Primestar Construction, Inc. v. City of Dallas, Texas

ACCEPTED
05-17-01447-cv
FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
3/27/2018 1:56 AM
LISA MATZ
CLERK

No. 05-17-01447-CV
______________________________________________________________________________
FILED IN
IN THE 5th COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS
FOR THE 3/27/2018 1:56:00 AM
FIFTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT LISA MATZ
OF Clerk
TEXAS
AT DALLAS, TEXAS
______________________________________________________________________________

PRIMESTAR CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Appellant,

vs.

CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS,
Appellee.
______________________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court
of Dallas County, Texas
______________________________________________________________________________

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
______________________________________________________________________________

WILLIE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 659-7330
(713) 599-1659
SBOT# 21633500
attyjrwii@wisamlawyers.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
PRIMESTAR CONSTRUCTION,
INC.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

______________________________________________________________________________
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

The following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court's final judgment, as well as

the names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel.

PARTIES COUNSEL

Appellant:
Primestar Construction, Inc. Lori Chambers Gray, Esquire
Lori Gray & Associates
11500 Northwest Freeway, Suite 340
Houston, Texas 77027
Trial Counsel for Appellant

Willie & Associates, P.C.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
Houston, Texas 77027
Appellate Counsel for Appellant

Appellee:
City of Dallas, Texas Office of the City Attorney
Charles Estee, Esquire
7BN Dallas City Hall
1500 Marilla Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
Trial Counsel for Appellee

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

I. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because
the sovereign immunity of the City of Dallas has been waived by
statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable . . . . . . . . . . 6

III. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because the
Appellant had standing to pursue her cause of action for breach of
contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

IV. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because a
Certificate of Merit is not applicable to this litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

V. The trial court erred by not entering properly requested Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

CETIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

APPENDIX

Appendix 1 - Order on City of Dallas' Plea to the Jurisdiction; Plea of Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; and Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to File a Certificate of Merit signed by the trial court on October
31, 2017.

Appendix 2 - Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Judgment, Request for
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial
signed by the trial court on December 15, 2017.

iv
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES:

Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp.,
919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Andrade v. Venable,
372 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Bland v. Blue,
34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Citizens Ins. v. Daccach,
217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7

Clear Creek I.S.D. v. Cotton Commercial USA, Inc.,
529 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.--Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6

Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer,
807 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 8

Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C.,
178 S.W.3d 844 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth
2005, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cty.,
221 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Heckman v. Williamson County,
369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Hernandez v. Texas Department of Insurance,
923 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.--Austin
1996, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 12

Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Insurance,
796 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 12

v
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd)

Page(s)

Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Group,
250 S.W.3d 78 (Tex. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 7

In re City of Lancaster,
228 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App.--Dallas
2007, orig. proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

In re Methodist Dallas Medical Center,
No. 05-13-00134-CV, 2013 WL 3423112
(Tex. App.--Dallas Jun. 3, 2013, orig. proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc.,
438 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11

Macina, Et Al. v. Yanez,
No. 05-17-00180-CV, 2017 WL 4837691
(Tex. App.--Dallas Oct. 26, 2017, pet. filed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11

Morris v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
523 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana
1975, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 10

Mussgrave v. Owen,
67 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
2002, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fidelity Communications Co.,
376 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.--Dallas
2012, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9

Patterson v. Planned Parenthood,
971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9

Samuel v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.,
434 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

State & County Mutual Fire Ins. v. Miller,
52 S.W.3d 693 (Tex. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Sysco Food Services v. Trapnell,
890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 8

vi
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd)

Page(s)

Texas Assn. of Business v. Texas Air Control Board,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Vernco Construction, Inc. v. Nelson,
460 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 9

West Orange-Cove I.S.D. v. Alanis,
107 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

West Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Republic Power Partners, L.P.,
428 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.--Amarillo
2014, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6

Zachry Construction Corp. v. Port of Houston Authority,
449 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5

RULES AND STATUTES:

TEX. R. APP. P. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 11

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.152 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 9

vii
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case: This is a breach of contract cause of
action brought by Primestar
Construction, Inc.

Trial Court: The Honorable Craig Smith.
192nd Judicial District Court,
Dallas County, Texas.

Parties in Trial Court: Primestar Construction, Inc. -
Plaintiff;
City of Dallas, Texas - Defendant.

Trial Court Disposition: Plea to the Jurisdiction rendered in
favor of the Defendant.

ISSUES PRESENTED

I. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because
the sovereign immunity of the City of Dallas has been waived by
statute.

II. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable.

III. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because the
Appellant had standing to pursue her cause of action for breach of
contract.

IV. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because a
Certificate of Merit is not applicable to this litigation.

V. The trial court erred by not entering properly requested Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

viii
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 8, 2017, the Plaintiff filed its Original Petition asserting a breach of

contract and wrongful termination of the contract by the Defendant, the City of

Dallas. (C.R. 11-43.) On June 5, 2017, the Defendant filed its Plea to the

Jurisdiction, in the Alternative, Special Exceptions; or, in the Alternative, Original

Answer. (C.R. 44-52.)

On June 21, 2017, the Plaintiff filed its Response to Defendant's Plea to the

Jurisdiction and Special Exceptions. (C.R. 53-56.) On July 21, 2017, the Defendant

filed its Plea of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; Motion to Dismiss for

Failure to File a Certificate of Merit and Supplemental Special Exceptions. (C.R.

57-75.) On August 21, 2017, the Plaintiff filed its Response to Defendant's Plea of

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; Motion to Dismiss for Failure to File a

Certificate of Merit; and Supplemental Special Exceptions. (C.R. 76-81.)

Subsequently, the parties filed their respective briefs and responses to the issues

that were before the trial court. (C.R. 82-247; 248-267.)

On October 31, 2017, the trial court entered its order granting the

Defendant's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Plea of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to File a Certificate of Merit. (C.R. 268.) On

November 8, 2017, the Plaintiff filed its Motion for New Trial or, in the

1
Alternative, Motion for Reconsideration. (C.R. 269-273.) On that same date, the

Plaintiff filed its Motion to Modify Judgment. (C.R. 274-275.)

On November 9, 2017, the Plaintiff timely filed its Request for Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law. (C.R. 276-277.) On December 11, 2017, the

Defendant filed its Response to Plaintiff's Request for Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, Motion to Modify the Judgment, and Motion for New Trial.

(C.R.278-283.) On December 11, 2107, the Plaintiff filed its Objection and Reply

to Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Request for Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, Motion to Modify the Judgment and Motion for New Trial.

(C.R. 284-286.)

On December 11, 2017, the Plaintiff timely filed its Notice of Past Due

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (C.R.287-288.) On December 15, 2017,

the trial court signed its Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Judgment,

Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial.

(C.R. 296.)

On December 12, 2017, the Plaintiff timely perfected its appeal to the Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of Texas. (C.R. 297-298.)

2
 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In this breach of a bilateral contract cause of action, the sovereign immunity

of the City of Dallas, Texas has been waived by the statutory provisions of TEX.

LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.152. See Zachry Construction Corp. v. Port of Houston

Authority, 449 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. 2014); Clear Creek I.S.D. v. Cotton Commercial

USA, Inc., 529 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed);

West Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Republic Power Partners, L.P., 428

S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2014, no pet.).

The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable to the

facts and the law in this breach of a bilateral contract cause of action due to the fact

that the City of Dallas, Texas was not a defendant in the federal action nor was the

City of Dallas in privity of contract with the Plaintiff and Travelers Insurance

concerning their insurance dispute. See Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Group, 250

S.W.3d 78 (Tex. 2008); Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. 1996);

Sysco Food Services v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994); Eagle Props., Ltd.

v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1990).

The Plaintiff in this cause had the requisite standing to bring this breach of

bilateral contract cause of action because the Plaintiff's rights had been reserved

and the City of Dallas, Texas was on actual notice of the reservation of rights. See

3
Vernco Construction, Inc. v. Nelson, 460 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. 2015); Patterson v.

Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998); Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc. v.

Fidelity Communications Co., 376 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2012, no pet.);

Morris v. Allstate Insurance Co., 523 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana

1975, no writ).

The Plaintiff is not in the class of litigants where a Certificate of Merit is

required to pursue this present litigation and the trial court erred by including the

contrary finding in its judgment. The Plaintiff nor the Defendant is neither an

licensed architect, licensed professional engineer, registered landscape architect

and/or registered professional land surveyor and this litigation concerns the breach

of a bilateral contract for payment and not for professional services. See TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(a); Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc., 438

S.W.3d 556 (Tex. 2014); Macina, Et Al. v. Yanez, No. 05-17-00180-CV, 2017 WL

4837691 (Tex. App.--Dallas Oct. 26, 2017, pet. filed).

When a trial court considers evidence and testimony to determine

jurisdictional facts concerning a Plea to the Jurisdiction, Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law are both necessary and helpful for meaningful appellate

review. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas Department of Insurance, 923 S.W.2d 192

(Tex. App.--Austin 1996, no writ). See also Higginbotham v. General Life &

Accident Insurance, 796 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. 1990).

4
 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because
the sovereign immunity of the City of Dallas has been waived by
statute.

This appeal involves the breach of a bilateral contract for construction

services provided to the Appellee by the Appellant. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §

271.152 states:

A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the
constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract
subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the
purposes of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to
the terms and conditions of this subchapter.

(Emphasis added.)

It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the Appellant's cause of action is for

the breach of a bilateral contract entered into by the Appellee and the Appellant

concerning the payment owed for construction services and the wrongful

termination of the contract by the Appellee. (C.R. 12-24, 27-43.) It is undeniable

that the Appellee, the City of Dallas, Texas, is a home-rule city and local

governmental entity that is subject to the provisions of TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §

271.152. The Court in Zachry Construction Co. v. Port of Houston Authority, 449

5
S.W.3d 98, 109 -114 (Tex. 2014), set out the exact parameters of what constitutes

waiver of sovereign immunity by a local governmental entity that has entered into

a bilateral contract and the damages that may be recovered in a suit for breach of

that contract. The Appellant's cause of action meets all of the statutory and

Supreme Court of Texas' criteria, thus the sovereign immunity of the Appellee has

been unambiguously waived by statute and applicable case law. See also Clear

Creek I.S.D. v. Cotton Commercial USA, Inc., 529 S.W.3d 569, 578-580 (Tex.

App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. filed); West Texas Municipal Power Agency

v. Republic Power Partners, L.P., 428 S.W.3d 299, 306-310 (Tex. App.--Amarillo

2014, no pet.). The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded

with instructions to order a new trial.

II. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable.

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents the relitigation of a claim or

cause of action that was finally adjudicated in a earlier suit. See Citizens Ins. v.

Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007); Hallco Tex., Inc., v. McMullen Cty.,

221 S.W.3d 50, 58 (Tex. 2006). If the claims and/or causes of action arise from the

same set of operative facts, the doctrine of res judicata applies and the claims

and/or causes of action will be barred in a subsequent suit. See Samuel v. Federal

Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 434 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.]
6
2014, no pet.); Musgrave v. Owen, 67 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tex. App.--Texarkana

2002, no pet.).

Additionally, in order for res judicata to apply, the parties in the second suit

are the same in the first suit or in privity with them. Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech.

Grp., 250 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex. 2008); Citizens Ins., 217 S.W.3d at 449. It is

uncontroverted and undisputed that the City of Dallas, Texas, was not a party to

the lawsuit filed in the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas,

Dallas Division. (C.R. 162-177.) Additionally, the federal district court

unambiguously and expressly held, "[T]he third party claim against the City of

Dallas appears to be unrelated to Primestar's liability under the indemnity

agreement, and Primestar has not explained why the claim is necessary to the

disposition of this case." (C.R. 213.) (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that the

Appellee, the City of Dallas, Texas, was not and is not a party to the final judgment

rendered by the federal district court. (C.R. 228.) Lastly, there has been no

evidence presented, either in the trial court below or in the federal district court,

that the Appellee, the City of Dallas, Texas, was ever in privity of contract

concerning the indemnity agreement between the Appellant and Travelers

Insurance that was litigated in the federal district court. See Igal; Citizens Ins.,

supra. Simply put, the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable to this litigation.

7
 The Appellee contends that the doctrine of collateral estoppel also does not

apply. Collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a particular fact issue

that the party had already litigated and lost in an earlier suit. State & County

Mutual Fire Ins. v. Miller, 52 S.W.3d 693, 696 (Tex. 2001); Barr v. Resolution

Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). To invoke collateral estoppel, a

party must establish: (1) the same facts sought to be litigated in the second suit

were fully litigated in the first suit, (2) those facts were essential to the judgment or

final order in the first suit, and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first

suit. See Sysco Food Services v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994); Eagle

Properties. Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990). The litigation in

the trial court below and the federal district court litigation do not meet all of the

criteria for the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply. (C.R. 213; 218.) The trial

court most certainly has the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the

controversy. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded with

instructions to order a new trial.

8
III. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because the
Appellant had standing to pursue her cause of action for breach of
contract.

The appellate record in this case clearly shows that the Appellee and the

Appellant entered into a contract and that the Appellant brought its cause of action

for breach of the contract by the Appellee, pursuant to the statutory provisions of

TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 271.152. When standing is conferred by statute, the

plaintiff does not have to show that it suffered a particularized injury distinct from

the general public. See Andrade v. Venable, 372 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Tex. 2012);

Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2005, no

pet.). Because standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, the issue

cannot be waived and can be raised for the first time on appeal. West Orange-Cove

I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 583 (Tex. 2003); Texas Assn. of Business v.

Texas Air Control Board, 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993). Standing focuses on

who is the correct party to bring the suit. See Vernco Construction, Inc. v. Nelson,

460 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tex. 2015); Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d

439, 442 (Tex. 1998). The Appellant certainly has statutory standing. Additionally,

the appellate record contains evidence that the Appellant and Travelers Insurance

had reserved the rights of the Appellant to pursue its cause of action in the trial

court below. (C.R. 251-252; 272-273.) See Nexstar Broadcasting, Inc. v. Fidelity

Communications Co., 376 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2012, no pet.);

9
Morris v. Allstate Insurance Co., 523 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.--Texarkana

1975, no writ). The Appellee was "actual notice" of the reservation of Appellant's

rights to pursue its cause of action and breached its affirmative duty to so inform

the trial court. The Appellee's affirmative duty to the trial court and this tribunal

never ceases, even on appeal. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT

3.03(a), (b) & cmt. 2, 3, 7; TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.04(a), (b) &

cmt. 1, 2. See also In re City of Lancaster, 228 S.W.3d 437, 441 (Tex. App.--

Dallas 2007, orig. proceeding); In re Methodist Dallas Medical Center, No. 05-13-

00134-CV, 2013 WL 3423112, at *1 (Tex. App.--Dallas Jun. 3, 2013, orig.

proceeding). The Appellant most certainly had the standing to pursue its cause of

action in the trial court. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and

remanded with instructions to order a new trial.

IV. The trial court erred in granting the Plea to the Jurisdiction because a
Certificate of Merit is not applicable to this litigation.

The trial court held an oral hearing on the Appellee's Plea to the Jurisdiction

and Motion to Dismiss. At the hearing, the trial court explicitly held that the

Appellant was not required to file a Certificate of Merit nor was a Certificate of

Merit relevant to the Appellant's cause of action. (1 C.R.R. 17-18.) Secondly, the

Appellant is not in the class of litigants where a Certificate of Merit is required to

pursue this present litigation and the trial court erred by including the contrary
10
finding in its judgment. The trial court should have granted the Motion to Modify

Judgment and deleted the Certificate of Merit finding from its judgment. (C.R.

274-275, 289-294.) The Appellee is neither an licensed architect, licensed

professional engineer, registered landscape architect and/or registered professional

land surveyor and this litigation concerns the breach of a bilateral contract for

payment and not for professional services. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §

150.002(a); Jaster v. Comet II Construction, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 571 (Tex.

2014); Macina, Et Al. v. Yanez, No. 05-17-00180-CV, 2017 WL 4837691 at *2-3

(Tex. App.--Dallas Oct. 26, 2017, pet. filed). A Certificate of Merit is not required

in this litigation. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and remanded

with instructions to order a new trial.

V. The trial court erred by not entering properly requested Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The trial court not only received documentary evidence, which has already

been referenced above, but received live testimony before ruling to grant the Plea

to the Jurisdiction. (2 C.R.R. 22-28. ) The Appellant timely and properly requested

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law concerning the jurisdictional issue after

the trial court granted the Plea to the Jurisdiction. (C.R. 276-277.) The trial court

never entered the requested findings and conclusions and the Appellant timely and

properly filed its Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
11
(C.R. 287-288.) The trial court denied entering the requested Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law. (C.R. 296.)

A trial court must consider evidence and testimony on a plea to the

jurisdiction when the evidence and testimony are necessary to determine

jurisdictional facts. Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex.

2012); Bland v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). Since the trial court

considered evidence and testimony when ruling on the Plea to the Jurisdiction,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are both necessary and helpful for

meaningful appellate review. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas Department of

Insurance, 923 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, no writ). See also

Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Insurance, 796 S.W.2d 695, 695 (Tex.

1990). The trial court abused its discretion and reversibly erred by not entering the

requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The judgment of the trial

court should be reversed and remanded with instructions to order a new trial.

PRAYER

For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, Primestar Construction, Inc.,

requests that judgment of the trial court be reversed and remanded with

instructions to order a new trial.

12
 Respectfully submitted,

WILLIE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

By:Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
Houston, Texas 77027
(713) 659-7330
(713) 599-1659 (FAX)
SBOT# 21633500
attyjrwii@wisamlawyers.com

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
PRIMESTAR CONSTRUCTION,
INC.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
served via e-service to Charles Estee, Assistant City Attorney, 1500 Marilla Street,
7DN Dallas City Hall, Dallas, Texas 75201, on the 26th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the Brief of Appellant submitted complies with TEX. R. APP. P.
9 and the word count of this document is 2,733. The word processing software
used to prepare the document and to calculate the word count is Windows 7.

/s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

13
APPENDIX
Appendix 1
 NO. DC-17-OS460

PRIMESTAR CONSTRUCTION, INC § IN THE DISTRlCT COURT
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 192ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
THE CITY OF DALLAS §
Defendant. § OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER. ON CITY OF DALLAS'S PLEA TO JURISDICTION j PLEA OF RES
J]JDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; AND MOTIQN TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE 'fQFILE A ~ERTIFICATE OF MF-ruT

ON THIS DATE tbe CoUt1 considered Defehdant City of Dallas's Plea to Jurisdiction;

Plea Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; and t\,'fotion to Dismiss for Failure to File a Certificate

of Merit. The Court, after re,liewlng tbe pleas and mMion, finds tha:l gO(Jd cause ha..r,· been shown

for the granting of the Pleas and Motion.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Court, GRANTS the Def~ndant City of

Dallas's Plea to Jurisdiction; Plea. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel; and Motion to Dismiss

for Failure to File a Certificate of Iv{erit.

SlONED thi' 4 day of October 2011.

Page 268
Appendix 2
 CAUSE NO. DC-17-05460
I

PRIMEST AR CONSTRUCCTION, INC, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. § 192nd JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
CITY OF DALLAS, TEXAS, §
Defendant. § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO MODIFY JUDGMENBT, REQUEST
FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

ON THIS DATE the Court considered Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Judgment, Request for

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial. The Court, after reviewing

the motion and requests and the City of Dallas's response and hearing the argument of counsel,

fmds that the motions and request should be denied.

IT IS, THEREFORE , ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Judgment, Request for

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial are DENIED.

SIGNED this I~ day of December 2017.

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Modify Judgment, Request for Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Motion for New Trial.

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