CED Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh

2018 WI 24

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2016AP474
COMPLETE TITLE: CED Properties, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
City of Oshkosh,
Defendant-Respondent.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 373 Wis. 2d 767, 895 N.W.2d 855
(2017 – Unpublished)

OPINION FILED: April 3, 2018
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: November 1, 2017

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Winnebago
JUDGE: John A. Jorgensen

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED: ABRAHAMSON, J. dissents, joined by A.W. BRADLEY,
J. (opinion filed)
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Erik S. Olsen, Joseph J. Rolling, Andrew D. Weininger,
and Eminent Domain Services, LLC, Madison. There was an oral
argument by Erik S. Olsen.

For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Richard J. Carlson and Silton Seifert Carlson, SC, Appleton.
There was an oral argument by Richard J. Carlson.
 2018 WI 24

NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2016AP474
(L.C. No. 2015CV70)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

CED Properties, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, FILED
v. APR 3, 2018
City of Oshkosh, Shelia T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Defendant-Respondent.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and

the cause remanded to the circuit court.

¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. CED Properties, LLC (CED)

challenges the special assessment imposed by the City of Oshkosh

(City)1 following the reconfiguration of a traditional traffic

light intersection into a roundabout.2 We review the unpublished

court of appeals decision, CED Properties, LLC v. City of

1
The City imposed the special assessment on other affected
commercial property owners, but this case involves only CED's
challenge to the special assessment.
2
Roundabout, American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (5th ed. 2011) ("A traffic circle.").
 No. 2016AP474

Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan.

18, 2017), affirming the circuit court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of the City.3 CED raises two issues:

(1) whether the term "special benefits" in Wisconsin's eminent

domain statute has the same meaning in Wisconsin's special

assessments statute, and if so, whether the City's denial of the

existence of any special benefits during the earlier eminent

domain proceeding precludes the City from asserting the

conferral of special benefits in the later special assessment

action; and (2) whether CED raised genuine issues of material

fact precluding summary judgment.

¶2 We hold that "special benefits" has the same meaning

under both statutes. Although the failure to raise the issue of

special benefits in an eminent domain action does not

necessarily preclude a municipality from later doing so in a

special assessment action, a municipality's admission that

special benefits are non-existent in the context of an eminent

domain proceeding constitutes relevant evidence in a later
challenge to the special assessment.

¶3 We further hold the court of appeals erred in

concluding CED failed to overcome the presumption of correctness

afforded the City's special assessment and to establish

sufficient genuine issues of material fact. The affidavit of

CED's expert raises material factual issues in dispute,

3
The Honorable John A. Jorgensen, Winnebago County,
presiding.

2
 No. 2016AP474

including whether the roundabout project conferred a local

rather than a general benefit, whether the project conferred any

special benefits on CED's property or actually diminished its

value, and whether the amount of the special assessment was fair

and equitably apportioned among the commercial properties

involved as well as proportionate to the benefits accruing to

the property. Because we conclude CED overcame any presumption

of correctness by presenting competent evidence to the contrary,

we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to

the circuit court for a trial.

I. BACKGROUND

¶4 CED owns property located on the northeast corner of

the intersection of United States Highway 45 and State Highway

76. Locally, United States Highway 45 is called Murdock Avenue

and State Highway 76 is called Jackson Street. A Taco Bell

franchise has operated on the property since 1992.

¶5 In January 2008, the City and the Wisconsin Department

of Transportation entered into an improvement plan agreement to
reconstruct and install a multi-lane roundabout at the Jackson-

Murdock intersection. The reconstruction plan proposed the

removal of traffic signals, concrete and asphalt paving,

concrete driveway approaches, sidewalk replacement and repair,

sanitary and storm sewer laterals, and the improvement of

streetscaping and landscaping. The plan required the City to

take about six percent of CED's property to ensure enough space

to build the roundabout. The City used its power of eminent
domain under Wis. Stat. ch. 32 to do so. In April 2012, after
3
 No. 2016AP474

lengthy litigation, the City and CED agreed the City would pay

CED $180,000 just compensation for the taking. During that

litigation, the City filed with the circuit court the appraisal

of its expert, Patrick Wagner. According to Wagner's report,

the City's partial taking caused CED's property to decrease in

value by $38,850, and he testified during his deposition that

the taking did not confer any "special benefits" on CED's

property under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3) (2015-16).4

¶6 In July 2010, the City passed a resolution that levied

special assessments upon CED's property and other commercial

properties pursuant to its police power under Wis. Stat.

§ 66.0703(1)(a)5 to help fund the intersection improvement

4
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.

Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(3) provides:

Special benefits accruing to the property and
affecting its market value because of the planned
improvement shall be considered and used to offset the
value of property taken or damages under [Wis. Stat.
§ 32.09(6)], but in no event shall such special
benefits be allowed in excess of damages described
under sub. (6).
5
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a) provides:

(a) Except as provided in s. 66.0721, as a complete
alternative to all other methods provided by law, any
city, town or village may, by resolution of its
governing body, levy and collect special assessments
upon property in a limited and determinable area for
special benefits conferred upon the property by any
municipal work or improvement; and may provide for the
payment of all or any part of the cost of the work or
(continued)
4
 No. 2016AP474

project. CED challenged the special assessment, but the City

argued the challenge was untimely. That dispute ended after

this court ruled that CED's appeal of the assessment was timely

and its complaint sufficient; we instructed the circuit court to

grant summary judgment in favor of CED. See CED Properties, LLC

v. City of Oshkosh, 2014 WI 10, 352 Wis. 2d 613, 843 N.W.2d 382

[hereinafter "CED I"].6

¶7 Following this court's decision in CED I, the City re-

assessed CED pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(10),7 imposing a

improvement out of the proceeds of the special
assessments.

Paragraph (b) provides where "an assessment represents an
exercise of the police power, the assessment shall be upon a
reasonable basis as determined by the governing body of the
city, town or village."
6
CED asserted in CED I that the improvement project had not
conferred special benefits under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a), but
this substantive issue was not addressed or resolved. See CED
Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2014 WI 10, 352 Wis. 2d 613,
843 N.W.2d 382.
7
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(10) provides:

If the actual cost of any project, upon completion or
after the receipt of bids, is found to vary materially
from the estimates, if any assessment is void or
invalid, or if the governing body decides to
reconsider and reopen any assessment, it may, after
giving notice as provided in sub. (7)(a) and after a
public hearing, amend, cancel or confirm the prior
assessment. A notice of the resolution amending,
canceling or confirming the prior assessment shall be
given by the clerk as provided in sub. (8)(d). If the
assessments are amended to provide for the refunding
of special assessment B bonds under s. 66.0713(6), all
direct and indirect costs reasonably attributable to
(continued)
5
 No. 2016AP474

special assessment of $19,486.36 based on CED's frontage along

Jackson Street and $20,616.67 based on CED's frontage along

Murdock Avenue for a total special assessment of $40,103.03.8

The City issued a final resolution authorizing the re-assessment

and a report describing the special benefits conferred upon CED

as: "a substantial increase in accessibility, which includes

safer, lower cost, and shorter travel times for customers,

deliveries and employees. These special benefits are different

in kind than those enjoyed by the public for through traffic."

The City said additional special benefits were conveyed by

correcting sidewalk defects in sections contiguous with the

property, which "provide[d] a safe corridor for pedestrians to

access the site," and by improving the streetscape, which

enhanced the property's overall aesthetics.

¶8 The City's report further explained that the project

improved the intersection's primary function of moving and

carrying traffic (a "community benefit") as well as the

secondary benefit of providing access to traffic flow (a
"special benefit" to abutting property owners, like CED).

According to the City, this intersection served about 25,000

the refunding of the bonds may be included in the cost
of the public improvements being financed.
8
The entire project cost $4,060,000. The Wisconsin
Department of Transportation paid $2,610,750. The City paid
$1,449,250, but specially assessed the affected property owners
$307,118.72 of that amount. The $40,103.03 charged to CED
equaled 0.99 percent of the total entire project cost.

6
 No. 2016AP474

vehicles each day, with 1,973 (or about 7.9 percent) of those

vehicles tied to stops at the Taco Bell on CED's property. The

City's analysis indicated that before the roundabout, it took a

vehicle 37.9 seconds to travel through the intersection; this

was reduced to 10.5 seconds per vehicle after the project.

¶9 CED again appealed the special assessment to the

circuit court, claiming the project conferred only community or

general benefits of better traffic flow and no local or special

benefits at all. CED further claimed the assessment was

unreasonable because it had no nexus between the linear feet

upon which the property was assessed and the alleged benefits

conferred.

¶10 The City moved for summary judgment. It acknowledged

the improvement conferred public benefits, but asserted that the

improvement also conferred special benefits assessable against

CED, that the resulting assessment was reasonable, and that CED

failed to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded the

City's assessment.
¶11 CED opposed the motion, arguing that because the City

conceded "special benefits" did not accrue to CED's property

during the Wis. Stat. ch. 32 eminent domain action, the City

forfeited the opportunity to assert "special benefits" during

the later special assessment appeal. Alternatively, CED argued

that even if asserting special benefits during the eminent

domain action was not a condition precedent to asserting them

during the ch. 66 special assessment action, the improvements
were not local in nature, no special benefits accrued, and the
7
 No. 2016AP474

assessments' costs were unreasonably apportioned among the

abutting property owners. CED also argued that the special

assessment violated the equal protection clause of the Wisconsin

and United States Constitutions.9

¶12 In support of its arguments, CED submitted the

affidavit and appraisal of its expert witness, James C. Johnson.

According to his affidavit, Johnson is a certified general

appraiser who was previously employed by the Wisconsin

Department of Transportation as an "access specialist." During

his time with that department, he "served on the committee that

established the 'Special Benefits Criteria' which were

implemented and used by the [department] for assessing whether

benefits were general benefits or special benefits." He cites

to cases on which he acted as an "access expert . . . on the

issue of reasonable access." He served as the department's

"litigation coordinator," training the department's consultant

appraisers "on evaluating general vs. special benefits." "[A]ll

requests for changes in the amount of compensation due to
landowners in the southwest region were reviewed by

[Johnson] . . . includ[ing] consideration of any access issues,

general benefits, and special benefits."

¶13 Having personally inspected CED's property, Johnson

believed that "absolutely no benefit to [CED's property], let

alone a special benefit" arose from any of the improvements. In

9
CED does not make this argument before this court.

8
 No. 2016AP474

fact, Johnson opined that the roundabout was a detriment to

CED's property, explaining: "Retail fast food sites like the

subject are more valuable when they are on controlled

intersections" since "[g]reater time at the intersection is

desirable for the subject because the subject is an impulse

stop." According to Johnson's appraisal, as of October 29,

2009, the roundabout project caused the fair market value of

CED's property to decrease $251,370.

¶14 CED also submitted an affidavit from its attorney,

attaching, as material here, Wagner's appraisal and the page

from Wagner's deposition where he said no special benefit

accrued to CED's property in the eminent domain action. CED

asserted in its brief opposing summary judgment that Wagner's

appraisal and testimony precluded the City from later specially

assessing CED for "special benefits."

¶15 The circuit court granted the City's motion for

summary judgment. It did not address whether genuine issues of

fact remained regarding the existence of a special benefit,
whether the benefit was local or general, or whether the

assessment was reasonable.

¶16 CED appealed and the court of appeals affirmed, with

Judge Mark Gundrum dissenting. CED Properties, LLC v. City of

Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan.

18, 2017). The court of appeals' majority ruled CED failed to

prove "a genuine issue of material fact to show that it has

overcome the presumption of correctness" and failed to prove the
special assessments were not reasonable. Id., ¶29. Judge
9
 No. 2016AP474

Gundrum disagreed, concluding that CED's expert's affidavit

setting forth reasons why the project made vehicle access to

CED's property "worse, not better" was sufficient evidence that

"could support a finding by a reasonable jury that a special

benefit does not exist." Id., ¶34 (Gundrum, J. dissenting)

(quoting First State Bank v. Town of Omro, 2015 WI App 99, ¶20,

366 Wis. 2d 219, 873 N.W.2d 247). Judge Gundrum said "a jury

issue exists as to whether the Jackson-Murdock Project conferred

special benefits on the CED property," and the "matter should be

returned to the circuit court for a jury trial on the issue."

Id., ¶¶30, 34. CED petitioned for review in this court, which

we granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17 This case requires us to review a grant of summary

judgment against CED. "We independently review a grant of

summary judgment using the same methodology of the circuit court

and the court of appeals." Water Well Sols. Serv. Grp., Inc. v.

Consol. Ins. Co., 2016 WI 54, ¶11, 369 Wis. 2d 607, 881
N.W.2d 285. The law governing summary judgment is well-known.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). Summary judgment must

be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Id.
10
 No. 2016AP474

¶18 We apply a two-step test to make this determination.

Garza v. Am. Transmission Co. LLC, 2017 WI 35, ¶21, 374

Wis. 2d 555, 893 N.W.2d 1 (citing Green Spring Farms v. Kersten,

136 Wis. 2d 304, 314-15, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987)). First, this

court asks if the plaintiff stated a claim for relief. Id.

Second, this court applies Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2), asking if any

factual issues exist that preclude a grant of summary judgment.

Id. It is undisputed here that CED's complaint states a claim

for relief. The parties' dispute focuses on whether CED

presented sufficient evidence to create any material issues of

fact to overcome the presumption of correctness.

¶19 "Summary judgment is a drastic remedy; therefore, the

moving party must clearly be entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." Genrich v. City of Rice Lake, 2003 WI App 255, ¶6, 268

Wis. 2d 233, 673 N.W.2d 361 (citing Vill. of Fontana-On-Geneva

Lake v. Hoag, 57 Wis. 2d 209, 214, 203 N.W.2d 680 (1973)). In

reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in a

light most favorable to CED, the nonmoving party. See Genrich,
268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶6. Any doubts as to whether a genuine issue

of material fact exists should be resolved against the City as

the moving party. Id.

¶20 This case also involves the interpretation and

interplay of two statutes, Wis. Stat.

§§ 32.09 and 66.0703(1)(a). The interpretation of statutes

presents a question of law we review de novo. State v. Talley,

2017 WI 21, ¶24, 373 Wis. 2d 610, 891 N.W.2d 390.

11
 No. 2016AP474

III. ANALYSIS

¶21 CED and the City disagree on whether the term "special

benefits" has the same meaning in both Wis. Stat. ch. 32 and

ch. 66. CED argues that if it has the same meaning, then the

City cannot take the position that no special benefits exist in

a ch. 32 action but later assert special benefits exist in a

ch. 66 action. We hold the term "special benefits" has the same

meaning in both statutes, but that it is used differently in

each context. Accordingly, the City is not barred from imposing

a special assessment on CED's property to pay for improvements,

provided the City establishes the improvements were local,

conferred special benefits on CED's property, and were fair,

equitable, and in proportion to the benefits accruing to the

property. These issues involve questions of fact for the trier

of fact to resolve.

A. The Meaning and Application of "Special Benefits"
¶22 We begin with the language of the statutes. See State

ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271

Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000

WI 76, ¶31, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). Except for

technical or specially-defined words or phrases, "[s]tatutory

language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted

meaning. . . ." Id. Additionally, because "[c]ontext is

important to meaning. . . . statutory language is interpreted in

the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of
a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-

12
 No. 2016AP474

related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or

unreasonable results." Id., ¶46 (citations omitted).

"Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable

effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage." Id.

¶23 Wisconsin Stat. §§ 32.09 and 66.0703(1)(a) both use

the term "special benefits." Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09 governs

"all matters involving the determination of just compensation in

eminent domain proceedings." Section 32.09(3) provides:

Special benefits accruing to the property and
affecting its market value because of the planned
improvement shall be considered and used to offset the
value of property taken or damages under [Wis. Stat.
§ 32.09(6)], but in no event shall such special
benefits be allowed in excess of damages described
under sub. (6).[10]
(Emphasis added.) Section 66.0703 governs the general rules

applicable to special assessments imposed by a city, town or

village. Section 66.0703(1)(a) provides:

Except as provided in s. 66.0721,[11] as a complete
alternative to all other methods provided by law, any
city, town or village may, by resolution of its
governing body, levy and collect special assessments
upon property in a limited and determinable area for
special benefits conferred upon the property by any
municipal work or improvement; and may provide for the
payment of all or any part of the cost of the work or
improvement out of the proceeds of the special
assessments.
10
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6) provides the method to
determine the amount a property owner shall be compensated in
the case of a partial taking of property.
11
Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0721, entitled "Special assessments
on certain farmland or camps for construction of sewerage or
water system," is not relevant to the analysis of this case.

13
 No. 2016AP474

(Emphasis added.)

¶24 Because neither statute defines the non-technical term

"special benefits," we give the term its common, ordinary, and

accepted meaning. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. The common,

ordinary, and accepted meaning of the term "special benefits"

itself does not change from one statutory section to another,

particularly when the statutory provisions have some

relationship as they do here.12 "Statutes in pari materia are to

be interpreted together as though they were one law." Antonin

Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of

Legal Texts 252 (2012). In other words, laws addressing the

same subject should be interpreted harmoniously, if possible.

Id. There is no textual basis for assigning different

interpretations of "special benefits" accruing to property in

the context of eminent domain versus "special benefits"

conferred on property upon which a special assessment is levied.

Wisconsin courts have applied the same definition of special

benefits in both the eminent domain and special assessment
contexts.

¶25 "Special benefits" means "an uncommon advantage." Red

Top Farms v. DOT, 177 Wis. 2d 822, 833, 503 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App.

1993) (eminent domain); Goodger v. City of Delavan, 134

12
"The presumption of consistent usage applies also when
different sections of an act or code are at issue" and "the more
connection the cited statute has with the statute under
consideration, the more plausible the argument becomes."
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Text 172-73 (2012).

14
 No. 2016AP474

Wis. 2d 348, 352, 396 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1986) (special

assessment). "Special" is defined as "[s]urpassing what is

common or usual." Special, American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language (1992 3d. ed.). "Benefit" is defined as

"[s]omething that produces or enhances well being; an

advantage." Benefit, American Heritage Dictionary of the

English Language (1992 3d ed.). This judicial definition of

"special benefits" as "an uncommon advantage" aligns with the

text of both statutes.

¶26 In Goodger, the court of appeals addressed whether a

special benefit was conferred for purposes of determining the

validity of a special assessment. 134 Wis. 2d at 352. It

adopted a plain meaning definition of "special benefits" to

denote "uncommon advantage" because "[a]bsent . . . a

legislative definition, the ordinary and accepted meaning of a

word used by the legislature can be established by reference to

a recognized dictionary." Id. (citation omitted).

¶27 The legislature uses the term "special benefits" in
each statute differently. In Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3), the term

begins the subsection and is qualified by the words that follow:

"Special benefits accruing to the property and affecting its

market value because of the planned improvement . . . ." In

Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a), the term is embedded in the middle

of a sentence and is not qualified by an effect on the

property's market value: " . . . for special benefits conferred

upon the property by any municipal work or improvement. . . ."
Although the meaning of the term "special benefits" itself
15
 No. 2016AP474

remains the same in both statutes, how it is used and applied in

the eminent domain and special assessment contexts is textually

different.

¶28 In the eminent domain statute, "special benefits" are

restricted to those local improvements that affect the market

value of the property13 for purposes of determining whether to

offset compensation to the owner of property taken for a planned

public improvement. If the improvement project necessitating

the taking does not affect the market value of the property,

then the City is not entitled to an offset for any special

benefits accruing to the property because of the planned

improvement. An assertion of "special benefits" in eminent

domain actions acts as an affirmative defense for the condemnor;

the governmental body has the burden of showing it is entitled

to an offset when property immediately increases or imminently

will increase in market value. Hietpas v. State, 24 Wis. 2d

650, 656-57, 130 N.W.2d 248 (1964); see also Molbreak v. Vill.

of Shorewood Hills, 66 Wis. 2d 687, 703, 225 N.W.2d 894 (1975)
("special benefits accruing to land not taken in eminent

domain . . . may be set off against damages if they enhance the

13
This court expanded the scope of special benefits to
include "imminent adaptability of the land to a higher and
better use from an economic standpoint because of proximity to
the public improvement." Hietpas v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 650, 656,
130 N.W.2d 248 (1964). Concomitantly, this court also extended
the meaning of special benefits "to include enhanced value
because of more advantageous adaptability for use." Petkus v.
State, 24 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964).

16
 No. 2016AP474

market value immediately" (emphasis added) (citing Hietpas, 24

Wis. 2d at 656-57)).

¶29 The statutory qualification in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3)

links special benefits to an effect on the market value of the

property. When the property's market value remains unaffected

by the planned improvement, a particular taking may not require

an offset against compensation owed to the property owner.

Regardless, the improvement project may nevertheless confer

special benefits on the property owner within the meaning of

ch. 66.

¶30 Wisconsin Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a) does not condition

special assessments on the conferral of special benefits

affecting the market value of the property. The work or

improvement must only provide an uncommon advantage specific to

that property. See Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶¶13-14; Goodger,

134 Wis. 2d at 352. Under § 66.0703(1)(a), "special benefits"

can include an increase in market value following the

improvement. Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 703. But the text does
not require it.

¶31 CED argues that the word "shall" in Wis. Stat.

§ 32.09(3) is mandatory language requiring the City to consider

and use any special benefits to offset compensation to the

property owner in an eminent domain action; therefore, CED

argues, failing to raise special benefits in an eminent domain

action forecloses a municipality from later assessing the

property for special benefits purportedly conferred. This
argument ignores the narrowing of § 32.09(3)'s mandate to only
17
 No. 2016AP474

those special benefits affecting a property's market value. In

the absence of an immediate or imminent increase in a property's

fair market value triggered by the planned public improvement,

the municipality need not consider or use special benefits to

offset the value of property taken under § 32.09.14

¶32 In the eminent domain proceeding involving CED's

property, the City's expert witness testified that he did not

believe CED's property received any special benefits from the

improvement project:

14
CED asserted at oral argument before this court that the
City is judicially estopped from specially assessing CED for
"special benefits" because it conceded no special benefits arose
in the condemnation action. We disagree. Judicial estoppel
"precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal
proceeding and then subsequently asserting an inconsistent
position." State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817
(1996)(citations omitted). The doctrine is equitable in nature,
intended to protect the proceedings against "cold manipulation"
rather than "unthinking or confused blunder[s]." Id. (citations
omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he doctrine is only applied when the
positions taken by a party are truly inconsistent."
Id. at 350 n.5.

The City's position in each proceeding is not clearly
inconsistent. "Special benefits" in condemnation actions are
limited to immediate or imminent increases to a property's fair
market value. The City is not specially assessing CED on the
basis of an increase in the fair market value of CED's property.
If the City successfully establishes the conferral of special
benefits on CED's property, based on the asserted "substantial
increase[s] in accessibility, which includes safer, lower cost,
and shorter travel times for customers, deliveries and
employees," then the City may levy and collect a special
assessment upon CED's property, provided the other
prerequisites——the improvement is local and the special
assessment is reasonable——are met.

18
 No. 2016AP474

Q. Okay. In your appraisal here, did you find any
special benefits to the subject property?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Are there any special benefits to the
property in this case?

A. I don't believe so.
This testimony does not resolve the issue of special benefits in

the context of a special assessment because the record is

unclear regarding whether the City's expert identified no

special benefits that affected the property's market value or if

he identified no special benefits whatsoever.

¶33 We conclude that "special benefits" has the same

meaning in each statute, but the failure to raise the issue of

special benefits in an eminent domain action does not

necessarily preclude a municipality from levying and collecting

"special benefits" via a subsequent special assessment.

Notably, in an eminent domain action, only special benefits

accruing to the property that affect its market value because of

the planned improvement are required to be considered and used

to offset the value of the property taken. Wis. Stat.

§ 32.09(3). In contrast, special assessments upon property may

be levied and collected for special benefits conferred on the

property by the improvement, regardless of the impact on the

property's market value; Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 is silent on the

subject.

¶34 CED decries the inefficiency and burden of forcing

property owners to "endure" two proceedings; however, the remedy
lies not with the judiciary but with the legislature, which

19
 No. 2016AP474

produced the ostensible problem. Perhaps, as CED contends, the

legislature did not intend this result but this court does not

divine the legislature's intentions; it interprets what the

legislature actually enacted.

B. Prerequisites to Police Power Special Assessments

¶35 While the City's denial of special benefits in the

eminent domain action does not foreclose its assertion of

special benefits in a subsequent special assessment, the City

must satisfy certain requirements in order for its assessment to

be valid. In order for the City to exercise its police power 15

to levy a special assessment on property to pay for public

improvements, three requirements must be met: (1) the

improvement must be local rather than general; (2) the

improvement must confer special benefits on the property; and

(3) the assessment must be fair and equitable and in proportion

to the benefits accruing. First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶9

(citations omitted). These three requirements are

interdependent. If the improvement is deemed general, the
inquiry stops and the special assessment is not permissible. If

the improvement is local, the analysis shifts to whether the

property received special benefits. If not, the special

assessment is invalid. If special benefits are found, the

review moves to the assessment's reasonableness. Each

requirement is addressed in turn.
15
It is undisputed that the City exercised its police power
in imposing the special assessments to fund the improvement
project.

20
 No. 2016AP474

1. Local versus general improvements

¶36 Because special assessments can be levied only for

local improvements, the character of the improvement must first

be determined before the propriety of the assessment is

considered. Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶9. A public improvement

is general in character if it "confers a substantially equal

benefit and advantage on the property of the whole community or

benefits the public at large." Duncan Dev. Corp. v. Crestview

Sanitary Dist., 22 Wis. 2d 258, 264, 125 N.W.2d 617 (1964).

Typically, general improvements are "financed by general taxes."

Id. Because a general improvement benefits the whole community,

it may naturally provide a benefit of some degree to the

affected property. In contrast, although a local improvement

"may incidentally benefit all the property in the municipality

and the public at large" it "is made primarily for the

accommodation and convenience of inhabitants of a particular

area in the community whose property receives a special benefit
from the improvement." Id. (emphasis added). "The fact that an

improvement confers a general benefit on the community does not

mean that certain property cannot benefit specially." Molbreak,

66 Wis. 2d at 699 (first citing Brock v. Lemke, 455 P.2d 1, 3

(1969); then citing 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corps. § 1314) (special

assessment); see also Red Top Farms, 177 Wis. 2d at 829

("special benefit . . . accrues to a property owner in addition

to the benefit enjoyed by other property owners in the
community").
21
 No. 2016AP474

¶37 Because special assessments can be levied only "for

local improvements . . . the circuit court must examine whether

the improvement was local, that is, whether the purpose was to

accommodate particular property owners and confer a special

benefit." Park Ave. Plaza v. City of Mequon, 2008 WI App 39,

¶20, 308 Wis. 2d 439, 747 N.W.2d 703 (citations omitted). In

order to be considered local rather than general, the special

benefit must also have "the effect of furnishing an uncommon

advantage to a property differing in kind, rather than in

degree, from the benefits enjoyed by the general public." Id.,

¶17 (citations omitted); Genrich, 263 Wis. 2d 233, ¶14; Petkus

v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 643, 648, 130 N.W.2d 253 (1964). This

concept dates back to 1851, when this court held that "common

advantages to the neighborhood were not chargeable as

benefits . . . but only such as were peculiar to [the particular

parcel]." Red Top Farms, 177 Wis. 2d at 826 (citing Milwaukee &

Miss. R.R. v. Eble, 3 Pin. 334, 358 (1851)). The test is

whether the property upon which the special assessment is levied
"has gained a benefit not shared by any other parcel." Id. at

832.

2. Special benefits

¶38 If an improvement is local in character, the next

consideration is whether the improvement conferred special

benefits on the subject property. Section III.A comprehensively

examines the meaning of "special benefits." Additionally, we

note that "a benefit could accrue without any actual use of the
improvement." Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 701. Commercial property
22
 No. 2016AP474

may receive special benefits from improved traffic safety and

aesthetic improvements to an adjacent public road. Id. at 699.

Finally, "the benefits necessary to sustain a special assessment

'must be substantial, certain, and capable of being realized

within a reasonable time.'" Wm. H. Heinemann Creameries, Inc.

v. Vill. of Kewaskum, 275 Wis. 636, 641, 82 N.W.2d 902

(1957)(citation omitted).

¶39 We also address CED's argument that this court

incorrectly expanded "special benefits" to mean not only an

improvement, but also to encompass a "service." Duncan, 22

Wis. 2d at 264 (first citing 14 McQuillin, Municipal

Corporations § 38.11 (3d ed.); then citing 48 Am. Jur. 2d

Special or Local Assessments § 1 (1964)). The expansion of

"special benefits" in Duncan ostensibly to include services was

repeated but not applied by the court of appeals in Genrich, 268

Wis. 2d 233, ¶13, and First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶20

("[a]n uncommon advantage will either increase services to

property or enhance its value"). Notably, Duncan involved an
assessment based on enhanced value of the property as a result

of the improvement. 22 Wis. 2d at 268.

¶40 Accepting CED's argument could require us to overrule

Duncan, a step we need not analyze.16 While it is questionable

whether services constitute "special benefits" for which a

16
Because a roundabout is unquestionably an improvement and
not a service, we defer a thorough analysis of Duncan
Development Corp. v. Crestview Sanitary District, 22
Wis. 2d 258, 125 N.W.2d 617 (1964).

23
 No. 2016AP474

special assessment potentially could be levied,17 the issue is

irrelevant in this case because a roundabout is an improvement,

not a service. "Service" as defined in § 66.0627(1)(c)

includes:

snow and ice removal, weed elimination, street
sprinkling, oiling and tarring, repair of sidewalks or
curb and gutter, garbage and refuse disposal,
recycling, storm water management, including
construction of storm water management facilities,
tree care, removal and disposition of dead animals
under s. 60.23 (20), loan repayment under s. 70.57 (4)
(b), soil conservation work under s. 92.115, and snow
removal under s. 86.105.
Construction of a roundabout is not mentioned in the statutory

definition of services and nothing in the list of services is

analogous to a roundabout. While use of the word "includes"

indicates that what follows are examples rather than an

17
Under Wis. Stat. § 66.0627(2), a municipality "may impose
a special charge against real property for current services
rendered . . . ." Section 66.0627(1)(c) defines "service." In
contrast, Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 governs the levying and
collection of "special assessments" for "special benefits"
conferred on property by an improvement. Because special
charges are imposed for services, whereas special assessments
are levied and collected for improvements, the legislature
regards services and improvements as distinct things subjecting
property owners to different taxes: charges for services and
assessments for improvements.

24
 No. 2016AP474

exhaustive list,18 the associated-words canon instructs that

associated words bear on one another's meaning. Brown v. Chi. &

N.W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137, 156, 78 N.W. 771 (1899) ("You may

know the meaning of a term by its associates,——what precedes and

what follows it. When? Not in every case; but when not

apparent from the language itself."); Scalia & Garner,

supra ¶24, at 195. The statutory examples of "services" have in

common the removal or rectification of temporary but recurring

occurrences, such as snow, weeds, and dead animals, along with

repair of sidewalks, curbs, or gutters——but not the construction

of a permanent structure like a roundabout.19 Contrary to the

City's characterization, infrastructure is not a service.

18
"The verb to include introduces examples, not an
exhaustive list." Scalia & Garner, supra note 12, at 132; State
v. James P., 2005 WI 80, ¶26, 281 Wis. 2d 685, 698, 698 N.W.2d
95, 102 (quoting Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes and Doves v.
DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶17 n.11, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612)
("'Generally, the word "includes" is to be given an expansive
meaning, indicating that which follows is but a part of the
whole.' While courts may sometimes read the word 'includes' as
a term of limitation or enumeration under the doctrine of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there must be some
textual evidence that the legislature intended this doctrine to
apply.").
19
The reconstruction of the intersection included the
replacement and repair of sidewalks: According to the report of
the Public Works Director and City Manager, "[d]efective
sidewalks section include those with open cracks, offset joints
or other defects that create a hazard to those using the
sidewalk. Removal of the hazards provides a safe corridor for
pedestrians to access the site." "[R]epair of sidewalks" is
specifically enumerated as a service for which the City may
impose a special charge on real property under Wis. Stat. §
66.0627(2).

25
 No. 2016AP474

Improved infrastructure may facilitate the delivery of services

to a property but it is not, in and of itself, a service.

3. Reasonableness

¶41 The third prerequisite to the exercise of the police

power to levy a special assessment requires a reasonable basis

for the assessment. An assessment made under the police power

is not limited to the value of the benefits conferred on the

property but must be made on a reasonable basis. Steinbach v.

Green Lake Sanitary Dist., 2006 WI 63, ¶13, 291 Wis. 2d 11, 715

N.W.2d 195. Reasonableness in this context requires (1)

uniformity——the assessment must be fairly and equitably

apportioned among all affected properties; and (2) uniqueness——

the assessment on a particular property must be in proportion to

the benefits conferred. Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶¶20-21.

¶42 Multiple methods may be used to achieve uniformity.

Id., ¶21. The City's selected method must be fair and equitable

and produce an assessment in proportion to the benefits accruing

to the property. Berkvam v. City of Glendale, 79 Wis. 2d 279,
287, 255 N.W.2d 521 (1977). In examining uniqueness, the

circuit court must consider the degree, effect, and consequences

of the special benefits. Id. "Whether the facts relating to a

special assessment made pursuant to the police power fulfill the

'reasonableness' standard is a question of law . . . ."

Steinbach, 291 Wis. 2d 11, ¶11. A special assessment in

substantial excess of special benefits accruing to the property

is an unlawful taking without compensation. Wm. H. Heinemann

26
 No. 2016AP474

Creameries, 275 Wis. at 640-41 (citing Vill. of Norwood v.

Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 279 (1898)).

C. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist Regarding the
Validity of the Special Assessment Levied on CED's Property.
¶43 Having set forth the law governing the validity of

assessments, we now apply it to the City's assessment of CED's

property. CED argues the court of appeals erred in affirming

the circuit court's grant of summary judgment because CED

presented sufficient evidence demonstrating disputed issues of

material fact. The City responds that CED failed to overcome

the presumption of correctness and therefore summary judgment

was proper. In the case of a special assessment appeal, "where

the assessing body did consider what property would be benefited

by the improvement and assessed according to the amount of the

benefit . . . in the absence of evidence to the contrary there

is a conclusive presumption that the assessment was on the basis

of benefits actually accrued." Molbreak, 66 Wis. 2d at 696

(emphasis added) (first citing Hennessy v. Douglas Cty., 99 Wis.
129, 139, 74 N.W. 983 (1898); then citing Friedrich v.

Milwaukee, 118 Wis. 254, 256, 95 N.W. 126 (1903)). To overcome

this presumption on appeal to the circuit court,

the burden is on the objector to show either that:
(1) The statutory procedure was not followed, or
(2) that the assessment was not based on benefits, or
(3) that the assessing authority did not view the
premises to make such a determination, or (4) for the
objector to produce competent evidence that the
assessment is in error.

27
 No. 2016AP474

Id. Significantly, the presumption of correctness exists only

in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Molbreak, 66

Wis. 2d at 696.

¶44 CED contends the affidavit of its expert witness,

James C. Johnson, raises genuine issues of material fact

regarding whether the improvement plan was general or local,

whether the project conferred special benefits on CED's

property, and whether the assessment was reasonable. The City

dismisses the Johnson affidavit as insufficient to overcome the

presumption of correctness and asserts this matter is controlled

by Park Ave. Plaza, 308 Wis. 2d 439, in which the court of

appeals upheld a grant of summary judgment in favor of the City

because the new road project resulted in increased traffic flow.

We hold that CED overcame any presumption of correctness and

presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of

material fact regarding whether the improvement was general or

local and whether the project conferred special benefits on

CED's property. Resolution of these issues will determine
whether the circuit court reaches the reasonableness of the

assessment on remand.

¶45 With respect to the first issue, the City's Initial

Resolution Declaring Intent to Reassess CED's property declares

"[t]he purpose of the project is to reduce congestion at the

intersection, increase traffic safety, renew utilities and

enhance aesthetics." Generally, the City identifies the

sidewalk replacement and repair, concrete paving, new and re-
laid sewer laterals, concrete driveway approaches, and
28
 No. 2016AP474

streetscape/landscape improvements as providing local and

specific benefits to CED's property. The City also points to

the improved traffic flow, a substantial increase in

accessibility, and reduced congestion as local and specific

benefits.

¶46 In response, CED generally argues the roundabout was

constructed not to benefit nearby businesses, but for the

primary purpose of benefiting the traveling public.

Specifically, CED proffers Johnson's affidavit as evidence

contradicting the City's assertion of local benefits. In his

affidavit, Johnson denies the purpose of the roundabout was

local, points to a decreased value of CED's property as a result

of its construction, and opines that the project did not improve

the convenience of CED's property or its customers, noting the

safety issues created by the reconfiguration of the

intersection. CED also points to evidence indicating that

increased accessibility was not an effect of the reconstruction

project, citing testimony in the affidavit of the City's
Assistant Director of Public Works/City Engineer that "[t]he CED

property has the exact same access after completion of the

project as it did prior to the project. The driveway access is

in the same location. The driveway access has the same

configuration."

¶47 "[T]he inquiry into the nature of an improvement"——

that is, whether a special benefit is local or general——

"presents a question of fact." Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶2.
"What may be called a local improvement under one set of facts
29
 No. 2016AP474

may well constitute a general improvement in the context of

different facts." Duncan, 22 Wis. 2d at 265. On remand the

finder of fact must determine whether the purpose was to

accommodate CED's property in particular, along with the other

property owners, with the effect of conferring special benefits

on CED's property.

¶48 Whether a special benefit has been conferred is also a

question of fact. First State Bank, 366 Wis. 2d 219, ¶20

(citing Park Ave. Plaza, 308 Wis. 2d 439, ¶20). "Summary

judgment is improper if specific facts could support a finding

by a reasonable jury that a special benefit does not exist."

Id. In this case, the testimony of the City's expert witness

during the eminent domain proceeding regarding the absence of

special benefits, coupled with the comparable testimony of CED's

expert witness, who opined that "[t]here is absolutely no

benefit to [CED's property] let alone a special benefit" from

the improvement, contradict the City's position in the special

assessment proceeding. The existence or absence of a special
benefit presents a question for the factfinder to decide.

Hietpas, 24 Wis. 2d at 656.

¶49 Here, Johnson's affidavit contains evidence

contradicting the City's position; he insists the property

received no special benefits whatsoever. Johnson's affidavit

and appraisal assert that the placement of the roundabout

actually impairs rather than benefits CED's property for a

variety of reasons, including reduced congestion discouraging
impulse stops at fast food restaurants, the removal of
30
 No. 2016AP474

landscaping that obscured drive-thru traffic for diners inside,

and the lack of direct access to the property for traffic coming

from three directions, potentially causing unsafe lane changes

to access it. Johnson opines that the roundabout's construction

overall reduced the value of CED's property. The City disagrees

with Johnson's assessment and points out that the roundabout

improved traffic flow through the area, improved existing

sidewalks and landscaping, and made the area safer. In his

affidavit, Johnson refutes the notion that the landscaping on

the central island of the roundabout increases the value of

CED's property, noting that CED possesses no property rights in

landscaping, which could be changed at any time.

¶50 Johnson's affidavit "cuts to the heart of the matter

and creates a genuine issue of material fact" rendering summary

judgment inappropriate. Genrich, 268 Wis. 2d 233, ¶17. A

reasonable jury could find that CED's property received no

benefits at all from the reconfigured intersection or it could

find that CED received the exact same benefits as the public at
large. Park Ave. Plaza is distinguishable because the property

owner presented "nothing to rebut the City's conclusion that

commercial properties received special benefits." Id., ¶26.

Here, CED presented Johnson's evidentiary affidavit. Because

disputed issues of material fact must be resolved by the

factfinder, summary judgment was improper.

¶51 Additionally, CED contends that the assessment imposed

upon it was unreasonable because it was unfairly and inequitably
apportioned among similarly situated property owners. CED's
31
 No. 2016AP474

$40,103.03 assessment was twice as much as any other assessment.

The City responds that it performed a "per lineal foot"

assessment and justifies the higher assessment on CED's property

because it sits on the corner. Accordingly, it has footage on

both Murdock and Jackson Streets. While the reasonableness of

the assessment presents a question of law, the analysis depends

upon resolution of the first two issues. Because

"'[r]easonableness' turns on the totality of the facts and

circumstances" this issue "is not easily disposed of on summary

judgment." Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 2d 112, 122

n.3, 334 N.W.2d 580 (1983) (citation omitted). In this case,

the issue of reasonableness cannot be disposed of on summary

judgment because issues of fact related to the character of the

improvement and whether it conferred any special benefits on

CED's property must first be resolved. Specifically, the trier

of fact must determine what, if any, benefits CED's property

received in order to determine if the assessment is

proportionate to those benefits compared with the benefits
accruing to all benefited properties. Steinbach, 291

Wis. 2d 11, ¶20.

IV. CONCLUSION

¶52 The term "special benefits" means the same in both the

eminent domain statute, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(3), and the special

assessments statute, Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(1)(a): "uncommon

advantage." Under § 32.09(3), only those special benefits that

affect the market value of a property because of a planned
improvement must be considered and used to offset the
32
 No. 2016AP474

compensation owed to the owner of property taken for the

improvement. Section 66.0703(1) permits a municipality to levy

and collect a special assessment upon property for special

benefits conferred upon the property by an improvement,

regardless of the improvement's effect on the property's market

value. Because of this distinction, a governmental body's

failure to raise special benefits in the eminent domain action

does not foreclose its ability to levy and collect a special

assessment upon a property for special benefits conferred.

¶53 The circuit court improperly entered summary judgment

in the City's favor in light of CED's submission of evidence

challenging the validity of the special assessment, which showed

a genuine dispute regarding whether the improvement plan was

general or local and whether the project conferred special

benefits on CED. Each of these issues must be decided by the

trier of fact. If the factfinder on remand finds the

improvement was local and conferred a special benefit on CED's

property, the circuit court will then determine whether the
assessment was reasonable as a matter of law.

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is

reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.

33
 No. 2016AP474.ssa

¶54 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). The court

of appeals got it right. The majority errs.

¶55 I write separately to make two points.

¶56 First, the court of appeals (correctly) made clear

that although "'[s]pecial benefits' in the eminent domain

context and the special assessment context [are] similar in

definition, they are distinct and different considerations under

distinct and different governmental actions."1 The majority

recognizes that unlike in condemnation proceedings, "special

benefits" in eminent domain proceedings must affect the market

value of the property. Majority op., ¶33.

¶57 Second, the majority stumbles by failing to

acknowledge that CED has not overcome the presumption of

correctness of the City's actions and has not established a

genuine issue of material fact to overcome summary judgment.

¶58 I agree with Chief Judge Lisa Neubauer, who emphasized

these points in her concurrence in the court of appeals: "[CED]

has failed to show by 'strong . . . clear and positive proof'
that the $20,000 special assessments are not reasonable——given

that it is undisputed that improvements to the sidewalks, curb

and gutters, etc. have been made——and the reasonableness

analysis requires only that CED's property be 'benefited to some

extent' and that the amount of the assessment can exceed the

value of the special benefits."2
1
CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh, No. 2016AP474,
unpublished slip op., ¶24 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017).
2
CED Props., unpublished slip op., ¶29.

1
 No. 2016AP474.ssa

¶59 The City is entitled to summary judgment.

¶60 For these reasons, I dissent.

¶61 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH

BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion.

2
 No. 2016AP474.ssa

1