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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-12727
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:16-cr-80199-KAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GUS JUNIOR BUTLER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 6, 2018)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gus Butler appeals his 180-month sentence imposed under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). He had pleaded guilty to
being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), and 924(e), and possessing heroin with intent to distribute in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and § 841(b)(1)(C). On appeal, Butler argues that the
district court erred in imposing an enhanced sentence under the ACCA; Butler says
his previous Florida convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and
domestic battery by strangulation are not qualifying predicate offenses.
We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a predicate offense within
the meaning of the ACCA. United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th
Cir. 2009). We are bound to follow prior binding precedent unless and until it is
overruled by this Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. United States v.
Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008).
We have held that a Florida aggravated assault “conviction under [Fla. Stat.
§] 784.021 will always include ‘as an element the . . . threatened use of physical
force against the person of another,’ § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), and . . . thus qualifies as a
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violent felony for purposes of the ACCA.” Turner v Warden Coleman FCI
(Medium), 709 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); see also United States v. Golden,
854 F.3d 1256, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming Turner’s holding that a
conviction for aggravated assault under Fla. Stat. § 784.021 qualifies under the
elements clause of the ACCA).
We have held that “a conviction for aggravated battery qualifies as a violent
felony for purposes of the ACCA.” Turner, 709 F.3d at 1341; see also In re
Rogers, 825 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016) (affirming Turner and holding that a
conviction under Florida's aggravated battery statute categorically qualifies under
the elements clause of the ACCA.”).
We have also decided that “Florida's domestic-battery-by-strangulation
statute qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ under the elements clause” of U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2. United States v. Dixon, 874 F.3d 678, 682 (11th Cir. 2017). The analysis
we use to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under
§ 4B1.2 is essentially the same as the analysis used to determine what constitutes a
crime of violence under the ACCA “because the definitions are substantially the
same.” Id. at 680.
The district court did not err in concluding that Butler’s prior convictions for
aggravated assault under Fla. Stat. § 784.021, aggravated battery under Fla. Stat.
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§ 784.045, and domestic battery by strangulation under Fla. Stat. § 784.041(2)(a)
constituted violent offenses for purposes of his ACCA sentence enhancement. We
have decided that violations of each of these Florida statutes qualify as predicate
offenses under the ACCA. See Golden, 854 F.3d at 1256-57; Rogers, 825 F.3d at
1341; Dixon, 874 F.3d at 682. We are bound to follow these prior panel decisions
under the prior precedent rule. See Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1236. Accordingly,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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