MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 01 2018, 9:07 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher Sturgeon Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Clark County Public Defender’s Office Attorney General
Jeffersonville, Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Elliot Edward Shelton, May 1, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
10A05-1709-CR-2084
v. Appeal from the Clark Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Bradley B. Jacobs,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
10C02-1502-F6-154
10C02-1505-F4-037
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Elliot Edward Shelton brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial
court’s denial of his motion for discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C). Finding
no error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In February 2015, the State charged Shelton with multiple drug-related
offenses, and a warrant was issued for his arrest under cause number 10C02-
1502-F6-154 (“Case 154”). He still had not been arrested when, on May 16,
2015, he was pulled over while driving. He was arrested on the outstanding
warrant in Case 154. Then on May 21, the State filed additional gun- and drug-
related charges against Shelton stemming from the traffic stop under cause
number 10C02-1505-F4-37 (“Case 37”).1 Shelton was later released on bond.
[3] Both cases were initially set for trial on October 20, 2015, but were moved to
January 5, 2016, at Shelton’s request. In December 2015, the State failed to
appear at a pretrial conference, so the trial court canceled the January 5 trials.
The court reset the pretrial conference for January 20, 2016. Beginning on
January 20, Shelton sought and was granted a series of continuances that
delayed the case for eight months to September 22. Each entry that granted
1
In its brief, the State incorrectly says that Shelton was arrested and charged on March 16 and March 21,
respectively. Appellee’s Br. p. 12. The State then uses these dates to calculate the Rule 4(C) timeline,
resulting in an incorrect calculation of the one-year periods.
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Shelton a continuance stated that the delay was charged to the defendant, and
Shelton or his attorney personally signed each form. Appellant’s App. Vol. II
pp. 164, 171-73. On September 22, Shelton failed to appear at a pretrial
conference, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Shelton was arrested five
months later in February 2017. A pretrial conference was held on February 27,
and the court then set Shelton’s trials for July 18, 2017, without objection.2
[4] On May 26, 2017, Shelton was appointed a new attorney, who immediately
objected to the trial date in Case 154. Four days later, Shelton’s attorney
moved for discharge under Rule 4(C) in Case 37. With some exceptions, Rule
4(C) guarantees a defendant the right to stand trial within one year of arrest or
the date charges are filed, whichever is later. A hearing on the motion was held
on July 5, and Shelton’s attorney asked the court to “incorporate[] the same
type of arguments” for his objection in Case 154. Tr. Vol. II p. 5. Shelton’s
attorney argued that the State was beyond the one-year deadline set by Rule
4(C) but that he had not been able to object or move for discharge because the
State had failed to request and the court did not set trial dates after the January
2016 trials were canceled. The trial court calculated the one-year periods and
concluded that they had ended on July 4.3 The court, however, stated that due
2
Case 37 was originally reset for trial on June 6, 2017, but on June 2 it was moved to July 18 due to court
congestion. Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 119-20. Case 154 was originally reset for trial on July 11, 2017, but
on July 6 it was moved to October 31 due to court congestion. Id. at 9-10.
3
The trial court incorrectly calculated the Rule 4(C) deadline. The court began the one-year period for both
cases on May 27, 2015, when the initial hearing in each case was held. The period started on May 16, 2015
(the date of arrest) in Case 154 and on May 21, 2015 (the date charges were filed) in Case 37. See Ind. Crim.
Rule 4(C) (“No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in
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to court congestion it would not have been possible to try Shelton before July
18. Id. at 19-20. The court then certified its order for interlocutory appeal.
[5] This interlocutory appeal now ensues.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Shelton argues that he should not be charged with the eight-month delay from
January 2016 to September 2016. He also contends that he was unable to raise
an objection or move for discharge under Rule 4(C) during these eight months.
[7] Rule 4(C) provides:
No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer
a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than
one year from the date the criminal charge against such
defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge,
whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his
motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was
not sufficient time to try him during such period because of
congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the
last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a
timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this
rule. Provided further, that a trial court may take note of
congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion,
and upon so finding may order a continuance. Any continuance
granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be
aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed,
or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later[.]”) (emphases added). The court also erred
when it counted Shelton’s request for a continuance of the October 20, 2015 trials against the State. See Tr.
Vol. II p. 19; Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 41, 155. All other calculations by the court were correct, and we
thank the court for its detailed explanation of its calculations, which aided in our review.
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reduced to an order, which order shall also set the case for trial
within a reasonable time. Any defendant so held shall, on
motion, be discharged.
“The State’s duty to try the defendant within one year is affirmative, and the
defendant is under no obligation to remind the State of its duty.” State v. Delph,
875 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. But the one-year period
may be extended for various reasons, including “if a delay is caused by the
defendant’s own motion or action[.]” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1066
(Ind. 2014).
[8] Shelton contends that the delay from January 2016 to September 2016 should
be charged to the State because he was negotiating a plea agreement with the
State during this time. He acknowledges that he requested each continuance
that resulted in the eight-month delay, Appellant’s Br. p. 10, but argues that his
situation is similar to the defendant in State v. Smith, 495 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986), reh’g denied. In Smith, the State argued that the one-year period was
tolled because it was engaged in plea negotiations with Smith. The trial court
discharged Smith. We upheld the order because Smith did not abandon his
right to be tried within one year because he engaged in plea negotiations and
because Smith did not request a continuance and his actions did not delay the
State in bringing him to trial within the one-year period. Here, Shelton is
correct that engaging in plea negotiations does not relieve the State of its duty to
bring him to trial within one year. However, unlike Smith, it is undisputed that
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Shelton requested each continuance that resulted in the eight-month delay,
thereby extending the time the State had to bring him to trial.
[9] Nevertheless, Shelton contends that the eight-month delay cannot be charged to
him because it did not cause a delay in the trials since no trial dates were ever
set during this time. This argument ignores the fact that, when the
continuances were granted, Shelton personally signed the entry form which
attributed the delay to him. His argument also runs afoul of our Supreme
Court’s holding in Cook: “[W]hen a defendant takes action which delays the
proceeding, that time is chargeable to the defendant and extends the one-year
time limit, regardless of whether a trial date has been set at the time or not.”
810 N.E.2d at 1066-67. Accordingly, the eight-month delay from January 2016
to September 2016 is charged to Shelton, not the State. Shelton was not
entitled to discharge under Rule 4(C).
[10] To assist the court with scheduling each case for trial, we calculate the time
remaining under Rule 4(C). In Case 154, the period began on May 16, 2015,
and ran until October 20, 2015—158 days. The period resumed on January 6,
2016, and ran until January 20, 2016—15 days. The period did not start again
until February 27, 2017, and ended on July 11, 2017—135 days. In total, 308
days have elapsed in Case 154, leaving the State with 57 days in the one-year
period. As for Case 37, the State’s time began on May 21, 2015, and ran until
October 20, 2015—153 days. The period ran again from January 6, 2016, to
January 20, 2016—15 days. The period resumed on February 27, 2017, and
stopped on June 6, 2017—100 days. In total, 268 days have elapsed in Case 37,
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leaving the State with 97 days in the one-year period. All other time periods in
both cases are charged either to Shelton or the court.
[11] Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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