IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 08–0051
Filed August 20, 2010
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
JODY NOLAN MCCULLAH,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza Ovrom,
Judge.
On further review, defendant contends the district court and court
of appeals erroneously construed Iowa Code section 708.3B. DECISION
OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Jason B. Shaw and
Thomas J. Gaul, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for appellant, and Jody
McCullah, Fort Madison, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant
Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jeffrey Noble,
Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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HECHT, Justice.
In a fight that began when a Polk County jail inmate attacked one
officer and was subdued by several others, the inmate and the officers
were left bloodied and injured. The inmate was charged with and
convicted of four counts of inmate assault in violation of Iowa Code
section 708.3B (2005). We are asked to determine whether a violation of
section 708.3B requires that, as a result of an assault or other specified
act by an inmate, a jail employee come into contact with blood, seminal
fluid, urine, or feces of an inmate. Because we conclude a conviction
under the statute may only arise if an employee comes into contact with
such bodily substances not his or her own, but not necessarily those of
the inmate, we affirm three of the convictions and reverse one.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On April 20, 2007, Jody McCullah was an inmate at the Polk
County jail. He was out of his cell, purportedly for a medical
examination on the second floor of the facility. Officer Harper, working
in the second floor control room, directed McCullah to the medical unit
and turned her back to him. McCullah snuck up behind Officer Harper,
struck her on the side of her head with a closed fist, and began pushing
buttons on the control panel.
Officer Rodish entered the area soon after and saw Officer Harper
struggling with McCullah. After calling for help, Officer Rodish sprayed
McCullah with pepper spray. McCullah resisted, and eventually Officer
Rodish wrestled him to the floor. At some point during the fight, Officer
Rodish cut his scalp, which bled profusely.
Deputies Bracelin, Purscell, and Vandepol responded to the call for
help and became involved in the altercation. The fight ended when
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Deputy Vandepol used a TASER on McCullah, and the officers were able
to handcuff him.
All six people involved in the fight received medical assistance, and
their injuries were photographed. Officer Harper had a large bruise on
her forehead and blood on her lip and chin, although she did not have
any bleeding wounds of her own. Officer Rodish had a significant
amount of blood in his hair and on his shirt. He suffered one laceration
on his scalp, which bled extensively and required five staples to close.
Although Deputy Purscell sustained no bleeding wounds, he had blood
on his arms, in his eye, and on his uniform when the melee ended.
Deputy Bracelin had a small amount of blood on his hand, but he
sustained no bruises or cuts himself. Deputy Vandepol was not injured
and did not come into contact with blood. McCullah incurred several
bleeding wounds on his face during the struggle.
McCullah was charged with one count of escape and four counts of
inmate assault in violation of Iowa Code section 708.3B. At trial,
McCullah moved for a judgment of acquittal contending the evidence was
insufficient to establish he was the source of the blood the jail employees
came into contact with. The district court concluded that a conviction
under section 708.3B does not depend upon proof that the employees
came into contact with the defendant’s blood, as blood from any source
would suffice. McCullah was convicted on all five counts. On appeal,
McCullah asserted the district court misconstrued the statute as
permitting a conviction without proof that the employees were exposed to
McCullah’s blood in the altercation and further claimed he was denied
his right to self-representation. The court of appeals affirmed his
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convictions. We granted his application for further review to address the
construction of section 708.3B. 1
II. Scope of Review.
We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges for the correction
of errors at law. State v. Jorgensen, 758 N.W.2d 830, 834 (Iowa 2008).
We will uphold a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal
if the record contains substantial evidence supporting the defendant’s
conviction. State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 1999).
Substantial evidence is evidence that “would convince a rational trier of
fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jorgensen, 758
N.W.2d at 834. “The evidence must at least raise a fair inference of guilt
as to each essential element of the crime.” State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d
782, 787 (Iowa 1992). “Evidence which merely raises suspicion,
speculation, or conjecture is insufficient.” Id.
To the extent that McCullah’s insufficiency claim involves the
district court’s construction of Iowa Code section 708.3B, our review is
also for errors at law. State v. Anderson, 782 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Iowa
2010).
III. Discussion.
The evidence produced at trial established that all four jail
employees came into contact with blood as they attempted to subdue
McCullah. The source of the blood is unclear, however, as both
McCullah and Officer Rodish sustained bleeding wounds in the process.
McCullah argues that section 708.3B is violated only if a jail employee
comes into contact with the defendant’s blood or other bodily
substances. Because the State did not prove the blood on the employees
1The court of appeals’ disposition of the self-representation issue raised by the
defendant and not addressed in this opinion stands as the final decision in this appeal.
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was his, McCullah contends his motion for judgment for acquittal should
have been granted.
We begin, of course, by reading the statute.
A person who, while confined in a jail . . . commits any
of the following acts commits a class “D” felony:
1. An assault, as defined under section 708.1, upon
an employee of the jail . . . which results in the employee’s
contact with blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces.
2. An act which is intended to cause pain or injury or
be insulting or offensive and which results in blood, seminal
fluid, urine, or feces being cast or expelled upon an employee
of the jail . . . .
Iowa Code § 708.3B. Although section 708.3B does not explicitly specify
a source of the bodily substances, McCullah argues the statute implies
that a conviction may be sustained only by proof that the inmate
committing the assault was the source of the blood, seminal fluid, urine,
or feces with which the employee came into contact. He contends the
harm the legislature intended to address involves the employee’s risk of
becoming infected with a disease as a result of exposure to the bodily
fluids of an inmate.
The State, however, asserts the statute is not ambiguous and the
intent of the legislature is clear from the words used. Because “blood,
seminal fluid, urine, or feces” is not modified, the State asserts the
statute plainly does not require that the inmate be the source of the
bodily substances. Indeed, as the source is not specified in section
708.3B, the State asserts a conviction can be sustained even by proof of
a jail employee’s exposure to his or her own bodily substances.
Accordingly, the State contends the statute is unambiguous, and this is
no occasion for the application of our rules of statutory construction.
If, as the State contends, the statute is unambiguous, we will not
engage in statutory construction. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887
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(Iowa 1996). A statute is not ambiguous unless “reasonable minds could
differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the statute.” Id. Ambiguity
arises in two ways—either from the meaning of specific words or “from
the general scope and meaning of the statute when all of its provisions
are examined.” Id.
We conclude that the lack of a modifier describing “blood, seminal
fluid, urine, or feces” creates an ambiguity about which reasonable
minds could differ. When we consider the statute as a whole, we believe
reasonable minds could be uncertain as to whether the statute limits the
universe of potential sources of the blood or other bodily substances to
which a jail employee is exposed. Reasonable minds could disagree as to
whether the lack of modifier for “blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces”
requires that the employee come into contact with the inmate’s bodily
substances, any third party’s bodily substances, or any bodily
substances including his or her own. Accordingly, we will apply our
principles of statutory construction.
To ascertain the legislature’s intent, we will assess “the statute in
its entirety, not just isolated words or phrases,” and we will seek to
interpret it so that no part of it is rendered redundant or irrelevant.
State v. Gonzalez, 718 N.W.2d 304, 308 (Iowa 2006). We strive for “a
reasonable interpretation that best achieves the statute’s purpose and
avoids absurd results.” Id. Additionally, we will “strictly construe
criminal statutes” and resolve doubts in favor of the accused. Id.
Legislative intent is ascertained not only from the language used
but also from “the statute’s ‘subject matter, the object sought to be
accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying policies, remedies
provided, and the consequences of the various interpretations.’ ” Cox v.
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State, 686 N.W.2d 209, 213 (Iowa 2004) (quoting State v. Albrecht, 657
N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003)).
McCullah argues that an “inmate who gives a jailer a bloody nose
is not guilty of inmate assault, but rather of assault causing bodily
injury.” To be sure, at the time the legislature enacted the inmate
assault statute, chapter 708 already prohibited assault in various forms,
including assault with intent to inflict serious injury (section 708.2(1)
(1997)), assault causing bodily injury (section 708.2(2) (1997)), and
assault against a peace officer both with and without the intent to inflict
a serious injury (section 708.3A(1) and (4) (1997)). These statutes do not
require the presence of or contact with bodily substances as a result of
the assaultive conduct. Because these statutes conceivably already
encompass a wide, if not exhaustive, range of assaults by inmates on jail
or prison employees, by enacting the inmate assault statute the
legislature must have intended to address some additional harm that
arises because of the employee’s exposure to certain bodily substances.
Among the obvious harms to be addressed by the enactment of
section 708.3B are the risk of exposure to blood-borne diseases that
arises when a person comes into contact with another person’s bodily
fluids 2 and the humiliating and degrading nature of coming into contact
2In fact, the prosecution contended the danger addressed by the statute was the
risk of exposure to disease. In the State’s closing argument, the assistant county
attorney argued:
What happened at Joe Purscell’s house that night when his wife
wants a kiss goodnight or Brandon Bracelin’s child wants a peck on the
lips before he goes to sleep? Don’t you think those men have to hesitate
for just a minute? Don’t you think they have to be wondering, What is
coursing through my veins? What poison was I exposed to as a result of
this man’s actions? Should they have to deal with those doubts? Should
they have to deal with that wonder?
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with other bodily substances. 3 With these purposes in mind, we believe
one construction becomes more reasonable than the others.
McCullah contends that the risk of exposure to blood-borne
diseases is greatest when a jail employee is exposed to the bodily fluids of
an inmate. However, as the State points out, inmates are not the only
people who may be infected with diseases such as hepatitis or HIV.
Rather, the risk of exposure to disease arises when a person is exposed
to anyone else’s bodily fluids, and not when an employee is exposed to
his or her own bodily fluids. Accordingly, to fully address the harms
sought to be remedied and to avoid absurd results, we conclude a
conviction under section 708.3B requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that an employee came into contact with another person’s blood,
seminal fluid, urine, or feces as a result of an assault by an inmate.
The State concedes that if we construe section 708.3B to require
the employee come into contact with blood or bodily substances not his
or her own, then McCullah’s conviction for inmate assault against Officer
Rodish should be reversed. We agree. The evidence established that
3Although our legislature has provided no statement of intent in the legislative
history of this statute, the legislatures in other states have provided some insight into
their motivation when they have enacted similar statutes. For example, the New York
State Assembly explained its reasoning when it enacted Penal Law section 240.32,
aggravated harassment of an employee by an inmate.
Within the past decade, there have been over 200 reported cases
of inmates in state correctional facilities throwing, tossing or expelling
excrement, urine, blood or other bodily fluids at correctional officers. In
addition to the vile and degrading nature of such conduct, the possibility
for the transmission of diseases makes this conduct potentially a health
risk for correctional officers, employees of the division of parole and
employees of the office of mental health located within a correctional
facility. While administrative and disciplinary remedies are available for
inmates who engage in this type of conduct, these remedies have not
been effective in curbing this behavior.
N.Y. Penal Law § 240.32 Legislative Memorandum (McKinney 2008).
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Officer Rodish was covered in blood, but also that he suffered a wound to
the head that bled profusely. Although McCullah had cuts to his face,
the evidence did not establish that he was the source of any of the blood
on Officer Rodish. A conclusion that Officer Rodish came into contact
with blood other than his own would, on this record, be based on mere
speculation or conjecture. As a conviction cannot be supported by mere
speculation or conjecture, see Casady, 491 N.W.2d at 787, we reverse
McCullah’s conviction for inmate assault against Officer Rodish.
However, we affirm McCullah’s other three convictions for inmate
assault. The evidence presented at trial established that Officer Harper
and Deputies Purscell and Bracelin came into contact with blood during
the altercation but did not suffer bleeding wounds of their own. Whether
the blood they were exposed to came from McCullah or Rodish does not
matter—it was not their own. Accordingly, we conclude the district court
properly denied McCullah’s motion for judgment of acquittal for the
inmate assaults against Harper, Purscell, and Bracelin.
IV. Conclusion.
We conclude a conviction under Iowa Code section 708.3B may be
sustained only upon proof that an employee came into contact with
blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces of someone else. We affirm
McCullah’s convictions for inmate assault against Officer Harper and
Deputies Bracelin and Purscell, but we reverse his conviction for inmate
assault against Officer Rodish.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART;
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED
IN PART.