NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 17-2437
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BRARAILTY DOWDELL,
Appellant
v.
COMMUNITY COLLEGE OF PHILADELPHIA
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Civ. A. No. 2:15-cv-06806)
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 15, 2018
Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 22, 2018)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
In this failure-to-hire case, Brarailty Dowdell appeals the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of his former employer, the Community College of
Philadelphia, on his claims of race and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Because we agree with the District Court that
Dowdell did not meet his burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we will
affirm.
I. Background
In 2014, Dowdell, an African American male, applied for a full-time faculty
position at the College as an English Generalist—a position that required a “Master’s or
Ph.D. degree in English, Composition, or [a] closely-related field.” App. 153. The
College further defined a “closely-related field” to mean at least eighteen credits in
“advanced study in language, literature, developmental English or reading.” App. 157.
In Dowdell’s case, his application reflected a B.A. in English and a Master’s of
Science in “Screenwriting/Film.” App. 203. At the initial screening stage, the Human
Resource Department noted on Dowdell’s application that he “[m]ay meet minimum
qualifications,” App. 231, and after the first round of interviews, the Hiring Committee
recommended Dowdell and twelve other candidates for a second interview. After the
second-round interview, the English Department Chair, who had not yet reviewed
Dowdell’s transcript, recommended to the Vice President of Academic Affairs, Dr. Judith
Gay, and the Dean of Liberal Studies, Dr. Sharon Thompson, that Dowdell progress to
the next round of interviews, as he appeared to “have the qualifications that we are
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seeking.” App. 248. In preparation for the third round of interviews, however, Dr. Gay
and Dr. Thompson realized in reviewing Dowdell’s transcript that his degree was not in
“Screenwriting/Film,” but in only “Film,” which likely had not required advanced study
in language, literature, developmental English, or reading. As Dowdell’s third-round
interview was already scheduled, they proceeded to hold it, afterwards attempting to
ascertain whether Dowdell might yet be qualified by obtaining and reviewing the actual
course descriptions of the Film classes on his transcript. At the interview, Dr. Gay and
Dr. Thompson had noted that Dowdell had difficulty describing developments in the
English discipline, and upon review of his transcript, they confirmed he lacked eighteen
credits in “advanced study in language, literature, developmental English or reading.”
App. 157. Having concluded Dowdell lacked the requisite degree in a “closely-related
field,” App. 157, they did not recommend him for hire.
Dowdell then filed suit, asserting claims of race and gender discrimination under
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of the College on the ground that Dowdell had not established a prima facie case of
discrimination because he did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position.
II. Discussion1
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Faush v.
Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is
1
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
appropriate where the moving party has established that “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact” and, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013).
Discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 are analyzed under the burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017). Under that framework, the
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of
the evidence. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). In a
failure-to-hire case, the plaintiff must show: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2)
he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subjected to adverse employment action; and
(4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. Sarullo v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003). We agree with the District Court that Dowdell’s
prima facie case fails on the second prong of the test.2
The second prong of the McDonnell Douglas test requires that the plaintiff show
he was “sufficiently qualified to be among those persons from whom a selection, to some
2
In its thorough and detailed opinion, the District Court also explained why
Dowdell had not satisfied the fourth prong of the test—a showing that the circumstances
give rise to an inference of discrimination—and why, even if he had established a prima
facie case, Dowdell could not show pretext. We agree with the District Court’s analyses
in these respects as well, noting, as did the District Court, that the statistical evidence
presented by Dowdell shows that the College hired comparatively greater numbers of
African American males than the proportion of African American males in the applicant
pool.
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extent discretionary, would be made.” Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983
F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1992), as amended (Feb. 1, 1993) (citation omitted). Dowdell
argues that he was qualified for the position because he demonstrated that he was a part-
time employee of the English Department, he was advertised by the College in a poster as
“[a]ccomplished [f]aculty,” App. 394, and he was highlighted by the College in a report
submitted for accreditation. He also points to the fact that the English Department Chair
initially identified him as “qualif[ied]” to Dr. Gay and Dr. Thompson. App. 248.
Dowdell’s arguments are unavailing. It is clear that Dowdell did not possess the
necessary credentials required by the College for the English Generalist position: a
Master’s or Ph.D. in English, Composition, or a “closely-related field” involving
“advanced study in language, literature, developmental English or reading.” App. 157.
Contrary to his initial representations, Dowdell’s Master’s degree was not in
“Screenwriting/Film” but simply in “Film,” and did not include at least eighteen credits
in graduate courses that devote significant attention to the English language. Even
Dowdell does not attempt to argue that he satisfied the eighteen-credit threshold.
Instead, he points to his “[a]ccomplished [f]aculty” designation, App. 394, his
feature in an accreditation report, and the English Department Chair’s determination,
before reviewing his transcript, that he appeared qualified. But none of these
circumstances changes the fact that Dowdell did not meet the minimum educational
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standards required for this position and therefore failed to establish a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas.3
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
3
While Dowdell also argues that the District Court erred in relying on the
College’s subjective testimony regarding the eighteen-credit standard, the District Court
correctly characterized this argument as a “red herring, as [Dowdell] has failed to present
factual support . . . that, in his own subjective opinion, he has more than eighteen
requisite graduate credits to support that he is qualified for the English Generalist
position.” Dowdell v. Cmty. Coll. of Phila., No. 15-6806, 2017 WL 2506444, at *7 n.15
(E.D. Pa. June 9, 2017).
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