LaFogg Subdivision final Plat

MAR ‘ 9 2012 STATE ()F VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT - ENVIRONMENTAL DIVISION VERMONT SUPEREOR COUHT { ENV|HONMENTAL DlVlSlON 'In Re LaFogg Subdivision { Docket No. 103-7-11 Vtec Final Plat Approval { Decision on CroSs-Motions for Sumrnarv ludgment David Christie (”Appellant”) appeals the Town of l-lalifa)< Planning Commission's (”the Commission”) approval of joan and Peter LaFogg’s (”Applicants”) permit to create a new parcel on their property in the Town of Halifa><, Vermont. Currently pending before this Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment concerning whether Applicants’ application for a permit to create a new parcel should be approved In this proceeding, Appellant is represented by Robin Stern, Esq. Applicants are represented by Christopher D. Roy, Esq. The Town of Halifa)< filed an appearance in this matter but did not participate in the motions. Factual Backgi_:ound For the sole purpose of putting the pending motions into context, the Court recites the following facts, Which it understands to be undisputed unless otherwise noted: l. Applicants own a 60.18i acre parcel of property in the Town of Halifax, Vermont (”the Town”). Appellant owns land abutting Applicants’ property. 2. The current version of the Town of Halifax Zoning Regulations (”the Regulations”) was adopted on l\/larch 6, 2007. Pursuant to the Regulations, Applicants’ property is located in the Conservation District. ` 3. A Single-family residence, constructed in approximately 2002, currently exists on Applicants' property. The residence was constructed prior to the adoption of the current Regulations. 4. Applicants’ property has 50 feet of road frontage on Old County Road, a public town road. 5. Applicants Seel< to create a new parcel on their property so that the property will consist of two Separate parcels. Lot l will consist of 32.54i acres and will include the 50 feet of road frontage currently existing on Old County Road. Lot 2 will be a ”bacl< lot” consisting of 27.63i acres and served by a 50-foot right-of~way. 6. On April 10, 2011, Applicants submitted an application to the Commission seeking a permit to divide their property and create a new parcel. The Commission approved the application on ]une 22, 2011. ’7. Appellant thereafter filed a timely appeal of the Commission's decision with this Court. Discussion ln his motion for summary judgment, Appellant asks the Court to deny Applicants' request for approval to divide their property into two parcels. ln support of his motion, Appellant argues that (1) ”[t]he proposed subdivision violates both local and state law”; (2) the proposed property division will increase the nonconformity of Applicants' property; (3) the proposed property division will result in merger of the parcels, thereby resulting in one nonconforming lot; and (4) the applicable provisions of the Regulations conflict with the applicable provisions of 24 V.S.A., Chapter 117.1 ln their cross~motion, Applicants contend that the Court should approve their application to divide their property into two parcels. ln support of their motion, Applicants argue that the Regulations permit division of their property, and, if their property is divided into two lots, Lot l will remain a permissible preexisting nonconforming lot under the Regulations and Lot 2 will be a conforming lot under both the Regulations and 24 V.S.A., Chapter 117. For the reasons detailed below, we conclude as a matter of law that (l) although the property is nonconforming, it can be divided into two lots pursuant to both the Regulations and 24 V.S.A., Chapter 117; (2) the proposed division of Applicants’ property will not increase the property's nonconformity because Lot l will be a permissible preexisting nonconforming lot and Lot 2 will be a conforming lot under the Regulations and 24 V.S.A., Chapter 117,' (3) the Regulations contain sufficient standards regulating the process of property division; (4) the proposed lots Will not merge,' and (5) the applicable provisions of the Regulations do not conflict with the applicable provisions of 24 V.S.A., Chapter ll7. 1 Appellant also argues as part of his motion for summary judgment that the proposed property division will defeat the purpose of the frontage requirements as well as the purpose of the Conservation District. Appellant did not raise this issue in his Statement of Questions, however, and we therefore decline to consider it. See V.R.E.C.P. 5(f) (”The appellant may not raise any question on the appeal not presented in the [statement of questions].”). I. Summarv judgment Standard A court may grant summary judgment where ”the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." V.R.C.P. 56(c)(3) (2011) (amended jan. 23, 2012).2 ln considering the parties’ cross- motions for summary judgment, we give each party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences City of Burlington v. Fairpoint Commc’ns, 2009 VT 59, jj 5, 186 Vt. 332 (citing Toysl lnc. v. F.l\/l. Burlington Co., 155 Vt. 44, 48 (1990)). We ”accept as true the jfactualj allegations made in opposition to jeach] motion for summary judgment, so long as they are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material." Robertson v. l\/lVlan Labs., lnc., 2004 VT 15, jj 15, 176 Vt. 356. II. Legalitv of PropertV Division Under State and Municipal Law l ln his motion for summary judgment, Appellant contends that the division of Applicants' property as proposed ”violates both local and state law." (Appellant's l\/lotion for Summary judgment 4, filed l\lov. 21, 2011). Specifically, Appellant argues that division of the subject property will increase the property's preexisting nonconformity under the Regulations and will create a new nonconforming lot without the road frontage required by the Regulations and 24 v.s.A., chapter 117. Applicants argue in their cross-motion that, if their property is divided, the proposed Lot 1 will remain a preexisting nonconforming lot and the proposed Lot 2 will be a conforming lot under the Regulations and 24 V.S.A., Chapter 117. We interpret a Zoning ordinance using the familiar rules of statutory construction l_nie Im__h_ag, 2008 VT 90, jj 19, 184 Vt. 262. We will ”construe words according to their plain and ordinary meaning, giving effect to the whole and every part of the ordinance.” l_d. lf the plain language resolves the conflict, ”there is no need to go further, always bearing in mind that the paramount function of the court is to give effect to the legislative intent.” Lubinsl