Singh v. Sessions

16-3984 Singh v. Sessions BIA A089 714 653 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 4th day of May, two thousand eighteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 JON O. NEWMAN, 8 RICHARD C. WESLEY, 9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 HARMESH SINGH, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 16-3984 17 NAC 18 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, 19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Fremont, CA. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 26 Attorney General; Brianne Whelan 27 Cohen, Senior Litigation Counsel; 28 Lindsay Corliss, Trial Attorney, 29 Office of Immigration Litigation, 30 United States Department of 31 Justice, Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 4 is DENIED. 5 Petitioner Harmesh Singh, a native and citizen of India, 6 seeks review of a November 18, 2016, decision of the BIA 7 denying his second motion to reopen. In re Harmesh Singh, 8 No. A089 714 653 (B.I.A. Nov. 18, 2016). We assume the 9 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural 10 history in this case. 11 The applicable standards of review are well established. 12 See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 13 2008). In his motion to reopen, Singh asserted that police 14 had raided his home in India and arrested and beat his father. 15 He argued that these events demonstrated a change in 16 conditions excusing the untimely and number barred filing of 17 his motion and established his prima facie eligibility for 18 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the 19 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 20 It is undisputed that Singh’s 2016 second motion to 21 reopen was number barred and untimely filed two years after 2 1 his 2014 removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), 2 (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, these time and 3 number limitations do not apply if reopening is sought to 4 apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed 5 country conditions arising in the country of nationality or 6 the country to which removal has been ordered, if such 7 evidence is material and was not available and would not 8 have been discovered or presented at the previous 9 proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 10 § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not err in finding that 11 Singh failed to demonstrate such conditions. 12 In support of his assertion that police raided his 13 house and arrested and beat his father, Singh submitted 14 only his own affidavit. The BIA was not required to credit 15 that affidavit because Singh had no firsthand knowledge of 16 the events described therein, and he did not submit any 17 evidence to corroborate his assertions. See Xiao Ji Chen 18 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) 19 (holding that weight afforded to evidence in immigration 20 proceedings lies largely within agency discretion). 21 Moreover, the BIA was not required to credit Singh’s 3 1 affidavit in light of the underlying adverse credibility 2 determination. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 3 143, 146-49 (2d Cir. 2007). 4 The BIA also reasonably concluded that country 5 conditions evidence of police abuses in India would not 6 change the outcome of Singh’s proceedings because Singh has 7 never rebutted the agency’s determination that he was not 8 credible regarding his claim that police had targeted him 9 on account of his political opinion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 10 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding no abuse of 11 discretion in the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen when 12 “evidence submitted by petitioner in support of her motion 13 was not ‘material’ because it did not rebut the adverse 14 credibility finding that provided the basis for the IJ’s 15 denial of petitioner’s underlying asylum application”). 16 Accordingly, because the BIA reasonably found that Singh 17 did not demonstrate a material change in conditions in 18 India, it did not abuse its discretion in denying his 19 motion to reopen as untimely and number barred. See 20 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). 21 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 4 1 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of 2 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition 3 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in 4 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request 5 for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance 6 with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and 7 Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). 8 FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 5