IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 30 / 06–1707
Filed September 5, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
BREMER COUNTY,
Appellant,
vs.
NATHANIAL PAUL McKINNEY,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Paul W.
Riffel, Judge.
Bremer County requests review of district court order requiring the
county pay material witness fee. WRIT SUSTAINED.
Kasey Earl Wadding, County Attorney, for appellant.
Robert W. Thompson of Thompson Law Office, Reinbeck, for
appellee McKinney.
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CADY, Justice.
In this appeal, we must decide whether the State or a county is
responsible for payment of a material-witness fee arising from a case filed
by the county pursuant to its statutory charge to enforce the state
criminal code. We consider the appeal of this case by the county as a
petition for certiorari, grant the petition, and sustain the writ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On February 3, 2006, Nathanial Paul McKinney was arrested and
confined as a material witness to the death of his father. He was held as
a material witness in the Bremer County jail for fifty-three days, until the
district court ordered him held on separate charges unrelated to the
suspected homicide.
Thereafter, the district court held a hearing to consider whether
McKinney was entitled to a material-witness fee under Iowa Code section
815.6 (2005). The district court held McKinney was entitled to receive a
material-witness fee and set the fee at $40 for each day he was held as a
material witness. It ordered the State to pay McKinney $2120.
The State of Iowa failed to pay the fee, as did Bremer County.
Consequently, McKinney filed an application with the district court for
payment of the fee and interest. The hearing was not reported, but the
parties filed a “statement of proceedings.” The statement revealed the
parties asked the court to decide which entity, the state or the county,
was responsible for payment of the fee. The district court ordered the
county to pay the material-witness fee, and the county appealed.
II. Issues.
First, we must decide whether the county has the right to appeal
the district court’s ruling. Second, if the case is properly before us, we
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must decide which governmental entity is responsible for paying the
material-witness fee.
III. Standard of Review.
To the extent we must decide which governmental entity is
responsible to pay a material-witness fee, our task is to determine the
proper meaning of the governing statutes. This is a legal question. As
such, our review is for errors at law. State v. Hippler, 545 N.W.2d 568,
570 (Iowa 1996); Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. This is the same standard of
review in certiorari actions. City of Okoboji v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 744 N.W.2d
327, 330 (Iowa 2008). Review in certiorari actions is strictly limited to
reviewing the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal and the legality of its
actions. State v. Cullison, 227 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Iowa 1975).
IV. Nature of Appellate Review.
In State v. McKinney, 743 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 2008) [McKinney
I], we observed that Iowa Code section 801.1 makes chapter 815 a part of
the Iowa Code of Criminal Procedure and that the rules governing civil
appeals do not apply to questions of material-witness fees.1 Iowa Code
chapter 814 governs appeals from the district court in criminal cases.
See Iowa Code §§ 814.1–.27. Under this chapter, an appeal is defined as
“the right of both the defendant and the state to have specified action of
the district court considered by an appellate court.” Iowa Code § 814.1.
Chapter 814 goes on to enumerate certain circumstances where the state
and the defendant are entitled to appeal. However, the chapter does not
1Although neither McKinney nor the State challenges the county’s right to
appeal, the question is jurisdictional, so we address it as a preliminary matter. See City
of Janesville v. McCartney, 326 N.W.2d 785, 785 (Iowa 1982) (addressing a similar
question as “a threshold question of our jurisdiction to review”). The State has not filed
a brief in this case, though both parties served their briefs on the State. McKinney’s
counsel, however, has argued the county is responsible for payment of the material-
witness fee.
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explicitly give the county a right to appeal in any case. See City of
Janesville v. McCartney, 326 N.W.2d 785, 785 (Iowa 1982) (holding Iowa
Code sections 814.4–.5 grant the state the right to appeal, but do not
grant the same right to cities); see also State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141,
147 (Iowa 2003) (holding the right to appeal is purely statutory).
Consequently, the county is not entitled to appeal.
Notwithstanding, we possess “ ‘constitutional powers to issue writs
to, and exercise supervisory and administrative control over, other
judicial tribunals.’ ” McKinney I, 743 N.W.2d at 552 (quoting State v.
Davis, 493 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Iowa 1992)). Thus, the county is not left
without a remedy. Our rules of procedure provide for certiorari
proceedings to originate at the appellate level in order to review the
jurisdiction of lower tribunals and the legality of their actions. Bousman
v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 789, 793–94 (Iowa 2001). Certiorari is
especially appropriate if the legality of the lower court’s acts is challenged
exclusively on legal grounds. Id. at 794. Here, the county is essentially
challenging the legality of the district court’s order that it pay a material-
witness fee to McKinney. The question is purely legal, so certiorari is
appropriate.
“This court has the authority to treat an improperly filed appeal ‘as
though the proper form of review had been sought.’ ” McKinney I, 743
N.W.2d at 552 (quoting Bousman, 630 N.W.2d at 793); accord Iowa R.
App. P. 6.304. Consequently, we consider the county’s appeal as a
petition for certiorari, grant the petition, and consider the writ.
V. Material-Witness Fee.
The county challenges the district court’s order that it pay
McKinney’s material-witness fee. While section 815.6 provides for a
material-witness fee, the legislature did not specifically designate the
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actual governmental entity responsible to pay the fee. Because section
815.6 is silent, we must engage in statutory construction to determine
which entity the legislature intended to be responsible.
A long-standing principle of statutory construction requires
statutes relating to the same subject matter to be considered in light of
their common purposes and to be harmonized. See State ex rel. Krupke
v. Witkowski, 256 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 1977); State v. Prybil, 211
N.W.2d 308, 311 (Iowa 1973) (in interpreting a statute, other pertinent
statutes are to be considered). There are a number of Iowa Code sections
that address material-witness fees, which enlighten our consideration of
the entity responsible to pay the fee.
First, Iowa Code section 331.756 charges the county attorney with
the responsibility to enforce state laws and to prosecute violations of
those laws in the name of the state. The county was fulfilling this duty
when it investigated and prosecuted the homicide of McKinney’s father.
Second, Iowa Code sections 602.1302–.1303—enacted as part of the
1983 reorganization of Iowa courts to establish a simplified and uniform
system of funding2—demonstrate the legislature’s intent for the state to
fund the court system and to pay witness fees. Section 602.13023
provides:
1. Except as otherwise provided by sections 602.1303
and 602.1304 or other applicable law, the expenses of
operating and maintaining the judicial branch shall be paid
out of the general fund of the state from funds appropriated
by the general assembly for the judicial branch. State
funding shall be phased in as provided in section 602.11101.
....
2See Gabrielson v. State, 342 N.W.2d 867, 868–69 (Iowa 1984) (discussing the
reorganization); 1983 Iowa Acts ch. 186.
3Section 602.1302 is entitled “state funding” and is found in the “budget and
funding” part (part 3) of the Code chapter titled “judicial branch” (chapter 602).
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3. A revolving fund is created in the state treasury for
the payment of jury and witness fees . . . .
....
4. The judicial branch shall reimburse counties for
the costs of witness and mileage fees . . . .
Iowa Code § 602.1302. In turn, section 602.11101 provides:
The state shall assume responsibility for components of the
court system according to the following schedule:
1. On October 1, 1983 the state shall assume the
responsibility for . . . the costs of prosecution witness fees
and mileage and other witness fees and mileage assessed
against the prosecution in criminal actions prosecuted under
state law as provided in sections 622.69 and 622.72.
Sections 622.69 and 622.72 mandate fees to lay and expert witnesses,
respectively. Nothing in these enactments excludes material-witness fees
from the terms “witness fees” or “other witness fees.”
In contrast, Iowa Code section 602.1303 is entitled “local funding”
and details the costs that cities and counties are required to bear. That
section provides, in relevant part:
A county or city shall pay the costs of its depositions and
transcripts in criminal actions prosecuted by that county or
city and shall pay the court fees and costs provided by law in
criminal actions prosecuted by that county or city under
county or city ordinance. A county or city shall pay witness
fees and mileage in trials of criminal action prosecuted by
the county or city under county or city ordinance.
Iowa Code § 602.1303. These Code sections suggest the legislature
intended for the State to pay the costs of those actions prosecuted under
state law while cities and counties bear the costs for actions prosecuted
under city and county law. Iowa Code section 815.13,4 entitled “payment
of prosecution costs,” reinforces this concept, providing in relevant part:
4“This section was enacted as part of the overall reorganization of the court
system wherein the state assumed financial responsibility from the counties for the
costs of county clerk of court offices, indigent legal defense, and other aspects of
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The county or city shall pay witness fees and mileage in
trials of criminal actions prosecuted by the county or city
under county or city ordinance. These fees and costs are
recoverable by the county or city from the defendant unless
the defendant is found not guilty or the action is dismissed,
in which case the state shall pay the witness fees and
mileage in cases prosecuted under state law.
A third section of the Code also reveals the legislative scheme for
counties to be responsible only for costs of prosecution under county
ordinances. Section 331.506(2), part of the county home rule
implementation, grants the county auditor power to issue warrants to
pay witness fees “in trials of criminal action prosecuted under county
ordinance,” but does not further empower the auditor to pay witness fees
in trials prosecuted under state law. Iowa Code § 331.506(2).
We believe the only way to harmonize the various Code sections is
to conclude the legislature intended for the state to pay for material-
witness fees, just as it would pay any other witness fee incurred in a
prosecution under state law. McKinney was held pursuant to an
investigation into the murder of his father. As such, the material-witness
fees were incurred vindicating state law. See Iowa Code §§ 707.1–.11
(comprising chapter 707 and defining homicide and related crimes).
Finally, it is helpful to consider the purpose of detaining material
witnesses. The purpose of the material-witness statute is to secure the
presence of a witness at trial. State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d
226, 239 (Iowa 2002); see also Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham,
279 U.S. 597, 616–17, 49 S. Ct. 452, 456, 73 L. Ed. 867, 873 (1929)
(considering the federal power to detain a material witness and
determining a material witness may be confined “for the purpose of
giving his testimony”). This process is a “vital” component of the system
___________________________
financing the court system.” State v. Klindt, 542 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa 1996) (citing
1983 Iowa Acts ch. 186).
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of criminal justice. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 236. Thus, the
ability to detain a material witness is not merely a local law enforcement
tool to investigate a crime, which might be most logically borne by the
particular investigating agency. Instead, the material-witness statute
serves the broader goals of our system of justice by ensuring each citizen
meets his public duty to testify to knowledge of a crime. Id. As such, we
conclude the legislature intended the State to be responsible for payment
of the material-witness fee incurred in this case.
VI. Conclusion.
The district court acted illegally by ordering the county to pay the
material-witness fee due McKinney. Although we recognize other issues
remain—including whether McKinney is entitled to interest—those issues
are outside the limited scope of a certiorari review.
WRIT SUSTAINED.
All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.