J-A05021-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RONALD WHEELER :
:
Appellant : No. 1422 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 30, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-09-CR-0004849-1982
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 08, 2018
Ronald Wheeler (Appellant) appeals pro se from the trial court’s denial
of his petition for DNA testing. Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the background of this case as follows:
On April 28, 1983, a jury convicted [Appellant] of First
Degree Murder and issued a penalty of death. . . . On appeal,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed [Appellant’s]
conviction for First Degree Murder but vacated his death
sentence, and he was subsequently re-sentenced by the trial
court on July 6, 1988 to life imprisonment. [Appellant] filed a
direct appeal from that sentence on August 3, 1988, and the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his judgment of
sentence on August 9, 1989.
Over the ensuing twenty-nine years, [Appellant] has filed
eight Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petitions seeking to
introduce new theories and relitigate the overwhelming
evidence upon which he was convicted.
____________________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Trial Court Opinion, 7/17/17, at 1-2.1
On August 18, 2014, Appellant filed the underlying petition requesting
DNA testing. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, noting that
Appellant filed his petition for DNA testing 25 years after the murder, 20
years after the technology for DNA testing had become widely accepted, and
after Appellant had already filed seven previous PCRA petitions which were
dismissed. On March 30, 2017, the trial court denied Appellant’s petition.
Appellant filed this timely appeal. He raises the following issues for our
review:
1. DID TRANSFEREE COURT VIOLATE COORDINATE
JURISDICTION RULE IN DENYING PETITION WTHOUT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE TRANSFEROR COURT HAD
SCHEDULED HEARING; APPOINTED COUNSEL; AND
CONTINUED HEARING, BUT CASE WAS TRANSFERRED PRIOR
TO TRANSFEROR COURT RESCHEDULING HEARING?
2. DID TRANSFEREE COURT VIOLATE COORDINATE
JURISDICTION RULE IN DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND
PETITION FOR DNA TESTING WHERE TRANSFEROR COURT
HAD CONTINUED EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO ALLOW FOR
AMENDMENT AFTER APPOINTING COUNSEL, AND IN
ADJUDICATING PRO SE PETITION FILED WHILE APPELLANT
WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL INSTEAD OF REVISED
MOTION FOR DNA TESTING FILED BY APPELLANT AFTER
TRANSFEROR COURT GRANTED APPELLANT LEAVE TO
PROCEED PRO SE?
____________________________________________
1 The trial court has summarized the procedural posture attendant to each of
Appellant’s post-conviction filings, beginning with Appellant’s first petition
filed on August 2, 1988 under the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA),
through the underlying petition for DNA testing filed on August 18, 2014.
See Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 2-3.
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3. DID REVISED MOTION FOR DNA TESTING SATISFY
REQUIREMENTS OF DNA STATUTE 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1?
4. DID TRANSFEREE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO REQUEST
INTERVENTION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL WHERE ENTIRE
COMMON PLEAS COURT BENCH HAD BEEN RECUSED AND
MOTION FOR INTERVENTION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
REMAINED PENDING?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant first argues that the trial court violated the “coordinate
jurisdiction” rule by failing to adhere to orders issued by a prior PCRA Court.
Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. “The coordinate jurisdiction rule, put simply,
states that judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule each other’s
decisions. The rule, applicable in both civil and criminal cases, falls within
the ambit of the ‘law of the case doctrine’ [which includes] the rule that
upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, the
transferee trial court may not alter the resolution of a legal question
previously decided by the transferor trial court.” Commonwealth v. King,
999 A.2d 598, 600 (Pa. Super. 2010). Here, the trial court found that the
prior PRCA court issued no decision binding upon it for the coordinate
jurisdiction rule to apply. Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 8-9. Our review
of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court next addressed
Appellant’s remaining challenges to the trial court’s denial of his application
for DNA testing, and found them meritless. We agree.
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Requests for post-conviction DNA testing are governed by 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9543.1. In order to succeed on a petition for DNA testing “[t]he text of
the statute set forth in Section 9543.1(c)(3) and reinforced in Section
9543.1(d)(2) requires the applicant to demonstrate that favorable results of
the requested DNA testing would establish the applicant’s actual innocence
of the crime of conviction.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 125 A.3d 1248,
1254–1255 (Pa. Super. 2015) quoting Commonwealth v. B. Williams, 35
A.3d 44, 50–51 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 121 (Pa. 2012).
“The statutory standard to obtain testing requires more than conjecture or
speculation; it demands a prima facie case that the DNA results, if
exculpatory, would establish actual innocence.” Id.
In addition to the requirement that the applicant must present a
prima facie case demonstrating that DNA testing would establish his actual
innocence, “[s]ection 9543.1(d) requires the petitioner to make a timely
request for DNA testing.” Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)(1)(iii).
“In analyzing timeliness for purposes of Section 9543.1(d)(1)(iii), the court
must consider the facts of each case to determine whether the applicant’s
request for post-conviction DNA testing is to demonstrate his actual
innocence or to delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice.”
Walsh, 125 A.3d at 1255. “The PCRA's one-year time bar does not apply to
motions for the performance of forensic DNA testing under Section 9543.1.”
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Commonwealth v. Walsh, 125 A.3d at 1252 (citations omitted) (emphasis
in original).
Here, the trial court concluded that Appellant failed to present a prima
facie case of actual innocence, and additionally that Appellant failed to make
his request for DNA testing in a timely manner. The trial court explained:
[N]one of [Appellant’s] requests for relief meet the
requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1, and they do
not demonstrate to [the trial court’s] satisfaction
that DNA testing would produce exculpatory
evidence establishing his actual innocence.
...
[Moreover] 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)(1)(iii) requires
the court to order testing “upon a determination,
after review of the record of the applicant’s trial, that
the motion is made in a timely manner and for the
purpose of demonstrating the applicant’s actual
innocence and not to delay the execution of sentence
or administration of justice.”
...
Here, [Appellant] has known for over thirty-
five years of the existence of the items he wishes to
be tested and he appears to be on a fishing
expedition by creatively developing alternative
theories of how the victim was murdered which are
dependent upon a reinterpretation or outright
rejection of the evidence upon which he was
convicted. . . .
Due to the speculative nature of the alternative
theories that [Appellant] has inappropriately posited
at this late stage, and his incredible allegations in
which he attempts to cast doubt on the weight of the
evidence of his guilt, [the trial court] found no merit
to his request for DNA testing to prove his
innocence. Therefore, in accordance with 42
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Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d), which requires that the court
shall not order the testing requested if the court
determines after review of the record that there is no
reasonable possibility that the testing would produce
exculpatory evidence that would establish the
applicant’s actual innocence, [the trial court] denied
[Appellant’s] motion for DNA testing.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 10, 12-13.
Upon review of Appellant’s claim and the record before us, we find that
the trial court adeptly addressed Appellant’s arguments in its Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion denying the petition for DNA testing. In this appeal – as
well as the companion appeal filed by Appellant at 1357 EDA 2017 – the trial
court comprehensively addresses Appellant’s issues with citation to relevant
statutory and case law, as well as thoughtful analysis and reasoning. The
record supports the court’s findings. We therefore adopt the trial court’s
opinion as our own for purposes of this appeal, and affirm the denial of
relief. See Trial Court Opinion, dated July 14, 2017. The parties shall
attach a copy of the July 14, 2017 opinion in the event of further
proceedings in this matter.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date:3/8/2018
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