IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 09–0239
Filed March 11, 2011
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
DAVID EDWARD BRUCE,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
James C. Bauch (trial and posttrial motions to amend trial informations)
and Thomas N. Bower (sentencing), Judges.
Defendant appeals from his sentence as a habitual offender
asserting that the State’s recidivist allegation was untimely. SENTENCE
VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J.
Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad P.
Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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APPEL, Justice.
This case presents one straightforward, procedural question: When
does a trial end? Here, after the jury returned a verdict finding the
defendant guilty, the State moved to amend the trial informations to
include sentencing enhancements. The district court allowed the
amendment and sentenced the defendant as a habitual offender.
Finding the amendment untimely, we vacate the sentence and remand
the case to the district court for resentencing.
I. Factual and Procedural History.
The State, in two separate trial informations, charged the
defendant, David Edward Bruce, with two counts of delivering
methamphetamine to a minor and one count of sexual abuse in the third
degree. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401D(2), 902.9(1), 709.1, 709.4 (2007).
The charge of delivering methamphetamine to a minor is a “special B”
felony offense, punishable by up to ninety-nine years in prison. Id.
§ 902.9(1). Sexual abuse in the third degree is punishable by up to ten
years in prison. Id. § 902.9(4). Although the State was aware that Bruce
had a criminal record that included prior felony drug and theft offenses,
the State did not charge Bruce as a habitual offender in the original trial
informations. If convicted on all charges, Bruce faced a maximum prison
sentence of 208 years.
The case was submitted to the jury. The jury was instructed that
delivery of methamphetamine was a lesser-included offense of the crime
of delivery of methamphetamine to a minor. The jury convicted Bruce of
two counts of the lesser-included offense of delivery of methamphetamine
and one count of sexual abuse in the third degree. Based on the jury’s
verdict, the maximum sentence that Bruce could receive was thirty
years, assuming the three sentences were to be served consecutively, and
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a minimum sentence of 3.3 years, assuming all sentences were to be
served concurrently. See id. §§ 124.401(1)(c), 124.413, 902.9(4).
Twelve days after the jury’s verdict, the State moved to amend the
trial informations to allege that Bruce had prior felony drug and theft
convictions. Because of these prior convictions, the State sought to have
Bruce sentenced as a habitual offender. If treated as a habitual offender,
Bruce faced a maximum prison term of 105 years. Id. §§ 124.401(1)(c),
124.411, 709.4, 902.9(3)–(4).
Bruce resisted the amendments, contending that the motion to
amend was untimely under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.4(8)(a).
While no record was made of the subsequent hearing, rule 2.4(8)(a)
provides:
a. Generally. The court may, on motion of the state,
either before or during the trial, order the indictment
amended so as to correct errors or omissions in matters of
form or substance. Amendment is not allowed if substantial
rights of the defendant are prejudiced by the amendment, or
if a wholly new and different offense is charged.
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4(8)(a). The district court concluded that, under State
v. Berney, 378 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1985), an amendment to enhance
punishment based on the defendant’s habitual offender status may be
filed subsequent to the jury verdicts on the substantive charges but prior
to judgment and sentence.
The district court sentenced Bruce as a habitual offender. The
court sentenced Bruce to two concurrent forty-five-year terms for the
drug offenses and a fifteen-year term, to be served consecutively to the
sentence on the drug charges, for the sexual abuse offense. Because the
court sentenced Bruce as a habitual offender, Bruce would serve a
maximum of sixty years and a minimum of eighteen years in prison. See
Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(c), 124.411, 124.413, 709.4, 902.8, 902.9(3).
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Bruce appealed from his sentence, urging this court to overturn
Berney. In the alternative, Bruce alleges that he was prejudiced by the
late amendment to the indictment. Finally, Bruce asserts that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise due process challenges to the
late amendments under the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
II. Standard of Review.
To the extent this case turns on the question of the proper
interpretation of our rules of criminal procedure, review is for correction
of errors at law. State v. Taeger, 781 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 2010).
III. Discussion.
The critical issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the
phrase “during the trial” in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.4(8)(a). In
approaching this question, we recognize that this issue was previously
decided in Berney. The Berney court considered what it characterized as
the “difficult” question of whether the phrase “during the trial” included
proceedings that were conducted after a jury verdict but prior to
sentencing and entry of judgment. 378 N.W.2d at 919. The court
concluded that “during the trial” included these postverdict proceedings.
Id. In reaching this decision, however, the court did not engage in an
extended analysis of the language, applicable cases, or other provisions
of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id.
While the phrase “during the trial” in rule 2.4(8)(a) was given an
expansive interpretation in Berney, the court was clearly uncomfortable
with the result. The Berney court stated:
We disapprove the prosecution’s dilatory filing of its
request to amend the trial information to charge habitual
offender status. Our rules of criminal procedure provide
both the defendant and the prosecution clear procedural
guidelines to follow. When the parties adhere to the rules
they are more likely to achieve a fair and expeditious trial or
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other satisfactory disposition of criminal charges. When a
party does not comply with the rules, the rights of the other
party are likely to be jeopardized. Here, however, defendant
claims no prejudice, and we are entirely satisfied that
defendant was not harmed by the amendment which
preceded trial of the habitual offender issue.
Id.
The above language demonstrates tension in Berney between its
ultimate holding and its observation that the rules provided “clear
procedural guidelines” and that the failure to follow them would likely
cause the rights of the other party to be prejudiced. See id. While the
Berney court allowed the particular defendant’s sentence to stand, the
court admonished prosecutors to not file dilatory amendments in the
future. Id.
We, of course, recognize that the principle of stare decisis demands
that we respect prior precedent and that we do not overturn them merely
because we might have come to a different conclusion. See, e.g., McElroy
v. State, 703 N.W.2d 385, 394–95 (Iowa 2005). On the other hand, it is
our obligation to revisit cases that were plainly wrongly decided. See,
e.g., Miller v. Westfield Ins. Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Iowa 2000). Upon
our review, we conclude that Berney is unsound and should be
overruled.
First, we believe the common understanding of the phrase “during
the trial” does not include proceedings after a jury has returned a
verdict. Absent a specific definition in the statute or rule, we believe the
phrase “during the trial” means the period of time in which the trier of
fact hears evidence and makes a decision based on that evidence. See
Weber v. Kessler, 179 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301 (Ct. App. 1981). Under this
definition, once the jury returns its verdict, the trial has concluded.
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Second, the expansive approach of “during the trial” in Berney is
inconsistent with authoritative case law interpreting the Double
Jeopardy Clauses of the Iowa and United States Constitutions. These
constitutional limitations prevent a defendant from being subject to
multiple prosecutions for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V; Iowa
Const. art. I, § 12. We have noted that jeopardy terminates when the
jury reaches a verdict or, in cases tried to the court, when the trial judge
enters a final judgment of acquittal. State v. Kramer, 760 N.W.2d 190,
194–95 (Iowa 2009); see also United States v. Byrne, 203 F.3d 671, 673
(9th Cir. 2000). By analogy, our approach to double jeopardy cases
strongly suggests that the term “trial” ordinarily does not extend into
proceedings after rendition of the verdict.
Third, the view that “trial” does not include events after verdict is
reinforced by reference to other rules of criminal procedure. See State v.
Kamber, 737 N.W.2d 297, 299–300 (Iowa 2007) (considering entire
context of statute and related provisions in interpretation). Iowa Rule of
Criminal Procedure 2.19 is entitled “Trial.” Although the rule does not
define “trial,” rule 2.19(1)(a) states that after the jury is “impaneled and
sworn,” the “order of trial” must proceed according to certain rules. The
rule regarding jury deliberations includes a reference to “final
submission” of the case to the jury. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(5)(h).
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24 further suggests that the
term “trial” does not include proceedings after a jury verdict. For
example, under rule 2.24(1), “motions after trial” include “motions for
new trial.” Rule 2.24(2)(a) further directs that motions after trial be filed
no “later than 45 days after verdict of guilty or special verdict upon
which a judgment of conviction may be rendered.” Iowa R. Crim. P.
2.24(2)(a). Clearly, under rule 2.24, the period of time after a jury verdict
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but prior to entry of judgment is considered to be “after trial.” It is
difficult to understand how “after trial” under rule 2.24 has the same
meaning as “during the trial” under rule 2.4(8)(a).
Furthermore, the interplay between rules 2.19(9) and 2.4(8)(a)
suggests that “trial,” even in the habitual offender context, concludes
when the jury renders its verdict on the substantive offense. Rule
2.19(9) states that certain objections to the State’s habitual offender
allegation may only be heard and determined by the court if they are
“asserted prior to trial of the substantive offense in the manner presented
in rule 2.11.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9). By filing a habitual offender
amendment after the jury has rendered its verdict on the substantive
offense, the State could effectively foreclose the defendant’s opportunity
to make these objections. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4(8), 2.19(9); see also
State v. Spoonmore, 323 N.W.2d 202, 203 (Iowa 1982). For example, the
State, by filing its amendment after the trial on the substantive offense,
could procedurally bar a defendant from challenging a habitual offender
enhancement on the grounds that a predicate felony is based on an
invalid guilty plea. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9); State v. Cooley, 471
N.W.2d 786, 787 (Iowa 1991); Spoonmore, 323 N.W.2d at 203. This
obvious problem militates heavily against the State’s interpretation of
rule 2.4(8)(a). See State v. Gonzalez, 718 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Iowa 2006)
(stating that we strive for “a reasonable interpretation that best achieves
the statute’s purpose and avoids absurd results”).
The State focuses its attention on the first part of rule 2.19(9)
because it calls for a bifurcated trial process in certain circumstances.
The rule states:
After conviction of the primary or current offense, but prior
to pronouncement of sentence, if the indictment or
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information alleges one or more prior convictions which by
the Code subjects the offender to an increased sentence, the
offender shall have the opportunity in open court to affirm or
deny that the offender is the person previously convicted, or
that the offender was not represented by counsel and did not
waive counsel. If the offender denies being the person
previously convicted, sentence shall be postponed for such
time as to permit a trial before a jury on the issue of the
offender’s identity with the person previously convicted.
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(9) (emphasis added). But bifurcation under rule
2.19(9) only occurs if the defendant is accused of being a habitual
offender at the time of the trial on the substantive offense and “denies
being the person previously convicted.” Id.
Finally, we note the obvious discomfort of the Berney court. The
court stated that the rules provided “clear procedural guidelines.”
Berney, 378 N.W.2d at 919. It also expressed concern that departure
from them will create situations that will likely jeopardize the rights of
litigants. Id. Yet the court upheld the State’s “dilatory” filing. Id. The
inconsistency of the admonition with the holding in Berney creates an
unstable opinion that should be abandoned.
For the above reasons, we conclude that Berney should be
overruled. We further conclude that “the trial” under rule 2.4(8)(a)
means the substantive trial when the State seeks to enhance the
defendant’s sentence based on a prior conviction. As a result, the
sentence in this proceeding was the result of an amendment filed after
trial and must be vacated.
Because of our holding, we do not need to address Bruce’s claims
that he was substantially prejudiced by the late amendment or that the
granting of the amendment violated his right to due process under the
United States and Iowa Constitutions.
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IV. Conclusion.
For all of the above reasons, the sentence imposed by the district
court is vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court for
resentencing.
SENTENCE VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.