein, and the discovery of the gun directly under Appellant all
coalesced to prove Appellant had knowledge of the gun's presence, that he had the intent to
posses the gun, and that he had the power to control the weapon. Accordingly, it is respectfully
suggested that the instant claim be deemed lacking in merit. 5
It is also suggested that Appellant's weight of the evidence claim also lacks merit. The
standard in reviewing a weight of the evidence claim is well-settled:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial judge has had
the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial
court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting or
denying a new trial is the lower court's convict ion that the verdict
was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new
trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013} (emphasis and citations omitted); see
also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 .3d 24, 27 (Pa. 2011) (stating that "[r]elief on a weight of the
evidence claim is reserved for extraordinary circumstances, when the jury's verdict is so contrary
5
Appellant's extreme nervousness manifested consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v.
Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 792 (Pa. 2004) ("The conduct of an accused following a crime, including
'manifestations of mental distress,' is admissible as tending to show guilt.") (quoting in part
Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 94 A.2d 743, 747 (Pa. 1953) ("mental distress, fear at the time of or
just before or just after discovery of the crime" are indicators of guilt)).
6
to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so
that right may be given another opportunity to prevail." (citation omitted)).
The initial determination regarding the weight of the evidence is for the fact-finder.
Commonwealth v. Jarowecki, 923 A.2d 425, 433 (Pa. Super. 2007). The trier of fact is free to
believe all, some or none of the evidence. Id. A reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its
judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666, 672 (Pa. 1999).
When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on the credibility of trial
testimony, appellate review of a trial court's decision is extremely limited. Unless the evidence is
so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture, weight
of evidence claims shall be rejected. Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 863 A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa.
Super. 2004 ).
Applying the foregoing to the instant matter, the Court's verdict does not shock the
conscience for the same reasons set forth above in the discussion of Appellant's sufficiency
claim. The Commonwealth presented credible testimony that Appellant possessed a firearm
without a license permitting him to possess a firearm on a public street of Philadelphia at a time
when he was prohibited from doing so. Although Appellant was not observed placing the gun
under the seat, the other evidence showing that he was nervous, the back seat upon which
Appellant was sitting was unhooked and loose, and that the gun was found directly under him all
caused this Court to conclude that the verdict did not shock the conscience. As noted in
Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa. Super. 2011), reargument denied (Mar. 16, 2011),
appeal denied, 29 A.3d 795 (2011), "[i]n DNA, as in other areas, an absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence." Thus, it is clear that this Court did not commit an abuse of discretion in
7
denying Appellant's weight claim and it is respectfully suggested that the decision to deny
Appellant relief on his weight claim be affirmed.
In his final claim, Appellant asserts that it was an abuse of discretion to admit, over
objection, evidence that during prior non-custodial interactions with Officer Stephan, Appellant
did not appear nervous and acted normally. (N.T. 13-14, 27). The admissibility of evidence is
solely within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only if the trial court has
abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the
overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of
record. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.2d 406, 411 (Pa.Super. 2012), quoting
Commonwealth v. Herb, 852 A.2d 356, 363 (Pa.Super. 2004). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
401 defines 'relevant evidence' as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."
Admissibility of evidence depends on relevance and probative
value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact
in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports
a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.
Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 781 A.2d 110, 117 (Pa. 2001), citing Commonwealth v. Crews,
640 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Bardo, 709 A.2d.871 (Pa. 1988).
The application of the foregoing establish that this Court did not commit an abuse of
discretion by overruling Appellant's objection to the introduction of the evidence under review.
The fact that Appellant exhibited nervousness that, in Officer Stephan's opinion, was out of the
ordinary was relevant and admissible. As noted above, extreme nervousness establishes
consciousness of guilt. Therefore, the fact that Appellant was extremely and unusually nervous
8
made his lack of such behavior when he was in Officer Stephan's presence previously relevant.
Therefore, this Court did not commit an abuse of discretion and Appellant's claim should be
deemed lacking in merit. 6
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully suggested that the judgment of sentence entered
in this matter against Appellant be affirmed.
BY THE COURT,
Date: ��4o/Y
6
In any event, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and any error in allowing the admission of this evidence was
harmless. See Commonwealth v. Dejesus, 880 A.2d 608 (Pa. 2005) (holding that because evidence of guilt was
overwhelming, any error caused by admission of prejudicial evidence was harmless).
9
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
b-
I, James Molinari, Esquire, Law clerk to the Honorable Daniel D. Mccaffery hereby
') ,n4 day of
certifies that on the � �1,L, , 2017, by first class mail, postage prepaid, a
true and correct copy of the attached opinion was served upon the following:
Leo M. Mulvihill, Jr., Esquire
2424 East York Street-Suite 111
Philadelphia, Pa. 19123
Hugh Bums, Esquire
Chief-Appeals Unit
Office of the Philadelphia
District Attorney
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107
James Molinari, Esquire
10