Opinion issued March 8, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-17-00925-CV
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HANI HAFIZ IBRAHIM QUTIEFAN, Appellant
V.
LUBNA AZIZ SAFI, Appellee
On Appeal from the 505th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 13-DCV-206211
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Hani Hafiz Ibrahim Qutiefan, proceeding pro se, attempts to
appeal from the trial court’s order, signed on November 2, 2017, in this divorce
case. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
We are authorized by statute to consider an appeal from a “final order”
rendered under Title 5 of the Family Code, unless a statute authorizes an
interlocutory appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b) (West 2014) (“An
appeal may be taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this
title.”); see, e.g., Brejon v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2009, no pet.). To be a “final order” under Title 5 of the Family Code, other
than in a termination case under Chapter 161 or an adoption case under Chapter
162, the order must contain the several items listed under Section 105.006. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006(a), (d), (e) (West 2014) (listing contents of final
order under Title 5 of Family Code not involving Chapters 161 or 162). Generally,
appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments or final
orders. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192–93 (Tex. 2001). To
be final, a judgment or order must “actually dispose[] of all claims and parties then
before the court, regardless of its language, or [] state[] with unmistakable clarity
that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.” Id. at 204.
Here, after reviewing the clerk’s record, appellant’s notice of appeal lists the
order on appeal as the “Order on Motion to Invoke the Sixth Amendment
Constitutional Right & Request an Appellate Lawyer,” signed on November 2,
2017. This order states, in pertinent part, that, “[a]fter reviewing the pleadings and
the arguments of [appellant] and any responses thereto, this Court is of the opinion
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that the MOTION TO INVOKE the SIXTH AMENDMENT CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT & REQUEST AN APPELLATE LAWYER IS [not] well taken and should
in all things, be DENIED.” However, this is not a “final order” under Title 5 of the
Family Code because it does not contain the several items required under Section
105.006 and it does not state that it disposes of all parties and claims. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006(a), (d), (e); see also Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 204.
Thus, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because this order is not an appealable
final order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b).
The Clerk of this Court’s February 8, 2018 notice warned appellant that this
appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless he timely responded
within ten days of that notice to show how this Court had jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). Appellant failed to timely file any response.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 42.3(a), (c); 43.2(f).
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Higley.
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