MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 28 2018, 9:45 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Christopher M. Forrest
Forrest Legal LLC
Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re The Marriage of: February 28, 2018
Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1708-DR-2025
Matthew Strack,
Appeal from the Allen Circuit
Appellant-Petitioner, Court
and The Honorable Thomas J. Felts,
Judge
Mary Strack, The Honorable John D. Kitch III,
Magistrate
Appellee-Respondent.
Trial Court Cause No.
02C01-1603-DR-382
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] Matthew (“Father”) and Mary (“Mother”) Strack separated in 2015. Following
a hearing, the trial court issued a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on May 18,
2016, which awarded primary physical custody of the parties’ children to
Mother, divided the marital estate, and ordered Father to pay Mother $650.00
per week in child support. Father now appeals, presenting two issues for our
review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in assessing the amount
of child support; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in dividing
the marital estate. Concluding the trial court abused its discretion on both
counts, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and Mother were married on April 13, 1996, and had thirteen children
together, eleven of whom are unemancipated (“Children”). Father filed a
petition for the dissolution of marriage on March 16, 2016, Mother filed a
counter-petition, and the trial court conducted a hearing on June 28, 2016,
wherein the parties presented evidence in a summary fashion. The trial court
entered a Provisional Order requiring Father to directly deposit his $650.00
weekly Wal-Mart check directly into Mother’s bank account, “in lieu of child
support and spousal support.” Appellant’s Appendix, Volume 2 at 17.
[3] Following a final dissolution hearing, the trial court made its “provisional order
of June 28, 2016 for $650 per week [in child support] a permanent Order of the
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Court[,]” and specified that it made this deviation “in the best interest of the
children.” Appealed Order at 2. The trial court also allocated tax exemptions
and the parties’ responsibilities for the Children’s uninsured medical expenses.
[4] Regarding the marital estate, the trial court divided the assets and liabilities of
the parties, explaining that its division was “an equal, just, reasonable, fair and
equitable award thereof under the facts presented at trial, including the parties’
agreement of the same.” Id. at 5. Father now appeals. Additional facts will be
supplied as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
[5] We begin by observing that Mother chose not to file an appellee’s brief. When
an appellee fails to submit a brief, we need not undertake the burden of
developing their argument. Whittaker v. Whittaker, 44 N.E.3d 716, 719 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015). In these cases, we apply a less stringent standard of review with
respect to showings of reversible error and may reverse the trial court if the
appellant—in this case Father—is able to establish prima facie error. Id.
“Prima facie” means “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id.
(citation omitted).
[6] On appeal, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by relying on
improper means to calculate his child support obligation and by failing to justify
its unequal division of the marital estate.
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I. Child Support
[7] The trial court ordered Father to pay $650.00 per week in child support. Father
claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adhere to the Indiana
Child Support Guidelines and relevant case law. Finding numerous errors with
the trial court’s order, we agree.
A. Standard of Review
[8] We presume a trial court’s calculation of child support is valid and we review
its decision for abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 924
(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The trial court abuses its discretion if its
decision is clearly against the logic and the effect of the facts and circumstances
before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id. This broad
discretion, however, “must be exercised within the methodological framework
established by the guidelines.” Quinn v. Threlkel, 858 N.E.2d 665, 670 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006).
B. Child Support Order
[9] The trial court made the following finding regarding child support:
5.1 The Court makes the provisional order of June 28, 2016
for $650.00 per week a permanent Order of the Court.
The Court makes this deviation in the best interest of the
children.
Appealed Order at 2. The Provisional Order dated June 28, 2016 referenced by
the court provides the following regarding “Temporary Child Support”:
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4.1 Father’s check from Wal-Mart is directly deposited into
the Chase account ($650.00 per week) in lieu of child
support and spousal support.
Appellant’s App., Vol. 2 at 17.
[10] Initially, we observe the trial court’s purported award of child support is not an
award of child support at all. The provisional order of June 28, 2016, which the
court’s final order makes permanent, states that Father’s check from Wal-Mart
would be directly deposited into Mother’s bank account “in lieu of child
support and spousal support.” Id. Moreover, Father was involuntarily
terminated from his job at Wal-Mart just before the final hearing. See
Transcript, Volume 2 at 3. It would be difficult—indeed impossible—for Father
to directly deposit a payroll check from a company at which he is no longer
employed.
[11] With that said, the Indiana Child Support Guidelines allow a trial court to
impute potential income to a parent if the court is convinced the parent’s
underemployment “has been contrived for the sole purpose of evading support
obligations.” Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 852 N.E.2d 939, 950 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006). And, we recently explained in Miller v. Miller, 72 N.E.3d 952, 956 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017), that:
While the Guidelines clearly indicate that a parent’s avoidance of
child support is grounds for imputing potential income, it is not a
necessary prerequisite. For example, the relevant commentary
states, “When a parent is unemployed by reason of involuntary
layoff or job termination, it still may be appropriate to include an
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amount in gross income representing that parent’s potential
income.” Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(A)(3), cmt 2c(4).
Thus, it is within the trial court’s discretion to impute potential
income even under circumstances where avoiding child support
is not the reason for a parent’s unemployment.
(quoting In re Paternity of Pickett, 44 N.E.3d 756, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)). The
trial court’s Decree of Dissolution of Marriage is absent a finding of imputed
income. Therefore, the trial court’s award is facially deficient and Father has
demonstrated prima facie error.
[12] Second, even assuming the trial court’s order of $650.00 per week was indeed
an order for child support, the trial court does not provide a basis for this
amount. “We cannot review a support order to determine if it complies with
the guidelines unless the order reveals the basis for the amount awarded.”
Vandenburgh v. Vandenburgh, 916 N.E.2d 723, 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Such
revelation could be accomplished either by specific findings or by incorporation
of a proper worksheet.” Cobb v. Cobb, 588 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992). Here, the trial court neither made factual findings nor incorporated a
valid worksheet.
[13] Our review of the record reveals a worksheet submitted by Mother proposing a
$650.00 support payment from Father. Respondents’ Exhibit [Volume] A-I at
11. To the extent the trial court relied on this worksheet, doing so was
improper because it was unsigned and never incorporated into the Decree. The
Indiana Child Support Guidelines provide:
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1. Submitting Worksheet to Court. In all cases, a copy of the
worksheet which accompanies these Guidelines shall be
completed and filed with the court when the court is asked to
order support. This includes cases in which agreed orders are
submitted. Worksheets shall be signed by both parties, not their
counsel, under penalties for perjury.
Ind. Child Support Guideline 3(B)(1) (emphasis added). We have previously
held that unsigned, unverified worksheets should not be the basis for a trial
court’s award. Vandenburgh, 916 N.E.2d at 723 (noting “the worksheets were
improper because they were not signed or verified.”); Cobb, 588 N.E.2d at 574
(concluding child support order based on unverified and unsigned worksheet
was error because the use of such a worksheet “has no sanction under either the
child support guidelines or the rules of evidence and trial procedure.”). We
somewhat limited those holdings in In re Paternity of Jo.J., 992 N.E.2d 760, 770
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), but only where the worksheet is supported, rather than
contradicted, by the evidence in the record. Because evidence such as Father’s
involuntary termination and the amounts reflected by other documents
contradicted Mother’s worksheet, it should not have served as the basis for the
trial court’s award.
[14] Third, the Decree states that Father’s $650.00 support order was a “deviation.”
Appealed Order at 2. A trial court may, in its discretion, “deviate from the
presumptive amount specified by the guidelines if application would result in an
unjust award.” Cobb, 588 N.E.2d at 574 (citing Ind. Child Support Guideline
3). When deviating from Guideline support, however, the trial court “must set
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forth a written finding stating the factual basis for the deviation.” In re Jo.J., 992
N.E.2d at 771. Here, the trial court makes no such finding, merely stating that
such a finding was “in the best interest of the children.” Appealed Order at 2.
This is insufficient to support a deviation from the Guidelines. 1 The
commentary to Indiana Child Support Guideline 3(F) states:
3. Deviation from Guideline Amount. If the court determines
that the Guideline amount is unjust or inappropriate, a written
finding shall be made setting forth the factual basis for deviation
from the Guideline amount. . . . A pro forma finding that the
Guidelines are not appropriate does not satisfy the requirement
for a specific finding of inappropriateness in a particular case,
which is required in order to deviate from the guideline
amount. . . .
[15] We have previously explained that although the findings accompanying a
deviation “need not be especially formal[, t]hey must . . . set forth the trial
court’s reason for deviating from the guidelines’ amount so that as a reviewing
court we may know the basis for the court’s decision.” Talarico v. Smithson, 579
N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). A finding that the deviation is in the
1
Mother’s child support worksheet shows Father’s child support obligation to be $551.67 with credits of
$65.00 for the children’s health insurance premium and $27.57 for parenting time of 52 overnights, which
would represent a total child support obligation of $459.10. Respondents’ Exhibit [Volume] A-I at 11.
However, Mother requested an upward deviation of $190.90 for a total child support obligation of $650.00
because “The child support worksheet only provides for 9 children at home; these parties have 11
unemancipated, minor children that need to be provided for. It is only appropriate to maximize the weekly
support payments at 50% of the Combined Weekly Adjusted Income.” Id. at 12.
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“best interest of the children” is inadequate to reveal the basis of the court’s
decision.
[16] Because the trial court failed to support its award with factual findings or the
incorporation of a valid child support worksheet, we are unable to determine
whether the court complied with the Child Support Guidelines. Therefore,
Father has demonstrated prima facie error and we must remand to the trial
court for clarification of its award. See, e.g., Dye v. Young, 655 N.E.2d 549, 551
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
[17] Father also argues that if we remand the issue of child support, we should
remand for the trial court to reconsider its determination regarding uninsured
medical expense obligations and the allocation of child tax exemptions.
Because these determinations are integrally tied to the appropriate amount of
child support, we remand these issues to be considered accordingly.
II. Marital Property
[18] Father also challenges the trial court’s division of the marital property.
Specifically, Father claims the property division is not “equal” as the trial court
purports, and that while it is well within the trial court’s discretion to make an
unequal division of the marital property, it must comply with Indiana’s marital
property division statute and provide its reasoning for doing so. Either way,
Father contends, the trial court abused its discretion. Again, we agree.
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A. Standard of Review
[19] The division of marital assets is within the trial court’s discretion, and we
reverse only for abuse of that discretion. Alexander v. Alexander, 927 N.E.2d 926,
933 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Father must overcome the presumption
that the trial court complied with the law and we consider the evidence most
favorable to the trial court’s disposition of the marital property. Id.
B. Division of Assets
[20] In a dissolution action, all marital property goes into the marital pot for
division, whether it was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired
by either spouse after the marriage and before the final separation of the parties,
or acquired by their joint efforts. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a). “Property,” in this
context, means “all the assets of either party or both parties.” Ind. Code § 31-9-
2-98. “The requirement that all martial assets be placed in the marital pot is
meant to [e]nsure that the trial court first determines that value before
endeavoring to divide property.” Montgomery v. Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 238
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[21] Indiana Code section 31-15-7-5 governs the distribution of marital property and
provides as follows:
The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital
property between the parties is just and reasonable. However,
this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents
relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following
factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
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(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of
the property, regardless of whether the contribution
was income producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
spouse:
(A) before the marriage; or
(B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time
the disposition of the property is to become effective,
including the desirability of awarding the family
residence or the right to dwell in the family residence
for such periods as the court considers just to the
spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as
related to the disposition or dissipation of their
property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related
to:
(A) a final division of property; and
(B) a final determination of the property rights of
the parties.
[22] If a court adheres to the foregoing statutory presumption and divides the
parties’ property equally, it need not set forth findings supporting its award.
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But, we have long held that when deviating from the presumption of an equal
division, the trial court must state its reasons for doing so. Lulay v. Lulay, 591
N.E.2d 154, 155-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that if the trial court deviates
from an equal division, the “trial court must enter findings explaining why it
awarded an unequal division of the property.”); cf. Kirkman v. Kirkman, 555
N.E.2d 1293, 1294 (Ind. 1990) (holding that trial court findings are not
compelled for “insubstantial deviations from precise mathematical equality.”)
[23] Following the final hearing, the trial court divided the assets and liabilities of
the parties. Our review of this issue, however, is hindered by the fact that the
trial court failed to calculate the gross marital estate, the values of the martial
assets, or the total value of each party’s share in the Decree. See Montgomery v.
Faust, 910 N.E.2d 234, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Appellate courts are ill-
equipped to determine the value of specific assets or of the total martial estate in
the first instance, so it is vital to our review to have the trial court do so.”).
Instead, the trial court simply allocated the parties’ assets and ordered that the
debt from the former martial residence be shared equally while the parties
would retain any debts held solely in their name.2 What follows is our best
attempt to make sense of the Decree:
2
Mother testified that the Fort Wayne City Utilities bill “is in both of our names, but . . . that was with the
Provisional Orders that I was responsible to pay that.” Tr., Vol. 2 at 37. Therefore, the Decree does not
specifically allocate the Fort Wayne Utilities Bill but, in order to view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the trial court’s disposition of the property, we attribute it to Mother. See Alexander, 927 N.E.2d at 933.
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Father Mother
Assets
Wal-Mart 401(k) $33,314.40
Wal-Mart Stocks $2,323.67
Pizza Hut 401(k) $281.03
Total Assets: $2,604.70 $33,314.40
Liabilites
Marital Residence Debt $14,425.34 $14,425.35
Father's Medical Bills $1,372.19
Xfinity Bill $232.83
Fort Wayne City Utilities Bill $836.68*
Total Liabilites: $15,797.53 $15,494.86
Assets - Liabilties $2,604.70 - $15,797.53 $33,314.40 - $15,494.86
Total Net Value: (negative) $13,192.83 $17,819.54
See Appealed Order at 4-5. After allocating the foregoing assets and liabilities,
the trial court concluded:
11.1 This division of property and assignment of liabilities
entered herein is an equal, just, reasonable, fair and equitable
award thereof under the facts presented at trial, including the
parties’ agreement of the same. See IC 31-15-6-4 and 5.
Appealed Order at 5 (emphasis added).
[24] Having noted that the trial court’s clear intention was to order not only a just,
reasonable, and fair distribution, but also an equal distribution, the Decree
clearly does not come close to meeting that characterization. Even when
viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court’s award, the evidence reveals
a discrepancy of $31,012.37: Father received negative $13,192.83 while Mother
received $17,819.54. Because the trial court’s division of property was not
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equal and the trial court failed to state its reasons for deviating from the
presumption of an equal division, Father has demonstrated prima facie error.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Davidson, 540 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
Conclusion
[25] Father has successfully demonstrated prima facie error regarding both the trial
court’s award of child support and its division of the parties’ marital property.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[26] On remand, we direct the trial court to the Indiana Child Support Guidelines
and, in accordance therewith, the court should determine an award supported
by specific factual findings or a valid child support worksheet incorporated into
its order. If the trial court still determines the Guideline amount is unjust or
inappropriate under the circumstances, the trial court shall make written
findings setting forth its factual basis for deviating from the Guideline amount.
[27] Similarly, we direct the court to follow the statutory presumption and effect an
equal division of the marital property or provide its rationale for choosing to do
otherwise.
[28] Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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