NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 26 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VESKO BORISLAVOV ANANIEV, No. 12-17108
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-02275-SI
v.
MEMORANDUM*
AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2018**
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Vesko Borislavov Ananiev appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and
state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de
novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
a claim. Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Ananiev’s FDCPA claims against
Aurora Loan Services, LLC and Aurora Bank, FSB (the “Aurora Defendants”)
because Ananiev failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the alleged
communications were attempts to collect a “debt” as defined by the FDCPA. See
Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ctions taken to
facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and
notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the
FDCPA.”); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that “while the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity,
it does so only through Section 1692f(6),” and that “[a]s for the remaining FDCPA
provisions, ‘debt collection’ refers only to the collection of a money debt”).
The district court properly dismissed Ananiev’s FDCPA claim under
§ 1692f(6) because Ananiev failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the Aurora
Defendants’ conduct was unfair or unconscionable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6); Ho,
858 F.3d at 573 (stating that only § 1692f(6) protects a consumer against abusive
practices of a security enforcer); Dowers, 852 F.3d at 971 (discussing protections
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for borrowers set forth in § 1692f(6)).
The district court properly dismissed Ananiev’s FDCPA claims against
Rosenthal Withem & Zeff, Robert L. Rosenthal, and Michael D. Zeff, and
Ananiev’s quiet title and fraud claims, because Ananiev failed to allege facts
sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ananiev further
leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper
when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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