THIRD DIVISION
ELLINGTON, P. J.,
BETHEL, J., and SENIOR APPELLATE JUDGE PHIPPS
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules
April 19, 2018
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A18A0227. BURNS v. THE STATE.
PER CURIAM.
This appeal arose from a granted application for interlocutory review wherein
James Phillips Burns challenged the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion in limine
to exclude evidence that the alleged victim had previously made a false accusation
of sexual abuse against another individual. Because we conclude that the trial court
erred, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion in limine and remand the
case.
The record shows that in December 2015, Burns’s wife discovered that her
daughter, Burns’s stepdaughter, had sent a friend a one-paragraph Twitter message
about a sexual incident that she had with Burns the previous July. Toward the end of
the paragraph, the victim stated, “And my brother’s best friend tried to rape me.”
Burns’s wife contacted law enforcement, and an investigation ensued. When asked
about the time her brother’s best friend tried to rape her during a forensic interview,
the stepdaughter replied, “Oh, I just made that up.” She explained that she did not
know why she said it and suspected that she was high on marijuana at the time. When
the police interviewed Burns’s wife, she also stated that her daughter told her she just
made up the story. Burns was charged with committing aggravated sexual battery,
aggravated sodomy, and incest upon his stepdaughter.
The State filed a motion in limine, based on the rape shield statute. During the
hearing on the motion, defense counsel agreed that evidence of the victim’s past
sexual behavior was inadmissible but indicated that he intended to introduce evidence
that the stepdaughter had admittedly falsely accused another person of sexual
misconduct. Citing Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135 (377 SE2d 158) (1989), defense
counsel argued that such evidence did not implicate the rape shield statute and was
admissible as pertaining to the stepdaughter’s credibility and to Burns’s right to
confront her as a witness called against him.
After the hearing, the trial court concluded that the prior accusation is
inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403. Specifically, the court ruled,
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As a statement made and disavowed, it is a false statement. The Court
must, however, further evaluate the statement under the appropriate
rules of evidence. The statement the defendant seeks to admit amounts
to an aside in [a] much longer paragraph and was immediately
disavowed by the victim upon questioning. The statement sought to be
introduced lacked specificity does not have significant probative value
for a fact finder otherwise charged with determining whether the claims
of the victim against the defendant are true. [ ] Thus, the Court finds that
the probative value of the statement in question is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues
and is inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403.
Burns filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which we granted, and this appeal
followed. Burns challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the prior false allegation
is inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403, insisting that its probative value is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues.
He also contends that the allegation is admissible under OCGA § 24-6-608.
1. At the outset, we point out that the parties correctly concluded that evidence
of the admittedly false accusation is not barred by the rape shield statute. That Code
section pertinently provides that, in prosecutions for certain sexual offenses,
“evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness shall not
be admissible, either as direct evidence or on cross-examination of the complaining
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witness or other witnesses.” OCGA § 24-4-412 (a) (emphasis supplied). In Smith v
State, 259 Ga. 135, our Supreme Court concluded that the rape shield did not bar
evidence of the victim’s alleged false allegations of sexual misconduct by persons
other than the defendant, finding persuasive the reasoning of other jurisdictions that
“[such] evidence does not involve the victim’s past sexual conduct but rather the
victim’s propensity to make false statements regarding sexual misconduct.” Id. at
136-137 (1).1 The Court went on to instruct, however, that “before such evidence can
be admitted, the trial court must make a threshold determination outside the presence
of the jury that a reasonable probability of falsity exists.” Id. at 137-138 (1) (citation
and punctuation omitted). See also Morgan v. State, 337 Ga. App. 29, 31 (1) (785
SE2d 667) (2016). The language set forth in the order2 in this case shows that the trial
court made the required threshold determination. Accordingly, the contested evidence
is not barred by the rape shield statute.
1
Although Smith was decided under the old Evidence Code, cases such as Morgan
v. State, 337 Ga. App. 29, 31 (1) (785 SE2d 667) (2016), indicate that Smith’s holding
remains intact under Georgia’s new Evidence Code. See Morgan, 337 Ga. App. at 31 (1),
quoting Smith, 259 Ga. 135.
2
In its order, the trial court stated, “As a statement made and disavowed, it is a false
statement.” Also, at the hearing, the trial judge remarked, “[U]nder the Smith test, there’s
no dispute, the State doesn’t dispute that it’s a false statement.”
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2. Burns asserts as error the trial court’s conclusion that the “probative value
of the statement in question [was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and confusion of the issues and is inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403.”
That Code provision does allow for the exclusion of relevant evidence when the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the concerns
referenced by the trial court. Our Supreme Court has explained, however, that OCGA
§ 24-4-403 should be used “only sparingly” because it permits the exclusion of
concededly relevant evidence. Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 70 (2) (786 SE2d 633)
(2016). Furthermore, under the principles recognized in Smith, this exclusionary rule
must yield to greater constitutional concerns. There, our Supreme Court considered
the State’s argument that even if the rape shield statute did not prohibit testimony that
the victim had falsely accused other men of sexual misconduct, such evidence was
barred by other evidentiary rules (relating to the manner in which a victim’s character
and general reputation for veracity could be attacked). Smith, 259 Ga. at 137 (1). The
Smith Court rejected that argument on constitutional grounds, noting that a majority
of the jurisdictions had determined that the evidentiary rules (preventing evidence of
a specific act of untruthfulness) “must yield to the defendant’s right of confrontation
and right to present a full defense.” Id.
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Burns maintains that because there is no forensic or DNA evidence in this case,
his defense will rest largely on the degree to which the factfinder determines that the
stepdaughter lacks credibility. It is well settled that the right of confrontation includes
allowing the cross-examiner “to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness” called against
him. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316-318 (94 SCt 1105, 39 LEd2d 347) (1974)
(defense counsel should be permitted “to expose to the jury the facts from which the
jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences
relating to the reliability of the witness”). Here, the trial court excluded evidence of
the stepdaughter’s false accusation because it concluded that the evidence “lacked
specificity” and created “unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues.” It is not clear,
however, how a false accusation could contain adequate specificity about an incident
that never occurred. And it does not seem that evidence of an allegation against a
totally unrelated third party presents “danger of unfair prejudice [or] confusion of the
issues” in this prosecution against one defendant, for sexual acts committed on one
day, against one individual. See Smith, 259 Ga. at 137 (1) (noting that evidence of the
victim’s prior false allegations about sexual misconduct of men other than the
defendant involved “the victim’s propensity to make false statements regarding
sexual misconduct”); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U. S. 227, 232 (109 SCt 480,
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102 LE2d 513) (1988) (explaining that speculation that jurors would be biased by
evidence of witness’s interracial relationship did not justify exclusion of evidence
having the potential to demonstrate falsity of witness’s testimony). Given these
circumstances, exclusion of the contested evidence at this preliminary stage was
erroneous.
3. Next, Burns asserts that the prior false allegation is also admissible under
OCGA § 24-6-608 (b), which provides that
[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness’s character for truthfulness, other
than a conviction of a crime as provided in Code Section 24-6-609, or
conduct indicative of the witness’s bias toward a party may not be
proved by extrinsic evidence. Such instances may however, in the
discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness: (1) Concerning the
witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness[.]
Burns’s assertion aligns with the constitutional concerns discussed above, as set forth
in Smith, 259 Ga. at 137 (1).
In sum, the contested evidence should not have been barred either by the rape
shield statute or by OCGA § 24-4-403, and the erroneous exclusion of such evidence
has been ruled reversible – even where other evidence of the victim’s reliability (or
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lack thereof) was presented to the jury. See, e.g., Smith, supra at 137-138 (1) (sexual
offense convictions reversed because prior false allegation should have been admitted
even though other evidence of victim’s untruthfulness was admitted). See also Benton
v. State, 265 Ga. 648, 650 (5) (461 SE2d 202) (1995) (reversing defendant’s
convictions of incest and other felonies committed upon 16-year-old stepdaughter,
where convictions were supported largely by the victim’s testimony, yet evidence –
that the victim had alleged sexual misconduct against another man, then recanted that
allegation – was erroneously excluded). Accordingly, the grant of the State’s motion
in limine is reversed, and this case is remanded.
Judgment reversed and case remanded. Division Per Curiam. All Judges
concur.
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