Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Thomas P. Wuensch

2018 WI 35

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2015AP175
COMPLETE TITLE: Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Thomas P. Wuensch,
Defendant-Appellant,
Heidi Wuensch,
Appellant.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(no cite)

OPINION FILED: April 17, 2018
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: October 2, 2017

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: La Crosse
JUDGE: Todd W. Bjerke

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED: A.W. BRADLEY, J., dissents, joined by
ABRAHAMSON, J. (opinion filed).
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Thomas C. Dill and BP Peterman Group, Brookfield;
Robert W. Brunner and Bryan Cave LLP, Chicago, Illinois; and
Kenneth Lee Marshall and Bryan Cave LLP, San Francisco,
California. There was an oral argument by Kenneth Lee Marshall.

For the defendant-appellant there was a brief filed by
Christa O. Westerberg, Susan M. Crawford, Aaron G. Dumas, and
Pines Bach LLP, Madison. There was an oral argument by Christa
O. Westerberg.
 2018 WI 35
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2015AP175
(L.C. No. 2009CV752)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company,

Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,

v.
FILED
Thomas P. Wuensch,
APR 17, 2018
Defendant-Appellant,
Shelia T. Reiff
Heidi Wuensch, Clerk of Supreme Court

Appellant.

REVIEW from a decision of the court of appeals. Reversed.

¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. This is a review of an

unpublished court of appeals summary disposition reversing the

La Crosse County Circuit Court's1 foreclosure judgment against

Thomas P. Wuensch in favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust

1
The Honorable Todd W. Bjerke presiding.
 No. 2015AP175

Company (Deutsche Bank).2 The circuit court admitted the

promissory note signed by Wuensch (the Note) into evidence when

offered by Deutsche Bank through its attorney, and permitted the

Bank to enforce the Note, ruling that the original Note,

endorsed in blank, was sufficient to establish possession. We

reverse the court of appeals' summary disposition3 and affirm the

circuit court's judgment of foreclosure.

¶2 The issue before this court is whether presentment by

a party's attorney of an original, wet-ink note endorsed in

blank is admissible evidence and enforceable against the

borrower without further proof that the holder had possession at

the time the foreclosure action was filed. To answer this

question, we must determine the evidence necessary to prove that

an entity seeking to enforce a note against a borrower has the

right to do so. We hold that presentment to the trier of fact

in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding of the original, wet-ink

note endorsed in blank, establishes the holder's possession and

entitles the holder to enforce the note.

2
Deutsche Bank's full title in this action is "Deutsche
Bank National Trust Company as Trustee for American Home
Mortgage Assets Trust 2007-2 Mortgage-Backed Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2007-2, by American Home Mortgage Servicing
Inc., its attorney-in-fact."
3
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wuensch, No. 2015AP175,
unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2016).

2
 No. 2015AP175

I. BACKGROUND

¶3 In December 2006, Wuensch signed an adjustable rate

Note issued by HLB Mortgage for $301,500. Wuensch secured the

Note with a mortgage he executed in favor of the mortgagee,

Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems, Inc. as nominee for

HLB Mortgage, the lender. By the time this action was filed,

HLB had transferred the Note to American Home Mortgage

Servicing, Inc. (AHM),4 HLB's parent entity, and AHM had endorsed

the Note in blank.

¶4 It is uncontested that in February 2008, Wuensch

defaulted. He failed to make any payment on the Note after

February 2008 and has remained in default through the pendency

of this foreclosure action. The events surrounding the default

underlie the circuit court's ruling that "equity dictates that

Wuensch be allowed one last opportunity to cure his default,

because his default on the Note may have been caused by the

actions of the preceding Note holders." They also color

Wuensch's arguments on the primary issue regarding whether
Deutsche Bank in fact possessed the original Note.

¶5 Wuensch's Note required him to remain current on all

property taxes by paying into an escrow account serviced by the

lender, which would pay his property taxes directly from the

escrow account. His promised monthly mortgage payment, due the

4
By the time the case was before the circuit court, AHM had
changed its name to Homeward Residential, and subsequently
merged with or was purchased by Ocwen Financial Services, the
current servicer of the Note.

3
 No. 2015AP175

first of each month, totaled $1,487.68, consisting of $1,210.98

for the Note itself, plus $276.70, which went into escrow to

cover property taxes.5 In August 2007, although Wuensch was

current on his mortgage payments, he received notice from the

Town of Onalaska that his property taxes had not been paid.

Around this time, Wuensch learned that AHM, then in possession

of his Note, had filed for bankruptcy earlier in the month.

¶6 In a letter dated February 23, 2008, AHM informed

Wuensch it had not received his February mortgage payment.

Wuensch claimed he had submitted payment via Western Union on

February 15, 2008. Wuensch's attempts to resolve the February

payment issue were unsuccessful. Allegedly based on the

recommendation of an AHM employee, Wuensch stopped making

payments on the Note altogether. As a result, AHM sent Wuensch

notice of acceleration dated March 4, 2008, indicating that he

was in default and owed $2,355.89, which had become due on or

after February 1, 2008. Regardless of why Wuensch stopped

making payments, there is no dispute that AHM never received any
mortgage payments from Wuensch after February 15, 2008.

¶7 Deutsche Bank filed this foreclosure action against

Wuensch in August 2009, attaching a copy of the Note to the

complaint. It elected to proceed to foreclosure under Wis.

Stat. § 846.101 (2013-14), waiving any deficiency judgment

against Wuensch, and consenting to Wuensch's continued occupancy

5
The moneys held in the escrow account also covered hazard
insurance and other costs and fees.

4
 No. 2015AP175

of the property until the circuit court entered confirmation of

a sale.6

¶8 Deutsche Bank claimed to be the "lawful holder of said

note and mortgage." During the life of the loan, Wuensch's Note

and mortgage were transferred multiple times, ultimately landing

with Deutsche Bank on August 4, 2009. Because of the nature of

a note endorsed in blank, precisely how Deutsche Bank came into

physical possession of the Note is not relevant. For purposes

of enforcing the Note, it is enough that Deutsche Bank was in

possession of the original Note at trial, a copy of which was

attached to the complaint.

¶9 In his answer, Wuensch denied that Deutsche Bank was a

holder entitled to enforce the Note and denied that any payments

were past due. Wuensch also asserted the following affirmative

defenses: material misrepresentation, laches, estoppel, lack of

standing, improper joinder of parties, and lack of note. In an

amended answer, Wuensch also alleged fraud and unclean hands by

Deutsche Bank and again asserted that the Bank lacked the
ability to foreclose.

¶10 Pretrial proceedings continued for five years before

the case finally came before the circuit court for a bench

trial. In May 2014, Deutsche Bank's attorney presented the

original, wet-ink Note to the circuit court to inspect and asked

the circuit court to admit into evidence a copy of the Note as a

6
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.

5
 No. 2015AP175

self-authenticating, "non-hearsay instrument . . . offered for

its legal significance, not to prove the truth of the matter

asserted."7 Wuensch's counsel objected on the bases of hearsay

and lack of personal knowledge on the part of Deutsch Bank's

counsel, while also asserting that Deutsche Bank's counsel was

impermissibly acting as a witness. The circuit court overruled

these objections and after inspecting the Note, observed:

THE COURT: When I looked at the document purporting
to be an original, looks like original ink on
signatures and appears to be the same as what has now
been marked as a copy Exhibit 1 . . . .

. . . .

It will be admitted.
The circuit court then concluded that "plaintiff is, in my mind,

the holder in due course of a note endorsed in blank and they

can proceed on it." Wuensch's counsel objected to the admission

of the Note and questioned the validity of the signatures on and

the assignment of the instrument, arguing that there were "no

indentations on the initials" and "the assignments of the

mortgage are relevant because of the false nature of them." The

circuit court responded, "the law is pretty clear that somebody

that is holding a note endorsed in blank has the right to seek

foreclosure of such a document" and that it did not think "the

assignments were relevant when there's a note endorsed in

blank."

7
Deutsche Bank's counsel also moved to admit the mortgage,
to which Wuensch's counsel made no objection.

6
 No. 2015AP175

¶11 Deutsche Bank called one witness at trial, Rasheed

Blanchard, a loan analyst from Ocwen Financial Corporation, the

entity that serviced the loan. He testified as to Wuensch's

payment history and the processes by which Ocwen serviced the

loan.

¶12 Wuensch testified regarding the difficulty he had

contacting AHM to resolve the 2007 property tax issue, the

payment history leading up to his default, and the events that

followed his default. He also claimed that the Note presented

by Deutsche Bank did not contain his original, wet-ink

signature.

¶13 In December 2014, the circuit court issued findings of

fact and conclusions of law in its judgment and order. It

determined that Deutsche Bank "is entitled to a judgment of

foreclosure of the Defendant's mortgage." It found Deutsche

Bank:

is the holder of the original Note, endorsed in blank.
The Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has in its
possession the original ink Note. The Plaintiff
produced the original Note at trial and the Court
examined it. The Court is satisfied that it is the
original Note executed by Wuensch on December 18,
2006. Exhibit 1 is a true and accurate copy of the
original ink Note.

7
 No. 2015AP175

It further found Wuensch was in default on the Note in the

principal amount of $315,233.64.8

¶14 The circuit court concluded that Wuensch's arguments

regarding allegedly fraudulent practices associated with

mortgage-backed securities comprised of pooled mortgages such as

his own were "beyond the scope of this case." Relying on Dow

Family, LLC v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 2014 WI 56, ¶21, 354 Wis. 2d

796, 848 N.W.2d 728, the circuit court ruled that "[u]nder the

doctrine of equitable assignment, a mortgage automatically

follows the assignment of the note." The circuit court applied

the Dow Family holding that "security for a note is equitably

assigned upon transfer of the note, without need for a written

assignment." Pivotally, the circuit court held that "[t]he

holder of an original note endorsed in blank has the right to

enforce the note"; therefore, Deutsche Bank had standing to

bring the foreclosure action against Wuensch.

¶15 The circuit court, however, exercised its equitable

authority to delay entry of the foreclosure judgment and permit
Wuensch the opportunity to return to the position he occupied

prior to the default event of February 2008. It explained:

8
The principal amount for which Wuensch was found liable
exceeds the original principal amount in the Note because the
Note provided for changes in the interest rate and the monthly
payment, resulting in the amount of Wuensch’s monthly payment
not fully paying accrued interest. In the Note, Wuensch agreed
"THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT I MUST REPAY COULD BE LARGER THAN THE
AMOUNT I ORIGINALLY BORROWED" but the Note capped the principal
amount at not more than 110% of the original amount.

8
 No. 2015AP175

Even if the Plaintiff is without blame for the
problems with Wuensch's mortgage, the same cannot be
said about the preceding holders of his Note.
Although the question of whether Wuensch's Note was
fraudulently passed between creditors before it came
into the Plaintiff's possession is beyond the scope of
this case, the Court is convinced that the seemingly
unregulated transferring of mortgages during the
housing bubble and crash contributed to Wuensch
finding himself in this position.
Accordingly, the circuit court stayed entry of the judgment

until January 24, 2015, to allow Wuensch to cure the default by

paying Deutsche Bank $347,826.03——the sum of the unpaid

principal, plus expenses paid by Deutsche Bank for property

taxes, hazard insurance, and other costs and fees. If Wuensch

did not pay that amount by January 24th, the circuit court would

enter judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank for the

entire amount sought——totaling $455,641.85.

¶16 Wuensch appealed in September 2015 and the court of

appeals summarily reversed the judgment of foreclosure.

Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wuensch, No. 2015AP175,

unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2016). Wuensch argued

the circuit court lacked a factual basis to enter judgment of

foreclosure against him because Deutsche Bank did not prove it

was the holder of the original Note entitled to enforce it. Id.

at 4. He contended that Deutsche Bank was required to present

evidence not only that the purported original Note was in fact

the original Note, but also that Deutsche Bank's counsel had

obtained the Note from the Bank. Id. Wuensch insisted that

possession alone of the purported original Note endorsed in
blank was not enough to prove possession. Id.

9
 No. 2015AP175

¶17 The court of appeals agreed. It held that Wuensch's

pleadings and his objections as to authenticity and possession

at trial placed "possession of the original note in dispute, and

there is no dispute that this was an issue that the plaintiff

had to prove at trial." Id. Citing Wis. Stat. §§ 906.02 ("A

witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is

introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has

personal knowledge of the matter."), 906.03(1) ("which provides

that a witness must take an oath before testifying"), and

901.04(2) ("a judge is to make preliminary determinations on the

qualifications of a person to be a witness"), the court of

appeals held as "axiomatic" the rule "that 'unsworn statements'

have 'no proper place' as substitutes for evidence in a trial."

Id. at 5 (citations omitted). The court of appeals recognized

the "difficulties" the Bank's counsel would have encountered had

he attempted to testify as to his personal knowledge surrounding

the Note and its possession. Id. at 5. Nevertheless, the court

of appeals held that the Bank was required to present testimony
from a witness with personal knowledge who could verify

possession of the Note by the Bank up to the moment Deutsche

Bank's attorney presented the Note to the circuit court. Id. at

6-7.

¶18 Acknowledging that the "mandate reversing the judgment

of foreclosure in this action may appear at first blush to

elevate form over substance and to produce a highly inefficient

result," the court of appeals nonetheless persisted in holding
that possession by the Bank's counsel would not suffice to prove
10
 No. 2015AP175

possession by the Bank itself or the concomitant right to

enforce the Note endorsed in blank. Id. at 8. Deutsche Bank

filed a petition for review, which this court granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶19 "Our review requires us to construe a statute and

apply it to the facts of the case." Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT,

2006 WI 62, ¶4, 291 Wis. 2d 80, 715 N.W.2d 213. Ordinarily, a

circuit court's "[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside

unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the

opportunity of the [circuit] court to judge the credibility of

the witnesses." Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). Furthermore, "the

decision whether to admit evidence is within the circuit court's

discretion." State v. Zamzow, 2017 WI 29, ¶10, 374 Wis. 2d 220,

892 N.W.2d 637 (citing State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, ¶17, 361 Wis.

2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 501 (2017).

However, the application of a statute to the facts of a case is

a question of law this court reviews de novo, although the court

benefits from the analyses of the circuit court and court of
appeals. Warehouse II, 291 Wis. 2d 80, ¶4 (first citing State

v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315; and

then citing State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663

N.W.2d 700).

III. DISCUSION

¶20 In mortgage foreclosure actions, the plaintiff has the

burden of proving the terms of indebtedness secured by a

mortgage. Mitchell Bank v. Schanke, 2004 WI 13, ¶32, 268 Wis.
2d 571, 676 N.W.2d 849 (citing Doyon & Rayne Lumber Co. v.
11
 No. 2015AP175

Nichols, 196 Wis. 387, 390, 220 N.W. 181 (1928)) (noting the

"requirement that the mortgagee prove the existence of debt in

order to foreclose on the mortgage, as a mortgage cannot exist

without a debt"); see PNC Bank, N.A. v. Bierbrauer, 2013 WI App

11, ¶10, 346 Wis. 2d 1, 827 N.W.2d 124. This includes verifying

that foreclosure proceedings are maintained by the party with

the right to enforce the note, a requirement that is not a mere

formality. See Bierbrauer, 346 Wis. 2d 1, ¶10. It is in fact a

foundational precondition for any foreclosure action, protecting

borrowers from wrongful loss of their homes, affording lenders a

procedure for enforcing notes, and providing certainty

surrounding property rights in mortgages. See, e.g., David A.

Dana, Why Mortgage "Formalities" Matter, 24 Loy. Consumer L.

Rev. 505, 507-08 (2012); Elizabeth Renuart, Uneasy

Intersections: The Right to Foreclose and the U.C.C., 48 Wake

Forest L. Rev. 1205, 1212 (2013); Adam J. Levitin, The Paper

Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of

Mortgage Title, 63 Duke L.J. 637, 648 (2013).
¶21 In ascertaining who has the right to enforce a note,

we begin with the language of the relevant statutes, a step the

court of appeals mostly relegated to footnotes. State ex rel.

Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271

Wis. 2d 633, 663, 681 N.W.2d 110. Article 3 of the Uniform

Commercial Code (U.C.C.), codified in Wisconsin at ch. 403 in

12
 No. 2015AP175

1995, provides that where a note is negotiable,9 it may be

enforced by a "holder." Wis. Stat. § 403.301. A "holder," as

relevant here, includes "the person in possession of a

negotiable instrument that is payable . . . to bearer." Wis.

Stat. § 401.201(2)(km)1. A "bearer" includes a person in

possession of an instrument endorsed in blank. Wis. Stat.

§ 401.201(2)(cm). "If endorsed in blank, an instrument becomes

payable to bearer," and can be "negotiated by transfer of

possession alone."10 Wis. Stat. § 403.205(2); Bierbrauer, 346

Wis. 2d 1, ¶12.

9
A note is a negotiable instrument, defined as "an
unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money,
with or without interest or other charges," provided that all of
the following apply:

(1) The note "is payable to the bearer or to order at the
time that it is issued or first comes into possession of a
holder."

(2) The note "is payable on demand or at a definite time."

(3) "It does not state any other undertaking or instruction
by" the borrower or lender (subject to a few, inapplicable
exceptions).

Wis. Stat. § 403.104(1) (2013-14). The Note at issue here is
unquestionably a negotiable instrument.
10
A blank endorsement, or an endorsement in blank, is
"[o]ne made by the mere writing of the indorser's name on the
back of the note or bill, without mention of the name of any
person in whose favor the indorsement is made, but with the
implied understanding that any lawful holder may fill in his own
name above the indorsement if he so chooses." Black's Law
Dictionary 774 (6th ed. 1990) (also spelled "indorsement").

13
 No. 2015AP175

¶22 Wuensch makes a variety of arguments undercut by a

plain reading of the statutes and application of relevant case

law. First, Wuensch argues that Deutsche Bank is not a

"holder." He asserts that self-authentication is not equivalent

to showing physical possession. He also insists that physical

possession of the original Note by Deutsche Bank's trial counsel

does not make the Bank a "bearer" and that "unsworn statements"

by trial counsel were insufficient to prove possession by

Deutsche Bank.

¶23 We reject Wuensch's arguments and uphold the circuit

court's admission of a copy of the original Note into evidence

based upon the court's inspection of the original Note and its

self-authentication. The circuit court compared the Note and

the copy side-by-side, observed that the copy was identical to

the original, and admitted the copy into evidence.11 Wisconsin

Stat. § 909.015(3) permits the trier of fact to compare

specimens that have been authenticated, and Wis. Stat.

§ 909.02(9) provides that commercial paper is self-
authenticating under chs. 401-411. Because the circuit court

admitted the copy of the self-authenticating Note based upon a

proper application of the law, its exercise of discretion was

not erroneous.

11
We note Wis. Stat. § 910.03 provides that "[a] duplicate
is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a
genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the
original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit
the duplicate in lieu of the original."

14
 No. 2015AP175

¶24 As a preliminary matter, we conclude that a person who

possesses an original note endorsed in blank is the "holder" of

that note. The "holder" is a person entitled to enforce the

note. Wis. Stat. § 403.301. As Deutsche Bank's counsel

physically possessed the original Note on his client's behalf at

trial, § 403.301 is satisfied. This rule alone resolves the

issue in favor of Deutsche Bank.

¶25 The rule that possession of an original note endorsed

in blank confers a right to enforce the note is not a new

concept or even one originating in the U.C.C. Deutsche Bank

accurately explains in its briefing that the principle traces

back to Lord Mansfield and took root in American common law as

15
 No. 2015AP175

early as 1895.12 See Miller v. Race (1758), 97 Eng. Rep. 398; 1

Burr. 452 (Lord Mansfield) (KB) ("bank notes are paid by and

received of the holder or possessor of them, as cash; and that

12
William Murray, Earl of Mansfield, served as Chief
Justice on the Court of King's Bench, the highest common law
court in England, from 1756 to 1788. Bernard L. Shientag, Lord
Mansfield Revisited——A Modern Assessment, 10 Fordham L. Rev.
345, 348-49 (1941). While the basic principles of negotiability
and the enforcement of notes endorsed in blank were established
prior to Lord Mansfield's tenure as Chief Justice, the holdings
in Miller v. Race and its progeny were revolutionary in setting
the course for modern doctrines on negotiable instruments.
Edward L. Rubin, Learning from Lord Mansfield: Toward A
Transferability Law for Modern Commercial Practice, 31 Idaho L.
Rev. 775, 778 (1995). For example, they informed Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England, which defined a "promissory
note" as "a plain and direct engagement in writing, to pay a sum
specified at the time therein limited to a person therein named,
or sometimes to his order, or often to the bearer at large." 2
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 467
(Oxford 1766) (emphasis added); see also W. S. Holdsworth,
Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10-11
(1929) ("Blackstone owed much to Lord Mansfield. . . . [W]e can
see that in [Blackstone's] treatment of commercial law . . . as
well as in his treatment of equity, he accepted and incorporated
into his book the reasoning and the results of the decisions of
Lord Mansfield . . . ." (footnotes omitted)). In the United
States, these early cases also eventually led to codification in
every state of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the
precursor to the U.C.C. See, e.g., § 2675-9, ch. 356, Wis. Laws
of 1899 ("The instrument is payable to bearer . . . [w]hen the
only or last indorsement is an indorsement in blank."); see also
Mark B. Greenlee & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Reconsidering the
Application of the Holder in Due Course Rule to Home Mortgage
Notes, 41 Unif. Com. Code L.J. 225 (2009). While a promissory
note is no longer transferred as readily as cash, "the
underlying purpose of negotiability——facilitating the transfer
of debt instruments——remains relevant." See Rubin, supra, at
796. Wisconsin Stat. §§ 403.301 and 403.205(2), which permit
the transfer of promissory notes endorsed in blank, likewise aid
in the transferability of debt instruments.

16
 No. 2015AP175

in the usual way of negotiating bank notes, they pass from one

person to another as cash, by delivery only and without any

further inquiry or evidence of title, than what arises from the

possession."); Dawson Town & Gas Co. v. Woodhull, 67 F. 451, 452

(8th Cir. 1895) ("When these notes were offered, they were in

the hands of the plaintiff's attorneys. The legal presumption

was that they had received them from the hands of their

client . . . ."); see also Peacock v. Rhodes (1781), 99 Eng.

Rep. 402, 403; 2 Doug. 633, 636 (Lord Mansfield) (KB) ("I see no

difference between a note indorsed blank, and one payable to

bearer. They both go by delivery, and possession proves

property in both cases."). Wuensch argues that these cases are

"inapposite" and outmoded. We disagree. Although the cases are

not controlling authority, the principles derived from them

persuasively inform the interpretation of Wisconsin's U.C.C.,

which has not displaced them. Wis. Stat. § 401.103(2) ("Unless

displaced by the particular provisions of chs. 401 to 411, the

principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its
provisions."); Met-Al, Inc. v. Hansen Storage Co., 844 F. Supp.

485, 489 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ("[P]re-Code case law is available to

aid in interpretation of the UCC unless violative of its

specific provisions.").

¶26 This rule is as widely supported today as it has been

historically. See, e.g., Dow Family, 350 Wis. 2d 411, ¶¶15, 24

(relying on ch. 403 to define the right to enforce a note: "if

an instrument is endorsed in blank, it becomes payable to the
bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession
17
 No. 2015AP175

alone. . . . Without the original note, or a properly

authenticated copy, there is no showing that [mortgage

corporation] is entitled to enforce the note as the party in

possession of a note endorsed in blank." (citing Mitchell Bank,

676 N.W.2d at 849)); Rodger v. Bliss, 130 Misc. 168, 169 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct. 1927) ("The notes were presented by the plaintiff in

open court . . . . They were negotiable instruments and their

possession was prima facie evidence of ownership." (citations

omitted)); Schmoldt v. Chi. Stone Setting Co., 33 N.E.2d 182,

183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1941) ("The production of the note by

plaintiff was prima facie evidence of his ownership"); In re

Foreclosure of a Deed of Trust Executed by Rawls, 777 S.E.2d

796, 799-800 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) ("[n]egotiable instruments

like mortgage notes that are endorsed in blank may be freely

transferred. And once transferred, the old adage about

possession being nine-tenths of the law is, if anything, an

understatement. Whoever possesses an instrument endorsed in

blank has full power to enforce it." (quoting Horvath v. Bank of
New York, N.A., 641 F.3d 617, 621 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in

original))). However, the 2008 financial crisis precipitated

inconsistent judicial application of a previously longstanding

rule.13 Renuart, supra ¶20, at 1241 ("The connection between the

13
Wisconsin has not been immune to this dissonance and the
court of appeals has issued numerous discordant opinions in the
years following the financial crisis addressing the precise
issue before this court. See, e.g., Bank of New York Mellon v.
Harrop, No. 2014AP2200, unpublished slip op., ¶¶ 8, 15 (Wis. Ct.
App. Mar. 31, 2016) (per curiam) (contradicting its holding in
(continued)
18
 No. 2015AP175

right to foreclose and the U.C.C. is one of the most common

issues faced by courts over the last five years due primarily to

the mishandling of the notes and mortgages and the foreclosing

party's response to the lack of proper documentation."). In

2011, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial

Code issued a report addressing "[r]ecent economic developments

the instant case when it ruled the Bank could enforce the note
against Harrop based on presentment of "the original Note" with
the debtor's signature "in original pen ink" and admission of a
copy into evidence; the court of appeals upheld the circuit
court's finding that "the fact that . . . counsel is
representing the [Bank] in this case, has the note physically in
his possession, is enough to establish that the note is in
possession of the [Bank]."); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Minkov, No.
2012AP2643, unpublished slip op., ¶18 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 8,
2013) ("Under this principle, because the note is endorsed in
blank, Bank of America is entitled to enforce the note if indeed
it possesses the note. However, as discussed above, Bank of
America has failed to identify any evidence in the record that
it possesses the original note. Therefore, it has not made a
prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment."
(Emphasis added.)); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Kolodziej, No. 2010AP60,
unpublished slip op., ¶28 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2011)
("Because PHH's submissions do not provide authentication for
the mortgage assignment and for the endorsed note, its
submissions do not make a prima facie showing that it is the
holder of the mortgage and note.").

The Wisconsin appellate court system functions fairly and
efficiently only if the court of appeals fulfills its
responsibility to publish opinions according to Wis. Stat.
§ (Rule) 809.23(1). The court of appeals, in particular
district IV with respect to the very issue presented here, has
been issuing unpublished opinions, per curiam opinions, or
summary disposition decisions even when the issue satisfies the
criteria for publication. This not only deprives the bench and
bar of important guidance on legal issues of substantial and
continuing public interest, it risks inconsistent disposition of
cases across Wisconsin.

19
 No. 2015AP175

[that] have brought to the forefront complex legal issues about

the enforcement and collection of mortgage debt."14

Specifically, the board addressed the situation where "the party

to whom a note is payable may be changed by indorsement." The

board offered the following illustration mirroring the instant

case:

Maker issued a negotiable mortgage note payable to the
order of Payee. Payee indorsed the note in blank and
gave possession of it to Transferee. Transferee is
the holder of the note and, therefore, is the person
entitled to enforce it. UCC §§ 1-201(b)(21)(A), 3-
301(i).[15]
¶27 As applied here, Wuensch was the maker and issued the

original Note to the order of HLB Mortgage, the payee. HLB

Mortgage subsequently endorsed the Note to AHM, also the payee,

which then endorsed the Note in blank. At this point, the Note

became enforceable upon transfer by the party in possession.

See Dow Family, 350 Wis. 2d 411, ¶17 n.6. When Deutsche Bank

took possession of the Note before trial, it mirrored the

position of the illustration's transferee. Thus, physical

possession of the original Note, endorsed in blank, by Deutsche

14
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code, Report: Application of the Uniform Commercial Code to
Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes 1 (2011).
15
This report largely reflects in form and function the
official comments to the U.C.C. While this report and its
illustrations are not law, we find them to be persuasive
authority. See, e.g., Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., Inc., 107
Wis. 2d 510, 523–24, 319 N.W.2d 855 (1982); State v. Eugenio,
210 Wis. 2d 347, 352, 565 N.W.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1997), aff'd, 219
Wis. 2d 391, 579 N.W.2d 642 (1998).

20
 No. 2015AP175

Bank's attorney at trial was sufficient evidence to support the

circuit court's conclusion that Deutsche Bank was the holder of

the Note, enabling the Bank to enforce it. Rawls, 777 S.E.2d at

800.

¶28 Second, possession of the original Note by Deutsche

Bank's trial counsel in his capacity as legal representative of

the Bank does not impair the Bank's status as bearer. When

trial counsel presented the original Note to the circuit court,

he was not acting to enforce the Note himself of course, but on

behalf of his client. Dawson Town & Gas Co. v. Woodhull, 67 F.

451, 452 (8th Cir. 1895) ("When the notes were offered, they

were in the hands of the plaintiff's attorneys. The legal

presumption was that they had received them from the hands of

their client . . . ."); see also U.C.C. § 3-420 cmt. 1 (Am. Law

Inst. & Unif. Law Comm'n 2013-14) ("Delivery to an agent [of the

payee] is delivery to the payee.").16 On this issue, we find

particularly persuasive In re Hernandez, No. 13-04735-8-SWH,

slip op., at 5 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 24, 2014), in which a
bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of North Carolina

concluded that in presenting an original note during court

proceedings in order to establish the client's possession

thereof, an attorney acts as an agent for the holder:

At the hearing . . . counsel for [petitioner]
presented the original Note with a blank endorsement.
While [petitioner's counsel] was in actual possession
of the Note, he was acting as attorney, agent and
16
See supra note 15.

21
 No. 2015AP175

proxy for [petitioner] and it is clear from the
court's examination of the Note that it was the
original document clearly in the possession of
[petitioner]. . . .
Because one underlying purpose of Wisconsin's U.C.C. is "[t]o

make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions," Wis.

Stat. § 401.103(1)(c), Wisconsin courts "give substantial weight

to cases from other jurisdictions" when resolving issues that

arise under that code. Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee,

N.A., 217 Wis. 2d 565, 577, 579 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1998).

¶29 The court of appeals erred in concluding that Deutsche

Bank was required to prove "the document in the plaintiff's

counsel's hands in fact came from his client and not from some

other person or entity." Deutsche Bank, No. 2015AP175, at 7.

The U.C.C. requires nothing more than presentment of the

original wet-ink note endorsed in blank in order to enforce it,

and presentment to the circuit court at trial may be

accomplished through the holder's attorney without the need for

testimony regarding how the holder came to possess the note.

¶30 Further, trial counsel did not issue "unsworn

statements" when he presented the original Note and the copy to

the circuit court for inspection. An attorney presenting self-

authenticating evidence to the trier of fact on behalf of his

client is not acting in the same capacity as a witness

22
 No. 2015AP175

delivering testimonial evidence.17 Thus, the court of appeals'

holding that "[t]he plaintiff was obligated to prove, under the

rules of evidence, that the document in the plaintiff's

counsel's hands in fact came from his client and not from some

other person or entity" is patently wrong. Id. (emphasis

added). Such testimony is entirely unnecessary where, as here,

no extrinsic evidence was needed to admit the Note, Wis. Stat.

§ 909.02(9), and no testimony was needed to explain the

circumstances of Deutsche Bank's possession; rather, the Bank

had the right to enforce the Note endorsed in blank solely by

virtue of its possession of the original Note. Trial counsel

was merely acting in the ordinary course of his representation

of Deutsche Bank when he offered the original Note to the

circuit court for inspection and the copy of the Note for

admission into evidence.

17
We can find no Wisconsin law directly stating this point,
which comes as no surprise because "[t]he proposition is so
apparent on its face that it is difficult to find legal citation
to support it." State v. Groppi, 41 Wis. 2d 312, 323, 164
N.W.2d 266 (1969), vacated on other grounds, 400 U.S. 505
(1971). "Lawyers routinely make assertions of procedural and
process facts and provide background information to
judges . . . . Lawyers do not need to be sworn when asserting
these process and background facts because they have an ethical
obligation not to make false statements of fact or law to the
judge." Judith A. McMorrow, The Advocate as Witness:
Understanding Context, Culture and Client, 70 Fordham L. Rev.
945, 946 (2001) (footnotes omitted); see also SCR 20:3.3(a)(1)
("A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of
fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct false statement of
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer.").

23
 No. 2015AP175

¶31 Finally, the nature of the original Note as self-

authenticating commercial paper under Wis. Stat. § 909.02(9) is

entirely independent of the issue of possession. Despite the

fact that § 909.02(9) definitively answers the question, Wuensch

argues that a trier of fact would need to determine the

authenticity of the Note. However, "[e]xtrinsic evidence of

authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not

required with respect to . . . [c]ommercial paper, signatures

thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided

by chs. 401 to 411." Wis. Stat. § 909.02(9). Among its

findings of fact, the circuit court was "satisfied that the

Plaintiff has in its possession the original ink Note. The

Plaintiff produced the original ink Note at trial and the Court

examined it. The Court is satisfied that it is the original

Note. . . ." The circuit court was the trier of fact in this

case, its personal examination is supported by Wis. Stat.

§ 909.015(3), and its findings are not clearly erroneous.

¶32 Wuensch suggests that admission of the copy into
evidence itself is problematic. He urges us to consider Dow

Family, 350 Wis. 2d 411, but ultimately misconstrues its

holding. In Dow Family, the court of appeals held that a copy

of an original note is insufficient evidence of possession and

was inadmissible in absence of the original wet-ink note. Id.,

¶20. The court of appeals held that Wis. Stat. § 909.01

requires "a document [to] be authenticated in order to be

admissible." Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals considered
the copy of the note alone insufficient to support
24
 No. 2015AP175

authentication and admission into evidence. Id., ¶21-22.

Although under Wis. Stat. § 909.02(9) "[e]xtrinsic evidence of

authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not

required with respect to . . . [c]ommercial paper, signatures

thereon, and documents relating thereto to the extent provided

by chs. 401 to 411," in Dow Family, the plaintiff was unable to

"explain the extent to which a copy of a note is self

authenticating . . . ." 350 Wis. 2d 411, ¶22 (emphasis added).

Most relevantly, the court of appeals reasoned that because "the

original note's whereabouts were unknown to [the plaintiff],"

this, along with other evidence, suggested that Fannie Mae,

rather than the plaintiff, was actually in possession of the

original note. Id., ¶23.

¶33 The facts in the instant case are distinguishable.

Whereas in Dow Family the original note was unavailable for

court inspection, Deutsche Bank's trial counsel actually

presented the original Note for inspection and comparison

against the copy. After examining the copy and the original
side-by-side, the circuit court found the Note presented by

Deutsche Bank's trial counsel to be the original Note and

accordingly admitted a copy into evidence. In finding that the

Note was what Deutsche Bank's trial counsel purported it to be,

a "non-hearsay instrument . . . offered for its legal

25
 No. 2015AP175

significance, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted,"

the circuit court properly admitted the copy into evidence.18

IV. CONCLUSION

¶34 We reject the court of appeals' legal conclusions

because they disregard the plain meaning of the applicable

U.C.C. provisions and impose evidentiary hurdles with no legal

foundation. Affirming longstanding principles governing

negotiable instruments, we hold that presentment to the trier of

fact in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding of the original, wet-

ink note endorsed in blank, establishes the holder's possession

and entitles the holder to enforce the note. We reverse the

summary disposition order of the court of appeals and uphold the

circuit court's judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche

Bank.

18
Because we uphold the judgment of the circuit court in
concluding Deutsche Bank may enforce the Note against Wuensch,
we need not reach Deutsche Bank's secondary argument that we
should remand this case for Deutsche Bank to present additional
testimony regarding its possession of the original Note.

This conclusion is also dispositive of Wuensch's secondary
argument that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion when it allowed Deutsche Bank an equitable remedy
despite its predecessor-in-interests' "unclean hands." While
the primary issue is dispositive, we note that the circuit court
considered AHM's actions in fashioning its remedy for Deutsche
Bank while also considering that Wuensch was (and remains) in
default as of February 2008. Because we uphold the circuit
court's judgment of foreclosure in favor of Deutsche Bank, which
factored Wuensch's claim of unclean hands into its equitable
remedy for Deutsch Bank, we need not consider Wuensch's
arguments regarding unclean hands further.

26
 No. 2015AP175

By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is

reversed.

27
 No. 2015AP175.awb

¶35 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). I agree with

the court of appeals that "the rules of evidence may not be

sidestepped based on the common sense expectation that the

particular entity seeking to enforce a note is generally going

to be the entity legally entitled to enforce the note."

Deutsche Bank Nat'l. Tr. Co. v. Wuensch, No. 2015AP175,

unpublished order at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2016).

¶36 The precepts that govern the admissibility of evidence

at trial do not rest merely on a particular person's idea of

common sense. Rather they rest on the rule of law. The rules

of evidence have been hued over centuries so "that the truth may

be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Wis. Stat.

§ 901.02. Indeed, the rules of evidence stand as both a

safeguard and cornerstone for the fair administration of

justice.

¶37 The presentation of admissible evidence is carefully

circumscribed. There are only four pathways for the

introduction of admissible evidence. See Wis JI——Civil 50
(2014). Given that "possession" is the essential question here,

even a cursory review of the record reveals that no evidence was

presented bearing on that issue:

 Evidence is the sworn testimony of witnesses——no sworn

testimony on possession was presented.

 Evidence is deposition testimony presented at trial——

no deposition testimony on possession was presented.

 Evidence is exhibits admitted by the court——no
exhibits addressing possession were admitted.

1
 No. 2015AP175.awb

 Evidence is agreements, stipulations, or facts the

court directs the jury to find——there are no

agreements or stipulations that Deutsche Bank holds

the Note and its possession is not subject to judicial

notice.1

¶38 Disregarding the evidentiary rules, the majority

allows an attorney to introduce dispositive facts through

unsworn statements and without calling a witness. Because I

determine that Deutsche Bank's end run around the evidentiary

rules is impermissible, I respectfully dissent.

I

¶39 The majority initially states that "[t]he issue before

this court is whether presentment by a party's attorney of an

original, wet-ink note endorsed in blank is admissible evidence

and enforceable against the borrower without further proof that

the holder had possession at the time the foreclosure action was

filed." Majority op., ¶2 (emphasis added). Yet, it is unclear

what the majority considers the issue to be. Without even
attempting to answer the question as initially presented, it

jettisons this question and focuses instead on possession at the

time of trial. Which is it?

1
A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact
that is "not subject to reasonable dispute" in that it is
"generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court" or "capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned." Wis. Stat. § 902.01(2). Deutsche Bank's
possession of the Note is not subject to judicial notice. Not
only is it subject to reasonable dispute, but it is in fact
vigorously disputed.

2
 No. 2015AP175.awb

¶40 If the question we are answering is based on

possession at the time of filing, then Deutsche Bank must surely

lose. Not only did Deutsche Bank fail to provide admissible

evidence of its possession of the Note at the time of trial, it

also certainly failed to present any information whatsoever to

indicate that it possessed the Note at the time this action was

filed. In other words, it failed to establish that it had

standing to maintain the action in the first instance.2 On this

additional basis alone, Deutsche Bank may have failed to

demonstrate its entitlement to enforce the Note.

¶41 Ultimately, the majority determines that "presentment

to the trier of fact in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding of the

original, wet-ink note endorsed in blank, establishes the

holder's possession and entitles the holder to enforce the

note." Id. In its view, Wis. Stat. § 403.3013 is satisfied

2
Courts around the country have concluded that a party
attempting to enforce a note must have possessed the note not
only at the time of trial, but also at the time of filing in
order to establish standing. See, e.g., Country Place Community
Ass'n, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Mortg. Acquisition Corp., 51 So.
3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Deutsche Bank Nat'l.
Tr. Co. v. Haller, 100 A.D.3d 680, 682 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012);
U.S. Bank, Nat'l. Ass'n v. Moore, 278 P.3d 596, ¶13 (Okla.
2012).
3
Wisconsin Stat. § 403.301 provides:

"Person entitled to enforce" an instrument means the
holder of the instrument, a nonholder in possession of
the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a
person not in possession of the instrument who is
entitled to enforce the instrument under s.
403.309 or 403.418(4). A person may be a person
entitled to enforce the instrument even though the
(continued)
3
 No. 2015AP175.awb

because "Deutsche Bank's counsel physically possessed the

original Note on his client's behalf at trial . . . ." Id.,

¶24.

II

¶42 In order to maintain a foreclosure action, Deutsche

Bank must demonstrate its entitlement to enforce the Note and

Mortgage. The Note in this case is endorsed in blank and is

therefore enforceable by the bearer. See Wis. Stat.

§ 403.205(2). Accordingly, Deutsche Bank must prove, by

admissible evidence, that it is the bearer of the Note.

¶43 Neither the majority's approach nor its conclusion is

framed by the rules of evidence. Relying on Wis. Stat.

§ 403.301 only, the majority sidesteps normal and accepted

evidentiary procedure.

¶44 Possession, like any other evidentiary fact, is

typically presented through the sworn testimony of a witness

with knowledge of such possession. See Wis. Stat. §§ 909.01,

909.015(1). This remains as true in the foreclosure context as
it is in all others.

¶45 Despite this well known and established procedure, the

Note here was merely presented to the court by Deutsche Bank's

counsel. The transcript reveals the following exchange between

Deutsche Bank's counsel, Mr. Karnes, and Wuensch's counsel, Mr.

Peterson:

person is not the owner of the instrument or is in
wrongful possession of the instrument.

4
 No. 2015AP175.awb

MR. KARNES: Your Honor, I’m handing Mr. Peterson a
copy of the original [N]ote. I also have the original
here today. I’m going to allow him to inspect the
original document and compare it to the copy.

MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, I have inspected two
different documents. One appears to be a copy of
another document. Whether this is an original [N]ote,
I have no idea nor could I conclude that, I’m not a
witness.
¶46 The circuit court examined the documents and stated,

"When I looked at the document purporting to be an original,

looks like original ink on signatures and appears to be the same

as what has now been marked as a copy Exhibit 1 . . . ." It

subsequently found:

The Plaintiff is the holder of the original Note,
endorsed in blank. The Court is satisfied that the
Plaintiff has in its possession the original ink Note.
The Plaintiff produced the original ink Note at trial
and the Court examined it. The Court is satisfied
that it is the original Note executed by Wuensch on
December 18, 2006. Exhibit 1 is a true and accurate
copy of the original ink Note.
¶47 In comparing the circuit court's subsequent findings

of fact to the actual exchange in court4 underlying the circuit

court's findings, a critical inaccuracy in the findings of fact

is illuminated. As cited above, Deutsche Bank's counsel, and

not any employee of Deutsche Bank, presented the purported Note

to the court ("I also have the original here today. I’m going

to allow him to inspect the original document and compare it to

4
I use the term "exchange in court" here rather than
"testimony" because counsel for Deutsche Bank was not testifying
as a witness when introducing the Note, and the circuit court's
finding that Deutsche Bank possessed the Note was not based on
any actual testimony.

5
 No. 2015AP175.awb

the copy.") (emphasis added). The attorney did not actually

address Deutsche Bank's possession of the Note.

¶48 Nevertheless, the majority accepts Deutsche Bank's

invitation to simply infer that because Deutsche Bank's counsel

had the Note in his possession, he must have received it from

Deutsche Bank. Yet no witness testified to this and no evidence

was presented at trial that would support this inference.5

¶49 The circuit court took no sworn testimony on the issue

of possession. The Note was put before the circuit court only

through the unsworn remarks of Deutsche Bank's attorney. This

is problematic for several reasons. First, remarks of counsel

are not evidence. Kenwood Equip., Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 48

Wis. 2d 472, 481, 180 N.W.2d 750 (1970); Wis JI——Civil 50, at 5,

110 (2017). Indeed, Deutsche Bank's attorney could not have

acted as a witness without potentially violating his

professional ethical obligations. See SCR 20:3.7(a).6

5
There was likewise no statement made regarding where
counsel obtained the Note. I agree with the majority that such
testimony is unnecessary: "[b]ecause of the nature of a note
endorsed in blank, precisely how Deutsche Bank came into
physical possession of the Note is not relevant." Majority op.,
¶8. Thus, testimony on the topic of possession need not be
extensive. A hypothetical witness need only provide testimony
that the original note is in Deutsche Bank's possession, not
testimony regarding how Deutsche Bank came to possess it.
6
SCR 20:3.7(a) provides:

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in
which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness
unless:

(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested
issue;

(continued)
6
 No. 2015AP175.awb

¶50 Second, the attorney's statements were unsworn. It is

well understood that "[b]efore testifying, every witness shall

be required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully,

by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to

awaken the witness's conscience and impress the witness's mind

with the witness's duty to do so." Wis. Stat. § 906.03.

Unsworn statements are "not evidence" and have "no proper place

in [a] trial." Nelson v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 797, 812, 151

N.W.2d 694 (1967).

¶51 Finally, Deutsche Bank's attorney gave no indication

he had personal knowledge of Deutsche Bank's possession of the

Note. "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is

introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has

personal knowledge of the matter." Wis. Stat. § 906.02. When

proffering the Note to the circuit court, counsel did not use

the word "possession" and did not make any statement akin to a

claim that Deutsche Bank possessed the Note. In sum, no

evidence was presented that Deutsche Bank possessed the Note.
¶52 The majority attempts to escape the conclusion that

the circuit court erred with the assertion that "[a]n attorney

presenting self-authenticating evidence to the trier of fact on

(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value
of legal services rendered in the case; or

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work
substantial hardship on the client.

Sub. (1) does not apply here because the issue of
possession was contested, and neither sub. (2) nor (3) applies
on its face.

7
 No. 2015AP175.awb

behalf of his client is not acting in the same capacity as a

witness delivering testimonial evidence." Majority op., ¶30.

Then in what capacity was he acting? He was attempting to

introduce evidence. If he was acting as counsel, then his

remarks are not evidence. See Kenwood Equip., 48 Wis. 2d at

481. If he was acting as a witness, then he impermissibly

provided unsworn testimony. See Wis. Stat. § 906.03.

¶53 The comments to SCR 20:3.7 emphasize the distinction

between testimony and advocacy: "A witness is required to

testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is

expected to explain and comment on the evidence given by

others." Here, the attorney attempted to straddle this line,

but ultimately was unsuccessful on both fronts. He did not

testify to any personal knowledge of possession, and there was

no evidence offered on the topic about which he could comment.

¶54 By accepting Deutsche Bank's attorney's presentation

of the Note, the circuit court created in essence an

unrebuttable presumption that Deutsche Bank possessed it. After
the circuit court accepted the Note as the original and in the

possession of Deutsche Bank, what was the homeowner to do? He

could not cross examine the attorney, who was not under oath and

not called as a witness.

¶55 Based on the actual evidence presented, I conclude

that the circuit court's finding of fact that Deutsche Bank

possessed the Note was clearly erroneous. There was no evidence

to that effect presented and therefore Deutsche Bank failed to
prove it possessed the Note.

8
 No. 2015AP175.awb

III

¶56 The court of appeals recognized that its "mandate

reversing the judgment of foreclosure in this action may appear

at first blush to elevate form over substance and to produce a

highly inefficient result." Deutsche Bank Nat'l. Tr. Co. v.

Wuensch, No. 2015AP175, unpublished order at 8 (Wis. Ct. App.

Aug. 23, 2016). Contrarily, the majority opinion is certainly

efficient.

¶57 Although efficiencies are admittedly important,

adherence to the evidentiary rules should drive foreclosure

proceedings. Courts should ensure that a lender has everything

in order before issuing a foreclosure judgment. The rules exist

to ensure that "proceedings [are] justly determined." Wis.

Stat. § 901.02. The corner cutting endorsed by the majority

eschews the evidentiary rules and subverts that goal.

¶58 For the reasons set forth, I respectfully dissent.

¶59 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S.

ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.

9
 No. 2015AP175.awb

1