IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 134 / 06-0775
Filed January 11, 2008
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
NATHANIAL PAUL McKINNEY,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, James M.
Drew, Judge.
A material witness, who was incarcerated for fifty-three days, requests
review of the witness fee awarded to him by the district court. WRIT
ANNULLED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, and Kasey E. Wadding, County Attorney, for appellee.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
In this appeal, Nathanial P. McKinney requests us to review the
district court’s order fixing his material witness fee at $40 for each day he
was confined. Because we find the amount of McKinney’s fee did not
constitute involuntary servitude under the United States and Iowa
Constitutions, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it set
the amount of the fee, we annul the writ of certiorari.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Pursuant to a warrant, the State arrested and confined McKinney as
a material witness to the murder investigation of his father. The State
asserted McKinney’s confinement was necessary based on information that
he was planning to leave Iowa, making him unavailable for service of a
subpoena. The district court set a $150,000 cash-only bond. Despite
McKinney’s arguments that his bond was excessive, the court continued it.
The court confined McKinney as a material witness for fifty-three days
before the court ordered his release. McKinney was not asked to testify
during his confinement. He filed an application for material witness fees
pursuant to Iowa Code section 815.6 (2005). He argued the court should
award a fee equal to the current minimum wage rate for each hour he was
confined. The court rejected McKinney’s argument and granted him a $40
per day fee. McKinney filed a notice of appeal.
II. Nature of Appellate Review.
The State alleges McKinney should have sought appeal through a
petition for writ of certiorari. We agree.
Iowa Code section 814.6 grants criminal defendants the right to a
direct appeal. Iowa Code § 814.6. The order granting McKinney fees is not
an appealable order under section 814.6 because McKinney is not a
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defendant. See Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 630 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 2001)
(holding the challenger could not bring a direct appeal under section 814.6
because he was a mere suspect and not a defendant “accused of or charged
with a crime”).
Section 815.6, the statute governing material witness fees, is in the
code of criminal procedure; thus, the rules governing civil appeals do not
govern McKinney’s appeal either. See Iowa Code § 801.1 (providing chapter
815 is part of, and may be cited as, the “Iowa Code of Criminal Procedure”);
see also Bousman, 630 N.W.2d at 793 (holding proceedings brought under
section 801.1 are not civil in nature). However, McKinney is not left without
a remedy just because his claim does not fall under the statutes or rules
governing criminal or civil appeals. Id.
We have “constitutional powers to issue writs to, and exercise
supervisory and administrative control over, other judicial tribunals.” State
v. Davis, 493 N.W.2d 820, 822 (Iowa 1992). Certiorari is “particularly
appropriate ‘where the lower court’s jurisdiction or the legality of its acts is
challenged exclusively on law or constitutional issues.’ ” Bousman, 630
N.W.2d at 794 (quoting McKeever v. Gerard, 368 N.W.2d 116, 119 (1985)).
This court has found illegality to exist when the court’s ruling lacks
“ ‘substantial evidentiary support or when the court has not applied the
proper rule of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Allen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 582 N.W.2d 506,
508 (Iowa 1998)). McKinney challenges both the legality and the
constitutionality of the district court’s fee award.
There are two functions to certiorari: (1) “the avoidance of
unnecessary litigation”; and (2) “the provision of a method of review when
no other means are available.” McKeever, 368 N.W.2d at 118. McKinney is
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not entitled to a direct appeal; therefore, a petition for writ of certiorari is
his only opportunity for appellate review.
Although McKinney did not initially petition for certiorari, this court
has the authority to treat an improperly filed appeal “as though the proper
form of review had been sought.” Bousman, 630 N.W.2d at 793.
Accordingly, we will treat McKinney’s notice of appeal as a petition for
certiorari, grant the petition, and proceed to decide the merits of his appeal.
III. Analysis.
The only issue McKinney raises on appeal is whether the district
court erred by failing to grant his request for a witness fee equal to the
statutory minimum wage rate. He argues the court’s failure to do so
violates the prohibitions against involuntary servitude in both the United
States and Iowa Constitutions.
The statute providing fees for material witnesses states, “[p]ersons
confined as material witnesses shall, for each day of confinement, receive
such fees as are set by the district court.” Iowa Code § 815.6. The
prohibition against involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides, “[n]either slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. Iowa’s
constitution states, “[t]here shall be no slavery in this State; nor shall there
be involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crime.” Iowa Const.
art. 1, § 23. Although the language of both constitutions is similar,
interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment are not binding on this court
when a litigant asks us to determine the constitutionality of Iowa statutes
challenged under our constitution. See State v. Bower, 725 N.W.2d 435,
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441 (Iowa 2006) (discussing the same concept in a due process context).
However, because McKinney has not given us any reason to interpret the
federal and Iowa involuntary servitude prohibitions differently, our
discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment is equally applicable to McKinney’s
Iowa constitutional claim.
One reason the American system of justice works so well is because
laypersons participate in the process. Every person has a public duty to
provide evidence regardless of the financial burden it may create. Hurtado
v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589, 93 S. Ct. 1157, 1164, 35 L. Ed. 2d 508,
518 (1973). This principle applies even if the court is required to confine a
witness under a material witness statute. Id. No matter how onerous the
duty to testify may be, it is necessary to the administration of justice under
our system of government as established by the Constitution. Blair v.
United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281, 39 S. Ct. 468, 471, 63 L. Ed. 979, 983
(1919). The witness’s personal sacrifice is one of the necessary
contributions a person makes for the welfare of the public. Id.
The prohibition against involuntary servitude in the Thirteenth
Amendment does not apply when an individual owes a public duty to
provide evidence in a court of law. Hurtado, 410 U.S. at 589 n.11, 93 S. Ct.
at 1164 n.11, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 519 n.11. Courts have upheld the
constitutionality of a statute providing for insignificant material witness fees
when the witness attacked the statute on involuntary servitude grounds.
See id. (upholding a statute awarding a one dollar per day witness fee for a
confined material witness). Compelling a person to perform his or her civic
duty to testify in a court of law, even under threat of contempt or criminal
sanctions, does not violate the prohibition against involuntary servitude.
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943–44, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 2760,
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101 L. Ed. 2d 788, 805 (1988). Accordingly, there is no merit to McKinney’s
claim that the payment he received from the State for being incarcerated as
a material witness was so low as to constitute involuntary servitude under
the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
At the time of McKinney’s confinement, our legislature had enacted
various fees to be paid to laypersons who participate in the judicial system.
The legislature set jury fees at $10 per day for each day of service. Iowa
Code § 607A.8. In addition to the jury fee, a juror is also entitled to be
reimbursed for travel and parking expenses. Id.
The legislature set ordinary witness fees at $10 for each full day and
$5 for each attendance less than a full day. Id. § 622.69. The legislature
also requires an ordinary witness to be reimbursed for mileage. Id. Expert
witnesses can receive up to $150 per day. Id. § 622.72.
The jury, ordinary witness, and expert witness fees set by the
legislature, are not high enough to reflect a legislative intent to pay jurors or
witnesses a wage for services rendered. Rather, the legislature enacted
these fees to lessen the financial burden on jurors or witnesses called to
fulfill their public duty.
Likewise, state legislatures have enacted fees for material witnesses to
protect them from the extreme financial burden they may incur during
confinement. Ronald L. Carlson & Mark S. Vogel, Material Witness and
Material Injustice, 58 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 24 (1980). When Iowa enacted the fee
provision for confined material witnesses, the legislature did not set a fixed
amount for the fee. Iowa Code § 815.6. The statute leaves the amount of
the fee to the district court’s discretion. Id. Just as the legislature did not
intend the jury, ordinary witness, or expert witness fees to be a wage for
services rendered, the legislature did not intend the material witness fee to
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be a wage. Accordingly, the court must analyze the effect of confinement on
the material witness’s financial situation and then, in its discretion, set the
fee. Therefore, on appeal we will only reverse a district court award of a
material witness fee for an abuse of discretion.
We presume that a discretionary ruling by the trial court is correct.
Sheer Constr. v. W. Hodgman & Sons Inc., 326 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Iowa 1982).
When a court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly
untenable or unreasonable, the court abuses its discretion. In re J.A.L., 694
N.W.2d 748, 751 (Iowa 2005). Considering McKinney’s financial situation,
we cannot hold the district court abused its discretion when it awarded him
a witness fee of $40 for each day he was confined.
IV. Disposition.
Because the amount of McKinney’s fee did not constitute involuntary
servitude under the United States and Iowa Constitutions, and the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it set the amount of the fee, we
annul the writ.
WRIT ANNULLED.