IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 118 / 04-1540
Filed December 22, 2006
MARTIN J. BAHL, LINDA C. BAHL, and
TERRENCE G. BAHL,
Appellants,
vs.
THE CITY OF ASBURY, IOWA, and the
CITY COUNCIL OF ASBURY, IOWA,
Appellees.
________________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Alan L.
Pearson, Judge.
Developers appeal adverse declaratory judgment holding Iowa law
does not protect mobile home parks from discriminatory zoning.
AFFIRMED.
Brian J. Kane and D. Flint Drake of Kane, Norby & Reddick, P.C.,
Dubuque, for appellants.
Stephen J. Juergens of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens &
Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, for appellees.
2
STREIT, Justice.
“A rose may still be a rose if called by another name but not so for
manufactured housing.” 1 We are called on to determine whether a
“mobile home” is a “manufactured home.” Developers claim the City of
Asbury unlawfully discriminates against “mobile home” parks through
zoning restrictions. Developers contend Iowa law requires “mobile
homes”—the kind with hitches, wheels, and/or axles—be treated the
same as traditional homes built on site. We find the statute in question,
which prohibits cities from discriminating against “manufactured
housing,” only pertains to factory-built homes that sit on permanent
foundations. Because developers’ proposal calls for “mobile homes,” the
city may treat it differently in comparison to other types of housing
developments. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s declaratory
judgment.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
The Bahls own real estate in Asbury which is zoned A-1 for
agricultural use. Since 1997, the Bahls have repeatedly sought to have
their land rezoned in a manner that would allow them to develop a
community of prefabricated 2 homes to be called “Oak Meadows.” The
Bahls’ rezoning applications have been resisted by neighbors and
Asbury’s city counsel.
After the Bahls’ second request for rezoning was denied in 1999,
they filed suit alleging Asbury’s zoning ordinance requiring “mobile
1A line from the ever-witty Chief Judge Alan Pearson’s decision upholding
Asbury’s city zoning ordinance. Bahl v. City of Asbury, No. CVCV053776, slip op. at 4
(D. Iowa Sept. 13, 2004).
2We use the term “prefabricated home” because the parties disagree on the
meaning of “mobile home” and “manufactured home.”
3
home” parks to be located only in R-4 (high density residential) districts
violated Iowa Code section 414.28A (1999). Under section 414.28A, “[a]
city shall not adopt or enforce zoning or subdivision regulations or other
ordinances which disallow or make infeasible the plans and
specifications of land-leased communities because the housing within
the land-leased community will be manufactured housing.”
The district court held Asbury violated section 414.28A because
one reason for denying the Bahls’ rezoning request was the fact the
proposed development was a land-leased community of manufactured
housing. On appeal, we affirmed. See Bahl v. City of Asbury, 656
N.W.2d 336 (Iowa 2002) (“Bahl I”).
In Bahl I, we said “the plain language of section 414.28A . . .
reveals a legislative intent to require equal treatment of land-leased
communities that are composed of manufactured homes with similar
communities composed of site-built housing.” Id. at 345.
We interpreted Asbury’s definition of “mobile home” in its zoning
ordinance to include all types of prefabricated housing. 3 Id. at 337 n.1.
In Bahl I, neither party disputed the Bahls’ proposed development was a
land-leased community of manufactured housing within the meaning of
chapter 414. Id. Nor did the parties dispute the Bahls’ project was
subject to the restrictions imposed on “mobile home” parks by the City’s
zoning ordinance. Id. Notably, the Iowa legislature used the terms
“manufactured housing” and “manufactured home” in chapter 414 of the
3In the current action, the district court noted “it appears that the Supreme
Court [in Bahl I] misread the definition of ‘mobile home’ under the city zoning
ordinance.” However, we need not revisit that ordinance because this appeal concerns
Asbury’s revised ordinance, which clearly distinguishes between “mobile homes” and
“manufactured homes.”
4
Code while Asbury used the term “mobile home” in its zoning ordinance.
Apparently, the parties were under the impression the terms could be
used interchangeably.
After Bahl I, Asbury amended its zoning ordinance so the terms
“mobile home” and “manufactured home” are now mutually exclusive.
Under the current ordinance, a “manufactured home” means a “factory-
built structure” on a “permanent foundation,” which does not have a
“permanent hitch” or any “wheels or axles” permanently attached to its
frame. A “mobile home” is defined as all other factory-built structures—
i.e. homes with permanent hitches, wheels and/or axles. Asbury also
defined “land-leased community” in its ordinance. A “land-leased
community” is any “tract of land under common ownership upon which
10 or more occupied manufactured homes are harbored . . . .”
The amendments to Asbury’s zoning ordinance require
manufactured homes be treated the same as site-built housing. Land-
leased communities for manufactured housing are permitted under the
same zoning requirements as for site-built communities. However, under
Asbury’s amended zoning ordinance, mobile home parks 4 are limited to
planned unit developments 5 (PUD) in R-3 or R-4 zones. The effect of the
City’s changes is to treat mobile home parks differently than either site-
built housing or manufactured housing as that term is used in Asbury’s
zoning ordinance.
4Asbury defines a “mobile home park” as a “tract of land upon which two (2) or
more occupied mobile homes are harbored, either free of charge or for revenue
purposes, whether or not site-built homes or manufactured homes are also in the same
development site . . . .”
5A PUD is a district described as encouraging flexible and innovative design in
the development of an appropriate site. PUDs are not typically subject to normal zoning
restrictions. Instead, the project is negotiated between the developer and the city on a
case-by-case basis.
5
Because the Bahls’ development proposal includes mobile homes
as defined by Asbury’s current zoning ordinance, the Bahls filed a
declaratory judgment action in the district court asking the court to find
Asbury’s current zoning ordinance violates Iowa Code section 414.28A
(2003). 6 The district court found in favor of Asbury. It stated:
Mobile homes as defined in the city’s zoning ordinance are
not protected by §§ 414.28 or 414.28A. Asbury defines
mobile homes as structures the Iowa legislature has
excluded from protection. Asbury’s treatment of exempted
structures does not offend §§ 414.28 or 414.28A.
The Bahls appeal.
II. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a declaratory judgment action tried at
law is for correction of errors. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Petersen, 679
N.W.2d 571, 575 (Iowa 2004) (citing United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Shelly
Funeral Home, Inc., 642 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Iowa 2002)).
III. Merits
The issue before us is whether Asbury’s treatment of “mobile
home” parks under its current zoning ordinance violates section
414.28A. Section 414.28A provides:
A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning or subdivision
regulations or other ordinances which disallow or make
infeasible the plans and specifications of land-leased
communities because the housing within the land-leased
community will be manufactured housing.
“Land-leased community” means any site, lot, field, or
tract of land under common ownership upon which ten or
more occupied manufactured homes are harbored, either
free of charge or for revenue purposes, and shall include any
building, structure, or enclosure used or intended for use as
part of the equipment of the land-leased community. . . . A
manufactured home located in a land-leased community
6All further references to the Iowa Code are to the 2003 version.
6
shall be taxed under section 435.22 as if the manufactured
home were located in a mobile home park.
Section 414.28A does not define “manufactured home” or “manufactured
housing.” Asbury contends the definition found in section 414.28 also
applies to section 414.28A. Section 414.28 states:
As used in this section, “manufactured home” means a
factory-built structure, which is manufactured or
constructed under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 5403 and is
to be used as a place for human habitation, but which is not
constructed or equipped with a permanent hitch or other
device allowing it to be moved other than for the purpose of
moving to a permanent site, and which does not have
permanently attached to its body or frame any wheels or
axles.
(Second emphasis added.) In other words, according to Asbury, section
414.28A only protects foundation-ready prefabricated homes from
discrimination and does not protect prefabricated homes with permanent
hitches, axles and/or wheels. Using this interpretation of section
414.28A, Asbury contends its zoning ordinance satisfies section 414.28A
because it requires foundation-ready prefabricated homes to be treated
the same as traditional on-site built homes. Asbury argues section
414.28A does not prohibit the city from restricting the location of mobile
home parks (i.e. two or more prefabricated homes with hitches, wheels
and/or axles).
The Bahls claim Asbury’s amended zoning ordinance “is a
transparent attempt through word play to circumvent a banned form of
discrimination . . . .” The Bahls make two arguments on appeal. First,
they argue our decision in Bahl I established the “law of the case” and
consequently the prefabricated homes with hitches, axles and/or wheels
described in their rezoning application are “manufactured homes” for
purposes of their continuing application. Second, the Bahls disagree
7
with Asbury’s interpretation of section 414.28A. The Bahls contend
“manufactured home” has a different meaning in section 414.28A than it
does in section 414.28. According to the Bahls, section 414.28 protects
foundation-ready prefabricated homes from discrimination while section
414.28A protects prefabricated homes with axles, hitches and/or wheels.
The Bahls therefore conclude section 414.28A prevents Asbury from
discriminating against its proposed development.
A. Law of the Case
The Bahls contend the law of the case doctrine prevents Asbury
from “argu[ing] that the type of homes proposed in the Bahls’ application
(mobile homes) are not ‘manufactured homes’ within the meaning of the
City’s ordinance or Chapter 414.” They base this contention on the fact
the parties in Bahl I did “not dispute that the development proposed by
the Bahls is a land-leased community of manufactured housing within
the meaning of chapter 414.” Bahl I, 656 N.W.2d at 337 n.1.
Under the law of the case doctrine, “an appellate decision becomes
the law of the case and is controlling on both the trial court and on any
further appeals in the same case.” United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 612 N.W.2d 101, 103 (Iowa 2000) (citing Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co.,
475 N.W.2d 630, 632 (Iowa 1991)). The doctrine is based on a public
policy against reopening matters which have already been decided. Id.
(citing Wolfe v. Graether, 389 N.W.2d 643, 651 (Iowa 1986)). Thus, issues
decided by an appellate court generally cannot be reheard, reconsidered,
or relitigated. Id. (citing 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 975, at 476–77
(1993)). The appellate court decision is final as to all questions decided
and the trial court is obligated to follow that decision. Id. (citing 5 C.J.S.
Appeal and Error § 975, at 476–77).
8
The law of the case doctrine does not apply to the present case
because we were not asked in Bahl I to determine the meaning of
“manufactured home” as the term is used in section 414.28A. The
doctrine applies “only to those questions that were properly before us for
consideration and passed on” and “[a] question not passed on is not
included” under the doctrine. In re Lone Tree Cmty. Sch. Dist., 159
N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa 1968) (citations omitted). Thus, we now turn to
section 414.28A and the meaning of “manufactured home.”
B. Iowa Code Section 414.28A
Section 414.28A states “[a] city shall not adopt or enforce zoning or
subdivision regulations or other ordinances which disallow or make
infeasible the plans and specifications of land-leased communities
because the housing within the land-leased community will be
manufactured housing.” A land-leased community is any property
“under common ownership upon which ten or more occupied
manufactured homes are harbored . . . .” Iowa Code § 414.28A. Section
414.28A does not include a definition of “manufactured homes.” The
definition, of course, is critical to our determination of the scope of the
statute.
“The polestar of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
legislative intent of a statute.” State v. Schultz, 604 N.W.2d 60, 62 (Iowa
1999) (citing Harris v. Olson, 558 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Iowa 1997)). “If the
legislature has not defined words of a statute, we may refer to prior
decisions of this court and others, similar statutes, dictionary definitions
and common usage.” Iowa Dep’t of Transp. v. Soward, 650 N.W.2d 569,
571 (Iowa 2002) (citing Bernau v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 580 N.W.2d 757,
761 (Iowa 1998)).
9
The Bahls argue “[i]n all previous proceedings, the City, the City’s
legal counsel, the courts, and the participants in the public hearings
have used the terms ‘mobile home’ and ‘manufactured home’
interchangeably, indicating a general understanding that the mobile
homes proposed by the Bahls were in fact ‘manufactured homes’ and
protected by 414.28A.” They also point to decisions from other
jurisdictions finding the terms “mobile home” and “manufactured
housing” are synonymous. See, e.g., Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656,
658 (Tex. 1987) (noting in the late 1970’s, the industry began using the
term “manufactured home” instead of “mobile home”). But the cases the
Bahls cite address restrictive covenants, not the statute at issue here.
We are only concerned with how the Iowa legislature defines
“manufactured home.” In this particular case, we need not look beyond
sections 414.28 and 414.28A because they offer enough clues to
determine the legislature’s intent.
Section 414.28A states “[a] manufactured home located in a land-
leased community shall be taxed under section 435.22 as if the
manufactured home were located in a mobile home park.” (Emphasis
added.) The words “as if” indicate the legislature understood the
difference between the terms manufactured home and mobile home and
did not intend “manufactured home” to include mobile homes.
Because of the reference to section 435.22, the Bahls invite us to
consider the definitions found in chapter 435, which pertains to taxing of
mobile homes and manufactured housing in parks and communities.
We think the Bahls are reading too much into the reference to section
435.22. The statute reads “[a] manufactured home . . . shall be taxed
under section 435.22 as if the manufactured home were located in a
10
mobile home park.” Iowa Code § 414.28A (emphasis added). It does not
say a manufactured home is defined in chapter 435.
We think it makes more sense to refer to a definition within the
chapter at issue. See State v. Hawk, 616 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Iowa 2000)
(“[C]ourts are obliged to consider a challenged statute in its entirety and
in pari materia with other pertinent statutes.”). Section 414.28, which
protects manufactured homes located outside of a manufactured home
community from discrimination, defines “manufactured home.” 7 Section
414.28 states:
As used in this section, “manufactured home” means a
factory-built structure, which is manufactured or
constructed under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 5403 and is
to be used as a place for human habitation, but which is not
constructed or equipped with a permanent hitch or other
device allowing it to be moved other than for the purpose of
moving to a permanent site, and which does not have
attached to its body or frame any wheels or axles.
Thus, the definition found in section 414.28 is limited to prefabricated
homes intended to be placed on permanent foundations. There is no
indication the legislature intended to expand the definition of
“manufactured home” for purposes of section 414.28A.
7Under section 414.28,
A city shall not adopt or enforce zoning regulations or other ordinances
which disallow the plans and specifications of a proposed residential
structure solely because the proposed structure is a manufactured
home. However, a zoning ordinance or regulation shall require that a
manufactured home be located and installed according to the same
standards, including but not limited to, a permanent foundation system,
set-back, and minimum square footage which would apply to a site-built,
single family dwelling on the same lot, and shall require that the home is
assessed and taxed as a site-built dwelling. . . . When units are located
outside a manufactured home community or mobile home park,
requirements may be imposed which ensure visual compatibility of the
permanent foundation system with surrounding residential structures.
11
In Bahl I, we said “it is instructive in our search for the meaning of
section 414.28A to consider what the legislature intended when it
enacted section 414.28.” Bahl I, 656 N.W.2d at 342. This is because
sections 414.28A and 414.28 are “very similar.” Id. at 341. We said:
There appears to be very little difference between section
414.28 and section 414.28A with respect to the operative
language. The primary distinction of course is that section
414.28 applies to “residential structure[s]” whereas section
414.28A governs “land-leased communities.”
Id. at 342. Therefore, it is logical to use the definition of “manufactured
home” found in section 414.28 to interpret section 414.28A. When we
do, it is obvious the legislature only intended section 414.28A to protect
foundation-ready prefabricated housing from discrimination. 8 Our
decision in Bahl I supports this conclusion. There, we said:
[T]he plain language of section 414.28A . . . reveals a
legislative intent to require equal treatment of land-leased
communities that are composed of manufactured homes
with similar communities composed of site-built housing.
Our interpretation of section 414.28A does not mean the City
must allow mobile home parks in all zoning districts. Nor
does it mean the City cannot regulate manufactured housing
developments. The statute merely mandates that land-
leased communities of manufactured housing be allowed in
any district in which similar communities of site-built
housing are allowed, under the same terms and conditions
imposed on such developments containing traditional
housing.
8In Bahl I, we said “the Asbury zoning ordinance contravenes section 414.28A by
relegating ‘mobile home parks,’ not all condominium-type communities, to R-4 zoning
districts.” Bahl I, 656 N.W.2d at 345 (emphasis added). We used the term “mobile
home parks” only because that was the term Asbury used in its zoning ordinance in
effect at the time of the previous litigation. According to Asbury, under its prior zoning
ordinance manufactured homes (i.e. the foundation-ready kind) were included within its
broad definition of “mobile homes.” In contrast to the prior zoning ordinance, Asbury’s
current ordinance treats “mobile homes” and “manufactured homes” as mutually
exclusive. We did not imply in Bahl I that prefabricated homes with hitches, wheels,
and/or axles are protected under section 414.28A.
12
Id. at 345 (emphasis added). Thus, Asbury’s zoning ordinance requiring
only foundation-ready homes be given the same treatment as site-built
homes and relegating prefabricated homes with hitches, wheels, and/or
axles to PUD R-3 and PUD R-4 is permissible. As the district court said,
Iowa has never protected housing that comes with a
permanent hitch and axles. To the extent mobile homes
come with permanent hitches and axles, they have never
been a protected form of housing in Iowa and were, in fact,
specifically excluded from protected status.
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
IV. Conclusion
Section 414.28A requires land-leased communities that are
composed of manufactured homes be treated equally to similar
communities composed of site-built housing. Manufactured homes
means foundation-ready prefabricated homes. The statute does not
apply to mobile homes—the kind of housing with hitches, wheels, and/or
axles. Thus, Asbury may limit mobile home parks to high density PUD
zoning districts.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Appel, J., who takes no part.